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This article traces the historical origins of the concept of piracy in its an-
cient Greek and Latin notions in order to provide a context for its modern
application in intrnational law. The variety of historical contexts from
which the term "piracy" has arisen have given rise to the numerous modern
definitions and consequences under international law. Professor Rubin
traces the spectrum of piracy in its legal implications, from its origins as a
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This article explores the legal dilemmas faced by both the U.S. and Indian
court systems in the aftermath of the Bhopal accident. The primary focus
of the article is on two areas: the dismissal of the victims' suit on forum non
conveniens grounds in the Southern District of New York, which was af-
firmed by the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals; and the alterna-
tive means of resolution of the dispute outside the adjudicative process.
The proceedings of both cases in the Indian and U.S. court systems are
discussed, with special emphasis placed upon the forum non conveniens
analysis employed by the U.S. Federal District Court. In conclusion, Pro-
fessor Nanda proposes the use of some form of alternative dispute resolu-
tion to settle the court claims, and as a means of avoiding the further injury
to the plaintiffs as a result of protracted court proceedings.
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THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION" REVISITED:
EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. - A CHOICE
BETWEEN FRIENDLY COOPERATION AMONG ALLIES AND
SOUND LAW AND POLICY ................ M. Cherif Bassiouni 255
In this Critical Essay, Professor Bassiouni attempts to develop a "bridge"
between the legal arguments of Professor Blakesley and the policy argu-
ments of Judge Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the Department of State. The es-
says by Professor Blakesley and Judge Sofaer appeared in 15:1 of the Den-
ver Journal of International Law & Policy. Professor Bassiouni examines
the radical departures from traditional U.S. extradition law and policy
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ARTICLES
The Law of Piracy
ALFRED P. RUBIN*
"Pirate ... Middle English from Latin pirata, from Greek peirates, 'at-
tacker,' from peiran, to attempt, attack, from peira, an attempt . . .
From Indo-European root per-."
"per- . . . To try, risk;" from which come the modern English words: fear,
peril, experience, expert, empire, and pirate.
American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (W. Morris, ed.)
(1969), 998, 1534.
I. THE ORIGINS
A. Introduction
The word "piracy" is used in modern English in many different ways,
from a half-admiring description of the shrewd practices of an assertive
businessman cutting the corners of morality but strictly within the law, to
a highly technical legal word of art related to some crimes for which peo-
ple have been hanged. In between lie uses that relate to unrecognized
rebels, naval vessels acting beyond their authority, naval vessels acting
within their national commissions to interfere with peaceful commerce in
ways the international legal order will not tolerate, and many other
shades of meaning. The most cursory examination of learned literature,
treaty articles and national statutes shows at least six different meanings:
(1) A vernacular usage with no direct legal implications; (2) An interna-
tional law meaning related to unrecognized states or recognized states
whose governments are not considered to be empowered at international
law to authorize the sorts of public activity that is questioned, like the
Barbary States of about 1600-1830, the Malay Sultanates of about 1800-
1880, and the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands of about 1820-1830; (3)
An international law meaning related to unrecognized belligerency, like
* Alfred P. Rubin is Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy, Tufts University. This article is a partial product of his work as Charles H. Stockton
Professor of International Law at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1981-1982. In a
slightly expanded version it forms the first chapter of a book on the law of piracy now in the
publication process at the Naval War College.
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Confederate States commerce raiders and privateers during the American
Civil War of 1861-65 in the eyes of the Federal Government of the United
States; (4) An international law meaning related to the private acts of
foreigners against other foreigners in circumstances making criminal ju-
risdiction by a third state acceptable to the international community de-
spite the absence of the usual territorial or nationality links that are nor-
mally required to justify the extension abroad of national criminal
jurisdiction; (5) Various special international law meanings derived from
particular treaty negotiations; and (6) Various municipal (i.e., national,
domestic) law meanings defined by the statutes and practices of individ-
ual states. It is possible to elaborate this list to take account of ambiguous
or inconsistent state practice and diplomatic correspondence, special
technical interpretations within the learned international legal writings
and different states' positions as to particular incidents, and other tradi-
tional modes of legal analysis.
All of these uses of the word "piracy" have been argued from time to
time to rest on classical writings and precedents. In the days leading up
to the Westphalian settlement of Europe in 1648, citations to Greek and
Latin sources were a major element of legal argumentation. Those renais-
sance legal arguments and the municipal law of the European sea powers,
particularly England, purported to rest on Roman law and usage. Thus,
to understand fully the modern meanings of the term "piracy" it is neces-
sary first to examine the Greek and Latin writings and Roman usages.
Time changes the meaning of words, and it is an error in scholarship
to attribute to ancient or even not very ancient authors the full range of
implication that a word carries in current usage. An amusing example ap-
pears in the 14th century Middle English poem, Sir Gawain and the
Green Knight where the Green Knight, entering King Arthur's great din-
ing hall, asks, "Where is . . . the governour of this gyng?" and it can be
shown by analyzing the uses of the word "governour" and "gyng"
("gang") in other medieval works that the modern cockney connotation of
jocular contempt that might be implied from the context of the Green
Knight's speech is simply not there.'
When, in 1811, Sir T.S. Raffles, the British Lieutenant Governor of
Java, wrote to Lord Minto, the Governor-General of India, that "It is un-
fortunately the practice in some of the Malay States rather to encourage
the young nobles of high rank, especially those of the Rajah's own extrac-
tion, whose maintenance would fall otherwise upon the Rajah himself, to
subsist themselves by piratical practices"2 he was using the word in a
non-legal sense insofar as the attitudes of the Malays was being ex-
plained. At the same time, from its European legal implications he con-
1. A.C. SPEARING, CRITICISM AND MEDIEVAL POETRY 7 (2d ed. 1972).
2. S. RAFFLES, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SIR THOMAS STAMFORD
RAFFLES 45-46 (1830), printing what appears to be a selection of the original letters of her
husband.
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cluded that suppressive activities by the British Navy might be justifiable
as a matter of international law. He seems to have been conscious of the
two meanings of the word when he advised that the British in the first
instance, rather than bearing the burden themselves of sweeping the "pi-
rates" from the seas, should "oblige every Rajah to refuse to every
description of pirates . . . any sort of assistance or protection in his own
territories."3 This suggestion, with much legal difficulty, became trans-
lated into British policy and assertions of international law over a period
of sixty or seventy years.
In the light of this and similar persistent confusions, before embark-
ing on an analysis of the precise meaning of the word "piracy" as used in
ancient texts it might be useful to set forth a few of the many instances in
which the word or its derivatives has been used by translators to reflect
their own ideas as to when it is appropriate to use it despite the fact that
the word does not appear in any form in the text being translated. Since
so much nineteenth and twentieth century writing about "piracy" cites
ancient usages that in fact exist only in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
tury purported translations, but not in the ancient texts, it might be pos-
sible to clear away some common misconceptions of our own time, when
some citations to earlier scholars, which in turn rest on still earlier schol-
arly citations, which in turn appear to rest on non-legal translations of
words that have no connection with the ancient conception of "piracy,"
seem to have become conventional wisdom; i.e., seem to be accepted as
correctly reflecting the ancient concepts merely because so often repeated
in scholarly writing.
Coleman Phillipson, whose analysis of classical conceptions of inter-
national law is justly famous to the degree that it seems to have almost
cut off later scholarship, wrote: "In the Homeric age the practice [of
"piracy"] was looked upon as a creditable . . . means of enrichment."4
Without disputing Phillipson's point, which will be examined more
closely in Part B, it is interesting to check his citations. These include
Homer's Iliad," and Odyssey,' and Thucydides' History of the Pelopon-
nesian War.' In fact, in none of these places cited by Phillipson does the
word "peirato" or any of its derivatives appear in the original Greek.8
3. Id. at 48. The entire letter, beginning at 39, is worth reading, especially pp. 45-46, 48,
77-82, for its eloquent appeal to the concept felt by Raffles to be embodied in the word
"pirate." He felt that what the young nobles were doing was not "piracy" at international
law, but should have been a crime under the law of the Malay sultanates from which the
"pirates" apparently derived their licenses to interfere with peaceful shipping.
4. 2 C. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND
ROME 370 (1911).
5. 1 HOMER, THE ILIAD i, 367; vi, 58; ix, 588; xii, 64 (A.T. Murray trans. 1971).
6. 1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY xv; 385, 426; xvii, 425 (A.T. Murray trans. 1960).
7. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR i, 5-7, 8 (C.F. Smith trans. 1959).
8. 1 HOMER, THE ILIAD 30-31, 266-267, 424-425 (A.T. Murray trans. 1971); 2 PHILLIPSON,
supra note 4, at 458-459; 1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 72-73, 320-321 (A.T. Murray trans. 1960);
2 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY iii, 102-103 (A.T. Murray trans. 1953); THUCYDIDES, supra note 7, at
1987
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Instead, the original Greek uses derivatives of the word "diapertho" or
the word "leia."10 Indeed, even if the word "peirato" did appear in the
places cited in Homer, it would not indicate a clear usage of the word,
since, aside from some clearly inappropriate contexts, what most com-
monly appears is a formula of words that seems to have been a customary
greeting addressed to strangers:
Is it on some business, or do ye wander at random over the sea, even
as 'pirates,' who wander hazarding their lives and bring evil to men of
other lands?"
This particular formula, which does not include the word "peirato" or
any of its derivatives in the original Greek, is repeated in many places,
including Hesiod 2 and Thucydides26 And yet it is the very Thucydides
passage not using the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives that is
mentioned by at least one very eminent twentieth century scholar as evi-
dence that "piracy" in the modern sense was accepted as legitimate in
ancient Greece.14 Obviously, it was not "piracy" that was legitimate, but
something else, labeled with a different word, that may or may not have
been analogous to the modern legal conception of "piracy."
It may be significant that the more or less standard glossary, Auten-
rieth's Homeric Dictionary, defines "peiran . . . -ato" as "test, attack,
make trial of, put to proof, contend with" etc., but does not record any
usage in Homer that would correspond with a sense of illegality or even
roving to seize the property of others regardless of legality.'"
Similarly, in Herodotus's history of the Persian War, the passage
most frequently cited as mentioning "piracy" does not use the Greek
word or any of its derivatives, and that passage is translated properly as
saying merely the coming of "Bronze men of the sea" was predicted by an
oracle.'6
Perhaps the most egregious anomaly of translation is in the frequent
citation to an historical episode in which the citizens of the "polis" of
Halonnesos refused to receive their property back from Philip of
Macedon as a gift, but insisted that they had never lost title since the
8-9, 12-13.
9. "To destroy utterly, sack, waste, always of cities." LIDDELL & Scorr, GREEK-ENGLISH
LEXICON 354 (8th ed. 1897).
10. "Booty, plunder." Id. at 881; the word is "leis" in the Epic dialect, id. at 889.
11. Nestor's interview with Telemachus, 2 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY iii, 73 (A.T. Murray
trans. 1953).
12. HESIOD, THE HOMERIC HYMNS & HOMERICA 352, 356-357 (H.G. Evelyn-White trans.
1954). The first 177 lines of this Hymn are addressed to the Delian Apollo; the rest, includ-
ing the lines cited here, to the Pythian Apollo. See also HOMER, THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 349
n. 1 (T.A. Buckley trans. 1891).
13. THUCYDIDES, supra note 7, at i, 5. The formula is different, but again the word
derives from "leisteia," not "peirato."
14. A. ZIMMERN, THE GREEK COMMONWEALTH 237-238 (5th rev. ed. 1961).
15. AUTENRIETH, HOMERIC DICTIONARY 252 (R.P. Keep trans. 1885).
16. HERODOTUS, THE PERSIAN WARS, 462-463 (A.D. Godley trans. 1931).
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capture had been by "pirates," who lack the legal power to alter rights to
title in property. But the Greek original does not contain the word
"peirato" or any of its derivatives."
As for Roman sources,'8 again some of the most often cited writings
purportedly defining the classical conception of "piracy" do not use the
word in either its Greek or Latin ("pirata") form. For example, Cicero, in
his second speech Against Verres, does not mention "pirata" in the pas-
sage cited time and again by renaissance and later scholars as one of the
sources of the law of "piracy." The word he uses is "praedones."'9 And
Livy's translator gives a totally distorted impression of the legal relations
between the Great Pompey's son, Sextus Pompey, and Octavian Caesar,
building on the distorted picture painted by the not wholly impartial
Livy himself, in this passage:
When Sextus Pompey again made the sea dangerous through acts of
piracy [latrociniis], and did not maintain the peace to which he had
agreed, Caesar undertook the inevitable war against him and fought
two drawn naval battles.20
In the original Latin the word "pirata" or its derivatives does not
appear.2
There are other anomalies in this passage that point out the need for
great circumspection in drawing far-reaching legal conclusions from the
use of Latin words in ancient sources. The word "bello" (war; belliger-
ency) is used to describe the conflict between two claimants to some pub-
lic authority in Rome in the turmoil following Julius Caesar's assassina-
tion and before Octavian achieved full mastery of the political system and
became Caesar Augustus. But if the Roman law of war applied, as the
word would seem to indicate, then the fundamental Roman conception of
"'war" as a legal status with legal implications would have applied in the
absence of declaration. And it would have applied against those who com-
mit "latrociniis" acts. This path of analysis leads to complications of sig-
nificant magnitude and in the light of other writings seems wholly mis-
guided. It is very likely that Livy was using the word "latrociniis"
17. DEMOSTHENES, DE HALONNESO, 2 ON POSTLIMINIUM, quoted in Greek in 2 PHILLIP-
SON, supra note 4, 375 n. 2. The words leistai and lestas are translated "pirates" also by
J.H. Vince. 1 DEMOSTHENES, ORATIONS 151-153, 156-157 (L.H. Vince trans. 1954). See also
leston at 156 translated "pirates" at 157.
18. What is addressed here are sources focusing on Roman law and Roman perceptions.
Since many educated Romans were literate in Greek, and some of the leading historians of
Rome, such as Plutarch and Polybius, were of Greek heritage, writing in Greek, a simple
distinction based on language would be misleading.
19. 2 CICERO, CONTRA VERRES II iv, 21 (L.H.G. Greenwood trans. 1953). Derivatives of
the Latin word "praedor," to make booty, to plunder, spoil, rob," are commonly translated
"pirate" or "piracy." LEWIS & SHORT, FREUND'S LATIN DICTIONARY 1417 (Andrews rev. ed.
1879).
20. 14 LivY, HISTORY OF ROME cxxviii (A.C. Schlesinger trans. 1959). The period de-
scribed is 38-37 B.C.
21. Id. at 158.
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pejoratively and not legally, and the word "bello" to mean "struggle" or
some similar non-legal idea, rather than war. Since these distinctions are
vital to a careful legal analysis, it may be concluded that not only transla-
tions, but even original texts must be read very carefully before legal im-
plications are drawn from them.
B. The Greek and Roman Conception of "Piracy"
Thucydides' description of political life in the Aegean area rests not
only on the poetic formula of greeting, but on other passages in Homer2 2
and, no doubt, oral and perhaps lost written traditions familiar enough to
his generation that citation was not felt to be necessary by him. Modern
scholarship sees this proud description as evidence not only of a political
system accepting the organized use of force by small bands without pejo-
rative implications or any deep analysis of the political structure of the
bands themselves,2" but also of a far-reaching economic order. During the
10th and 9th centuries B.C.,24 such wars and raids reflected the struggle
for survival and economic gain by combinations of families and small
communities as part of a larger economic system in which "Forcible
seizure followed by distribution in this fashion, was one way to acquire
metal or other goods from an outside source."2 5 The seizures did not nec-
essarily involve essential supplies, and the concepts of justifiable behavior
apparently extended to permit these raids by Greeks against Greeks and
non-Greeks alike merely for gain. Given the state of politics and econom-
ics in the area, such raids were probably not the principal means of com-
merce, and it has been suggested that gift-exchanges were the main mech-
anism for economic transfers.2" The system might bear some similarity for
purposes of this study with the Viking political and economic system of
Scandinavia in the 9th to 11th centuries A.D.27
22. The most important passage repeated by several later translators and scholars to
support the assertion that "piracy" was a way of life to Homeric-Age Greeks, although the
passage does not use the word peirato or any of its derivatives in the original, is from 1
HOMER, supra note 5, ix, 39-42: Odysseus is speaking: "The wind bearing me from Ilium
made me approach the Ciconians in Ismarus; and there I laid waste the city, and destroyed
them. And taking their wives and many possessions out of the city, we divided them, that no
one might go deprived of an equal share . . ."
23. Of course, Odysseus's band was a group of warriors without fixed base who derived
their political existence from allegiance to Odysseus, the "King of Ithaka." See HOMER,
supra note 12 at 116.
24. The sack of Troy is usually placed several centuries earlier by scholars. But M.I.
Finley convincingly argues not only that the fabled sack never took place, just as the stirring
events of the epic Niebelungenlied and Beowulf could never have taken place outside of
poetic imagination, but, more importantly, that the world reflected in the Homeric poems
was the world of the historical tradition of their author(s), reflecting realities of the 10th
and 9th centuries B.C. M.I. FINLEY, THE WORLD OF ODYSSEus 48-49 (2d rev. ed. 1978).
25. Id. at 63.
26. Id. at 64. Aristotle mentions plundering as one of five general categories of political
economy: "the pastoral, the farming, the freebooting (sic), the fishing, and the life of the
chase." ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1256b (E. Barker trans. 1946b) (1975 ed.).
27. J. BRONDSTED, THE VIKINGS 26-27 (1965).
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The earliest time when the surviving literature in Greek uses the
word "peirato" and its derivatives to describe anybody appears to be
about 140 B.C., and it is to some specific political and economic commu-
nities of the Eastern Mediterranean littoral that the word was applied.
Polybius, whose Histories is the principal source of much of our knowl-
edge of the rise of the Roman Republic, uses the word peiraton in a pas-
sage translated by W.R. Paton in a Way avoiding the confusions wrought
by too frequent use of the English word "pirate," but creating an
equivalent confusion. He refers to: "Euripidas with two companies of Ele-
ans together with his freebooters [peiraton] and mercenaries ... 28 Just
what "freebooter" means in that context seems very unclear. But what
does seem clear is that the word "peirato" and its derivatives was being
applied not to brigands or others outside the legal order, but to small
communities including fighting men who were regarded as capable of
forming alliances and participating in wars as they were fought between
acknowledged political leaders within the legal order of the time.
Diodorus Siculus, writing about 60 B.C., uses the word in connection
with events of 304 B.C.:
[Amyntas] . . .suddenly confronted some pirates [peiratais] who had
been sent out by Demetrias ... the Rhodians took the ships with...
Timocles, the chief pirate [archipeirates].29
The usage of Livy, writing in Latin 29 B.C.-14 A.D., is similar. In
describing events of 190 B.C., he refers to Nicander, whom he calls a pi-
rate chief (archipirata), fighting with five ships as an ally of Rome3° In
referring to the "war" of 68-67 B.C. by which Pompey the Great cleared
the Eastern Mediterranean of Cilician commerce-raiding communities,"1
Livy not only refers to the struggle as "war" and describes it as if it were
legally indeed a "war" at Roman law, but he refers to its ending by a
negotiated surrender under which the "pirates" agreed to conform to
more settled ways:
Gnaeus Pompeius was ordered by a law passed by the popular assem-
bly to pursue the pirates, who had cut off the traffic in grain. Within
forty days he had cleared them from all the seas. He brought the war
[belloque] against them to an end in Cilicia, received the surrender of
the pirates and gave them land and cities. 32
Finally, the Greek Plutarch, writing in about 100 A.D., paints such a
clear picture of the "pirates" to which Livy referred in his brief synopsis
of the "war" of Pompey to end their control of commerce in the Eastern
Mediterranean, that it seems worth setting out in some detail. Through-
out this translation, wherever the word "pirate" is used, the word
28. 2 POLYBIuS, THE HISTORIES 461 (W.R. Paton trans. 1954).
29. 10 DIooORus SICULUS, [HISTORY] 400-401 (R.M. Greer trans. 1954).
30. 10 Livv, HISTORY OF ROME 320-321 (E.T. Sage trans. 1935).
31. See Plutarch's description of the same events, infra notes 36-39.
32. 14 Livy, HISTORY OF ROME supra note 20, at 122-123.
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"peirato" or one of its derivatives is used in the original Greek,
The power of the pirates [peiratiki] had its seat in Cilicia [in Asia
Minor, where they flourished during the wars of Rome against Mithri-
dates (88-85, 83-81, 74 B.C.)] ...until they no longer attacked navi-
gators only, but also laid waste islands and maritime cities. And pres-
ently men whose wealth gave them power, and whose lineage was
illustrious, and those who laid claim to superior intelligence, began to
embark on piratical [peiratike] craft and share their enterprises, feel-
ing that the occupation brought them a certain reputation and dis-
tinction. . .Their flutes and stringed instruments and drinking bouts
along every coast, their seizures of persons in high command, and
their ransoming of captured cities, were a disgrace to the Roman
supremacy [hegemonias] .3
To complete the picture of political societies conforming to the archaic
Eastern Mediterranean pattern, Plutarch mentions the unique religious
worship of the "pirates," whose rites centered on the town of Olympus in
southern Asia Minor.34 This combination of settled communities, religious
rites, musical tradition, and the conception of the "pirates" that what
they did was entirely proper, is what brought them into conflict with
Rome. It is hard to see how they were considered outlaws or violators of
any law other than the Roman conception of hegemony; a conception ob-
viously not shared by non-Romans at that time,3 and possibly not by
many Romans of the pre-Augustan age that Plutarch was writing about
almost a century after the reign of Augustus. On the other hand, Plutarch
seems to have accepted the idea that such political societies, no matter
how conforming to a traditional pattern, were an anachronism beyond the
orderly system within which Rome had become accustomed to operate.
The word "peirato" and its derivatives seems to be applied to traditional
Eastern Mediterranean societies operating in ways that had been ac-
cepted as legitimate for at least a millenium. But the conception of Ro-
man order, the idea that Roman hegemony was a matter of right, of law,
had begun to make the continued existence of "pirate" communities un-
acceptable even if no justification for distinguishing those "pirate" com-
munities from their less assertive neighbors could be found directly in
Roman or general international law as it was applied between Rome and
other political communities of the Eastern Mediterranean.
33. 5 PLUTARCH, PARALLEL LIVES OF GREEKS AND ROMANS 173-175 (C.B. Perrin trans.
1917).
34. Id. at 175.
35. This Roman hegemony was achieved not by mere assertion or, indeed, by simple
conquest, but in the main by diplomacy and by treaty. See Livy, ROME AND THE MEDITERRA-
NEAN (M. Bettenson trans. 1976), for a lively English translation of the principal part of
books 31-35 of Livy's HISTORY OF ROME. The Roman hegemonial system involved military
alliances in return for which Rome guaranteed the personal position of the person invested
as the embodiment of the legal power of the client state. For a very clear and evocative
description see SALLUST, THE JUGURTHINE WAR 14 (J.C. Rolfe trans. 1931, 1960). For a lively
modern translation see SALLUST, THE JUGURTHINE WAR: CONSPIRACY OF CATALINE 47 (S.A.
Hanford trans. 1963).
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The procedures for the "war against the Pirates" adopted by the Ro-
man Senate were extraordinary and reflect these legal doubts as to the
precise status of the Roman hegemony and its legal basis. A law was
passed by the Republic's Senate in 68 B.C. under which Pompey the
Great was commissioned to subdue them not as a naval commander (the
word "admiral" had not yet been invented, but the Loeb Classical Li-
brary's translator of Plutarch uses it here) but as a king deriving his sov-
ereign powers from the Roman donation, thus opposing the "pirates'"
sovereignty with Roman sovereignty and making of the piratical society
something like rebels. Plutarch makes it clear that this procedure was
shocking: Pompey was commissioned by the Roman Senate to take the
seas away from the pirates [peiraton] by giving him "not an admiralty,
but an out-and-out monarchy and irresponsible [sic: "unbridled" might
be a better translation] power over all men."36 His authority was decreed
to extend to land areas within 400 furlongs of the sea, thus to include the
entire territory of the Aegean Islands, Crete and the Dodecanese and
enough of the land of Asia Minor to include all their villages and Olym-
pus, the "pirates'" religious center.
Plutarch's description of the course of the war, and the negotiation
for peace, seems to confirm this impression, that Rome treated the "pi-
rates" not as outlaws but as enemies to be met in war and defeated. After
dispersing the "pirates' "-fleet,
Some of the pirate bands [peiratorion] that were still roving at large
begged for mercy, and since he [Pompey] treated them humanely, and
after seizing their ships and persons did them no further harm, the
rest became hopeful of mercy too, and. . . betook themselves to Pom-
pey with their wives and children, and surrendered to him. All these
he spared,and it was chiefly by their aid that he tracked down, seized,
and punished those who were still lurking in concealment because
conscious of unpardonable crimes.37
But the most numerous and powerful had bestowed their families and
treasures and useless folk in forts and strong citadels near the Taurus
mountains, while they themselves manned their ships and awaited
Pompey's attack near the promontory of Coracesium in Cilicia; here
they were defeated in a battle and then besieged. At last, however,
they . . .surrendered themselves, together with their cities [poleis
and islands of which they were in control ...The men themselves,
who were more than 20,000 in number, he [Pompey] did not once
36. PLUTARCH, supra note 34, at 177.
37. This passage looks like an illogical interpolation by a post-Augustan Greek scholar
guarding his safety under a rigid Roman imperial system more interested in justifications
than in historical accuracy. Just what these "crimes" were, and against what law other than
the Roman hegemony that did not become law until after the conquest and the evolution of
Roman conceptions of law under Augustus, is not clear. Furthermore, it appears that their
"unpardonable crimes" consisted of resistance to the Roman sovereignty, since those who
had participated in commerce-raiding but surrendered seem to have been humanely treated
as conquered enemies.
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think of putting to death ... [but] determined to transfer the men
from the sea to land ...to till the ground. Some of them, therefore,
were received and incorporated into the small and half-deserted cities
of Cilicia. . .To most of them, however, he gave as a residence Dyme
in Achaea which was then bereft of men and had much good land. 8
Pompey's monarchical position under the commission issued by the
Roman Senate received something of a comeuppance shortly after, when
Metellus, another Roman general, was with rather less mercy wiping out
Cilician "pirate" villages in Crete. Since all of Crete lay within 400 fur-
longs of the sea Pompey apparently regarded this as an encroachment on
his authority and sent one of his lieutenants, Lucius Octavius, to join
with the "pirates" fighting against Metellus. Metellus won, "captured the
pirates [peiratas] and punished them, and then sent Octavius away
"" There is no further reference to Pompey's commission in this
context.
It seems clear that the word "pirate" was used by Plutarch to classify
communities with which Pompey felt it was appropriate not only to go to
war and conclude a peace treaty, but even to send military assistance to,
as to an ally, when they accepted the Senate's ordinance subjecting them
to the law of Roman "hegemony."
On the other hand, it appears that there was a change in Roman
concepts underway. To label a group "pirates" was not merely to classify
their way of life within a legal order as we still use the word "Viking" to
evoke a way of life legitimate within the harsh legal order of the middle
ages. By the time Plutarch wrote, there was an implication of impropriety
to that way of life. It had nothing to do with political motivation or crimi-
nality even under the law of Rome as applied in the Empire or allied
areas. It dealt instead with the place of an antiquated way of life in a new
commercial and political order that could not countenance interference
with trade in the Mediterranean Sea. It was not bound to "piratical" acts
on the "high seas," but to a conception of "piratical" villages forming a
society [poleisl on land which refused to accept Roman supremacy. Rela-
tions with the "pirates" were relations of war, not of policing the internal
or imperial Roman law; the results of Roman victory were the normal
results of a victorious war at that time and in that place.4
"War" to the Roman jurists was not merely a condition of fact with
people of one village or religious worship killing or enslaving people of
another village or divine descent. War was regarded as a legal status even
if no active fighting was occurring, and since victory or defeat in war had
such enormous consequences for the belligerents and their families, re-
38. PLUTARCH, supra note 33, at 181-187.
39. Id. at 189-191.
40. Those results were essentially to put the losers at the discretion of the victors; the
men were frequently killed and the women enslaved. There were no trials, no accusations or
defenses, no lawyers involved. See generally, EURIPIDES, THE TROJAN WOMEN (adapted by
J.-P. Sartre 1967).
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flecting the vitality of the vivifying force given by the tribe's or commu-
nity's "God" or totemic life source to some eponymous ancestor or
founder, the ceremonies involved in the creation of that status were es-
sentially religious. The religious element of the status of war was not a
mere prayer for victory, but reflected much deeper concerns for the con-
tinuance of the race. Virgil's epic poem, Aeneid, telling the mythology
surrounding the founding of the Roman tradition in Italy by Aeneas, a
son of the defeated King Priam fleeing from the sack of Troy, is unmis-
takably, in this sense, a religious work.
The interplay between religion and the secular law between "na-
tions" or "races" or god-protected communities and tribes, is evident
from the narration of the great literary (but not always accurate) histo-
rian Livy, who grew to manhood during the days of Julius Caesar, and
wrote his history of Rome with access to sacred documents during the
early days of the reign of Augustus. He details from the oldest treaty in
the holy archives (c. 670 B.C.) the treaty-making procedures of Roman
tradition, setting out some of the formulas of words and symbolic acts,
involving a freshly plucked holy plant, the sacrifice of a pig, and metrical
ritual (which in part, alas, he fails to record as "not worth the trouble of
quoting"). Through these rituals the titulary gods on both sides (in this
case the Romans and the Albans) were called upon separately to witness
the commitment of the current holders of the life of each god's own com-
munity to the sanctity of the pledge.4 ' In this particular incident, as re-
ported by Livy, the "war" between the Romans and Albans was put into
the hands of three representatives from each side, chosen for their mar-
tial vigor and thus presumably reflecting the vigor of the holy life of each
community as well as its mere secular martial prowess. The Romans won
in a close contest, only one champion for each side surviving, and Hora-
tius for Rome ultimately killing his Alban antagonist as the two armies
stood by and watched. The two sides then buried their dead and Alba
accepted Roman rule submitting their entire treasure and lives to the
mercy of the Roman god represented by the Roman political
organization.4 2
Livy also details the ceremony followed by the Romans even into his
own time when "war" was to be begun. In Livy's version, the ceremony
for a formal declaration of war was adopted from the religious rites of the
ancient Roman tribe of the Aequicolae and taken over by priests (fetials)
representing the entire Roman community. It is worth repeating in its
entirety for an understanding of the importance of the ceremony and the
significance of Cicero's argument in Livy's own time43 that "war" against
"pirates" could be begun without it:
41. Livy, HISTORY OF ROME, supra note 20. An excellent modern translation of Books I-
V of this work is Livy, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME (A. de SMlincourt trans. 1971).
42. Id. at 60-61.
43. Livy's version may reflect more religious myth than political history. See also Fus-
TEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY 5-6 (trans. 1956).
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When the envoy arrives at the frontier of the state from which satis-
faction is sought, he covers his head with a woolen cap and says: Hear
me, Jupiter! 'Hear me, land of So-and-so! Hear me, 0 righteousness! I
am the accredited spokesman of the Roman people. I come as their
envoy in the name of justice and religion, and ask credence for my
words.' The particular demands follow and the envoy, calling Jupiter
to witness, proceeds: 'If my demand for the restitution of those men
or those goods be contrary to religion and justice, then never let me be
a citizen of my country.' [Presumably so that the results of impiety
will not be visited on the entire community.] The formula, with only
minor changes, is repeated when the envoy crosses the frontier, to the
first man he subsequently meets, when he passes through the gate of
the town, and when he enters the public square. If his demand is re-
fused, after thirty-three days . . . war is declared in the following
form: 'Hear, Jupiter; hear Janus Quirinus; hear, all ye gods in heaven,
on earth, and under the earth: I call you to witness that the people of
So-and-so are unjust and refuse reparation . . .' The envoy then re-
turns to Rome for consultation. The formula in which the king asked
the opinion of the elders was approximately this: Of the goods, or
suits, or causes, concerning which the representative of the Roman
people has made demands of the representative of . . . [So-and-so],
which goods or suits or causes they have failed to restore or settle, or
satisfy . . .: 'speak, what think you?' The person thus first addressed
replied: 'I hold that those things be sought by means of just and right-
eous war. Thus I give my vote and my consent.' The same question
was put to the others in rotation, and if a majority voted in favour,
war was agreed upon. The fetial thereupon proceeded to the enemy
frontier carrying a spear with a head either of iron or hardened wood,
and in the presence of not less than three men of military age made
the following proclamation: 'Whereas the peoples of [So-and-so] . . .
have committed acts and offences against the Roman people, and
whereas the Roman people have commanded that there be war with
[them], and the Senate of the Roman people has ordained, consented,
and voted that there be war with [them]: I therefore, and the Roman
people hereby declare and make war on [them].' The formal declara-
tion made, the spear was thrown across the frontier."
These forms, ar at least their underlying concepts, were employed against
not only the South Italian peoples with whom the Romans shared a simi-
lar culture, but also against the North Italian Gauls and presumably eve-
rybody else with whom it was religiously conceived that a struggle on
earth reflected competing demands on a divine source of life symbolized
by tribal or community gods."5
The most commonly cited authority for the original Roman legal con-
ception of "piracy" adopted as the source for modern European views of
international law on the subject is Marcus Tullius Cicero. Cicero, an ac-
tive lawyer and politician contemporary with Julius Caesar, killed appar-
44. Livy, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME, supra note 20 at 69-71.
45. Id. at 381-383.
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ently by order of Marc Antony in 43 B.C. in the aftermath of the murder
of Julius,"' has been cited inappropriately often,'4 7 but did in fact mention
"pirates" [pirata] in one passage that evidences the changing legal con-
ceptions of the generation that gave Pompey the legal power to subdue
them by simply asserting a superior legal power over the territory and
seas in which their outmoded culture survived. In that passage he merely
denies any legal obligation to keep an oath to "pirates" on the ground
that by being the enemies [hostes] of all communities, they are not sub-
ject to the law of the universal society that makes oaths binding between
different communities." There are many reasons for regarding this state-
ment as not indicating any considered legal opinion. Hugo Grotius him-
self, the great Dutch scholar and jurist of international law of the first
half of the 17th century, criticized this passage on the ground that the
observance of an oath is owed to God, not to the person receiving the
benefit of the oath.4' Other factors not usually considered by those citing
this passage of Cicero as evidence that "pirates" in his day were common
criminals include the fact that the passage appears in a work on moral
duties, not law; as Cicero himself noted, the two do not always coincide.50
Moreover, bearing in mind Cicero's political situation in 44 B.C. when
this was written, and the episode in Julius Caesar's life involving the
same Cilician "pirates,"'" and the peculiar legal authority given to Cic-
ero's sometimes friend Pompey coupled with Pompey's use of that au-
thority against Metellus and the fact that Pompey was by now dead and
his twenty-five year old treaty with the "pirates" could be disregarded
without personally insulting him, and some notion of the complexity of
Cicero's thinking can be appreciated. Indeed, the "pirates" that had been
suppressed by Pompey in 67 B.C. had revived by the time Cicero was
writing this, and Marc Antony was believed to have mobilized them
against Brutus and Cassius. Cicero's condemnation of the "pirates" seems
thus less a statement of a legal opinion than a slap at his enemy,
Antony. 2
46. Cf. I CICERO, DE OFFICUs book xi, 39: "As for war, humane laws touching it are
drawn up in the fetial code of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion, and
from this it may be gathered that no war is [legal] unless it is entered upon after an official
demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declara-
tion made."
47. The complex politics of Rome at this period are not important to the present analy-
sis. Cicero had sided with Pompey the Great against Julius Caesar at times and with the
Senatorial party of Brutus and Cassius against the triumvirate of Marc Antony, Lepidus
and Octavian that seized power on the death of Julius. See 7 PLUTARCH, PARALLEL LIVES OF
GREEKS AND ROMANS supra note 33 at 206-207, making clear Plutarch's opinion of Antony's
responsibility for Cicero's death, and the reasons for it. See also 3 CICERO, LE'rERS TO AT-
Ticus 131, 152, 179-181 (D.R. Shackleton Bailey trans. 1968), for insight into Cicero's rela-
tions with Pompey in 50 B.C.
48. 3 CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, xi 29.
49. 2 Gso'rIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs 373 (F.W. Kelsey trans. & photo. reprint 1925).
50. CICERO, supra note 48, at xii-xvi.
51. 7 PLUTARCH, supra note 33, at 441, 444.
52. CICERO, SELECTED WORKS 177, n.1 (M. Grant trans. 1960).
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Perhaps the best evidence of the Roman jurists' actual conception of
"piracy" lies in the collection of undated opinions appearing in Justin-
ian's Digest of 534 A.D. 53 There appears to be in fact only one passage in
the Digest in which the word "pirata" or its derivatives appears. In the
section on the law of property dealing with the devolution of property
rights in case of a wrongful taking, the opinion of Paulus (c. 230 A.D.) is
given: "Persons who have been captured by pirates or robbers remain [le-
gally] free."'8 4
Two other opinions have been so often cited by so many scholars as
applying to "pirates" that it seems important to set them out here, even
though by failing to use the word "pirata" or any of its derivatives they
seem to demonstrate the opposite of the lesson for which they so often
are cited. Ulpian (d. 223 A.D.) wrote:
Enemies are those against whom the Roman people have publicly de-
clared war, or who themselves have declared war against the Roman
people; others are called robbers or brigands. Therefore, anyone who
is captured by robbers, does not become their slave, nor has any need
of the right of postliminium. He, however, who has been taken by the
enemy, for instance, by the Germans or Parthians, becomes their
slave, and recovers his former condition by right of postliminium.11
And Pomponius (c. 130 A.D.):
Those are enemies who declare war against us, or against whom we
publicly declare war; others are robbers or brigands. 6
The concept of property rights needing reassessment after a legal
capture, and that in some circumstances captives would become free and
property would revert to its former owner on the conclusion of a war or
on recapture, was an important one.57 It becomes must more important
for purposes of this study later when the European-based international
law of naval prize makes it significant that the captor be classified as a
person able to change legal title or not. It was by reading the word
"capti" in the passage ascribed to Paulus, to apply to goods and not
merely to persons, and by classifying "pirates" as covered by Ulpian and
Pomponius as if they were brigands [latrones] or robbers [praedones]
that this legal conclusion was reached.
One other implication of these passages seems significant. By attach-
53. A convenient summary of dates, names and structure of the Justinian Digest and its
place in the legal literature is found in NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 30, 39-42
(rev. ed. 1969).
54. MOMMSEN & KRUEGER, CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS XLIX. 15.19.2 (Kunkel ed. 1954); see
also PAULUS, ON SABINUs book xvi. My translation is identical to that in J.B. Scorr, 9 THE
CIVIL LAW 184 (1932), except for the interpolation of the word "legally" to avoid the absurd
reading that captives are in fact free.
55. MOMMSEN & KRUEGER, supra note 54, at XLIX. 15.24.
56. Id. at L. 16.118.
57. It apparently dates back to Greek conceptions. See supra note 17 and accompany-
ing text.
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ing the word "hostes [enemies]" to those against whom legal war [bellum]
was waged, and refusing to attach the word to police action against brig-
ands and robbers [latrones et praedones], an entirely different light is
shed on the phrase "common enemies of all mankind [hostes humani
generis] '8 as a paraphrase of its original, Ciceronian, meaning. If this
analysis is correct, and Cicero was speaking as the technical lawyer later
scholars have assumed in drawing their implications from this reference
to "pirates," then what he really seems to have meant was that "pirates"
are not robbers or brigands but legal enemies with the sole exception re-
garding promises to them that Grotius rightly criticizes as illogical and
which is incorrect as history.
It may be concluded that the fundamental Greek and Roman concep-
tion of "piracy" distinguished between robbers, who were criminals at Ro-
man law, and communities called "piratical" which were political societies
of the Eastern Mediterranean, pursuing an economic and political course
which accepted the legitimacy of seizing the goods and persons of stran-
gers without the religious and formal ceremonies the Romans felt were
legally and religiously necessary to begin a just war. Nonetheless, the Ro-
mans treated them as capable of going to "war"-indeed as in a perma-
nent state of "war" with all people except those with whom they had con-
cluded an alliance. There is some evidence that the Romans refused to
extend the technical law of postliminium to them, perhaps on the ground
that since they never ceased to be at war, there was no opportunity to
determine the title to captured goods and no need to recognize title in
those deriving rights from belligerent capture; the goods remained subject
to recapture by anybody, and the rights of postliminium would be appli-
cable against the recaptor, just as in war goods recaptured before the end
of hostilities reverted to their original owner subject only to payment of
costs attributable directly to the recapturing action. The legal rationaliza-
tion found by the Roman Senate for suppressing the communities of "pi-
rates" was not an asserted Roman right to police the seas (although Plu-
tarch seems to have thought that rationale would have been better than
the one actually used by the Senate), but the quite different assertion of a
Roman right to territorial as well as maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern
Mediterranean. To examine the full implications of this popular Roman
view on the course of Roman, and, indeed, world history, is far beyond
the limits of this study. For present purposes it seems enough to point
out that "piracy" to the Romans was a descriptive noun for the practices
of a particular landbased Eastern Mediterranean people whose views of
law and intercommunity relations appear to have reflected a millenium-
long tradition that had become an obstacle to Roman trade and inconsis-
tent with Roman views of the world order under Roman hegemony. The
58. The phrase appears to have gained currency as a shortening of the passage from
CICERO, supra note 48. The source of the paraphrase hostes humani generis has not been
found. Blackstone attributed it to Sir Edward Coke. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (Amer. ed. 1790).
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word did not imply criminality under any legal system, Roman or law of
nations. It was applied to a fully organized society with families and a
particular religious order that seems to have been not shockingly different
from the social organization and religious orders of many other peoples of
that time and place.
It is not beyond conjecture that something of this pattern was in the
mind of Sir T.S. Raffles when he called "piratical" some of the Malay
Sultanates with which he had to deal in 1811. 59
None of this is meant to imply that non-polis-connected marauding
at sea, what today might (or might not) be called "piracy" as a result of
later legal developments, was permissible at Roman internal law, Roman
imperial law relating to hegemonial rights, if any, or international law as
perceived by Roman statesmen. But those acts were called something
else, and to analyze the full range of legal results that flowed from using
those other labels would involve a discussion beyond the limits of this
study. To Europeans of later times whose education included familiarity
with Greek and Latin writings in which the words "peirato" and "pirata"
or their derivatives were used, some hint of the earlier meaning remained
despite later legal uses of the word in forms contemporary with the later
Europeans in special legal contexts. And that classical meaning did not
carry the implication of criminality or violation of general international
law that other meanings carried; it justified a kind of political action, per-
haps, and also perhaps had some legal implication in general interna-
tional law particularly as it related to the laws of war and postliminium.
But these are factors better discussed later on.
C. The Reorganization of the Renaissance
1. "Piracy" Enters Vernacular English as "Privateering"
For a thousand years after Justinian the word "pirate" appears to
have remained buried in the Greek and Latin texts familiar to learned
monks but not considered significant to soldiers and statesmen. Norse
raiders of the 9th to l1th centuries A.D. following a career that seems in
many ways analogous to that of the "pirates" of the time of Cicero and
Pompey were not usually called "pirates" in English or Latin in contem-
porary documents, but were called by the names they gave themselves,
"Danes" or "Vikings." Ranulf Higdon (or Higden) wrote a general history
of the world in Latin in the first half of the 14th century, referred to by a
Greek abbreviation for its long title as the Polychronicon, that received
some popularity for a century or so after its first production in manu-
script. In it he drew the obvious analogy, calling the Vikings "Dani
piratae." John de Trevisa, a don at Oxford 1362-1379, translated Higdon
into his native Middle English, translating the word "piratae" as "see
theves [sea thieves]." The earliest use of the word "pirate" in English
59. See RAFFLES, supra note 2.
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found by the compilers of the Oxford English Dictionary is in the second
quarter of the 15th century.60 That early usage seems to have had no legal
connotation.
Meantime, in the Mediterranean Sea area, the old Greek and Roman
usages seem to have survived. Merchant ships that passed near enough to
fishing or small agricultural villages of the Mediterranean to be safely at-
tacked by the inhabitants of those communities were, from time to time,
attacked. The dangers of trade and travel during the rise of Venice, the
Crusades, the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the dominance
of Suleiman the Magnificant in 16th century Turkey and the Eastern
Mediterranean generally, and the establishment of stable Muslim rule in
the southern Mediterranean towns of Algiers, Salee, Tripoli and Tunis
did not evoke images of "piracy" as a violation of any law.
Later writers have used the word "piracy," with its modern legal and
romantic connotations, in wholly misleading ways. As with later refer-
ences to "piracy" attributed to classical authors, the most eminent mod-
ern writers have used the word to refer to a host of activities in the Medi-
terranean of the 16th and 17th centuries that may or may not have been
considered "piracy," or even wrongful under any legal system. The situa-
tion is summed up admirably by Fernand Braudel, a French historian
who himself uses the word "piraterie" in the most confusingly vague and
unhistorical ways:
In the 16th century [as in Homeric times] the sea was filled with pi-
rates, and pirates perhaps even more cruel than those of earlier days.
Raiding [1a course] takes a mask, disguises itself as semi-official war-
fare, with letters of marque ...
I have repeatedly said that piracy was the child of the Mediterranean.
True enough, but historians have often lost sight of the generality of
the practice while focusing their attention and reproofs only on the
Barbary corsairs. Their fate, which was grand, overshadows the rest.
Everything else is deformed. That which is called "piracy" when done
by the Barbary corsairs is called heroic, pure crusading spirit when
done by the Knights of Malta, and the equally ferocious Knights of
St. Stephen, based at Pisa under the protection of Cosimo dei
Medici. "'
60. The earliest usages recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary are: . . . 1387
Trevisa, Higden (Rolls) VI, 415 see Theves of Danes (L. Dani piratae); 1426 Lydg. De Guil.
Pilgr. 23963, I mene pyratys of the Se, which brynge folk in pouerte. 1430-40 Bochas 1.xii 38
(1544) This word pirate of Pirrhus toke the name. 1522 J. CLERK in ELLIS ORIG. LETTI. SER
111.1.312, Pirats, Mores and other Infidels . . . OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, at 901. Higden
(or Higdon) and the Polychronicon are explained in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 454 (11th
ed. 1910).
61. BRAUDEL, LE MEDITERRANEE ET LE MONDE MEDITERRANEEN A L'EPOQUE DE PHILIPPE
II 694 (1949). Because of the importance of the specific words, I have translated the French
original myself despite the existence of a fine English translation by Sian Reynolds of the
1966 second (revised) edition of Braudel's masterpiece. BRAUDEL, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II (S. Reynolds trans. 1973).
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Thus, while the picture painted by Braude 2 is brilliantly clear and imag-
inative, the fact that he uses the word "pirate" to include licensed war-
fare at sea should not be forgotten. He describes the Mediterranean of
the 16th century as featuring: "Sea-pirates . . . aided and abetted by
powerful towns and cities. Pirates on land, bandits, received regular back-
ing from nobles." ' But the picture is actually, legally, one of lively and
dangerous commerce and conflicting claims to authority that might be
called an authority to tax nearby shipping lanes with capture of the ves-
sel, confiscation of its cargo, and the enslavement of the crew the penalty
for tax evasion. Another legal basis for "piracy" as the word is used by
Braudel was the medieval law of war: "One of the most profitable ven-
tures of Christian pirates in the Levant became the search of Venetian,
Ragusan or Marseillais vessels for Jewish merchandise, . . . likening it to
contraband, a convenient pretext for the arbitrary confiscation of
goods."6 4 The "Christian pirates" referred to here seem to have been the
Knights of Malta, a crusading Order asserting sovereign rights to govern
land and to participate in lawful war."'
For theft to be profitable, "stolen" goods must have a market. Where
the market is in the control of a "government," a person or body to whom
is conceded the legal power to change title to property, and a "taking" is
authorized by the proprietor of that market, it is difficult to conceive of
"stealing" as distinct from "lawful capture" or "taxation." By the end of
the sixteenth century such markets were flourishing in Valetta (Malta),
Leghorn (Livorno, Italy) and Algiers. Their legal basis was thus the law of
the Christian Knights of Malta, Cosimo de' Medici, and the Muslim Gov-
ernor (under Turkish control) of Algiers."6
For the pattern of commerce to be profitable the goods must con-
tinue to flow; the taxation or belligerent interdiction (or robbery) must
not be so burdensome as to drive trade away; even risk-sharing through
insurance must be managed in such a way that the risk does not become
so great as to be uninsurable."7 Examining this economic reality and the
undeniable vitality of Mediterranean trade in the period 1580-1648, when
captures at sea were most vigorously condemned by European writers as
intolerable, even if legal, it can be conjectured that the forcible exchange
of goods and slave-taking was in fact a tolerable part of the economic
system of the Mediterranean at that period. Indeed, even a century later,
62. Id. For convenience, citations to Braudel below will be used to refer to his work as
translated by Reynolds, and the Reynolds translation will be quoted without closer analysis
of its use of the word "pirate" or its derivatives.
6:3. Id. at 749.
64. Id. at 728.
65. Id. at 822. "As early as 1552 and again in 1565, Jewish protests had singled out for
complaint the ships of the 'most evil monks' of Malta, that 'trap and net which catches
booty stolen at the expense of Jews'" citing J. HACOHEN, EMEK HABKHA, LA VALLEE DES
PLEURS 172 (1881). See id. at 822, n.371.
66. Id. at 870.
67. Id. at 883-884.
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the risk of being taken as a slave in the waters near Algiers and Morocco
was significant, and the fate of the slave once taken was not always as
grim as might be assumed by a 20th century reader.68
England was already a major sea power by the time the Spanish Ar-
mada was defeated in 1588, soon to dominate large areas of the sea and
express through the application of force its sentiments as to the proper
order of commerce and private property.
John Chamberlain, whose letters written 1597 to 1626 constitute a
major source of insight into the trade and politics of that period in Eng-
land, apparently used the word "piracies" as a synonym for "privateering
under license" in a letter to Dudley Carleton dated 31 January 1599:
"Upon the Duke of Florence's embargo and complaint of our piracies,
here is order upon pain of death that no prizes be taken in the Levant
seas." A similar usage appears thirteen years later when Chamberlain
refers to unlicensed takings as a matter of state authority bearing no ap-
parent relationship to abstract notions of morality or international law:
"Many of our pirates are come home upon their pardon for life and
goods, but the greater part stand still aloof in Ireland, because they are
not offered the same conditions, but only life . .. "o The same usage was
applied to Algiers and Tunis, whose licensed or unlicensed prize-takers
were called "pirates" while routine treaty negotiations were conducted
with the rulers of those places.
Sir Thomas Roe had taken great pains and thought he had done a
chef d'oeuvre in concluding a truce or peace for our merchants with
the pirates of Algiers and Tunis. But he is in danger to be disavowed
and all this labor lost (howsoever it comes about) and we left to the
mercy of those miscreants who have already seven or eight hundred of
our able mariners, among whom many gunners and men of best ser-
vice at sea, who by this treaty should have been delivered."
About the beginning of the 17th century "pirates" began to take the
place of "Spaniards" as the villains in English popular ballads. A ballad
published in 1609 condemning John Ward and a Dutchman named Simon
Danseker for their villainies under Barbary license illustrates the chang-
ing mood:
Gallants, you must understand,
Captain Ward of England,
A pyrate and a rover on the sea,
Of late a simple fisherman
68. Cf. D. DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE ch. 1 (1719). Defoe is also supposed to be the au-
thor of A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PIRATES (1718) under the pseudonym of Capt. Charles
Johnson.
69. CHAMBERLAIN, THE CHAMBERLAIN LETTERS: A SELECTION 12 (E.M. Thomson ed.
1966) (letter no. 16 to his friend Dudley Carleton in the standard collection edited by N.E.
McClure).
70. Id. at 124 (letter no. 132 to Carleton dated 29 January 1612).
71. Id. at 226 (letter no. 434 to Carleton dated 12 July 1623).
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In the merry town of Feversham,
Grows famous in the world now every day.
Men of his own country
He still abuses vilely;
Some back to back are cast into the waves;
Some are hewn in pieces small,
Some are shot against a wall;
A slender number of their lives he saves.
At Tunis in Barbary
Now he buildeth stately
A gallant palace and a royal place,
Decked with delights most trim,
Fitter for a prince than him,
To which at last will prove to his disgrace.
There is not any Kingdom,
In Turkey or in Christendom
But by these pyrates [Ward and Danseker]
have received loss;
Merchant-men of every land
Do daily in great danger stand,
And fear do much the ocean main to cross
But their cursed villanies,
And their bloody pyracies,
Are chiefly bent against our Christian friends;
Some Christians so delight in evils
That they become the sons of divels,
And for the same have many shameful ends.
London's Elizabeth
Of late these rovers taken hath,
A ship well laden with rich merchandize;
The nimble Pearl and Charity,
All ships of gallant bravery,
Are by these pyrates made a lawful prize.
The ballad ends with three more verses describing a quarrel between
Ward and Danseker, and seeing in their separation, Ward to stay near
Tunis and Danseker to hover near "Argier" (Algiers), the hand of God
which will lead to their overthrow.
7 2
The realities reflected on this ballad led to a diplomatic expedition to
Algiers in 1621 under Sir Robert Mansell, which failed,7 3 and an unsuc-
72. 33 NAVAL SONGS AND BALLADS, 25-29 (1907).
73. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69 at 281 (letter no. 374 to Carleton dated 10 March
1621): "We hear that Sir Robert Mansell and his fleet have done just nothing, but negoti-
ated with those of Algiers for certain slaves."
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cessful attempt by Parliament to ransom 1500 Christian captives in 1624.
Popular indignation over the plight of the captives is reflected in a
frankly polemical ballad of that year:
Not many moones have from their silver bowes
Shot light through all the world, since those sworne foes
To God and all good men . . . [sic] that hell-borne crew
Of pirates (to whome there's no villanies new),
Those halfe-Turkes and halfe Christians, who now ride
Like sea-gods (on rough billows in their pride),
Those renegadoes, who (their Christ denying)
Are worse than Turkes . . ."
In 1637, 3-400 souls were taken from Salee by the English ship
Rainborow, apparently peacefully.75
The English conception of when the word "pirate" was appropriate
in international relations at this period had not come to be stably re-
flected in a specific legal context. As is apparent from the last quoted line
of the ballad of Ward and Danseker, at least in the popular mind there
was no distinction between privateering and "piracy;" a "pyrate" could
make "lawful prize" of a captured vessel. It is possible, although not en-
tirely clear, that the word was a pejorative use for privateers of any na-
tionality who captured English vessels. The word appears to have slipped
so quickly into the general pejorative vocabulary that whatever legal pre-
cision it might have derived from classical sources eroded by the late 16th
century.
Some clues as to the evolving meaning of the word, and some insight
into the pattern of governance and trade that gave rise to the changes in
meaning, are implicit in contemporary documents relating to the East In-
dia Company's business in Southeast Asia. There are mentions, for exam-
ple, of English and Dutch ships in 1622, during one of the very brief peri-
ods of cooperation between the merchants of the two nations, keeping
company "for fear of pirates" near Java, but it is unclear precisely who or
where the "pirates" were. 76 Similarly there is mention in December 1623
in a communication from the Council at Batavia to the English
merchants at Jambi (in Sumatra) that it is deemed "dangerous to send
one ship for England alone, because of the abundance of pirates lurking
in all places,"" and a few days later the same Council referred to the
need for homeward-bound ships to be prepared "against the invasion of
74. 33 NAVAL SONGS AND BALLADS, supra note 72, at 31-32. "The lamentable cries of at
least 1500 Christians: Most of them being Englishmen
75. Id.
76. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, EAST INDIES, CHINA AND JAPAN 1622-
1624 No. 143, at 64 (Sainsbury ed. 1878, 1964). This is in a report dated 27 August 1622
from the British East India Company's Council in Batavia (Richard Fursland (President),
Thomas Brockedon and Augustine Spaldinge) to the Company in London.
77. Id. No. 367 at 196. Fursland had died and was replaced on the Council by Henrie
Hawley and John Goninge; Thomas Brockedon apparently acted as President.
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that cursed crew of pirates.""8 Again, it is unclear precisely who or where
the "pirates" were, but they were probably not the Dutch; there is a ref-
erence in instructions given to an English trading voyage to Bantam (in
Java) by the "President and Council of Defence" in Batavia on 16 August
1623 to the need to defend against an assault by the Dutch "as from pi-
rates," 9 apparently distinguishing between the two threats.
King James I, convinced that the East India Company was withhold-
ing from the Admiralty its tenth share of prize money taken under license
by the Company as "reprizals" (apparently against Portugal), is reported
to have called the Company itself "pirates.""0 In the Court Minutes of the
East India Company the same transaction is explained:
• . . Mr. Governor replied that upon receipt of the release promised
for the time past and the warrant and direction for the future they
were ready to pay the money. His Majesty's answer was that this was
to give them leave to be pirates; the answer was that the Company
delighted neither in blood nor rapine, and therefore humbly besought
his Majesty would be a means that peace might be between the En-
glish and Portugals . . . or else that his Majesty would explain in
what cases the English might defend themselves by offending others if
there were cause.8'
It seems likely that two different conceptions of "piracy" were involved,
one asserted by the Company referred to "blood" and "rapine" and seems
to relate to English criminal law as it might be applied generically to rob-
bery within the jurisdiction of the Admiral; the other implied by King
James I related to any unlicensed taking. It is tempting in this to see a
Stuart King seeking a legal basis for classifying as criminals those who
merely failed to submit to total centralized control over their activities,
and a private Company seeking to restrict royal control to what was per-
mitted by Parliament in its criminal statutes. But, as shall be seen below,
the dispute probably reflects differing conceptions of law on a much
deeper level.
It does seem to be concluded by all who have examined the facts of
Mediterranean commerce in the 16th and 17th centuries that licensed
"privateering" of many European powers, including England, made trade
not only in the Mediterranean but also in the North Atlantic and else-
where, hazardous for all traders of any nationality, and that the four Bar-
bary communities of Tunis, Morocco, Algiers and Salee joined in this
practice in the early 17th century. 2 The word "piracy" was used increas-
ingly around the turn of the 17th century to refer to privateering, possi-
78. Id. No. 368 at 202 (Dec. 14, 1623); report to the Company in London.
79. Id. No. 565 at 365, signed by Brockedon, Hawley and Goninge.
80. Id. No. 303 at 125 (June 23, 1629); Minutes of meetings concluding June 23, 1624.
Eventually, the Company paid two-tenths to the King in order to obtain the release of their
vessels from arrest by the Admiral.
81. Id. No. 481 at 294 (June 23-25, 1624).
82. See BRAUDEL, supra note 61; see generally FISHER, BARBARY LEGEND 137-145 (1957).
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bly by analogy to the classical "pirates" of Cilicia in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, but the word was assuming a more specific meaning related to
unlicensed "privateering" as the century progressed.
2. "Piracy" Enters the Legal Vocabulary as "Outlawry"
The professional international law scholars of the 16th and 17th cen-
tury left in their writings evidence of this evolution of meaning, and how
the word "piracy" acquired technical international legal meanings reflect-
ing the popular culture.
The North Italian Pierino Belli, publishing his major work on mili-
tary subjects and war in 1563 rests on the medieval post-glossater Baldus
Ubaldus (1327-1400) as authority for interpreting Cicero's and Plutarch's
writings to mean that while war should not be begun without a declara-
tion, "it is customary to make an exception in the case of pirates
[piratae], since they are both technically and in fact already at war; for
people whose hand is against every man should expect a like return from
all men, and it should be permissible for any one to attack them."8 He
distinguishes "pirates," towards whom the laws of war apply, from per-
sons whom the Pope or Holy Roman Emperor has branded as public ene-
mies; public enemies, but not "pirates," are termed "outlaws" whom even
persons without soldiers' licenses may kill.84 But Belli makes a major de-
parture from precedent when repeating Cicero's condemnation of Marc
Antony's agreement with the Cilician "pirates" in 44 B.C. 5 as if applica-
ble in all contexts and disregarding any evidence that treaties with the
Cilician "pirates" had in fact been concluded and observed by Pompey as
well as by Marc Antony. Indeed, the inconsistency between the two
passages in Belli, one affirming the applicability of the law of war to rela-
tions with "pirates" and the other asserting a rule of law that would make
the termination of that war impossible except by the complete annihila-
tion of the "pirates," seems to reflect some confusion of thought.
Balthasar de Ayala, a native of Antwerp (now part of Belgium, then
part of the provinces of the Habsburg monarchy ruled from Spain) writ-
ing in 1581 carried the confusion a step further. By reading the passages
of Justinian's Digest relating to captivity and postliminium as if all refer-
ences to "brigands" ("latrones") applied equally to "pirates," he actually
denied the status of lawful enemy ("hostes") to pirates in apparent disre-
gard of all the ancient writings:
For the same reason, the laws of war and of captivity and of postlim-
iny, which apply to enemies, do not apply to rebels, any more than
they apply to pirates [piratis] and robbers (these not being included
83. BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO TRACTATUS pt. II, ch.11 (H.S. Nutting trans. 1563
ed. & photo. reprint 1936).
84. Id. at 83.
85. Id. at 88, pt. II, ch.14. Belli quotes verbatim CICERO supra note 46. See also supra
note 49.
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in the term "enemy"). Our meaning is that these persons themselves
can not proceed under the laws of war and so, e.g., they do not acquire
the ownership of what they capture, this only being admitted in the
case of enemies; but all the modes of stress known to the laws of war
may be employed against them, even more than in the case of ene-
mies, for the rebel and the robber merit severer reprobation than an
enemy who is carrying on a regular and just war and their condition
ought not to be better than his.86
Nor is it clear why he denied the status of lawful enemy to rebels,
although legally the case for criminality was easier to make regarding
"rebels" than "pirates" in 1581, since rebellion was obviously a violation
of the law of the monarch against whom it was aimed, and was committed
by people within the "allegiance," of that monarch, while "pirates" were
beyond the reach of municipal law under normal feudal concepts. The
possibility that rebels might achieve an independent status under inter-
national law before the former monarch accepts that negation of his mon-
archy's internal law, and thus become best viewed as entitled to the pro-
tection international law gives to lawful belligerents even if their precise
status is doubtful, was not considered by Ayala. Perhaps his views were
influenced by loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy during the violent days
of the rise of the Dutch Republic. 7
3. The Legal Order and Outlawry
a. Positivist Theory: Law as a Support for Policy
The first writer of lasting eminence to convert the confusions of the
time to legal principle, to argue that the label "pirate" carries with it
unmistakably the meaning of outlawry and that what "pirates" do is for-
bidden by international law, was Alberico Gentili. Born in Italy in 1552,
but forced by the Inquisition to leave when his father, and apparently he
himself, converted to the Protestant religion in the 1570s, Gentili settled
in England in 1580 and was appointed to a teaching post at the Univer-
sity of Oxford in 1581. He was made Regius Professor of Civil Law there
in 1587 and published the first volume of his Commentaries on the Law
of War in 1588. Two other volumes followed in 1589, and all three were
reissued together in 1598. He appeared with Royal permission as the ad-
vocate for Spain in several cases before the Royal Council Chamber in
London, dying in 1608 full of honors.8 8
86. AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFicus BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI ch. II, para. 15 (J.P.
Bate trans. 1912).
87. See J.L. MOTLEY, THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC (1856); J.L. MOTLEY, THE
UNITED NETHERLANDS (1860). Ayala's father was a Spaniard, married to a Belgian and resi-
dent in Antwerp for some 16 years before the birth of Balthasar in 1548. The Ayala family
was very well connected with the Habsburg monarchy. The Act of Abjuration was passed by
the States General of the Netherlands in 1581. Until 1648, Spain denied the legal labels
resulting from the ability of the Netherlands to maintain its independence militarily.
88. 2 GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRi TRES (Text of 1612) 12a-14a (J.C. Rolfe trans.
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After defining the legal state of war ("Bellum est") as a "just [legal?]
and public contest of arms [publicorum armorum iusta contentio]," 9 and
asserting on the basis of quotations from Justinian's Digest that only
Princes have the legal power to resort to war,9" Gentili devotes an entire
chapter to demonstrating by legal logic that "pirates" cannot be public
enemies; cannot wage "war." '9 "A state of war cannot exist with pirates
and robbers, in the opinion of Pomponius and Ulpian [cum piratis & la-
trunculis bellum non est. vt ita Pomponius, & Ulpianus definierunt].' '92
He goes on: "Pirates are the common enemies of all mankind [hostes sunt
communes], and therefore Cicero says that the laws of war cannot apply
to them."93 But the passage Gentili immediately quotes from Cicero does
not mention "pirata" or any of its derivatives or the law of war; it is a
passage relating only to promises given to "praedones."'9 4
It is, of course, possible to quote the entire chapter, but it is not the
function of this study to subject to critical analysis the influential scholar-
ship of others except as necessary to trace the evolution and legal mean-
ing of the concept of "piracy" in modern international law. Thus, without
further examples, it is possible to conclude that Gentili in 1588 took an
argumentative position, supported with an advocate's brief, that "piracy"
was not a matter of permanent war with communities pursuing violent
tax collections at sea or basing part of their economy on booty seized
from their neighbors. "Piracy" to Gentili was apparently any taking of
foreign life or property not authorized by a sovereign, synonymous with
brigandage or robbery on land, i.e., his conception of the criminal law
implications of the words praedones and latrones or latrunculi in Roman
law, which he does not analyze, applied equally to "piracy" without
analysis.
It seems clear that the license of an established sovereign was the key
to his thinking. The chapter concludes with a famous example illustrating
precisely that:
But what are we to think about those Frenchmen who were captured
by the Spaniards in the last war with Portugal and were not treated as
lawful enemies: They were treated as pirates [piratae], since they
served Antonio, who had been driven from the whole kingdom and
never recognizd as king by the Spaniards. But history itself proves
that they were not pirates [piratas] and I say this because of no argu-
ment derived from the number and quality of the men and ships, but
from the letters of their king which they exhibited; and it was that
1933).
89. Id. Bk. I, ch.ii.
90. Id. at 22.
91. Id. at ch.IV.
92. Id. Rolfe's translation seems imprecise; Gentili did not say that Pomponius and
Ulpian actually came to that conclusion, but that the legal conclusion flowed from their
definition.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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king whom they served, not Antonio, although this was especially for
the interest of Antonio: a consideration, however, which did not affect
their status."
The implications of Gentili's position were great. If it were generally
accepted, whatever the weaknesses of the appeal to classical writings in
support of it, that all takings were in some sense "criminal" unless au-
thorized by a person whose legal power to issue such an authorization
were acknowledged, no degree of political organization or goal could make
a "rebel" into a lawful combatant or require the application of the laws of
war to the struggle against the rebel army. A tool of enormous power was
placed in the hands of "sovereigns." The political struggle to unify France
and to engorge the Royal power of the Stuart kings of England would be
helped. Moreover, each "sovereign" would seem to be accorded the legal
power, by "recognizing" anybody's legal status needed to license pri-
vateers or naval commanders (or withholding that "recognition"), to de-
termine what legal regime would be applied to any struggle between the
"sovereign" and an enemy of uncertain status. The Barbary states could
be rendered "piratical" by simply withholding recognition of his govern-
mental position from a new Dey or "recognizing" a rival, thus depriving
the one not liked of the power to issue the Turkish equivalent of letters of
marque and reprisal. Gentili's approach was clearly attractive to him as
an advocate for Spain in England 1605-1608. s6
Many of the cases in which Gentili was concerned involved "postlim-
iny" in its renaissance form, the determination of title to goods and sta-
tus of persons taken by a foreign sovereign, his agent, or a "privateer" (or
"pirate") possibly acting in excess of his foreign license. While it is not
necessary for purposes of this study to set out the complexities of the
Roman law of postliminium, a few words as to its growing importance in
renaissance Europe seem needed.
b. Some Technicalities: Property Law and Privateering
"Postliminium" was the Roman law word of art to denote that
branch of the law which dealt with rights of property during wartime.
Questions involved primarily the status of persons (slave or free) cap-
tured in war and brought to the territory of a neutral before the war
ended; would it be unneutral of the third country to deny the property
right of the captor in his slave? If so, could the captor sell the slave and
pass title to a neutral? And if that neutral sold the slave to a buyer from
his original country, what then; would the captive soldier become a slave
in his own country? The analogy to captured goods and vessels seems
clear.
95. Id.
96. See GENTILI, supra note 88. A collection of Gentili's briefs before the English Royal
Chamber was published posthumously in 1613. See GENTILI, HISPANICIs ADVOCATIONIS 1613,
1661 (F.F. Abbot trans. 1661 & photo. reprint 1912).
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By late medieval times, the legal status of war, retaining some of its
religious background, no longer applied to many lawful private takings. It
was, in fact, in an effort to avoid bringing about a state of war between
princes that letters of marque and reprisal were issued to private persons
authorizing them to recapture from foreigners goods that had been
wrongfully taken by those foreigners. There were no judicial proceedings
prior to the issuance of the letters, thus there could be, and presumably
were, serious questions about the "wrongfulness" of the original taking
and the propriety of the supposed "recapture." Moreover, it was rarely
possible to assure that the goods "recaptured" were identical with the
goods originally taken, and it was but a small step to issue letters of mar-
que and reprisal ("licentia marcandi" in 1295) for the taking not necessa-
rily of the original goods, but of any goods up to the value of the original
goods; and not necessarily from the original taker, but from his fellow-
citizen.9 7
Little help in determining the precise meaning and origin of the sys-
tem exists in etymology. "Reprisal" comes from Latin via French and
means "re-taking." It is possible to speculate that the original sense in
law involved simply an authority to recapture goods wrongfully taken by
another. "Marque" seems to have an obscure origin and some relationship
to the technical old Provengal law of pledge. It has no English usage other
than in "Letters of Marque" and almost always the words "marque and
reprisal" appear together. On the other hand, as noted above, the phrase
"licentia marcandi," clearly meaning a letter authorizing a taking in the
sense of "letters of marque and reprisal," appears in a document of 1295,
and the phrase "Marquandi sue gagiandi" in an English legal document
of 1293, predating by some sixty years the earliest reference to "la lei de
Mark & de represaills" found by the compilers of the Oxford English
Dictionary in an English statute of 1354. The word "marquandi" seems
to relate not to seizures and pledges but to merchantability; the legal
power to pass title to goods."'
These shifts in the system of private "reprisal" and equivalent cap-
ture for sale to satisfy the original claim in money terms by the end of the
16th century had failed of their purpose to avoid war between the sover-
eigns over private claims. The issuance of such letters had begun to be
regarded in Northern Europe as necessarily involving the centralizing
monarchies in the attack on foreigners whom it was the legal duty of their
97. See 1 MARSDEN, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LAW AND CUSTOM OF SEA at 38, Vol. 49
(N.R.S. 1915). See, e.g., letter of 1295 (23 Edw. I) authorizing an English captain to make
capture up to the value of the goods spoiled by "the men and subjects of the realm of
Portugal."
98. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 179 defines "marque" as meaning merely "repri-
sal" and traces it back to medieval Latin "marcare," "to seize as a pledge." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 751, 1529, traces the word back to the Indo-Germanic root "merg-":
"boundary," "border" via Old Provencal "marcar," "to seize." The phrase marquandi sue
gagiandi ("marque and pledge"?) appears in a document of 1293 cancelling a similar license
that had apparently been issued earlier. I MARSDEN, supra note 97 at 19, 38-39.
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own sovereigns to protect. Thus, the issuance of letters of marque and
reprisal was becoming itself a belligerent act, justifiable only by the law of
war. The old forms persisted, and it was apparently felt not necessary
that the war be declared before the letters were issued, while it was felt to
be necessary to apply the laws of war to determine the lawfulness of the
capture. Thus, the license, the letters, held by the captor were felt to be
subject to examination and the legal status of the foreign "sovereign" is-
suing an equivalent license could be called into question. The question
would arise whenever goods or a ship purchased in Algiers or Tunis ar-
rived in England or Holland, for example, and some former owner identi-
fied it as his. This was often done in the case of a ship; Admiralty pro-
ceedings to determine rights in a vessel became the typical forum for
hearing questions of this sort. Thus, while "prize courts" in any country"
might deal with wartime captures, and the Royal Council Chamber in
England dealt with various claims involving the dignity of the Crown in
the early 17th century, ordinary Admiralty courts in England dealt with a
variety of cases arising out of peacetime capture under letters of marque
and reprisal.
The proceedings in Admiralty, Royal Chamber and Prize were pro-
ceedings before national courts; i.e., only the sovereign could authorize an
adjudication of property rights within his domain, so all the courts there,
whatever their title or form, derived from him their authority to adjudi-
cate title to property. But the substantive law they applied was necessa-
rily a law that had to be acceptable both at home and, if the new title
were to be of any use to the winner of the case, abroad. Thus rationales
or, probably more accurately, justifications based on legal logic and prece-
dent for the determinations of the tribunal, had to be found in terms that
would seem persuasive to the tribunals erected by foreign sovereigns deal-
ing with the same or similar cases. This pattern of logic and the appeal to
precedent based on incidents not tied to local circumstances and legisla-
tion might be best described as the application of "international law" to
the case, or of a special branch of municipal law, or even as a sort of
conflict of laws situation where the municipal law refers the tribunal to a
foreign system of laws (in this case "international law") which in turn
refers the questions of title to a foreign law (perhaps the law of Tunis in
the case of a Tunisian capture followed by legal proceedings equivalent to
Prize or Admiralty or Royal Chamber proceedings in Tunis). Which set of
concepts was used would depend on the complexity of the mind of the
analyst and the consistency of the particular legal model with other legal
principles important to the tribunal.
Gentili, as the Advocate of Spanish interests in England at the high-
est legal levels, apparently phrased his pleadings, when he could, as
pleadings on behalf of English merchants deriving title through Spanish
99. The practice of holding prize courts only in the territory of the capturing country as
an aspect of belligerency does not seem to have become clearly established until somewhat
later. 2 MARSDEN, supra note 97, at xii, vol. 50.
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claimants, and seems frequently to have omitted the Spanish middle step.
Thus, where he argued on behalf of English merchants against other
English merchants, he was actually doing his proper job of representing
Spanish interests. Where he could, he also described the interests of the
other side as foreign, even where it seems likely that they were as deeply
(or as shallowly) rooted in England as his own side's were.
In the first cases in his book of pleadings, Gentili argued that the
Roman writers and precedents created a law of "postliminy" that should
be applied in the Royal Chamber to permit lawful title to pass to a captor
only as a result of lawful capture during time of war, and then only after
the capture is perfected by the captive people, goods or vessel being
brought to the territory controlled by the capturing person's sovereign
and the capture declared good there. He noted as if merely in passing,
that "To Pirates and wild beasts no territory offers safety [Piratis, & feris
territorium nullum praebet securitatem]" because "Pirates are the ene-
mies of all men [Piratae sunt hostes omnium]' '10 0 and cannot perfect
their captures any more than wild beasts can. In a case involving a
purchase by English merchants directly from "pirates" in a market under
the supervision of the treasury officials of the "King of Barbary," Gentili
argued that the Roman law forbidding pirates to alter title (he did not
distinguish between title to persons and title to goods) applied in Barbary
as it applied in Turkey, the territorial descendant of the Eastern Roman
Empire of which Justinian was Emperor. That law, he argued, nullified
the purported legal effects of the English purchase even though there was
some official Barbary connection with the sale. As an additional reason in
policy for adopting the legal pattern he proposed, he argued that a con-
trary result would give to "pirates" a "very convenient place, which is
quite close to the Spanish lines of trade and occupied by English
merchants, where they may distribute their booty among their confeder-
ates. Does this make for trade?"''
On the other side, when attempting to support title derived by
purchase in Tunis from "pirates" against the Venetian original owners, he
argued that there are exceptions to the absolute rules. Under one such
exception at Roman law the payer of a ransom to "pirates" could hold the
persons ransomed until repaid the amount of the ransom; rights of pos-
session might thus be passed by "pirates" even if full rights of property
could not.' s It is not clear just who the "pirates" were (they were as-
serted to be English) or what they did or if they had any letters from a
foreign prince. Since they were not parties to the case, and Gentili's argu-
ment did not rest on asserting the legitimacy of their acts (which might
have been conformable to international law but forbidden by English mu-
nicipal law under some special definition of "piracy") these issues were
not presented.
100. 1 GENTILI, supra note 96, Bk. I, ch iv, at 15.
101. Id. at 68.
102. Id. at 101-105.
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Finally, in a case involving English possessors of "pirate" property
deriving their title through purchase at Tunis, with Gentili arguing for
the English possessors, he was forced to depart still further from his theo-
retical position that the Barbary states were "piratical" when they li-
censed takings without going to war. Admitting that his former argu-
ment 1 3 went the other way, he tried to distinguish the cases on the
ground that the involvement of the Turkish Treasury ("fiscus") in the
first case was merely a matter of form while in this case the involvement
was direct. But major stress is placed on a more solid policy ground: that
those who are safe under the law of the place of the transaction must be
safe in their rights in England also. This is a basic principle of conflict of
laws and necessary for any country involved in international trade. It
thus indicates a limit to the theoretical discretion of lawyers and states-
men to attach legal labels to suit the particular interest of the moment.
Gentili went even further: "Our countrymen have their trade with Tunis,
Algeria, and many another state taken from them by this claim of the
Venetians that those states are nothing but piratical retreats and that
there is none in them but pirates and that the very magistrates in them
are pirates too."1 4 This frankly political argument for attaching the label
"state" to the Barbary organizations, and "government" to their officials,
is consistent with Gentili's basic idea: That legal labels are attached not
on the basis of facts, but on the basis of their legal and political results by
a policy choice.
Thus Gentili's "recognition" approach had its limits. Reality and the
needs of commerce exposed it as not a rule for judgment by a third party
or scholar, but as a tool of advocacy attractive primarily to flexible-
minded lawyers and statesmen seeking a justification for actions that
might not stand moral scrutiny.
It was not even clear that the Gentili approach would help "legiti-
mate" monarchs dispose of rebels as "pirates." Not only was its legal ba-
sis shaky, but it was not clear politically that treating a dynastic claimant
as a "pirate" chief would have any significant effect in the world of af-
fairs. It was not clear, as it is not clear today, that the legal results of loss
in war are less harsh on the vanquished than defeat as "pirates." Hanging
for treason, for political convenience or influence, or for crime differ as far
as the victim is concerned only to the degree that some sense of dignity
might attach more easily to the political prisoner than to the common
criminal. Yet, it has been common in all ages that political prisoners suf-
fer far more than common criminals in times of stress. And if the alterna-
tive to fighting on in a hopeless cause was to be death on a criminal's
scaffold, it is not clear that calling "piracy" what others might call "priva-
teering licensed by an unrecognized sovereign" would always shorten the
struggle or make victory easier for the established sovereign. Thus the
103. See 1 GENTILI, supra note 104, iv.
104. Id. at 105-112.
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particular example does not seem to support the principle Gentili argued
to underlie it.
There are other implications to Gentili's approach. His approach to
"law" seems dominated by the ephemora of policy. If "piracy" is criminal,
by what law? Apparently, by giving to each sovereign the power by "rec-
ognition" or "non-recognition" to classify belligerent behavior as "piracy".
when engaged in by licensees of a foreign government or of a political
movement whose status could be denied, the privateers or soldiers of that
government or movement could be subjected not to international law, but
to the domestic ("municipal," to use the usual word of art) criminal law
of the "non-recognizing" sovereign. In theory, Gentili's approach, based
on an advocate's twist to Roman municipal law, reached the same posi-
tion as was condemned by Plutarch when considering the authority the
Senate had given Pompey to suppress the Cilician "pirates" in 68 B.C.
Now any sovereign could extend his municipal law to the high seas, and
possibly even to foreign land, by authorizing his Admiral or General or
other delegate to wipe out the "pirates" there. Clearly, this broad author-
ity would not survive the politics of Europe, where the extension of one
state's municipal law to the land claimed by another would result either
in a system of competing empires and "war" unmodified by the humani-
tarian and chivalrous law of war that was generally acknowledged in Eu-
rope as necessary, or in the acknowledgment that a European sovereign of
sufficient political power and a claim to authority along traditional lines
could not be properly denied "recognition" as such. But outside of Eu-
rope, where the competition for empire among European sovereigns and
their subjects was becoming intense, the claims of non-European rules to
the legal authority of a European sovereign could be denied without those
implications. And if the struggle grew too difficult to manage or the non-
European too strong to ignore as a political actor or too adept at finding
European allies who would "recognize" his legal capacity to license
soldiers and privateers, the European power that had overextended itself
by abusing the legal tools Gentili would place in its control could simply
withdraw for a while to reconsider the politics and law of its position.
10 5
The vistas opened by Gentili's discovery in the ancient Roman law
relating to latrones and praedones of a pattern of rules that could justify
the most extreme action against non-European political societies, and
against internal forces resisting the move towards centralized control in
the monarchies and bureaucracies of European expansion, were immense
and very attractive to the rising merchant classes.
105. Gentili's approach, which might be considered the birth of "positivism" as an op-
erating theory of international law, is most lucidly elaborated and the role of "recognition"
harmonized with current practice by Kelsen, Recognition in International Law, 35 AM J.
INT'L L. 604 (1941) and GROSS, STATES AS ORGANS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROBLEM
OF AUTOINTERPRETATION, (Lipsky ed.) reprinted in 1 L. GROSS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORGANIZATION 367 (1984).
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c. Naturalist Theory: Law as a Moral Order Governing Policy
Gentili's approach was not universally adopted by scholars. Hugo
Grotius (Huigh de Groot) was a Dutch prodigy whose reformulation of
the basic conceptions of the law that governs relations among states was
so influential that he became known as the father of modern international
law. Born in 1583, he began University studies at Leyden eleven years
later, received his Doctorate at fifteen from the University of Orleans
while accompanying John van Oldenbarnevelt on a diplomatic mission,
and was greeted on that occasion by King Henri IV as "The miracle of
Holland."10 The first edition of his masterwork, On the Law of War and
Peace, was published in France in 1625 and incorporates writings dating
back to 1604. Later editions with his own corrections in them appeared in
1631, 1632, 1642 and 1646, the last being published posthumously.'0 7 His
active life included government service in many capacities, including Am-
bassador from Queen Christina of Sweden to France in 1634-1645,118 and
the 1646 edition of On the law of War and Peace incorporates not only
vast classical scholarship and literary precision, but distills the experience
of an active statesman deeply involved in the political struggles of his
time.
Without mentioning Gentili by name, Grotius took issue with him on
at least two vital points: (1) His classical scholarship, which Grotius cor-
rected in large part; and (2) his emphasis on the power of an established
sovereign through non-recognition to place an active political community
within the legal classification "pirate." Most importantly, by describing
some characteristics of "pirates," Grotius implied a view of the legal order
which permits an objective classification; he indirectly created a defini-
tion of "pirate" quite different from the Gentili definition and equally
influential in the long run.
As to the disagreements, Grotius addressed the same preliminary
question that Gentili addressed as to whether "war" was a fitting legal
classification for all armed contentions. Quoting Pomponius and Ulpian
among others, Grotius came to no sweeping conclusions regarding "pi-
rates" on the basis of their opinions. Instead, he turned to a more direct
analysis of the characteristics of a society before it should be denomi-
nated "piratical," asserting that the label properly fits only those who are
banded together for wrongdoing but does not include societies formed for
other reasons even if also committing unjust acts." 9
Moreover, a commonwealth or state to Grotius did not immediately
cease to be such if it committed an injustice, even as a body; and a gath-
ering of pirates and brigands was not a state, even if they did perhaps
106. DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HUGO GROTIUS 3-4 (1969).
107. Id. at 23, 58. Grotius died in 1645, reportedly regretting that "by undertaking
many things, I have accomplished nothing!" Id. at 18.
108. Id. at 16.
109. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 49, Bk. III, i and ii.
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mutually maintain a sort of equality. The reason, according to Grotius, is
that pirates and brigands are banded together for wrongdoing; the mem-
bers of a state, even if at times they are not free from crime, nevertheless
have been united for the enjoyment of rights, and they do render justice
to foreigners."' The problem comes in practice when trying to distinguish
a "piratical" community from a wrong-doing state. Comparing Ulpian's
conclusions about captives not losing their liberty if taken by brigands"'
with the willingness of Ulpian to allow lawful capture to German ma-
rauding tribes on land as described in the works of Caesar and Tacitus," 2
and comparing the celebration of a Roman "Triumph" at the end of the
"war" with Illyrian indiscriminate sea-borne marauders with the refusal
of Rome to order a Triumph to end Pompey's acknowledged war with the
Cilician "pirates," '' Grotius simply reiterated his view that these legally
vital distinctions which, after all, determine rights to potentially large
amount of captured property"" and the liberty of real people, rest solely
on the criminal purpose of the marauders' association." 5
This basis for discriminating between "piratical" and non-piratical
marauding communities in the classical literature seems insupportable.
There is no evidence that the "peiraton" of Plutarch and Polybius, with
their villages, religious observances, alliances, etc., were banded together
for the purpose of plundering their neighbors any more than were the
Germanic tribes or Illyrians. Moreover, Grotius himself saw that the dis-
tinction could not survive close legal scrutiny or the need politically to
take full account of marauding societies no matter what the purpose of
their original union, once their activities and degree of organization and
their political power passed a certain point. He argued that a "transfor-
mation [mutatio]" may take place with regard to individual chieftains of
brigand bands [praedonum ducibus] who become "lawful chiefs [justi
duces]" in some cases,"' and also to whole communities by mere evolu-
tion." 7 But, instead of reconsidering his definition Grotius immediately
passed on to other things.
In short, Grotius's conception of when the word "pirate" would fit as
110. Id. at 631.
111. See supra note 55.
112. CAESAR, DE BELLO GALLICO, vi,; TACITUS, DE MORIB. GERM. 46 Ann. xii at 27; HIsT.
iv at 50. These citations by Grotius do not seem particularly strong to support his point, but
the point itself, that the Germanic tribes were treated as legal enemies in war despite the
Roman opinion that their political and social organization was contemptible, is beyond
dispute.
113. APPIAN, BELL. ILLYR. ii, 9 PLUTARCH, supra note 33.
114. See generally supra note 54. Justinian's Digest addresses the legal inability of "pi-
rates" to effect a change in the personal status of captives, but extends that legal incapacity
in the case of property only to latrones and praedones.
115. GROTIUS, supra note 49, Bk. III, ch. iii, sec. 2, para. 3.
116. Grotius does not say how this comes about legally, implying that it is not by "rec-
ognition," but by the force of natural law.
117. GROTIUS, supra note 49, Bk. III, ch. iii, sec. 8, quoting with approval St. Augustine,
De Civ. Dei IV, iv.
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a legal word of art seems to focus not on recognition or the derivation of
authority from some acknowledged prince, but from facts directly: The
word would fit robber bands on sea or land; it would not fit the Barbary
states or other complete communities, whose primary purpose of associa-
tion is lawful, i.e., defense, raising families, making war. The legal results
that flow from attaching the word seem vague indeed, since Grotius
would allow oaths and promises to "pirates" to be kept and legation to be
maintained. The only really significant passage then is the one offhand-
edly expanding the Justinian Digest's rule regarding the impossibility of a
piratical capture changing the personal status of the captive, to the very
important area of general postliminium-the disposition after recovery of
goods previously captured by "pirates."
Even in this last regard, postliminy, Grotius was not certain that its
rules and exceptions had any application to his time. The expansion of
organized political societies in peaceful contact with each other had, in
his optimistic view, made the Roman law of postliminy obsolete: A lawful
capture in war followed by prize proceedings would legally change title to
captured goods; an unlawful capture in war or the lack of a legal proceed-
ing similar to prize court proceedings in which the various claimants to
the goods would have an opportunity to dispute the lawfulness of the cap-
ture, the contraband nature of the goods and their actual ownership and
destination, would not change the title, and the loser could reclaim his
goods if he could in fact recover them. A lawful capture outside of war he
regarded as impossible.
But what, then, about seizures by the Barbary corsairs? Were those
"states" in a permanent status of war with the states of Europe? Could
their licensees' seizures and their magistrates' legal procedures confer ti-
tle on the corsairs and thus on the European merchants who eventually
bought the goods? Or were they "pirates" who, by the ancient Roman
law, could not get title to goods however elaborate their legal proceed-
ings? Or were they "states" not at war whose depredations could give
them some rights of possession, but with regard to whom the law of post-
liminy should be revived to clarify precisely what those rights were and
against whom they could be asserted? Grotius reported without comment
a judgment of the highest court in Paris delivered while he was writing
[presumably shortly before 1625):
The decision held that goods which had belonged to French citizens,
and had been captured by the Algerians, a people accustomed in their
maritime depredations to attack all others, had changed ownership by
the law of war, and therefore, when recaptured by others, became the
property of those who had recovered them."8
Despite Grotius's seeming to doubt the legal strength or practical wisdom
of the Paris decision, and bearing in mind that his merely recording it
118. Supra note 49, at Bk. III, ix at 19(2). This language appears in the Amsterdam
(Blaeu) edition of 1632. It appears in all editions after 1632.
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added greatly to its weight in those days when there were no formal court
reports and a necessarily different concept of stare decisis, (i.e., the bind-
ingness of common law decisions on later courts) from the current'con-
cept, the inclusion of this judgment in his book may indicate Grotius's
own uneasiness with the classifications that his logic and moral percep-
tion of the legal order had led him to. Of course, if there were no moral
content to the law but only form, the decision was clearly correct: Algiers
met the criteria of statehood by Grotius's own definitions, and the proce-
dures of legal title transfer by the law of Algiers were not questioned.
Moreover, presumably both the former owner and the owner deriving title
through the sale in Algiers were innocent of the taking and certainty in
the law seems always to have been more important for practical men of
affairs and merchants than its conformity to an abstract ideal of morality;
a decision against Algiers would have had to come in the form of a deci-
sion against a merchant who presumably had his insurance or other 17th
century risk-sharing arrangement to fall back on. It is only the moral feel-
ing that such takings seemed more like robbery than like war or tax en-
forcement that seemed bothersome, and that sense of wrong came from
an analogy to the municipal law of robbery that seems misplaced in an
age when privateering was the normal way to recover the loss due to the
acts of foreigners abroad. Perhaps there was an undercurrent of yearning
for Empire, the imposition of Dutch order on the world, or at least on the
non-European part of it. Perhaps it was a deeper sense of order felt in-
creasingly as the excitement of trade and travel combined with classical
learning began to stir European scholars. But this is speculation.
The practical diplomat's position expressed by implication through-
out De Jure Belli ac Pacis, that facts and the needs of politics and moral
order dictate the legal classifications that must be attached to situations,
contrasts strongly with Gentili's position that lawyers and politicians can
apply the labels best suited to their legal and political needs by a simple
exercise of will. Under Grotius's analysis, rebels at a fairly early stage,
when their independent existence, at least as a community capable of bel-
ligerency, could be objectively determined, must be treated as a legal en-
tity exercising belligerent rights under international law. That position, of
course, suited very well the position of the Netherlands rebelling from
Spain. Gentili, the Spanish advocate in London's Royal Council Chamber
sitting in Admiralty insisted that only a license from a recognized sover-
eign could authorize the exercise of soldiers' or privateers' privileges, thus
that legitimate sovereigns attempting to suppress rebellion could treat
the rebels as criminals, even "pirates," with whatever legal results could
be drawn from that classification, without raising any questions of inter-
national law.
Under the analyses of both Grotius and Gentili, robber bands not
purporting to have any license could be treated as "pirates," but the
legal result of this was not to treat "pirates" directly as Roman law" la-
trones" or "praedones." It was to justify attaching the label "pirate" to
those robber bands that would have been called "latrones" or
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"praedones," but not "pirata," before the great reanalysis of the late
16th century. Whatever the Roman law treatment of "latrones" and
"praedones," the effect of this was to refer the treatment of those now
called "pirates" back to the municipal law systems of the labeling states,
presumably by unconscious analogy to the primacy of Roman municipal
criminal law in questions involving the disposition of those whom the Ro-
man law called "latrones" or "praedones."
There is another aspect to the Grotian view of the international soci-
ety of the time that must be mentioned. Despite Grotius' reputation as an
able advocate for seas open to all," 9 in De Jure Belli ac Pacis the more
extreme arguments, under which Portuguese monopoly treaties with the
Sultans of the Malay Archipelago and their enforcement against third
states were denominated criminal, 20 were dropped and Grotius concluded
that:
[Slovereignty over a part of the sea is acquired in the same way as
sovereignty elsewhere, that is, . . . through the instrumentality of per-
sons and of territory. It is gained through the instrumentality of per-
sons if, for example, a fleet, which is an army afloat, is stationed at
some point of the sea, by means of territory, insofar as those who sail
over the part of the sea along the coast may be constrained from the
land no less than if they should be upon the land itself.'2 '
Thus the basis for the extension of municipal criminal law to the activi-
ties of foreigners on at least parts of the sea was laid in theory. The the-
ory was that of effective occupation-the power in fact of a sovereign to
dominate a part of the sea and apply his law there as he did on land; a
power that could be exercised not by theoretical claims, but by the use of
military force. Argumentative support for this position was found in vari-
ous Greek and Roman precedents, 2 although the example of the Roman
119. In 1604 Grotius drafted an argumentative brief to justify the Dutch seizure in the
Straits of Singapore of a Portuguese "prize" at a time when the Dutch did not claim bellig-
erent rights against Portugal. Basing his argument of a "natural" right of trade and thus the
inadmissibility in law of Portuguese monopoly treaties with the Sultans of the Malay Archi-
pelago, Grotius concluded that the Portuguese actions were criminal and that Dutch coun-
termeasures could properly include captures in reprisal. I GROTIus, DE JURE PRAEDAE COM-
MENTARIUS 327 (Williams and Zeydel trans. 1950); Dumbauld, supra note 106, at 23-56;
RUBIN, INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF THE MALAY PENINSULA 29-32 (1974).
120. In 2 GROTIus, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS 147 (Williams & Zeydel transl.
1950) the word "pirate" is used where, in supra note 119 and here, I have used the word
"criminal." It is not certain that either is correct. Volume II of the set contains a photo-
graphic reproduction of the actual Latin manuscript, and in the page corresponding to p.
327 of the translation in Volume I, I cannot find the word pirata or any of its derivatives.
The word latro does appear but not in a place that seems to correspond to either of the two
places in which the translators have used the word "pirate." Grotius' handwriting seems
clear enough, so it would be well to be cautious about this translation and its use of the
word "pirate."
121. GRoTIus, supra note 49, at Bk. II, Ch. iii, para. 13(2).
122. E.g., Athenian claims asserted against Megara in THUCYDIDES, supra note 7, IV,
cxviii; and Dio Cassius' mention of "all the sea which belongs to the Roman Empire." D.
CASSIUS, ROMAN HISTORY, XLII.
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Senate conferring monarchical powers on Pompey in 68 B.C. is not cited.
Thus, as Gentili had found a legal rationale for the extension of munici-
pal law to foreign territory, so Grotius, reversing his earlier position as
the sea power of The Netherlands increased, found a rationale for the
extension of municipal law by any state with a warship to that part of the
sea within the military control of that warship.
d. Some Implications
It may thus be seen that the word "piracy" entered modern English
usage in a vernacular sense to cover almost any interference with prop-
erty rights, whether licensed or not, and was applied as a pejorative with
political implications but no clear legal meaning. The word in its Latin
form entered the vocabulary of lawyers concerned with public order in
the late 16th and early 17th century as a synonym for action, whether or
not related to property rights, which was conceived to be unauthorized
within the legal system posited by the lawyers using the term. Thus, it
could be applied to "rebels" violating the constitutional order of a single
country; persons within the allegiance of one monarch acting against that
monarch under the purported authority of another monarch; foreign pri-
vateers whose property rights were being denied; or even the officials of a
political society denied legal status as a person subject to the "interna-
tional legal order," as defined by each ruler in Christendom for himself,
with the legal effect that the officials of that "non-state" would be re-
garded in the denying state as lacking the legal power to change property
rights or carry on a legal "war" or prescribe law in any territory. In its
most expansive meanings, no implication of criminality existed; it was not
a crime by any law to be an official of an unrecognized political society.
On the other hand, an individual acting against the criminal law, or the
law regarding "treason" or "mutiny," of a state could not exculpate him-
self from the operation of that law by claiming a license to act issued by
an unrecognized "government." A link between individual criminality and
the international legal order was thus put in place, as the existence of
political groups outside the legal order, "outlaw" groups, meant that ac-
tion taken pursuant to the "outlaw's" authority was, as far as an official
within the legal order was concerned, unauthorized and, if that action vio-
lated a rule of law of the enforcing official, and occurred within his per-
ception of his jurisdiction to enforce the rule, could be punished regard-
less of the link to an "outlaw" organization.
To follow the evolution of this conception further, it is necessary not
only to understand the fundamental difference in the approaches to de-
fining the legal order taken by "naturalists" and "positivists," but to
know that as governmental control tightened with the rise of a secular
legal order in Europe based on effective control and ambition, the outer
limits of national assertions of jurisdiction to prescribe rules of property
and criminal behavior were explored. Some of those limits have already
been mentioned, as it was pointed out that legal words that did ot reflect
reality may have governed some statesmen's actions, but that legal policy
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as well as political action lost persuasiveness and effectiveness as it de-
parted from reality as perceived by those whose actions were supposed to
be influenced by it. As the vice of "naturalism" is to attribute legal force
to the merely moral commands that the lawyer or statesman would like to
be law but which is denied by others, so the vice of "positivism" is to
treat as if real the model built by mere words to reflect what the lawyer
or statesman would like to be real rather than what actually is. Whereas
"naturalism" imputes consensus where there may be none, "positivism"
can lead to solipsism-an emphasis on the arbitrary aspects of consent as
the basis of the law-making process, and a retreat to "de jure" dreams of
power.
In any case, in addition to its usage in the international legal order,
the word "piracy" in the 16th and early 17th century was acquiring a
meaning in the municipal legal orders of the countries of Europe whose
views of law were to dominate sophisticated legal thought for the next
four hundred years. It is impossible to understand the evolution of the
conceptions of "piracy" in international law without first understanding
not only some rudiments of the conception of the international legal or-
der and some legal theory, but also it is necessary to consider the munici-
pal law usage, particularly in connection with municipal criminal law and
its jurisdiction to apply to the acts of foreigners abroad, and municipal
property law and the need to mesh that law with foreign property law so
that private property crossing national boundaries remain secure in the
possession of the foreign "owner." We now turn to that.
D. English Municipal Law and Piracy in the Renaissance
1. Introduction
It is beyond the powers of a sole scholar in reasonable time to ana-
lyze the municipal laws that might relate to the conception of "piracy" of
all countries, or even all European countries, or even a few major Euro-
pean countries. It is fortunately possible to trace the municipal law of
England" 3 as it relates to "piracy" from the time it began to emerge from
the obscurity of time and the vagaries of medieval records, through the
great formative days of Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) and Sir William
Scott (Lord Stowell) (1745-1836) to modern times. As in the examination
of classical sources, it is necessary to begin with a word of caution. The
word "pirate" does not appear with a precise meaning in English legal
literature until the 16th century, and attempts to trace the law regarding
"piracy" back beyond that time all seem to assume that other legal words
carried the identical meaning." ' The assumption may be correct, but it is
123. It was the law of England that became the most influential set of prescriptions and
was administered by the most wide ranging system of naval activity and courts. This system
lies at the roots of American conceptions of the interplay between the municipal law of
"piracy" and international law.
124. It is not proposed in this place to trace the word or the concept (if there is any
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not convincingly argued in any known source despite the extraordinary
volume of writing devoted to the history of the English law relating to
"piracy." Typical of the confusion, and worth mentioning only because of
the eminence and scholarly reputations earned by the people involved, is
the elaborate history of the English and international laws of "piracy" by
Chief Justice Cockburn in Regina v. Keyn1 2 5 and the compilations of doc-
uments by Reginald G. Marsden. 2 6 In the first, Lord Cockburn refers"
in some detail to two cases of Common Law indictment for "piracy" in
the time of Kings Edward II and Edward III. In fact, the word does not
seem to appear in any of his quotations. 128 Marsden, while reproducing
several documents that use the word in the 14th century and even earlier,
notes:
As a legal term "piracy" belongs to a later date. The Latin word is
common from the first, but it was not always used in an evil sense. In
1309 wines are stated to have been captured "more piratico;" in 1353
"piratae et alii inimici nostri" are spoken of . . ., and in 1359 one
Robert Blake, who robbed a ship at sea, is called "pirata". . . But in
the twelfth century ships in the service of William II are spoken of as
"piratae"-"jam mare munierat piratis . . .; Anglici vero piratae qui
curam maris a rege susceperant . . .;" and in 1324 Edward II pre-
pared for war "Admiralos et piratas super mare constituendo" . . .
Before the latter part of the 14th century robbery at sea seems to
have been dealt with in the King's courts as one and the same crime
as robbery on land; and so of murder and assault. The records do not,
discrete concept) of "piracy" in non-legal English usage. It might be useful to those so in-
clined to mention that the earliest trace of the concept seems to be in the 8th century A.D.
epic BEOWULF, see Chickering, BEOWULF; A DUAL LANGUAGE EDITION.
125. Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex.D. 63 (1876); reprinted in 2 BRITISH INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES (hereinafter cited as B.I.L.C.) 701, at 756-800. In this 7-6 decision, the majority held
that the laws of England did not apply to foreigners in foreign ships even in England's
territorial waters in the absence of a clear expression by Parliament that the law was in-
tended to apply beyond land (except to British flag vessels).
126. MARSDEN, SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY (ed. 1894, 1897); MARSDEN,
supra note 97.
127. Cockburn relied heavily on HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 77 (1685 ed.), but does not
seem to have checked Hale's sources. Hale in fact refers to "Piracy" and "depredation upon
the Sea" as a species of "petit treason, if done by a [British] subject." Hale implies without
any evidence that it was triable at common law until the Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III
statute 5 c. 2 (1352). But his source is clearly Coke, who in his THIRD INSTITUTE, emphasized
not the "piracy" aspect of the offense, but its relationship to the law of "treason," limiting
the jurisdiction of British Common Law courts to the jurisdiction they had in other cases of
"petit Treason" and in no way implying any purview over the acts of foreigners outside of
England. See infra note 193. Aside from this possible unintended implication in Hale, there
was no doubt that Hale knew that the offense of "piracy" was triable only at Civil Law, not
Common Law, in England from 1352 to 1536. "Civil Law" was the body of law administered
by Admiralty and some other non-Common Law courts of England. Thus, to the degree
Cockburn meant to imply that "piracy" in any way pertinent to the case of foreign actions
on board a foreign ship was historically an offense against English Common Law, he was
certainly wrong with regard to actions after 1352, and probably wrong with regard to actions
before then.
128. Regina v. Keyn 2 B.I.L.C. 759.
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to the present writer, appear to support the view insisted upon by
some of the judges in Reg. v. Keyn . . . that piracy has from the first
been recognized by the law of England, as a crime distinct from rob-
bery and murder on land." '
On the other hand, Marsden himself used the word "piracy" in head-
notes to various documents in which neither the word nor any clear con-
cept appears; his indexes use the word to refer to cases that seem to have
nothing to do with the word or any clear concept of "piracy," and in at
least one place in his table of contents he refers to a document that seems
irrelevant in both word and sense to anything related to "piracy" and for
which he does not use the word in his own headnote."3 ° Occasionally he
uses the word to translate Latin documents in which the word "pirata" or
its derivatives does not appear; since his own note quoted above indicates
his awareness of how deceptive that can be, the practice is inexplicable.
In these circumstances, and finding similar doubts and problems to at-
tend reference to other deservedly reputable works,"' it seems necessary
to return once again to primary sources, so happily collected by Marsden,
hoping only that the reprints purporting to set out original language are
more accurate than the translations.132
There are at least three analytically distinct problems that must be
seen clearly before it is possible to understand the growth of English law
relating to "piracy" and its relationships to international law. First, there
is the question of jurisdiction: Is there a court in England empowered by
English law to consider the case? Second, there is the question of sub-
stance: Is the particular act complained of a violation of English law?
Third, there is the question of the reach outside of England of the pre-
scriptions of English law and the enforcement jurisdiction of English
courts. Each of these problems contains within it a whole host of subsidi-
ary questions and the answers to any one of them change the pattern in
ways that effect the whole problem and, indeed, the perceptions of all
three problems. Because the interplay of these three problems is so com-
plex, and the implications of tracing any particular pattern of legal be-
havior in disregard of the entire picture are so destructive of coherence, a
basically chronological approach will be taken.
In the earliest documents, as noted above, the word "pirate" (the
documents are in Latin, the word "pirata") and its derivatives are not
used in any sense pertinent to this study. Indeed, Marsden's headnotes to
documents of 1216 and 1228 relating to a ship "piratically captured" and
"A pirate hanged" do not reflect either language or concept in the docu-
129. I MARSDEN, supra note 97, at 99-100.
130. Id. at 2, 6, 10, 31, 46, 74, 89, 136, 371, 388, 391. This list is not exhaustive.
131. E.g., HOLDSWORTH, A HIsToRY oF ENGLISH LAW (1922-1928).
132. Since in some cases Marsden modernizes the spellings, and in others he seems to
prefer what seem quaint and false antique spellings, it is impossible to be certain about the
accuracy of his reprinted "original" texts without duplicating his entire research; a patent
impossibility at this time.
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ments reproduced. In the first 3M King John directs his port bailiffs to find
and deliver to its owners on presentation of proof of ownership a ship and
goods alleged to have been diverted, and to hold for further action those
in whose hands the ship and goods may be found. The case may involve
maritime embezzlement and in any case seems a civil rather than a crimi-
nal matter with an undifferentiated legal power in the King to resolve
both civil and criminal aspects of it. In the second, the criminal charge for
which one Willelmus de Briggeho was hanged involved consorting with
general evil-doers who robbed a ship off the port of Sandwich (". . . Wil-
lelmus de Briggeho, suspensus postea pro consensu malefactorum navis
depredate ante Sandwicum. ,)..3, Not only is the word "pirata" or its
derivatives not used, but again the facts are so unclear as to make any
conclusions doubtful. All the people involved might well have been En-
glish, the vessel robbed might have been English, the location seems to
have been mentioned for the purpose of identifying the incident, rather
than as significant to establish any court's or nation's jurisdiction, and
the location is so closely linked with a bit of land clearly within the realm
of England that it is impossible to say that any concept of extending that
jurisdiction seaward was involved.
The earliest reference to an international incident in the modern
sense appears in a document of 1289. King Edward I by that document
established a Commission to inquire into "certain trespasses [transgres-
siones]" committed by Englishmen against some Frenchmen and com-
plained of by the King of France. The Commissioners were directed to
"cause due restitution to be made of the goods."' 3 5
Apparently private recapture, self-help, was the normal remedy of
seamen despoiled of their property in those rough times, and well into the
next century, 36 but there is mention of letters of marque in documents of
1293 and 1295 indicating at least a Royal attempt to get control over the
activities of his mariners when foreign ships might become involved and
protests from foreign princes could be expected. 37 In the latter case, the
letter ("licentia marcandi") granted an English petitioner the legal right
at the law of England to take back from Portuguese "sons of perdition"
the value of goods seized by them under license of the King of Portugal,
who is alleged to have got a tenth of the booty. It is noteworthy that the
English license is not directed against the particular people who took the
English goods, but against any subjects of the realm of Portugal. What
seems to have been involved was not an attempt to get control of robbery
at sea, but of private legal remedies; to limit the rights of English victims
133. 1 MARSDEN, supra note 97, at 2.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id. at 10-11.
136. Id. at 8, 69. Marsden interprets these documents of 1276 and 1341 as involving the
King in suits before his own Common Law courts for a share of the value of a "prize" taken
by English seamen without license of the Crown. The King apparently lost.
137. Id. at 19, 38-39. See supra notes 101, 102.
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to the equivalent of restitution for injury done by a foreigner, and to
avoid as far as possible committing the public forces and resources of the
Crown to the petty struggle.
It was about this time that the post of "Admiral" was established in
England as a magnate authorized to oversee the issuance of letters of
marque and reprisal and their due performance and ultimate
cancellation.SS
It is not clear what the source of substantive law was that the Admi-
ral was supposed to apply. The Commissioners of 1289, responding to
complaints by the King of France against English seamen, were directed
to make the restitution "in accordance with the law and custom of our
realm," England.' In 1361, a prior commission 14 0 to try the case in a
Common Law court (the accused having been caught in England with
their booty) was revoked and replaced by a commission authorizing "our
Admirals" to try the case "according to the maritime law.' 4 ' But the
"maritime law" is not likely to have been conceived as a law foreign to
England. The great Code of the Laws of Oleron, compiled in a small is-
land within the feudal lands of Eleanor, Duchess of Guienne, the wife of
Henry II and mother of Kings John and Richard I, had been promulgated
by her for Guienne in the Gascon tongue, promulgated with revisions
then in England by Richard and John, re-issued by Henry III in 1266,
and confirmed by Edward III in 1329.'42 They were distinguished from
the Common Law of England by the very fact of royal promulgation as a
Code; the power of interpretation was given to the Admirals as benefi-
ciaries of royal patronage rather than Common Law judges with their own
traditions of independence and the legal power to develop custom, as dis-
tinct from statutory or decree law, in both criminal and civil matters.
Presumably the merchants most directly concerned with the terms of
maritime law preferred this system also, since their interests could more
easily be pressed at the royal court or with a royal administrator, the
Admiral, than with Common Law judges when a change in the law or its
interpretation was sought in the interest of English sea-borne commerce.
Thus, when a commission of 1374 directed the leading administrators of
England's Southeastern coast to hear and determine various criminal
matters arising at sea along the coasts, "supra mare per costeras," of
Kent (the word "piracy" is not mentioned: the list of offenses included
138. Id. at 19, (revoking a letter of "marque or reprisal" (marquandi seu gagiandi) in
1293); id. at 38-39, (informing the administrators of the realm of the proper issuance of
letters of marque by "our nephew, John of Brittany" in 1295); id. at 88-89 (transferring the
trial of English malefactors from the Common Law courts to the jurisdiction of the Admi-
ral's court because the robbery had occurred at an unspecified place at sea, not within any
particular shire of England in 1361-it is not clear whether this case involved any foreigners
or letters of marque.)
139. Id. at 10-11.
140. Id. at 84-88.
141. Id. at 88-89.
142. 1 Peters, Admiralty Decisions ...app. at iii(1807).
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the Common Law and non-legal words "robberies, depredations, discords
and slayings")1 43 it seems significant that the law to be applied was "the
law and custom of our realm of England and . . . the law of the sea.""'"
The implication is not that the law of the sea is different from the King's
law in England, but that it is different from the other law of England, the
Common Law which includes its own custom. The reference to the "law
of the sea" pointedly omits any reference to custom.
The word "pirate" enters the English legal vocabulary via Latin com-
missions in the 15th century. The first direct legal use of the word ap-
pears to have been in an order of Henry VI in 1443 directing the restitu-
tion to Englishmen of goods taken from them by "pirates."I" The context
is purely civil-a question of property rights, not of crimes, and the word
seems to be used in a pejorative, not a technical, sense. Similarly, a Proc-
lamation by Henry VII in 1490 mentions:
divers and monyfold spoliations and robberies .. uppon the se unto
the said subgettis of the said most high and myghty princes [of Eng-
land and various foreign places] . . . as well by their enemyes as by
other pirattis and robbers, which, as it is said, daily resorte into divers
portes and places of this his realme of England, and ther be suffered
to utter and sell their prises, spoiles, and pillages . . .146
This seems to classify the "pirates" with "enemies" as well as with "rob-
bers," and classifies what might be lawful spoils with the booty of wrong-
ful takings. Significantly, the Proclamation does not purport to apply the
law of England or the "law of the sea" or "maritime law" to the first
takers of the goods. To discharge the King's international obligations to
his fellow princes it takes a strictly territorial approach, commanding
that:
[N]o manner of persons ... from henssforth comfort, take no
receyve, in any ... places of this his realme any of the said mysdoers,
ne any merchandisez or goodes by them spoiled or takyn. .. uppon
payn of forfeiture of the same merchaundises . . . or to the value
thereof, for restitution to be made to the parties grevid, and uppon
payn of imprisonment . . . at the Kinges will. 47
The command is directed at Englishmen and perhaps foreign merchants
only when they are in England; punishment for the "enemies," "pirates"
and "robbers" is not prescribed, but only for the receivers of their goods
in England.
The earliest reference to "pirates" in a context that seems to attach
specific legal results to their activities seems to be a Latin letter of ap-
pointment by Henry VIII in 1511 to John Hopton, who was directed to:
143. 1 MARSDEN, supra note 97, at 100-101.
144. Id. at 101-102.
145. Id. at 132-134. The Latin original uses the word pirata at 135.
146. Id. at 145-146.
147. Id.
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[S]eize and subdue all and singular such spoilers, pirates, exiles, and
outlaws [praedones, pirates, exules, et bannitos] wheresoever they
shall be seized, to destroy them and to bring all and singular of them,
who are captured, into one of our ports, and to hand over and deliver
them, when so brought in, to our commissioners . . ."'
Whether or not this instruction was actually intended to apply to foreign-
ers in foreign vessels, or only to Englishmen and persons of any allegiance
in English vessels, is not clear. Nor is it clear how far from the coasts of
England Hopton was expected to range; he appears to have confined his
activities to areas within easy sail of English ports" 9 and the more gen-
eral language of the letter of appointment may never have been intended
to reach farther. Moreover, the degree to which the commissioners men-
tioned in the letter had jurisdiction in derogation of Admiralty courts and
Common Law courts, whether in fact there were Admiralty courts func-
tioning throughout the period, are questions it is impossible to resolve
without what appears excessive research.'
The first attempt to organize the administration of justice regarding
maritime English offenses and have it apply in a regular way, through
permanent tribunals instead of through ad hoc tribunals set up under ad
hoc commissions of the King, was not until 1535."' The Preamble to that
statute says:
Where pirates, thieves, robbers and murders upon the sea, many times
escape unpunished, because the trial of their offences hath heretofore
been ordered before the admiral, or his lieutenant or commissary, af-
ter the course of the civil laws, the nature whereof is, that before any
judgment of death can be given against the offenders, either they
must plainly confess their offences, (which they will never do without
torture or pains) or else their offences be so plainly and directly
proved by witnesses indifferent, such as saw their offences committed,
which cannot be gotten but by chance at a few times, because such
offenders commit their offences upon the sea . . 2"
To cure these legal problems, the statute provides that all "felonies, rob-
beries, murders and manslaughters" should henceforth be tried by special
Commissions using the forms of the Common Law, under which convic-
tion and execution were easier. The word "piracies" is not used in the
operative part of the text.
Section IV of the statute of 1535 allows for an unlicensed taking at
sea not to be considered criminal if only necessities of the voyage were
148. Id. at 146-147.
149. Id. at xv, xviii.
150. Id. at 149, where it is indicated that the Admiralty courts had been allowed to
atrophy and were revived only in 1520.
151. 27 Hen. VIII ch. 4 (1535); reprinted in 4 Pickering, The Statutes at Large 348.
(1763).
152. Id. at 348-349. The 18th century English must be Pickering's transliteration. The
original language is not given in this source. Presumably it was identical with the language
quoted below from the Preamble to 28 Hen. VIII ch. 15 (1536).
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taken, and a written promise to pay for them was given and redeemed
within four months if the taking were "this side of the straits of Marroke"
or 12 months if on the other side (in the Mediterranean). There is no
mention of takings across the Atlantic or on the other side of the Straits
of Magellan; but then Drake had not yet made his circumnavigation. The
statute is silent as to the nationality of the taker or the victim, or the
nationality of the vessels. Nor does it deal with the defense of vessels
anywhere. It appears to envisage the arrest in the normal Common Law
fashion of accused malefactors in England; it thus merely replaces the
discretionary Admiralty courts, using Civil Law procedures, with tribu-
nals (Commissions) to be appointed and to use Common Law procedures
outside both Admiralty and Common Law systems in England without
affecting the normal rules of jurisdiction.
The statute of 1535 was superseded the following year by a nearly
identical statute, 28 Hen. VIII c. 15 (1536).' The Preamble to the stat-
ute of 1535 referred to "pirates, thieves, robbers and murders." The Pre-
amble to the statute of 1536 refers to "traitours pirotes theves robbers
murtherers and confederatours." Presumably, "traitours" and "confeder-
atours" were added to the list to take account of evolving Common Law
thought that wanted to classify "piracy" as an Admiralty term for breach
of feudal relationships, equivalent to the master-servant bond in days
when status seemed more important legally than contract ties. Under the
laws of Oleron, the master of a vessel had some of the legal powers of a
feudal superior over his crew. 54 Thus, "traitours" and "confederatours"
(i.e., conspirators, those who join together to commit a wrongful act)
would relate to passengers and crew within the vessel, and seem to refer
to what today would be called "mutineers."' 5 5 Like the statute of 1535
the statute of 1536 drops the word "pirate" ["pirotes"] in its substantive
terms:
All treasons felonyes robberies murders and confederacies, hereafter
to be comytted in or uppon the see, or in any other haven ryve creke
or place where the admyrall or admyralls have or pretende to have
power auctorities or jurisdiction, shall be equired harde determyned
and judged in such shires and places in the realme as shall be lymyt-
ted by the Kynges Comission or Comissions to be directed for the
same, in like fourme and condicioun as if any such offence or offences
hadd been comytted or done in or uppon the lande; and such commis-
sions shall be ... directed to the admyrall [or his delegates] . . .and
153. Id. at 441-443; 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 913-915 (Spec. Supp. 1932).
154. See supra note 127; See supra, note 142, the laws of Oleran arts. V-VII, XII-XIII,
XIX. The blend between mere contract service and a status relationship entered into by
contract (as the feudal relationship was enter#ed into by contract forms also) is too complex
to analyze here. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898).
155. "Mutiny" enters the legal vocabulary in England only with the adoption of the
Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 Will. & Mary ch. 5 (1689), referring not to mariners, but to soldiers
who "excite, cause, or join in any mutiny or sedition in the army, or shall desert their majes-
ties' service in the army."
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to iij or iiij such other substantiall persons as shall be named or ap-
pointed by the lorde chauncellor of Englande . . .Il
The legal words of art did not include any reference to international
law or Roman law or, indeed, any concept of "piracy" except in the non-
technical recitation of the preamble; instead the words of art of the En-
glish Common Law of crimes were used. It is in that context that the
word "felonyes" makes sense; the distinction being drawn involved the
technical English law of "high treason," "petit treason" and Common
Law crime, as yet incompletely distinguished from trespass, or tort
actions. 15
The extraterritorial reach of this legislation was no more clear than
before. It was apparently restricted to the places in which the Admiral by
the law of England had legal power, authority or jurisdiction. That appar-
ently included vessels flying the English flag wherever they might be
afloat, including foreign ports and the navigable waters of England.15 But
it was never clear whether it extended to foreign vessels on the high seas
or on internal navigable waters of England, which were within the Com-
mon Law courts' jurisdiction. The case of Regina v. Keyn showed at great
length that there was considerable doubt, ultimately resolved rightly or
wrongly against the Admiral's pretentions, if he had any, that it extended
to foreign vessels outside England's Common Law jurisdiction even
within three miles of the English coast.
The system remained fundamentally unaltered through the entire
period of this study. 5 9
2. In Rem Property Adjudications
The earliest technical legal usage of the word "pirate" in an English
court reflects the Roman law origins of the "Civil Law" applied in those
English courts not governed by the "Common Law" of England.'60 In
156. 4 Pickering, supra note 157.
157. "A mere common crime, however wicked and base, mere wilful homicide, or theft,
is not a felony; there must be some breach of that faith and trust which ought to exist
between lord and man." 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 154, at 304. By Coke's time
"felony" had come to cover all serious Common Law offenses, but not Admiralty offenses
and not treason, which had become a statutory offense with its own procedures. See COKE,
THIRD INSTITUTE 15; See also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND. As to the relationship between "tres-
pass" and "felony," see id. at 511-512.
158. The precise territorial boundary between Admiralty jurisdiction and the Common
Law jurisdiction evolved over time. The first boundary was merely between things done
upon the sea and things done within the realm. 13 Rich. II ch. 5 (1390). Within two years
Parliament had decided a clearer line was needed, and drew it at the bridges nearest the
mouth of the river, offenses upstream belonging to the Common Law courts and offenses
downstream to the Admiralty. 15 Rich. II ch. 3 (1392).
159. Cf. Sir William Scott, Hercules 2 Dods, Hercules 363, 165 Eng. Rep. 1511, at 1517
(1819); 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 910 (Spec. Supp. 1932).
160. See, NICHOLAS, supra note 53, at 2, 98-103; Admiralty actions based on the adjudi-
cation of property rights trace back to Roman Law, thus Civil Law, concepts. The experts in
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1553 John Clerke, "Proctor General" of the Admiralty court of England,
referred to goods "left and deposited by Henry Strangwis, Peter Kil-
ligrew, Thomas Killigrew and Baptist Roane & others .. .pirates, rob-
bers and malefactors [piratas predones et malefactores] . . .now being
under arrest."' 1 Apparently it was the goods that were arrested, not the
"piratas predones et malefactores," who had fled. The goods were confis-
cated and the various claimants were given a chance before the Admiralty
court in an in rem proceeding to prove their property rights. It is unclear
whether the denial of property rights to those who had fled (presumably
for fear of criminal prosecution in the Common Law courts or before Ad-
miralty Commissions under the statute of Henry VIII) was a reflection of
a legal conclusion that "pirates" could not possess property at English
Common or Civil Law. It might equally well have been a mere incident of
the Civil Law system of in rem proceedings under which those with
claims to property must submit those claims for adjudication in the light
of the claims of others, and failure to present a claim for whatever reason
resulted in loss of the possible rights and carried no criminal law or other
general implications.
The notion that calling the possessor of a ship a "pirate" would de-
prive him of legal rights to a ship seemed very useful to Sir Julius Cae-
sar,16 2 who applied the word to possible claimants in a series of widely
different in rem cases. For example, in 1585 the Diana was arrested at
the order of Caesar and condemned as a "pirate" ship to be sold for the
benefit of the Admiral when her Master, a Frenchman named Killie, sail-
ing under a French flag, did not appear. Killie was considered a "pirate"
by Caesar even though it seems possible that he had a French commis-
sion, or letters of marque and reprisal, authorizing in the name of France
his depredations against English ships. s3 There was no criminal action
involved.
In another case in 1598, Caesar gave title to a prior owner against a
purchaser who derived his claim to title from an Englishman "commonly,
openly, publicly, and notoriously reputed to be a pirate [articulatis pro
pirata communiter, polam, publice, et notorie reputatum fuisse et esse]"
in the complete absence of criminal proceedings or other evidence as to
the place of the taking or the circumstances surrounding it.'"
Civil Law in England were called "civilians," and sharp distinctions with elements of jeal-
ousy are evident in the attitudes of Common law judges to the Civil Law and the civilians at
this period.
161. 2 MARSDEN, supra note 126, at 84-86.
162. Like, GENTILI, supra note 88, Caesar was Italian by birth. He was the leading Brit-
ish Admiralty judge, 1584-1605. 3 Dictionary of National Biography 656.
163. 2 MARSDEN, supra note 126, at 161. Sir Julius simply recited as if proved that the
vessel was piratarum super alto mari infra jurisdictionem marittimam Admirallitatis an-
glie. He did not define "pirate," or "high seas" or his conception of the Admiral's jurisdic-
tion as it might have applied in the case.
164. 1 MARSDEN, supra note 97, at 298. It is not known why Marsden dropped "and is
[et esse]" (a pirate) from his translation, or what Laesar's evidence was for that conclusion.
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In 1608 another Admiralty judge, Thomas Crompton, used the word
in a similar way to deny title to James and John Powntis, purchasers "in
foreign parts" of Venetian goods "captured. . . by one John Ward,', and
other pirates and sea rovers" and sold to them apparently via official
channels in Algiers. The goods or their value were granted to the Vene-
tian Ambassador for the merchants he represented.' This case seems to
avoid the problem of a commission for Ward, or the possibility that his
capture was a "lawful prize" or a confiscation for non-payment of Alge-
rine transit tolls, by simply calling Ward a "pirate" and ignoring the
probable subsequent involvement of the Algerine officials in a legal trans-
action to transfer title. There was no criminal proceeding or attempt at
definition.
While not pertinent to the definition of the word "piracy," it might
be mentioned in this place that the use of that word to bring into play the
idea that stolen goods should be returned to their previous owner because
thieves by ancient principle cannot pass title they do not have, even to
innocent purchasers, created special problems with regard to the use of
the word. Without denying the superior title of the prior owner to the
title a thief might assert merely by his possession of the goods, the needs
of commerce required greater stability of title when dealing with a foreign
seaman; a merchant had to be able to buy goods from one who might
later turn out to have been a "pirate" (however defined), or a major legal
impediment would limit international seaborne commerce. The solution
to this problem appears to have been not only the easy acknowledgment
of title transfers under Barbary states law for the benefit of corsairs (or
"pirates"), but also the application in English law of the rule that:
if a Man commit Piracy upon the Subjects of another Prince or Re-
publique (though in League with us) and brings the Goods into Eng-
land, and sells them in a Market Overt; the same shall bind, and the
Owners are for ever concluded, and if they should go about in the
Admiralty to question the property, in order to restitution [sic], they
will be prohibited.167
Englishmen's goods found in England were still to be returned to their
English prior owner as a matter of statute law.'
A strange incident in 1615 demonstrates the vernacular use of the
word by the highest officials of England to refer to an Admiralty in rem
case in which the word "piracy" was not in fact used but the legal results
were drawn without it. In 1615, Captain Newporte of the Centaur invited
the Captain of the French ship L'Esperance to dinner off Cape Verde.
Newporte then seized the French ship, whose owner turned out to be the
politically influential Governor of Dieppe, Francois de Villiers Houdan.
165. Apparently the same person that had become notorious in English folk ballad at
about this time. See generally, supra note 72.
166. 1 MARSDEN, supra note 97, at 373.
167. MOLLOY, DE JURE MARTIMO, bk. I, ch. iv, para. xxi, at 12 (1677).
168. Id. at para. xx.
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The English Admiralty court under Judge Daniel Dun decreed restitution
of the vessel or its value to the French owner, ending a diplomatic crisis.
There is no evidence of Captain Newporte's authority, if any, for his ac-
tion, nor is there any known record of a criminal proceeding growing out
of the incident. But in the Privy Council Register for 11 July 1617 there
is a reference to money held "for satisfaction of a sentence given in the
Court of Admyraltie on the behalfe of Viliers Howden, a governor of
Deipe, concerning a pyracie committed upon a shipp of his by one capten
Newporte.' ' 6 9 Apparently, the word "pyracie" was used in a non-legal
sense to mean something like "unauthorized taking," with an implication
of crime; no clear legal sense seems to have been intended. The only legal
action mentioned was the one for restitution. The word "sentence" does
not seem to refer to any criminal court's action, but to the judgment of
the Admiralty court in an in rem proceeding. It is in this context that it is
possible to interpret the remark of King James I in 1624170 referring to
the East India Company as "pirates" merely for failing to pay him what
he felt was his share of their lawful captures.
3. Outlawry, Crime and Cicenser
From the mid 16th to the mid 17th centuries the word "pirate" and
its derivatives was used more and more frequently in official English doc-
uments not related to property-rights cases before the Admiralty courts,
and had acquired a meaning as a vague basis for ever-expanding English
assertions of jurisdiction. In 1569 Queen Elizabeth had by proclamation
denounced "all pyrats and rovers upon the seas" and declared them "to
be out of her protection, and lawfully to be by any person taken, pun-
ished, and suppressed with extremity." '' Until 1569 ships suspected of
involvement in "piracy" and privateering without a commission had been
treated with strict attention to English forms; they (the ships) were to be
arrested only after arriving at English ports, and Vice-Admirals were sim-
ply warned against harboring or countenancing "pirates" within their ju-
risdiction as that jurisdiction was established by their commissions.'72 An
169. 1 MARSDEN, supra note 97, at 388-394. The privy Council extract is at 394, n.1.
Quaere if this is the same Newporte mentioned in CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 34, (let-
ter no. 61 dated 28 February 1603) as having taken a treasure rumored to be worth two
million pounds in Nombre de Dios and Cartagena.
170. See supra note 80.
171. 1 MARSDEN, supra note 97, at 224, from a recital in an unsigned opinion Marsden
identifies as probably a copy of a 1579 legal memorandum from David Lewes, judge of Ad-
miralty, to the lord Admiral setting out the bases for the Admiral's legal authority. See full
text infra at note 179. This is the earliest document found setting forth a basis for what
later came to be asserted as "universal" jurisdiction in all countries to enforce their domes-
tic laws against foreign "pirates" for their acts solely directed against foreign victims. That
the roots of that concept lay in the municipal (English) law of "outlawry" and not in any
international practice or Roman law, appears to have been forgotten by later writers and
statesmen.
172. Id. at 173, n.1, paraphrasing "Instructions to Vice-Admirals of the coast," dated
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indication of the difficulties of an increasingly centralized administration
gaining legal control of English seamen continuing the ancient practice of
re-capture without a license, abusing their opportunities and making gen-
eral commerce of English as well as foreign merchants unsafe, lies in the
recitation of fact accompanying a Warrant from Queen Elizabeth to the
Warden of the Cinque Ports (the English fortified towns strategically sit-
uated on the South coast) in 1577:
Whereas there is an unyversall complainte made as well by our owne
merchaunts and fishermen, as also by other merchaunts straungers
being the subjects of our frinds and allyes, of the great number of
pyrats and sea rovers haunting and keeping the narrow seas and
streames thereof . . .; We having care that our streames should be
quyet and voyde of such malefactors, and understanding that sute
hath ben made to our previe Counsell on the behalf of divers townes
corporat of our realme, being annoyed by such pyrates and sea rovers
haunting their coasts, to have license to sett fourth shippes for the
chastening and repressing of the said malefactors, offering to do the
same at their owne adventure, proper costs and chardges. . . by these
presents do geve full power and authoritie unto you, to give and
graunte commissions under the seal of your office of the Cinque
Portes to as many, as well cities and townes corporat of this our
realme, as you shall thinke good, as also to others whom you shall
thinke such as will not abuse the same, to arme and sett fourth. . . to
purge and clere the sea coasts of such evill persons .. .13
Despite the language of outlawry in the Proclamation of 1569, the War-
rant of 1577 requires that the forms of English law be followed if any
property were to change hands as a result of the law-enforcement effort.
Persons licensed by the Warden of the Cinque Ports under this Warrant,
if they wanted any compensation for their own costs to be paid out of
"the proper shippes and goodes of the pyrats or sea rovers" they have
caught, could do so only "after they have been thereof attaynted in the
[form] of lawe as shall be thought convenyent by the [officials] of our
Exchequier."'"7 The procedure Was set out in a series of commissions:
Imprimis that the pyrats taken maye be brought to the next port, and
there presented to the Vice Admiral, . . . or the next justice of the
peace, who shall send them to the nexte gaol, their [sic: ther (there)?]
to remayne untill they be tryed by order of justice.
That the shippes and goods and merchandizes in the possession of the
pyrats be ...valued by the oth of fower honest, skilfull, and expert
persons ...and then delyvered to the custodie of the said customer
. .., their to remayne unto such tyme yt maybe appear how much
thereof shall appertaine to these pyrats, and how much to others. 7
"Customer" apparently meant "customs enforcer," i.e., person holding a
173. Id. at 216-217.
174. Id. at 217.
175. Id. at 218, setting out a sample commission.
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license to patrol the coast and see to the enforcement of English import
laws. The word "pyrat" seems to have been applied to smugglers as well
as those whose acts fell within the legal terms used in the legislation of
Henry VIII quoted above.
The term "pirate" was used also to cover Englishmen holding foreign
commissions as "privateers" without the Queen's permission. In a Procla-
mation of 1575 the situation is clearly described:
[Hier Majestie's will and pleasure is that none of her subjects should
entermeddle in anie quarrells of anie forraigne prince or subjects, ei-
ther on thone side or thother, (speciallie by sea), without her Majes-
tie's license . . . Because now of late, under pretence of those for-
raigne services, manie piracies be dailie committed and done, yea in
her Majestie's owne ports, and a great number of maryners . . . be
torned from good subjects to be pirates . . . And because her
Heighnes hathe further bin informed that divers of her officers . . .
have wincked often at theis disorders . . . express warning to all her
Heighnes' officers that whosoever shall be hereafter founde to be neg-
ligent in the apprehending of suche malefactors in the execution of
this proclamation, or shall wincke at their doinges, . . . shall not onlie
lose their offices, but shall incurr her Majestie's further displeasure,
and be suerlie punished . . .17
This Proclamation apparently rested on the assumption that "piracy"
was not illegal at international law but only at English municipal law, and
that the English jurisdiction was felt to be grounded in the relationship
between subject and sovereign, not in any jurisdiction over the acts of
foreigners. Some territorial aspect to jurisdiction seems to be implied by
the failure to distinguish between acts done in "her Majestie's owne
ports" as well as in the narrow seas (which were, in any case, regarded as
within English prescriptive jurisdiction even if only to exclude foreign
ships or make them as a legal unit obey English law without actually ap-
plying English law within them) and in the Warrant issued at about the
same time to the Warden of the Cinque Ports mentioning "oure
streames." "Piracy" seems to have meant robbery or some other crime
listed in the legislation of Henry VIII within the jurisdiction given then to
Admiralty Commissions, and not acts done by foreigners outside of that
jurisdiction. As noted above, that jurisdiction was territorial and ex-
tended to English flag vessels, but, despite the learned arguments of the
minority in Regina v. Keyn, did not at this time in practice extend to
foreign flag vessels on the high seas or foreigners within foreign vessels in
English seas.
The notion that persons holding a foreign license might be enemies
but not criminals even if acting on board English vessels or against En-
glish vessels, even if acting in English rivers and portions of the seas, may
be seen in the restriction to English subjects of the terms of the Procla-
mation of 1575. In approving the draft Warrant of 1577 Lord Burghley,
176. Id. at 202-204.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the head of Elizabeth's administrative office, indicated that this was his
conception. He wrote to the Warden of the Cinque Ports, Lord Cobham,
that if there were peace between England and Spain the entire fuss would
subside "for lack of victims." ' Further evidence that the word "pirate"
was applied in 1577 without specific meaning at international law exists
in a note by David Lewes, an Admiralty judge apparently consulted by
Lord Burghley in this matter. At the bottom of a draft letter of assistance
to Sir William Morgan ordering her Majesty's officials to help him pre-
pare for his voyage of discovery and "also (if occasion so serve) to serve
against the Turkes and Infydells," Lewes wrote "Instede of this make a
permission to take pyrates, according to her Majestie's warrant."' 7 8 It is
hard to see how "Turkes and Infydells" were necessarily criminals at En-
glish law or how English law extended to places in which the discovery of
unknown lands might be made. And there is no evidence at all that
"Turkes and Infydells" were conceived at that time as necessarily viola-
tors of international law in Europe. Indeed, it would seem that Lewes'
note was not a legal translation of Morgan's request, but a denial of that
request as it might apply to "Turkes and Infydells," restricting Morgan's
authority to whatever authority was given to commissioners under the
warrant of 1577.
The needs of English commerce and possibly imperial policy seem to
have influenced Lewes, and two years later, in 1579, he issued a legal
opinion in which the earlier documents other than the Proclamation of
1569 were ignored and the most expansive statement of English jurisdic-
tion was given to the Lord High Admiral:
First it is lawful for every man, by the lawes of the sea, to apprehend
and take pyrats, being public enemies to all estates, without authority
or commission.
Secondly, the Queen's Majesty for proclamation published in Aprill
ano 110 regni sui [15691, hath declared and denounced all pyrats and
rovers upon the seas to be out of her protection, and lawfully to be by
any person taken, punished, and suppressed with extremity.
Thirdly, the first and principall part of the Lord Admirall's office by
law is, and ever hath been, to clear the jurisdiction apperteyning to
his office, being the sea, of pyrats and rovers haunting the same; in
respect whereof he hath, and ever hath had their goods and chattels,
being condemned and atteynted for the same.
Fourthly, by his Lordship's letters patents it may appeare that' he
hath a more ample and larger power than to set forth ships to take
pyrats.'79
The implementation of this opinion, which seems to have no legal argu-
ment in it to support its conclusions of law, indicates that it was not
177. Id. at 218, note by MARSDEN paraphrasing Burghley's letter.
178. Id. at 220-221.
179. Id. at 235-236.
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taken seriously as a statement of international law by the Crown. Shortly
after it was issued, Elizabeth complained to Lewes as an Admiralty judge,
Sir Gilbert Gerrard as Attorney General, and 13 others involved in the
enforcement of the law, that the 1577 warrant had not worked well. In-
stead of simply instructing the Admiral to suppress "piracy" by seizing
"pirates" wherever he found them under the general law of the sea or as
outlaws under English law as Lewes's opinion seems to have urged, she
stiffened the enforcement in England of the English procedures by pro-
viding for small Commissions consistently with the statute of Henry VIII:
To enquire searche and trie out ... by oathes of twelve good men or
otherwise by all waies and meanes you can devise of all manner of
person or persons that have offended ... contrarie to the lawes and
statutes of this our realme or equitie and justice . . .,10
The possibility that "equitie and justice" was intended to include inter-
national law seems to have been overborne by the need to dispose of the
property of the "pirates," however defined, under the forms of English
law. Those forms were essential to the prosperity of the Admiral however
inconsistent with the view Lewes might have had as to the legal justifica-
tions at international law for individuals unlicensed by the Crown to seize
"pirates." When a fearless adventurer like Sir Walter Ralegh was in-
volved, there was no thought of his simply seizing "pirate" goods any
place. His appointment in 1585 to be "Vice Admiral" was restricted to
"the countie of Cornwall and the sea quoasts thereunto adjoyning," and
he was required to post bond against the possibility that he might fail to
make true account "of all suche piratts' goods, concelmentes, profitts, and
casualties, as shall happen to growe and rise within the precincte of the
said Viceadmirallshippe." Fully half of the "pirate" goods coming to him
in his new post was to go to his political senior, the Lord Admiral.' 81 And
in 1589 an Order in Council was issued that all English captures, with no
exceptions, must be submitted to an Admiralty court to have the lawful-
ness of the prize adjudged; failure to abide by the procedure meant that
the buyers got no title and the commission under which the prize was
taken was to be considered void.'82
There are a number of documents relating then to the growth of the
English law regarding prize and commissions, letters of marque and repri-
sal under the centralized administration Lord Burghley organized for
Queen Elizabeth. In them there is no indication that "pirates" might be
taken without a commission, 83 and by 1599 there is some indication that
the word "pirate" was acquiring yet another meaning in English, as a ge-
180. Id. at 227-229.
181. Id. at 235-236.
182. Id. at 252.
183. After Elizabeth was succeeded by James I in 1601, there was a further tightening
of the administration, and commissions to companies engaged in normal mercantile voyages
in the Mediterranean or along the African coast began specifically to include authority to
capture "pyrates." Id. at 377-378.
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neric term carrying with it the implication of criminality and applied to
English captains who ignored the rules under which the Admiral made his
living:
[H]er Majestie now commaundeth, that whosoever shall herafter in-
termeddle with, or take at sea, any shippe or vessell coming from, or
going to, any port or haven belonging to the sayd Seigneurie of Ven-
ice, or Grand Duke of Tuskane, and shall break the bulke of the
goodes of any such shipp or vessell, (though the prise be lawfull),
before the same shalbe adjudged good prize in the high court of the
Admiralty, such offendors shalbe executed as pirates, and the shippe,
with the prize also, shalbe forfeited to her Majestie.' 4
4. Coke's Synthesis
The relationship between the English municipal law regarding
"piracy" and the international law of "piracy," if there was any before
1600, received attention at the most prestigious levels of English munici-
pal law in 1615 when Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England at the
Common Law criminal court of King's Bench, presided over two cases in
which "piracy" was an issue. The reports of these cases by Rolle are im-
portant to an understanding of the English conception of "piracy" as the
word entered common legal usage and England became the world's great-
est sea power.
Marche's Case, alias Palachie's Case,iss concerned a capture of a
Spanish ship by a Moroccan official during a time when England regarded
Morocco and Spain as legally at war.'8" Acknowledged as a subject of the
King of Morocco, Palachie represented to the court that:
He is the Moroccan Ambassador to the Netherlands and that on the
sea he captured a Spanish ship (there being war between the King of
Barbary [sic] & the King of Spain) and then coming with the ship in
England, & thereupon the Spanish Ambassador complained against
him as a Pirate, & diverse Civil Law experts were commanded by the
King [of England] to give their opinions on the matter. They agree
that an Ambassador is immune from local law by the law of nature &
of Nations, but if he commits any offense against the law of nature or
of reason, he loses his immunity; not so if he offends only a positive
law of any particular country, such as laws regarding clothing, etc.
And many other questions were answered by the civilians; but as we
[the panel] 87 and other common law Justices are asked for our opin-
184. Id. at 300, Proclamation of 1599.
185. 1 Rolle 175 (1615) K.B. Easter Term. An English version sub noma. The King
Against Marsh is reprinted in 3 B.I.L.C. 767-769.
186. The captor was "Sam. Palachie." "Joseph Pallache" is mentioned in FISHER, supra
note 82, at 175, as the Moroccan commander of an Atlantic fleet three of whose prizes
reached England in 1614.
187. It is not clear whose words are thus reported by Rolle. Sir Edward Coke and Sir
John Doddridge are identified by Rolle as members of the panel. Coke gives some details
lacking in Rolle's more or less official report. Apparently the Spanish Ambassador had com-
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ions, we should say that the civilians have missed the point, because
the Defendant is being tried here for piracy, and being tried under the
statute of 28 Henry VIII cap. [15? The text has a blank space here],
which says that piracy should be tried as a felony committed on land
under the common law. And what is charged as piracy here is not
piracy nor would it be even a felony had it been committed on land
[the report repeats some words here and seems slightly garbled] be-
cause it is legal for one enemy to capture another on land. According
to our opinion and the relevant statute [which is cited] we hereby rule
accordingly, that is anybody wants to bring charges against another
under the pertinent statute [citing another] he who is robbed must
prove that he himself was a legal friend of our Lord the King, and
that he who robbed him was within the jurisdiction of our Lord the
King or in legal friendship, because if the taking was by an enemy it
was not robbery but lawful capture. As to Palachie's Case, we agree
with the civilians that the [Spanish] Ambassador could proceed
against him civilly for the goods that are here, for those are in friendly
territory, (R[olle]: I question whether it seems that by the law of na-
tions an enemy can legally take from another [in neutral territory?])
Dod. suggests that rights of reprisal might be significant; Coke sug-
gests that if goods were taken illegally and not restored, the King [of
England] might simply return them.'8 8 Coke and Dod. also said that
nobody could be hanged for piracy based on robbery on the Thames
[River] because that is within an English county [thus outside the Ad-
miral's jurisdication?]. "
In the second case, Hildebrand, Brimston, & Baker's Case,' 90 English
plained directly to the King's Council, which referred the case to the Chief Justice (Coke),
the Master of the Rolls (Doddridge) and Sir Daniel Dun (judge of Admiralty). "And the said
referees heard the Counsel learned both in the Common and Civil Laws, on both sides on
two several days in this Term: and after conference between themselves, and with others,
these points were resolved..." COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE xxvi at 152-154.
188. Id. at 154. The major doubts reported by Rolle were resolved in favor of Palachie
on the basis of a precedent pronounced by Lord Popham in King's Bench, 1605, in which a
Dutchman landing captured Spanish goods in England while England was at peace with
both Holland and Spain, was supported. According to Coke's summary: "It was resolved by
the whole Court of the King's Bench upon conference and deliberation, that the Spaniard
had lost the property of the goods for ever, and had no remedy for them in England." Coke
summarized the law:
[H]e that will sue to have restitution of goods robbed at Sea, ought by Law to
prove two things. First, that the Sovereign of the plaintiff was at the time of
the taking in amity with the King of England. Secondly, that he that took the
goods was at the time of the taking in amity with the Sovereign of him whose
goods were taken: for if he which took them was in enmity with the Sovereign
of him whose goods were taken, then it was no depredation or robbery, but a
lawful taking, as every enemy might take of another.
It seems significant that Coke does not mention commissions or letters of marque and repri-
sal to authorize the taking.
189. PALACHIE'S CASE, supra note 185. The translation from the French law of the time
is mine. The English version seems obscure in places and not to follow the original French
law.
190. 1 Rolle 285 (1615) K.B., Hilary Term.
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shipowners were trying to recover their ship in an in rem proceeding at
Admiralty. The ship and cargo had been captured by "pirates." The peti-
tioners sought the intervention of the King's Bench Common Law court
to prohibit further Admiralty proceedings, apparently fearing the Admi-
ral's interest in "pirate" goods would make it difficult for them to recover
what they felt was theirs.
Those men [petitioners] were the owners of a ship, and sent it to the
Indies to trade. On the high sea the sailors took the ship through
"Piracy" (as is assumed in the Admiralty court) and as the ship re-
turned here to the Thames the Admiral seized it and all that is on it
as "pirate goods," claiming it all for himself under the terms of his
Royal warrant, and the merchants are taking the sails and tackling
out of the ship and are suing for them in the Admiralty court. The
Petitioners now pray for a "Prohibition" to that court, to stop the
action. Coke agrees that the Admiralty has, by the grant of the King,
all "Pirate goods;" i.e., the property of pirates. But the Admiralty
does not have the goods which pirates took from other men, because
that is not within the Royal grant; the owners have those things. And
if the Admiralty wants those goods, it may not sue for them in prize
because they are within the body of a county of England, that is, on
the Thames. Dod.: If a man borrows a horse, and commits a robbery
while riding it, the horse is not forfeit; so here, the ship is not forfeit
simply because those who were in the ship committed piracy. Coke
agreed, and he asked the Petitioners if they were convicted of piracy;
to which they replied that nobody had been convicted. So the Prohibi-
tion was granted on the ground that the taking had been within the
body of a county of England.''
It seems plain from both these cases that Coke was primarily concerned
with the division of jurisdiction in England between the Admiralty courts
and the Common Law courts; that to him "piracy" was simply the Admi-
ralty word for an offense against the law of England that was based on
the "Civil Law," i.e., the Roman law based system that English courts
with extra-territorial reach applied to transactions occurring outside Eng-
land, and not the Common Law; that it carried legal results at the Civil
Law which were not the same as the legal results the same action would
have drawn at Common Law.
In summarizing the legal situation long after these cases were de-
cided, Coke addressed "Piracies, Felonies, Murders and Confederacies
committed in or upon the Sea" by first noting that James I's amnesty for
felons given on his coronation in 1602 did not extend to pirates because
theirs was not an offense at Common Law, but at Civil Law, outside the
kingdom, without the legal result of forfeiture of land or corruption of
"bloud" (i.e., disinheriting the children).'92 His entire discussion of the
substance of the offense is based on the technical construction of statu-
tory English law except for a major assertion that only subjects of Eng-
191. Translation from Rolle's law French is mine.
192. COKE, supra note 163, XLIX, at 111.
VOL. 15:2,3
THE LAW OF PIRACY
land could legally be tried for "piracy." To Coke "piracy" at Common
Law was a type of "petit treason," and those who are not subject to the
King of England cannot break the tie of allegiance, since there is no such
tie, therefore they cannot commit treason, therefore, with only minor ex-
ceptions, there cannot be a foreigner guilty of "piracy. '193 Since resident
foreigners, denizens of the realm, do come within the allegiance of the
King for some purposes, it might appear that Coke's language is some-
what too general and his conclusion too broad, but since "piracy" cannot
occur within the realm, where the Common Law applies to the exclusion
of Civil Law, that exception would not apply and Coke's analysis seems
beyond dispute. The effect of Coke's approach, which seems to set out the
traditional English position as reached by a judge concerned with ques-
tions of jurisdiction and limiting the Crown's discretion, is simply to
make "piracy" the legal word of art that Admiralty tribunals and com-
missions set up under the Act of 1536 applied to some but not all of the
"crimes" listed in that Act. As a kind of "petty treason," it would seem
that all cases of "mutiny" in an English vessel, i.e., a vessel with a master
whose authority over the ship's company and passengers is fixed by En-
glish law, could be denominated "piracy." Also, an attack by one English
vessel on another could be denominated "piracy" since both vessels would
have been conceived to have a legal existence deriving from a common
superior, the Admiral or the Crown, and an attack by one on the other
would necessarily involve a breach of legal subordination by the attacking
vessel unless otherwise authorized by the Admiral or Crown. But, if the
law regarding "piracy" were part of the criminal law of England and de-
rived from the feudal conception of treason, it could apply only to those
within the allegiance of the Crown in England, just as King John's Nor-
man knights could not commit "treason" by attacking John's English
subjects, whatever else their acts may have meant legally. Under this
"treason," personal allegiance, conception, the English Admiral's jurisdic-
tion, and thus the jurisdiction of Commissions set up under the Act of
1536, would apply only to English vessels, not to foreign vessels, in navi-
gable waters (of course, all vessels infra corpus comitatus would be sub-
ject to the Common Law courts of the Shire, not the Admiralty at all). To
Coke and the Common Law judges of England in the early 17th century,
Admiralty jurisdiction itself must then have seemed in a sense territorial,
with English ships filling the role of counties in England, and foreign ves-
sels being ruled by the municipal laws of whatever countries gave their
captains authority to command the ships' companies and passengers.
One major gap must have disturbed Coke, although no mention of it
appears in his known writings. What law governs the actions of a foreign
vessel attacking an English ship, or an English vessel without license at-
tacking a foreign ship? In both those cases, the breach of allegiance ap-
parently necessary before the label "piracy" could attach, would be pre-
193. Id. at 113.
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sent only in the case of an Englishman aboard the foreign attacker or the
fortuitous presence of an Englishman aboard the foreign vessel attacked.
In the first case, it would seem that the assault on an English vessel
would likely have been analogized to a similar assault in an English
county's territory; the foreign attacker would have been guilty of an as-
sault or robbery within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty under the Act of
1536, thus triable by a Commission; but the crime would not have been
"universal" or "law of nations" "piracy," it would have been "assault" or
"robbery" or some Admiralty term, perhaps "piracy," equivalent to that.
In the second case, there would have been no crime in England unless the
breach of the terms of a commission or letters of mark and reprisal justi-
fying the forfeiture of a deposit or other civil penalty. The gap in English
law and jurisdiction here seems to have been the basis for the difficulties
Queen Elizabeth's administration tried to solve by the Warrant of 1577,
and the path by which the vernacular word "piracy" began to enter the
legal vocabulary applied to Englishmen injuring foreigners abroad.
It should be noted that foreigners aboard English vessels were, by
Coke's notion, "denizens" within the allegiance of the King of England,
thus there was a territorial basis in the nationality of a vessel for attach-
ing English jurisdiction to some foreigners. Coke's conception of the "high
seas" (or navigable waters) did not apparently make them part of any
"territorial" part of England or trace the Admiral's jurisdiction to any
concept of territoriality other than the analogy between a vessel itself and
a bit of English territory for the purposes of jurisdiction, and the notion
that Common Law courts' jurisdiction stopped at the edge of navigable
waters. The Admiral did not rule the seas, only English vessels on the
seas and perhaps Englishmen in foreign vessels for some limited purposes
where they, as the "denizens" of a foreign sovereign, had to satisfy two
allegiances and could be the victims of English "pirates" in the tradi-
tional sense as persons against whom a "petty treason" at English law
could be committed.
From this point of view, the later notion that to be "piracy" there
had to be an exchange between two vessels of different legal subordina-
tion was a complete reversal of the "petty treason" definition in English
Common Law as applied in Admiralty. Also, from this point of view, the
notion was excluded that England ruled the British seas as a matter of
territorial right as Grotius might have argued. The Grotian view of mare
clausum might have had considerable appeal to statesmen, but required a
reconsideration of the fundamentally feudal English conceptions of juris-
diction. It was, of course, out of these inconsistencies that the confusions
of Regina v. Keyn grew, as the English assertions of territorial rights in
the "Narrow Seas" (the English Channel), the North Sea and elsewhere,
or even in the three-mile strip of navigable waters surrounding the Brit-
ish Isles, were not matched by legislation placing those "territories"
within the body of a county or within the "territorial" jurisdiction of the
Admiral as the law-giver for English ships.
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5. Summary
Based on Queen Elizabeth's Warrants of 1569 and 1577, and the con-
ceptions of territoriality that seem to underlie them, and the summary by
Coke in the reign of James I some fifty years later emphasizing a breach
of feudal personal ties as the root of the conception of the substantive
crime of "piracy," it seems clear that later English assertions of jurisdic-
tion over foreign "pirates" for their acts against other foreigners, or even
against English vessels abroad, did not grow from any "natural law" con-
cept of universal jurisdiction over thieves, or the universality of property
rights. The assertions grew from the impact on English vessels or English
persons of foreign depredations, the impact on an English ship being
analogized to an impact amounting to physical presence in an English
county, and the Admiral's jurisdiction being that of a county judge with
regard to events within English traditional jurisdiction but outside the
physical bounds of an English county. It seems that this conception is
also what gave rise in later years to the notion, first expressed by Sir
Leoline Jenkins in 1680,111 that to be "piracy" two ships had to be in-
volved; one of them being a ship flying the flag of the country whose "Ad-
miral" was seeking a jurisdictional basis to hear the case. There is appar-
ently no basis in the early English law for "universal" jurisdiction over
foreigners abroad in connection with acts denominated "piracy."
One other case before the King's Bench at about this time appears to
have ended the question of the legal status of the Barbary states as far as
concerns English Common Law. In 1617 an Englishman named Howe was
alleged to have sent his servant, Saddocke, with a known counterfeit jewel
to "Barbary," where the jewel was sold for 800 pounds English money to
the "Roy de Barbary." The King of Barbary, after discovering the fraud,
imprisoned Southerne, another Englishman there, until Southerne repaid
the value of the fraud. The transaction appears to be similar in sense to
holding a foreign merchant, through a capture under letters of marque
and reprisal, responsible for the value of goods wrongfully taken by his
countryman, except that there appears to have been no attempt first to
exhaust the English remedies, perhaps because the "King of Barbary" did
not choose to submit himself to English remedies as a matter of royal
pride. Southerne then sued Howe for the amount of his ransom. Lord
Popham threw the case out saying that there should be no legal indemni-
fication to the plaintiff on the basis of his imprisonment without convic-
tion in Barbary because that was merely an act of a "barbarous King," for
which he should seek remedy through a petition to the Crown, not
through the courts.' 5 Whatever else might be doubtful in the conclusion
194. Charge to a Grand Jury, 18 Feb. 1680, 167 Eng. Rep. 561.
195. Southern v. Home, 2 Rolle 5 [1617]. There were other grounds for the decision,
such as the rule caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), under which Howe and his servant
did no legal wrong to the King of Barbary, and thus could not be compelled to bow before
the foreign law under which the fraud (at least when worked against the King) would nullify
the deal.
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or reasoning of the case, the dictum that the "barbarous King" was none-
theless a King for being barbarous, implying that the Barbary states were
states for purposes of English municipal law, and their rulers entitled to
the dignity of foreign sovereigns, was clear. The case was frequently cited
afterwards for that proposition, despite the fact that the same result
would have flowed had the King been merely a pirate chief (why should
Howe have been responsible for the lawless acts of an outlaw any more
than for the lawful, or legally unchallengeable, acts of a King?).' 96
From this brief survey, it would seem that there were several differ-
ent conceptions of "piracy" reflected in the English municipal law of the
late 16th and early 17th centuries and, within those conceptions, several
major issues of definition. One conception, expressed most persuasively
by Lord Coke, was that "piracy" was not at all part of the Common Law
of England, but was part of the "Civil Law" enforced in England in ap-
propriate cases. To Coke, those cases were only those to which English
concepts of jurisdiction gave purview to English officials responsible for
enforcing the Civil Law. With regard to "piracy," he used the word to
refer to a host of Civil Law offenses within the jurisdiction of the English
Admiral by tradition and Royal delegation. That jurisdiction gave the
Admiralty courts purview over offenses that would be Common Law of-
fenses had they been committed with the "corpus comitatus," the body of
an English county, and included any forcible takings, whether properly
considered "robbery," "murder" or, apparently, any other violation of the
King's peace. The people subject to that jurisdiction were those within
the King's "ligeance," including English subjects wherever they might be,
and foreigners acting within the territorial jurisdiction of the Admiral,
i.e., in English ships. It did not apply to foreigners who acted under com-
missions of their own sovereigns, regardless of where and who their vic-
tims. Nor did it apply to foreigners without commissions acting beyond
the "territorial" reach of English jurisdiction (including ships adminis-
tered under English law). To Coke, the jurisdictional rules and ties of
allegiance were the essence of the matter; the law defining the substance
of the offense could be changed by statute.
To David Lewes and presumably other Admiralty judges and offi-
cials, the word "piracy" carried much wider connotations. There appeared
to them to be a wider general law forbidding "piracy" under which the
Admiral and his delegates could act, if not indeed any person with or
without commission. But what the precise definition of "piracy" was,
whether it included all "Turkes & Infydells" regardless of their political
organization or specific activities, and what happened to "pirate" goods
once captured, were questions they seem to have left unanswered. Their
196. Again, as so often in this study, an interesting side-track must be resisted. For a
full understanding of the background against which the classification of the "King of Bar-
bary" as a king and nothing else (he was not argued to be a "pirate" as far as appears from
Rolle's report of Southern v. Home) a full course in English commercial, criminal and con-
stitutional law of the early 17th century would be necessary.
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conception seems to have derived from the use of the term "piracy" in
vernacular English, taking what seemed politically useful, and ignoring
those parts of the common usage, like reference to "lawful prize," that
seemed to get in the way. The highest officials of England seem from time
to time to have adopted this common usage, but despite Lewes's position
on the Admiralty court and as a Commissioner under the statute of 28
Henry VIII, his general notions appear never to have been translated into
legal documents or English legal practice.
To Sir Julius Caesar and other Admiralty judges, the concept of
"piracy" was important as part of the Civil Law of property applied
through in rem proceedings of English Admiralty courts. There seemed to
be a tendency to use the word in connection with property seized within
Admiralty jurisdiction without the authority of a commission or letters of
marque and reprisal. But the legal result of that usage was connected
with the disposition of the property, not the person who seized it. The
usage did not reflect a concept of criminal law, but of property law; the
16th and 17th century English Civil Law version of the ancient Roman
law of postliminium.

For Whom the Bell Tolls In the Aftermath
of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on
Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative
Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute
VED P. NANDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over two years after the occurrence of the worst industrial accident
in history at a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India,' thousands of Bhopal resi-
dents still suffer from lingering effects. 2 A lawsuit brought by the Govern-
ment of India against Union Carbide is pending in the Bhopal district
court.3 As litigation drags on, the death toll continues to rise4 and legal
fees obviously keep mounting; but those suffering-the injured and the
families of the deceased alike- are without compensation. This comment
discusses two selected issues: (1) the decision of the federal district court
for the Southern District of New York to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens, which was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and (2) the need to explore other means, besides adjudi-
cation, to settle the Bhopal conflict. A brief factual setting precedes this
discussion to provide the necessary context for it.
II. THE SETTING 5
A massive leak of toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas occurred during
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Its People, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 30, col. 2.
3. For a recent report on the case, see Weisman, India Hopes to Speed Verdict on
Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., Hazarika, India to Seek at Least $3 Billion From Union Carbide for Bho-
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the night of December 2-3, 1984, at the Bhopal plant of Union Carbide,
India, Ltd. (UCIL), a subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation, A New
York corporation with headquarters in Danbury, Connecticut.' Union
Carbide owns 50.9 percent of the stock of its Indian subsidiary. The In-
dian government's reports put the death toll at 2,347, over 1,600 of whom
were killed as a direct result of the deadly gas leak, while the remaining
hundreds died because of its fatal effects over the next several months.
7
Those seriously injured number between 30,000 and 40,000 and the In-
dian Government received 500,000 leak-related claims.8 Lingering effects
include shortness of breath, eye irritation, and depression.'
In the proceedings before the Bhopal district court, the Indian gov-
ernment claimed that inadequate safety equipment at the plant and the
defective plant design Union Carbide supplied to UCIL were responsible
for the release of the lethal gas.10 It asserted that although Union Carbide
knew that safety equipment at the plant was inadequate, it did not take
remedial measures." The Indian government's assertion of defective
plant design is reportedly based on documents submitted to it by UCIL
between 1975 and 1981 requesting the extension of the employment of a
Union Carbide engineer, L.J. Couvaras, who served as project manager
during the construction of the Bhopal plant. 2 According to these docu-
ments, Couvaras was responsible for "the design, development, planning
and construction work" at the Bhopal plant, and for "detailed engineer-
ing" at the facility.1 3 Earlier, the Indian government had blamed Union
Carbide for errors in the design, management and oversight of the Bhopal
plant, resulting in unreasonable and "highly dangerous and defective
plant conditions."' 4 It enumerated among defective conditions inadequate
safety measures, faulty alarm systems, storage of huge quantities of toxic
chemicals and lack of cooling facilities. 5
In a memorandum presented to the federal district court for the
Southern District of New York, plaintiffs, including the Government of
India, had similarly claimed that Union Carbide was not only the creator
of the design used in the Bhopal plant but also had supervised and main-
tained the detailing phase during which no substantive change was made
6. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Kramer, For Bhopal Survivors, Recovery is Agonizing, Illnesses are Insidi-
ous, Wall St. J., April 1, 1985, at 14, col. 2; Lewin, Carbide is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas
Disaster, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985, at D2, col. 2.
8. See Miller, supra note 2.
9. See id.
10. See Meier, India Says a Union Carbide Engineer Was Responsible for Bhopal Site
Design, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at cols. 1-2.
14. See Miller, supra note 2, at col. 3; Int'l Env't. Rptr. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 8, 1986); id., 343
(Oct. 8, 1986).
15. See Int'l Env. Rptr., Oct. 8, 1986, at 343.
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from Union Carbide's design. 6
Union Carbide, on the other hand, has contended that the responsi-
bility for the Bhopal tragedy lay with UCIL and the Government of India
and the state of Madhya Pravesh where the plant was located, for they
had the key role in operating and overseeing the plant.17 At the Bhopal
proceedings, the company asserted that while it had sold general design
drawings to UCIL it was the latter which had hired other companies to do
detailed design and construction."s Acknowledging that although it had
trained some of the plant managers, the company claimed that it was un-
able to dictate the plant's daily operations, for the government of India
had barred it from running the plant. 9
In support of its assertion that the Government of India and Madhya
Pravesh must share the responsibility for the accident, Union Carbide has
contended:
[T]he Indian government had approved and inspected the plant, knew
about the dangers of MIC and refused to allow American employees
from Carbide to remain in India to provide technical assistance re-
quested by its subsidiary to the Indians running the plant. ... [Tihe
state government in Bhopal had allowed people to move close to the
plant fence knowing the dangers they would face in an accident."0
Earlier, in New York proceedings, Union Carbide presented several
affidavits designed to refute the contention that it was responsible for the
design and construction of the plant.2 According to the affidavit of Ranjit
K. Dutta, who was employed as General Manager of the Agricultural
Products Division of UCIL from 1973 to 1976, "at no time were Union
Carbide Corporation engineering personnel from the United States in-
volved in approving the detail design or drawings prepared upon which
construction was based. Nor did they receive notices of changes made." 2
The Bhopal court will have to sort out questions regarding the safety
of the plant design and the adequacy of the key safety equipment and
operating systems at the Bhopal plant. While the issues of responsibility
and liability remain to be resolved and uncertainty still surrounds the
causes for malfunctioning of some of the safety devices,2" this much is
certain-that all emergency safety devices failed and there was no early
16. See Memo at 17-20, cited in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bho-
pal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp 842, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
17. See Miller, supra note 2, at col. 3; Diamond, Carbide Gives Details on Its Sabotage
Claim, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1986, at 29, col. 1.
18. See In re Union Carbide Corp. at 856-57.
19. See Diamond, supra note 1, at 43, col. 1.
20. Id. at 29, col. 2.
21. See In re Union Carbide Corp. at 856-58.
22. Cited in id. at 857.
23. See, e.g., Union Carbide's assertion that a disgruntled UCIL worker or group of
workers caused the leak. See Diamond, supra note 17.
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warning of impending trouble.24 Because of instrumentation faults, the
monitoring gauges did not work and mechanical valves which were to act
as a backup measure were apparently dysfunctional. The vent gas scrub-
ber (VGS), designed to neutralize any leaking MIC by automatically
"washing" it with caustic soda and rendering it harmless, was shut off
when the escape occurred, and the flare tower which was supposed to
burn escaping gas was also shut down. But, according to one report, "be-
cause of faulty design, both the VGS and flame tower together could not
have prevented the MIC from escaping into the atmosphere. 2 5
As evidence of a faulty plant design, it was reported that no backup
system was provided to prevent the kind of gas escape that occurred at
the Bhopal plant, that safety measures used elsewhere by Union Carbide,
such as a computerized pressure/temperature sensing system, and other
effective alternatives, were nonexistent. 6 A reporter concluded after a
study of the design analysis of the MIC storage area:
First, that a short-sighted design modification made in the pipeline
connections, less than a year ago, along with the dysfunctioning of
some valves, was primarily responsible for water ingress in the MIC
tank. And second, the original design of the MIC storage area did not
provide for even a single safe route for a toxic gas at a very high tem-
perature and pressure to be neutralized before escaping into the atmo-
sphere. In other words, the safety features were grossly under-
designed.27
In addition to questions raised about fault in plant design and stor-
age of excessive amounts of MIC at the plant,2" other issues still to be
resolved include whether negligence on the part of the employees or man-
agement was responsible for the accident, whether sabotage was involved,
whether employees' training measures and plant operating and mainte-
nance procedures were adequate, and whether existing government regu-
lations on occupation, and of safety and health issues which were applica-
ble to the Bhopal operation are adequate and were followed. Other
pertinent questions relate to the management's role in educating the pub-
lic on the risks of MIC leak and the use of safety procedures were such a
leak to occur, and in providing adequate warning systems to those in the
vicinity of the plant and prompt medical assistance to victims.
Litigation began both in U.S. and Indian courts in the wake of the
Bhopal tragedy." The Indian government adopted the Bhopal Gas Leak
24. See generally Bhopal: What Really Happened?, supra note 1.
25. Id. at 105.
26. See generally id. at 104-105.
27. Id. at 103.
28. See, e.g., claim by plaintiffs that it was Union Carbide's fault to authorize excessive
storage of MIC at the plant. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India
in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
29. See, e.g., Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the
Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 273, 290 (1985); Stevens, U.S. Lawyers Are Arriving
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Disaster Ordinance on February 20, 1985, and a month later, on March
29, enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, s"
under which the government of India assumed responsibility as the sole
representative of all the victims of the gas leak to bring a single action
against Union Carbide. Subsequently, in April 1985, the Indian govern-
ment, on behalf of the victims, filed as parens patriae a lawsuit against
Union Carbide in the federal district court for the Southern District of
New York, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages in an un-
specified amount,31 invoking six separate theories of liability on the part
of Union Carbide-absolute liability, strict liability, negligence, breach of
warranty, misrepresentation, and the multinational enterprise liability
theory." Earlier, the government of India had rejected a Union Carbide
offer to settle the controversy for $200 million dollars.33
The U.S. lawyers filed a lawsuit in India challenging the Indian gov-
ernment's action of filing a lawsuit on behalf of all the victims in the
United States,3 ' alleging that the Bhopal Act violated the right of Indian
citizens under the Constitution of India to choose their own counsel, and
alleging a conflict of interest by the Indian government, for it could not
represent the victims because of its shared responsibility for the disaster
by failing to enforce safety regulations. 5
The Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all the
lawsuits brought in the United States in federal district court in the
Southern District of New York." On May 12, 1986, District Judge Kee-
nan dismissed the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens under
three conditions: first, that Union Carbide consent to submit to the juris-
diction of the courts of India and continue to waive defense based upon
the statute of limitations; second, that Union Carbide agree to satisfy any
judgment rendered against it by an Indian court, provided that the mini-
mal requirements of due process are met; and third, that Union Carbide
comply with U.S. rules of discovery under the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.3 7
to Prepare Big Damage Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
30. Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Ordinance, No. 1 of 1985, Feb. 20, 1985. The text of the
March 19, 1985, Act is reproduced in 25 I.L.M. 884 (1986). For an insightful comment, see
Deshpande, The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act 1985, 27 J. INDIAN L.
INST. 23 (1985).
31. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844; Galanter, supra note 29, at
286; Riley, Bhopal: The Legal Escalation Begins in Earnest, Nat'l L. J., April 22, 1985, at 8,
col. 1; Lewin, Carbide Is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985,
at 1, col. 5.
32. See Riley, supra note 31.
33. See Galanter, supra note 29, at 285.
34. See Riley, supra note 31, at 8, col. 3.
35. See Lewin, supra note 31, at D2, col 4.
36. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
37. See id. at 867.
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Efforts at a negotiated settlement did not succeed as the Indian gov-
ernment rejected a Union Carbide offer of 350 million dollars, an offer
accepted by lawyers representing private plaintiffs in litigation s.3  Attor-
neys for the individual plaintiffs in the Bhopal case appealed the ruling
by Judge Keenan that sent the proceedings to India." Union Carbide
cross-appealed the judge's ruling contending that the Indian government
must also be bound by U.S.-style discovery rules, and that Judge Keenan
should retain authority to monitor the Indian court proceedings and be
available to rectify any possible abuses of Union Carbide's right to due
process in India.'" Subsequently, on September 5, 1986, the Indian gov-
ernment sued Union Carbide in the Bhopal district court in India for
damages arising out of the gas leak,'4 1 seeking at least 3 billion dollars.4 2
In January 1987, the second circuit court of appeals reversed the fed-
eral district court and held that both Union Carbide and the Indian gov-
ernment must have equal access to evidence, thus granting Union Carbide
U.S.-style discovery powers as well.48 However, it rejected Union Car-
bide's proposed remedy regarding supervision of the Indian court pro-
ceedings by Judge Keenan as "impractical" and evidencing "an abysmal
ignorance of basic jurisdictional principles, so much so that it borders on
the frivolous."" Otherwise, it affirmed the district court.45
III. THE APPLICATION OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 4 s
A. Gilbert and Piper Standards
The district court dismissed the actions, applying the standards
enunciated earlier by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert4' and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.48 In Gilbert and its compan-
ion case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,"' decided in 1947,
the Supreme Court established the parameters for the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, which it subsequently reviewed in
Piper in 1981. Piper added two distinct principles to the Gilbert balanc-
ing test of private and public interest factors."'
38. See Int'l Env't. Rptr. (BNA) 107 (April 9, 1986).
39. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987)[hereinafter Gas Plant Disaster].
40. See id. at 202.
41. See Int'l En'tv. Rptr. (BNA) 343 (Oct. 8, 1986).
42. See Hazarika, supra note 4, Meir & Miller, supra note 4.
43. See Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d at 206.
44. Id. at 205.
45. Id.
46. For a discussion of forum non conveniens, see generally The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, in V. Nanda & D. Pansius, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS ch. IV (1986).
47. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
48. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
49. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
50. See notes 60, 62-64 infra.
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At the outset it is useful to recall the Supreme Court's articulation of
what it considered the "ultimate inquiry" in the application of the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, that is, "where trial will best serve the
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice."'" Thus the basic poli-
cies underlying the doctrine as a touchstone were the parties' convenience
and justice. In Gilbert the court said that "the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed," unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant.5 2 The district court may, however, dismiss the case in its
sound discretion when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the
case. The Court enumerated certain private and public factors to be con-
sidered in exercising its jurisdiction."
Piper, which was a wrongful death action, involved an airplane crash
in Scotland. All decedents and beneficiaries were foreigners. Applying the
balancing test of Gilbert, the district court dismissed the case on forum
non conveniens grounds." Acknowledging that a plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum ordinarily deserves substantial deference, the court observed that
"the courts have been less solicitous when the plaintiff is not an American
citizen or resident, and particularly, when the foreign citizens seek to
benefit from the more liberal test rules provided for the protection of citi-
zens and residents of the United States." 56 Rejecting the plaintiffs' con-
tention that Scottish law was less favorable and hence dismissal would be
unfair, the court said that change in the substantive law because of the
dismissal deserves no significant weight, for any deficiency in the forum
law was a "matter to be dealt with in the foreign forum."56
On appeal, the third circuit court of appeals reversed and remanded
for trial57 on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in its
application of the balancing factors set forth in Gilbert,58 and on the al-
ternative ground that dismissal under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens is not permissible where the law of the alternative forum is less
favorable to the plaintiff."
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme court upheld the district court, stat-
ing that, "[blecause the central purpose of any forum non conveniens in-
quiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice
deserves less deference."60 Earlier, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc,
had held in a 1981 case 1 that the plaintiff's citizenship was not a proper
factor in a forum non conveniens inquiry.
51. 330 U.S. at 527.
52. 330 U.S. at 508.
53. See id.
54. Reyno v Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
55. Id. at 731.
56. Id. at 738.
57. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. See id. at 162-63.
59. See id. at 164.
60. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
61. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1981).
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The Supreme Court approved the district court's application of the
private and public interest factors in accordance with Gilbert's balancing
test. It also upheld the district court in stating that the impact of a
change in substantive law because of dismissal on the ground of forum
non conveniens should ordinarily not be given "conclusive or even sub-
stantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry."62 In the Court's
words, "if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of
a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtu-
ally useless."6 However, it left the door open for taking into considera-
tion an unfavorable change in law, for"if the remedy provided by the al-
ternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no
remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial
weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the
interests of justice." 4
At the outset, the district court followed the Piper rationale in con-
cluding that, because plaintiffs were not United States residents, their
choice of the United States forum would be given "'less deference' than
would be accorded a United States citizen's choice." 5 It then turned to
the question of the effect on plaintiffs' claims of a change in law if the
case were transferred to India. Following Piper, however, the court fo-
cused its inquiry on the question whether the remedy provided to the
plaintiffs in India would be "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory" that
it would be "no remedy at all."
The court noted that Union Carbide was "definitely amenable to pro-
cess in India"66 , because it had unequivocally accepted the jurisdiction of
Indian courts. Next, the court discussed the alleged inadequacy of the
Indian legal system to handle the Bhopal litigation and conducted a re-
view of affidavits by plaintiffs' and defendants' experts on the Indian le-
gal system.6" The court specifically addressed the alleged delays and
backlogs in Indian courts, the state of tort law in India, and procedural
and practical capacity of Indian courts. The court concluded:
[Tihe courts of India appear to be well up to the task of handling this
case. Any unfavorable change in law for plaintiffs which might be suf-
fered upon transfer to the Indian courts, will, by the rule of Piper, not
be given "substantial weight." Differences between the two legal sys-
tems, even if they inure to plaintiffs' detriment, do not suggest that
India is not an adequate alternative forum.68
However, the court imposed two conditions as prerequisites to dis-
62. 454 U.S. at 247.
63. Id. at 250.
64. Id. at 254.
65. See in re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), citing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 256, 261.
66. Id. at 847.
67. See id. at 847-52.
68. Id. at 852.
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missal; one, that Union Carbide submit to discovery on the American
model.", and, two, that it agree to be bound by and to satisfy the judg-
ment of the Indian tribunal.
7 1
The court then determined that the private interest factors
"weigh[ed] greatly in favor of dismissal on grounds of forum non con-
veniens."' It found that relative ease of access to sources of proof bearing
on liability favored dismissal, for most of the documentary evidence con-
cerning design, manufacture and operation of the Bhopal plant, training
of employees, and issues of safety, was to be found in India. 2 Similarly,
the court found that consideration of the other two factors articulated in
Gilbert, ease of access to witnesses,73 and the ease of arranging a view of
the premises should one be required,74 also favored dismissal.
Finally, the court considered three factors under the public interest
concerns: administrative difficulties of hearing the case in New York; 5
the relative concerns of India and the United States;76 and the relative
capability of an Indian versus a U.S. court in applying Indian law to the
case which the court found to be the applicable choice of law.7 Here
again it concluded, as it did earlier after a review of the private interest
concerns, that public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of dismis-
sal, for the plant was heavily regulated by the Indian government, and
"[n]o American interest in the outcome of this litigation outweighs the
interest of India in applying Indian law and Indian values to the task of
resolving this case.
'78
Responding to the plaintiffs' assertion that the Indian justice system
had "not yet cast off the burden of colonialism to meet the emerging
needs of a democratic people,' 79 the court said that, in its view,
to retain the litigation in this forum, as plaintiffs request, would be
yet another example of imperialism, another situation in which an es-
tablished sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a
developing nation. This Court declines to play such a role. The Union
of India is a world power in 1986, and its courts have the proven ca-
pacity to mete out fair and equal justice. To deprive the Indian judici-
ary of this opportunity to stand tall before the world and to pass judg-
ment on behalf of its own people would be to revive a history of
subservience and subjugation from which India has emerged. India
and its people can and must vindicate their claims before the inde-
69. See id. at 850.
70. See id. at 852.
71. Id. at 860.
72. See id. at 853-59.
73. See id. at 859-60.
74. See id. at 860.
75. See id. at 861-62.
76. See id. at 862-66.
77. See id at 866.
78. Id. at 867.
79. Id.
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pendent and legitimate judiciary created there since the Independence
of 1947.8
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, but, after
reviewing the conditions imposed by the district court on Union Carbide,
it struck the condition that the company consent to the enforcement of a
final Indian judgment and modified the other, that it consent to broad
discovery under American rules, ordering that it
be deleted without prejudice to the right of the parties to have recip-
rocal discovery of each other on equal terms under the Federal Rules,
subject to such approval as may be required of the Indian court in
which the case will be pending. If, for instance, Indian authorities will
permit mutual discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules, the district
court's order, as modified in accordance with this option, should not
be construed to bar such procedure. In the absence of such a court-
sanctioned agreement, however, the parties will be limited by the ap-
plicable discovery rules of the Indian court in which the claims will be
pending."'
Even though the courts said that they were simply applying perti-
nent standards and balancing factors on a forum non conveniens inquiry
as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, I consider these opin-
ions deserving of special attention, at least on three counts, and will con-
sequently discuss these three issues: (1) the courts' observations on the
Indian legal system; (2) the courts' treatment of the citizenship factor in
forum non conveniens inquiry; and (3) the courts' discussion of U.S. ver-
sus Indian interests in its consideration of the public interest factors.
B. The Courts' Observations on the Indian Legal System
In their comments on the impact of differences between American
and foreign legal systems to determine whether the foreign forum meets
the standard of being "an adequate alternative" forum under the Piper
articulation, the courts show appropriate regard for and sensitivity to for-
eign legal systems. The district court "defer[red] to the adequacy and
ability of the courts of India," 2 and cited with approval the statement of
an expert on the Indian legal system from his affidavit that "[d]ifference
is not to be equated with deficiency." 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit responded to Union Carbide's plea
that it be protected against a possible denial of due process in Indian
courts by the U.S. district court retaining the authority "to monitor the
Indian court proceedings and [to] be available on call to rectify in some
undefined way any abuses to [Union Carbide's] right to due process as
80. Id.
81. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 206 (2d Cir 1987).
82. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 867.
83. Id. at 853.
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they might occur in India." ' In emphatically rejecting Union Carbide's
proposed remedy as bordering "on the frivolous," the court added: "Nor
could we, even if we attempted to retain some sort of supervisory jurisdic-
tion, impose our due process requirements upon Indian courts, which are
governed by their laws, not ours."85
It is certainly appropriate for U.S. courts to inquire into the proce-
dural and substantive aspects of a foreign legal system to determine
whether the basic due process protections will be available to a defendant
in a foreign forum. However, the criteria applied to determine the out-
come of such inquiry are not to be a carbon copy of U.S. standards, for
dissimilarity is not to be associated with incompetence, inadequacy or in-
ability. In such an inquiry international standards should be applied,
which is a routine practice by many courts in conflict of laws cases involv-
ing enforcement of a foreign state's money judgment."6 This necessitates a
review by the forum of the foreign state's jurisdictional principles and
notice requirements, in addition to a preliminary determination that the
foreign tribunals are available and are fair and competent, and that the
foreign legal system does provide procedures compatible with due process
of law. Following such an inquiry the court should defer to the foreign
forum in a spirit of cooperation rather than judicial parochialism.
The District Court opinion could be read as having opted for judicial
comity over judicial parochialism. For Judge Keenan pays a compliment
to the Indian Legal system by observing that "the courts of India appear
to be well up to the task of handling the case."8 " However, Judge Kee-
nan's review of the plaintiffs' assertion that the Indian legal system is
incapable of handling the Bhopal litigation leaves many questions unan-
swered. For example, he fails to address the plaintiffs' contention con-
tained in Professor Marc Galanter's affadavit that "Indian legal institu-
tions still reflect their colonial origins," suffering from a lack of broad-
based legislative activity, inaccessability to legal information and legal
services, burdensome court filing fees and limited innovativeness pertain-
ing to legal practice and education."
Relying on the affidavits of defendant's experts for the suffestion
that a developed and independent judiciary exists in India, Judge Keenan
84. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d at 205.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263
(1962); 78 N.Y. Cir. Prac. L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1978); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See Gene, Valley, Birnbaum &
Wrubel, Foreign Plaintiffs and the American Manufacturer: Is a Court in the United
States a Forum Non Conveniens?, 20 FORUM 59 (1984); Rosato, Restoring Justice to the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens for Foreign Plaintiffs Who Sue U.S. Corporations in
the Federal Courts, 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKET L. 169 (1986); Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CH. L. REV. 373 (1980).
87. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 852.
88. See Galanter Affadavit at 11-12, cited in In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp at
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concluded that "[pilaintiffs present no evidence to bolster their conten-
tion that the Indian legal system has not sufficiently emerged from its
colonial heritage to display the innovativeness which the Bhopal litigation
would demand. Their claim in this regard is not compelling."8 9
India's claim on this issue merited careful scrutiny, no a summary
rejection, especially since the defendant's experts had not rebutted the
precise contention that India's colonial legacy impeded the innovative po-
tential of its judiciary.90
On the related issue of endemic delays in the Indian legal system,
Judge Keenan remarked that "United States courts are subject to delays
and backlogs too," 9 and concluded, again in reliance on the affidavits of
the defendant's experts, that through judicial accommodation the Indian
judiciary could handle the Bhopal litigation, the court failed to acknowl-
edge the conclusion reached by another district court in 1982 in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Bombay,9' that "an early decision in the courts of
India would be improbable."' 3 The court in that case took judicial notice
of the extensive delays that are a routine part of the Indian judicial sys-
tem.'4 And the pace of litigation in Bhopal thus far does not bear out the
promise of a speedy and effective trial. The transfer of the presiding
judge, G.S. Patel, in February, 1987, the third such judge to be trans-
ferred from Bhopal district court since the trial began there, adds further
uncertainty and likely delay in the proceedings."
Finally, on the issue of "procedural and practical capacity of Indian
courts," the plaintiffs' contention was that the Indian legal system lacks
the wherewithal "to deal effectively and expeditiously with the issues
raised in the lawsuit.""' Judge Keenan discussed the Indian bar's ability
to handle the Bhopal litigation, the state of tort law in India, the alleged
lack of procedural devices, such as discovery, third-party impleader, or-
ganization of complex litigation, class action procedure, and unavailabil-
ity of juries or contingent fee arrangements in India, which are essential
to the adjudication of complex issues, and concluded that the Indian legal
system provides an adequate alternative forum. He said, "Differences be-
tween the two legal systems even if they inure to plaintiffs' detriment, do
not suggest that India is not an adequate alternative forum."' 7
89. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp at 848.
90. See generally Baxi, Introduction: Towards the Revictimization of the Bhopal Vic-
tims, in INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL CASE 1 (Indian
Law Institute, New Delhi 1986).
91. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 848.
92. 531 F. Supp. 1175 (1982).
93. Id. at 1181.
94. Id. at 1181, n. 7
95. See Weisman, Bhopal Judge Taken Off Case, N.Y. Times, Feb 26, 1987, at 29, col.
3; Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 97 (Mar. 11, 1987.).
96. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
97. Id. at 852.
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It is noteworthy that the government of India was alleging institu-
tional inadequacy of the the Indian legal system, coupled with the ab-
sence of a well developed doctrine of tort law in India to expeditiously
and equitably cope with the issues of multinational liability involving
high technology, complex manufacturing processes, and mass disaster. As
Professor Upendera Baxi reminds us, "[I]t was not a mere claim favour-
ing plaintiff with the choice of American law as in Piper."'98
C. Treatment of the Citizenship Factor
On the second issue, the plaintiff's citizenship, the district court did
not consider foreign citizenship of the plaintiffs as the determining factor
in ordering dismissal. Relying on the Piper teaching that "a foreign plain-
tiff's choice deserves less deference,"99 the court stated that "the assump-
tion that this forum is convenient is not completely reasonable," and
hence decided to "apply the presumption in favor of plaintiffs' choice of
forum with less than maximum force."' 0 In the same vein, the Second
Circuit said that "[1]ittle or no deference can be paid to the plaintiffs'
choice of a United States forum when all but a few of the 200,000 plain-
tiffs are Indian citizens."' 0 '
Perhaps the district court treated the issue of plaintiff's citizenship
summarily because of its findings that both the private and public inter-
est factors weighed heavily in favor of dismissal. However, its observation,
correlating convenience with citizenship, invites comment. In support of
its position, the court relied on Koster, which had suggested that a plain-
tiff's choice of a home forum should be given greater deference, 102 and on
Piper which, citing Koster with approval, further stated in a summary
fashion that in the converse situation, where a foreign plaintiff chooses a
U.S. court, that choice deserves "less deference."'0 3
A careful reading of Piper shows that while it did approve of the
Koster formulation of the presumption in question, it cited Pain v.
United Technologies Corp.' 4 for the proposition that "citizenship and
residence are proxies for convenience.'" 08 However, Pain explicitly re-
jected according presumptive weight to an American citizen's choice of a
U.S. forum, stating instead that, "[alt best, citizenship serves as an inade-
quate proxy for the American residence of plaintiff, which in turn is only
one indicator of how inconvenient it may be for the plaintiff to litigate
his case in a foreign forum, as measured by the Gilbert factors of private
98. Baxi, supra note 90, at 16.
99. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at 256 n. 24 (1981).
100. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 845.
101. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
102. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524.
103. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
104. 637 F.2d 775, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
105. Piper, 454 U.S. at 256 n. 24.
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interest.' 6
Also, while citing Koster, Piper did acknowledge in a footnote that
[a] citizen's forum choice should not be given dispositive wight, how-
ever... Citizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference than
foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically barred
when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As always, if the
balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum would
be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court, dismissal
is proper.107
Pain, in fact, had explicitly stated that, "[ulpon examination the factor of
American citizenship per se proves largely irrelevant to the factors which
Gilbert-Koster required courts to consider when making forum non con-
veniens determinations."' 0 8
Also, while Piper cited to a comment in the University of Chicago
Law Review for its proposition that "a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves
less defense," the comment in fact cautioned that while "it is entirely
proper that characteristic [that make foreign litigation inconvenient for
American citizens] be weighed in a court's balancing of the parties' incon-
veniences [,] ... American citizenship, as such correlates imperfectly with
those characteristics, and therefore should not be used a a facile proxy of
the plaintiff's convenience."'0 9
On the question of appropriate weight to be given to a plaintiff's citi-
zenship in the forum non conveniens inquiry, two earlier opinions of the
Second Circuit, Farmanfarmain v. Gulf Oil Corp.,"' decided in 1978, and
Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc., v. M/V Nordic Agent,"' decided two years later, pro-
vide a more reasoned approach. In the former, the court held that under a
bilateral treaty a foreign plaintiff had to be treated like an American
plaintiff, when the treaty, like other Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, granted the foreign national "access to [this] country's
courts on terms no less favorable than those applicable to nationals of the
court's country.""1 2 In the latter case, the court urged a uniform standard
for determining forum non conveniences motions, after noting that "[the
trend of both the common law and admiralty law in particular has been
away from according a talismanic significance to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. ' '1 3
Assume that UCIL was still employing U.S. engineers and supervi-
sors who lived in a compound next to the Bhopal plant, and that the leak
which was soon plugged caused injuries to fifteen U.S. citizens and two
106. Pain, 637 F.2d at 797 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
107. Piper, 454 U.S. at 256 n. 23.
108. Pain, 637 F.2d at 775 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
109. Note, supra note 86, at 383 (footnote omitted).
110. 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
111. 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. Farmanfarmain, 588 F.2d at 882, citing 8 U.S.T. 900, 902-903 (1957).
113. Alcoa, 654 F2d at 154. See generally, id. at 154-56.
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Indian citizens. All seventeen of them brought an action in a U.S. court
alleging negligence on the part of Union Carbide. Should the citizenship
of the plaintiffs determine the outcome of a motion for dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens by the defendant? This hypothetical
suggests that in a modern world of shrinking distance and where corpora-
tions choose residences and citizenships to suit corporate needs, the fac-
tor of citizenship in the calculus of forum non conveniens needs
reappraisal.
Since the district court was not prepared to undertake such an ap-
praisal, and since there is no necessary correlation between citizenship or
residence on the one hand and convenience or justice on the other, why
elevate this factor in a forum non conveniens inquiry and why even refer
to it in the case?
D. Private and Public Interest Concerns
Judge Keenan's discussion of private interest concerns is quite de-
tailed. " 4 I would submit that if Judge Keenan had addressed with speci-
ficity India's contention that Union Carbide was responsible and hence
liable for defective plant design at Bhopal and that as a multinational
enterprise it engaged in a complex, interlocking control system over all its
subsidiaries, he might have reached different conclusions on questions
pertaining to sources of proof and access to witnesses.' "
In the balancing of U.S. versus Indian interests in the public interest
calculus, the court properly inquired into the relative interest of each
country. How much weight should the district court have given to the
choice of a U.S. forum by the government of India? Should the court take
into account comity as a factor? As Professor Baxi observes, this unprece-
dented decision to bring the action in the United States was "by itself the
highest affirmation of the Indian public interest. And that determination
signified that while the Indian vision of development is tolerant of impor-
tation of hazardous technology, it does not and will not tolerate a 'lower
standard abroad' in designing of plan and safety relief systems by an
American multinational. In altogether ignoring this affirmation of the
public interest by the sovereign state of India, Judge Keenan has in fact
been grossly paternalistic.' 1 6 Also, the court brushed off the plaintiff's
argument that the trial in a U.S. court would have a deterrent effect on a
U.S. company exporting hazardous industry abroad by again citing from
Piper that:
[T]he incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were
held in an American court is likely to be insignificant. The American
interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the enor-
114. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842, 852-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
115. For a comprehensive analysis on these issues, see Baxi, supra not 90, at 22-27.
116. Id. at 30.
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mous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevita-
bly be required if the case were to be tried here."'
It also rejected the argument that a U.S. proceeding would avoid cre-
ating "double standard" of liability and would prevent possible "black-
mail effect of dismissal." In response, the court said that "it should avoid
imposing characteristically American values on Indian concerns.""'
While conceding the moral danger of creating a "double standards," the
court said: "however, when an industry is as regulated as the chemical
industry is in India, the failure to acknowledge inherent differences in the
aims and concerns of Indian, as compared to American citizens would be
naive, and unfair to defendant.""'
The court found the Indian interest in creating, enforcing or even
extending standards of care and protecting its citizens from ill-use as
"significantly stronger" than the U.S. interest in deterring multinational
corporations from exporting allegedly dangerous technology.1 20 Finally,
the court said that "the purported public interest of seizing this chance to
create new law is no real interest at all,'1 2 ' and that it would exceed its
authority were it to rule otherwise.1 2
As to what kind of regulations should apply to multinationals en-
gaged in the export of hazardous technologies or products and as to who
should prescribe and enforce them - self regulation, host state's laws,
home state's laws, international environmental standards - are questions
beyond the scope of this comment.'23 The courts are not legislators, nor
were they asked to act as one by the plaintiffs in the Bhopal case. Also,
since there is no U.S. statute as yet which mandates that a foreign plain-
tiff injured by a U.S. multinational's activities abroad have access to U.S.
courts, a desirable step in my estimation, the issue before the court sim-
ply was to balance U.S. and Indian interest.
The court correctly identified India's interest in setting and enforcing
standards in an industry it invited into the country in the first place and
now regulates. However, it gave a short shrift to the U.S. interest as the
home country, both for the deterrent value of a U.S. proceeding and also
to ensure that double standards are not set. There is certainly support in
earlier decisions, mostly related to pharmaceutical industries, for the
court's insistence that it was attempting to avoid the imposition of what
it called "characteristically American values on Indian concerns."124
117. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260-61 (1981), cited in In re Union
Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 862.
118. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 865.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See generally Nanda & Bailey, supra note 5.
124. See, e.g., Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa, 1980), aff'd
mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.
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However, this attitude, seemingly noble, of not appearing to be pa-
ternalistic, shields defendant U.S. companies and smacks of benign neg-
lect. Taken to its logical extreme, it implies that a host country without
the necessary technical ability or wherewithal to regulate hazardous in-
dustries it invites from abroad has to fend for itself, for otherwise U.S.
courts might be criticized from imposing U.S. values on their concerns.
These concerns regarding safety and the value of human life, I sub-
mit, are in many instances identical for both the host and the home coun-
try, and the courts must undertake a contextual analysis to determine
whether it would be convenient to the parties and just in outcome for the
court to dismiss the case in favor of a foreign forum, for these are the
basic policy considerations underlying a forum non conveniens inquiry.
Such analysis will include a consideration of several factors such as the
nexus of the litigation with the forum and special characteristics of the
lawsuit which might have a bearing on the issues of convenience and
justice.
The court mechanically applied the Gilbert public interest factors
and concluded that, on balance, India's interests weighed more heavily
than those of the United States. It did not consider comity as a factor in
the equation. The pharmaceutical cases Judge Keenan cited to support
his conclusion are clearly distinguishable from the Bhopal case, and the
language he used on the respective values of the two countries was inap-
posite. To reiterate, it would be desirable for the courts to focus their
inquiry on forum non conveniens motions squarely on convenience and
justice. If Judge Keenan had done so, the answer would not have been as
clear-cut as his opinion makes it out to be.
IV. WHY NOT SETTLEMENT?
The adjudication drags on with no end in sight. As of mid-January
there were no negotiations underway between Union Carbide and the
government of India to reach an out-of-court settlement."5 The latest
salvo in the litigation battle was fired in January 1987 by the plaintiffs'
lawyers at the Bhopal proceedings. They outlined their strategy to invoke
"multinational enterprise liability" theory for imposition of liability on
Union Carbide."2 6 Under this theory a multinational corporation which
controls a majority interest in a hazardous enterprise has a "knowledgea-
ble duty to assure that the activity does not cause harm.'
The theory was apparently accepted by a panel of the Indian Su-
preme Court decided in December 1986 to impose liability on the top
Ohio 1982), modified sub nom. Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.
1984).
125. See Weisman, India Hopes to Speed Verdict on Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1987, at 31, cols. 1-2.
126. See Id. at cols. 2-4.
127. Id. at col. 2.
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management of a company in a chemical leak case, holding that the man-
agement "had an absolute and non-delegate authority" to ensure that its
hazardous facilities are safe,12 and that "no harm results to anyone on
account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity
which it has undertaken."129 The court found it "necessary to construct a
new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has
arisen. . .on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries
which are concomitant to an industrial economy . ". ." 1
This theory is an extension of Rylands v. Fletcher' into a new prin-
ciple of "strict and absolute" liability as to the measure of compensation
in such cases, the court held that it "must be correlated tot he magnitude
and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a
deterrent effect." '32 In reliance on the holding of that case, a U.S. lawyer
assisting the government of India suggested that to win its case before the
Bhopal court the government did not have to prove even negligence but
simply that the activity was ultrahazardous and that it caused damage.'33
It is yet to be seen if the Bhopal court would accept this or any of the
several other theories under which the United States parent company
could be held liable.'3 4 The major concerns with litigation, however, are
among others, its cost, a lengthy process, a hardening of positions, and
the outcome which invariably is a zero-sum game with winners and losers.
And the process takes its toll on the victims and their families who pa-
tiently keep waiting for compensation.
It is not within the scope of this comment to explore the relative
advantages and disadvantages of litigation versus alternative dispute res-
olution (ADR) techniques. Voluminous literature, which keeps growing,
exists on ADR. s5 In the resolution of the United States environmental
disputes especially, the use of negotiation and mediation techniques has
advanced far beyond the experimental stage."3 6
128. See id. at col. 3.
129. See Mehta v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12739 of 1985, 20 Dec.
1986, at 30. A copy of the memorandum opinion is on file at the office of the Denver Journal
of International Law & Policy.
130. Id.
131. [1868] 2 H.L. 330.
132. Mehta v. Union of India, supra note 129, at 32. For an analysis, see Baxi & Dias,
Shriram Judgement-Companies 'Absolutely Liable' for Industrial Hazards, Bus. India,
Jan. 12-25, 1987, at 40.
133. See Weisman, supra note 125; at cols. 4-5.
134. See, e.g., Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for
an International Settlement, 20 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 321 (1985).
135. See, e.g., S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985), and id.
at 577-88 for a bibliography.
136. See, e.g., L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984);
T. SULLIVAN, RESOLVING DEVELOPMENT DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS (1984); RESOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DISPUTES (L. Susskind, L. Bacow & M. Wheeler eds, 1984);
Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261; Barnes, Environ-
mental Mediation: A Tool for Resolving International Environmental disputes in the "Pa-
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The continuing delay in resolving the Bhopal case adds to the im-
mensity of the Bhopal tragedy. It seems imperative that the immensity of
the ADR techniques such as mediation and conciliation be tried to re-
solve the Bhopal conflict without further delay. For the real losers thus
far have been the victims and their families who desperately need the aid.
Similarly, authorities in Bhopal urgently need financial resources to pro-
vide medical and social services to the needy and to undertake commu-
nity development projects. The immediate needs include proper medical
facilities and jobs because the shutting down of the Union Carbide plant,
which was the main source of employment in Bhopal, has caused severe
hardship. Ample resources are needed for bringing cottage industries to
Bhopal, for providing vocational training to the unemployed workers, and
for social services, including day care and educational facilities.
Perhaps it will be helpful to the parties and mediators or facilitators
(if they were used) to know why prior attempts at negotiation in the Bho-
pal dispute failed. In a recent commentary on dispute resolution, as many
as 11 factors were identified as responsible for such failures, including
constituency pressures, different perceptions of alternatives to agreement,
emotionalism, and failure of effective communication.13 7
The undisputed fact is that Union Carbide owns 50.9 percent of the
stock of UCIL, and the real dispute concerns the extent of the parent
company's financial responsibility to the victims. The parties will be
much better served by resolving this dispute in a flexible, non-adversarial
private, equitable and expeditious way. ADR techniques are eminently
suited to provide a setting for this to happen.
V. CONCLUSION
Who is to blame here? Certainly there is plenty of blame to go
around and the recipients include Union Carbide, UCIL. and the govern-
ments of India and Madhya Pradesh. And while the issues of liability,
adequate amount of compensation, and strategies to resolve the Bhopal
controversy are of great significance and ought to concern us, the issues
often ignored relate to the Bhopal victims for whom the bell continues to
toll.
Consequently, what is of utmost concern is to devise ways to ensure
justice for the Bhopal victims in the long run and to make certain that
cific Way" (Working Draft Paper for Multidisciplinary Symposium at the Hague Academy
of International Law, Nov. 1984); Patton, Settling Environmental Disputes: The Experi-
ence with and Future of Environmental Mediation, 14 ENVTL. L. 547 (1984); Stein, The
Settlement of Environmental Disputes: Towards a System of Flexible Dispute Settlement,
12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 283 (1985); Susskind & Weinstein, Toward a Theory of Environ-
mental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311 (1981); and Wald, Negotiations
of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985).
137. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 135, at 88-89. I am grateful
to me colleague John Barkai for his helpful suggestions in my study of ADR techniques to
resolve the Bhopal controversy.
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their immediate relief and rehabilitation needs are appropriately met.
Notwithstanding haphazard efforts thus far, the Bhopal victims have not
received substantial aid. It is imperative that to provide them the needed
assistance a special Bhopal fund be established, which is efficiently ad-
ministered by nongovernmental agencies, and is funded principally by
Union Carbide. 38
Thus, while international efforts at seeking long-range solutions to
intricate problems, such as, transfer of hazardous technologies and prod-
ucts, especially to developing states, are essential, the immediate and ur-
gent problem in the Bhopal case concerns the wellbeing of the victims
and their families. Similarly, while the courts further refine the doctrine
of forum non conveniens and find expeditious adjudicatory procedures to
resolve complex tort litigation, I consider it a massive disservice to the
victims of the Bhopal catastrophe if the parties do not make good faith
efforts to find an out-of-court settlement. And, the sooner, the better.
138. On April 2, 1987, the new Judge hearing the Bhopal case, Judge M. W. Deo, asked
Union Carbide and the Indian government to agree to interim compensation for the Bhopal
victims. He said that after having gone through the records he had been left with "a strong
impression that there is in store a grand, long-drawn battle for the poor gas victim who is
gasping with his already gas-afftected respiratory system." Majpuria, Judge Asks Interim
Bhopal Payment, India Abroad, April 10, 1987, at 1, col. 1,2.
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CRITICAL ESSAYS
The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited:
Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K.-
A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation
Among Allies And Sound Law and Policy
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
PREFACE
The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy is to be com-
plimented for its initiative in exploring the thorny question of the "politi-
cal offense exception" to extradition, in light of the ratification of the
"Supplementary Treaty Concerning Extradition Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at London on
June 1972," of 25 June 1985 (hereinafter the Supplementary Treaty).1
The two articles by State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer and
Professor Christopher Blakesley reflect the dual scope of this Journal:
Law and Policy. Mr. Sofaer advocates a policy, which he largely shaped,
on extradition as an instrument of combating "terrorism." Professor
Blakesley describes with scholarship and insight the history, evolution,
and application of the "political offense exception." Both articles are sig-
nificant contributions to understanding respectively, the Administration's
policy and the legal jurisprudential significance of the "political offense
exception" in the law and practice of extradition. Mr. Sofaer's ardent ad-
vocacy of a certain policy is counter-balanced by Professor Blakesley's
equally convincing legal analysis. Intellectually, the articles are distin-
guishable as to the depth of their respective analyses and the breadth of
their research. More significantly however, the basic values embodied in
each article differ in many respects. The reader will no doubt readily note
these differences, but what may need further reflection are the future im-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Secretary-General, International
Association of Penal Law, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences.
1. The Supplementary Treaty was ratified by the Senate on July 17, 1986. It supple-
ments the Treaty on Extradition between the United States and the United Kingdom of
June 8, 1972, entered into force, January 21, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468. See
Recent Development, Extradition: Limitation on the Political Offense Exception, 27 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 266 (1986).
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plications of the policy advocated by Sofaer and the description of the
law and jurisprudence provided by Blakesley. This article will seek to de-
velop a bridge between law and policy, in an effort to assess the implica-
tions of the Administration's policy on the law and practice of extradition
through the paradigm case of the Supplementary Treaty.
INTRODUCTION
Individual terror-violence has increased over the last two decades, as
has state-sponsored terror-violence.2 Notwithstanding the greater harm
caused by state-sponsored terror-violence, the United States and most
Western European countries have focused their attention and directed
their efforts against individual terror-violence,3 while treating the greater
depredations caused by state-committed terrorism with benign neglect."
Only one state that has supported individual terror-violence, Libya, has
been the target of United States reaction.' Understandably, governments
find it difficult to deal with state-committed and state-sponsored terror-
violence because of a variety of political and economic considerations, al-
though this difficulty is hardly justifiable on moral or ethical grounds.'
In the United States, the contemporary debate on terror-violence, re-
gardless of its source, origin, or cause, selectively centers on the Palestin-
ian-Israeli conflict, and to a lesser extent, on the conflict in Northern Ire-
land. The focus on the Middle East is due to the pressures of a strong
domestic constituency, the pro-Israel lobby, and on Northern Ireland be-
2. The number of international incidents rose from approximately 500 per year for the
period 1979 - 1983, to approximately 600 for 1984, and to nearly 800 for 1985, but is likely to
be lower in 1986. The number of casualties from 1984 was 1279 with 312 deaths to 2177 and
877 deaths in 1985, but 1986 is expected to fall between these two figures. See U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, Pub. No. 744, TERRORISM: OVERVIEW & DEVELOPMENTS (1985). The figures reflected
are based on the Department of State's classification which is under "premeditated, politi-
cally motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by substantial groups or
clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." International terrorism
is defined by the U.S. as "terrorism [as defined above] involving citizens or territory of more
than one country." Id. See also, PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT: TASK FORCE ON
COMBATTING TERRORISM (1986). See J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 109-
15 (1986); M. Bassiouni, International Control of Terrorism: Some Policy Proposals, 37
INT'L REV. CRIM. POL'Y 44 (1981) (U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.M/37 (1985); M.C. Bassiouni, A
Prolegomenon to Terror- Violence, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 745 (1979). See generally, M.C.
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (1975) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM]; Friedlander, The Implausible Dream: International Law, State
Violence and State Terrorism, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION (G. Lopez & M.
Stohl eds. 1986); R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL
CONTROL (Vols. I-I 1979; Vol. Il1 1981).
3. See J. MURPHY, supra note 2.
4. See Bassiouni & Beres, Panel on Terrorism, 1985 A.S.I.L. PROC.
5. See e.g., Church, Hitting the Source, Time, Apr. 26, 1986, at 16-27; Doerner, In the
Dead of the Night, Time, Apr. 26, 1986, at 28-31; Church, Forgetting Gaddafi, Time, Apr.
21, 1986, at 18-27; Thomas, Week of the Big Stick, Time, Apr. 7, 1986, at 14-15; Stengel,
Sailing in Harms Way, Time, Apr. 7, 1986, at 18-24.
6. See e.g., Church, The U.S. and Iran, Time, Nov. 17, 1986 at 12-26.
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cause an external ally, the United Kingdom, presses for U.S. cooperation
against IRA militancy. The issues in this article focus primarily on the
debate surrounding the latter conflict.
The conflict in Northern Ireland is unofficially reported as having
caused 25,000 casualties over the last four decades. Since the early 1980's,
both the U.K. and the U.S. have focused their efforts on enhancing the
extradition of accused IRA "terrorists" from the U.S. to the U.K. Since
1985, these efforts have centered on the Supplementary Treaty. As a bi-
lateral treaty, that instrument has no effect on the general law and juris-
prudence of the United States concerning the limits of the "political of-
fense exception," except insofar as relations with the U.K. are concerned.7
The Supplementary Treaty is, however, a landmark in the history of the
United States extradition law and policy for a number of reasons. The
signing of the Supplementary Treaty was to have signaled the end of the
Administration's support for years of legislative efforts to revise and up-
date U.S. extradition law, which, for all practical purposes, has remained
virtually unchanged since 1848.8 In addition, it indicated that the Admin-
istration favors the selective bilateral treaty approach exemplified by the
Supplementary Treaty.9 Such an approach relies on politically convenient
bilateral treaties with friendly states and political allies, and denies simi-
lar favored-state treatment to less friendly or inimical states. In some re-
spects, such a policy is a reminder of the time when only friendly sover-
7. The Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted with the Supplemen-
tary Treaty, states that Article 111(b) applies only to the United States. It does two things:
First, it limits the scope of Article III(a) in U.S. extradition proceedings to offenses listed in
Article I of the Supplementary Treaty. In other words, if an individual is to be extradited to
the United Kingdom for fraud, drug smuggling, or some other offense not listed in Article I,
that individual may not invoke Article 111(a) before a federal magistrate or judge. Article
III(b) also gives either party to the extradition proceeding the right to appeal a finding
under Article III(a). S. Exac. REP 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5(1986).
8. Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 184, 12 Stat. 84; Act of March 3, 1869, ch. 141, 15 Stat. 337;
Act of June 19, 1876, ch. 133, 19 Stat. 59; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 793, 31 Stat. 656; Act of
June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, 32 Stat. 419, 475; Act of March 22, 1934, ch. 73, 48 Stat. 454; Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 822; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 96; Act of Oct. 17,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, Title III, § 301(a)(3), 82 Stat. 1115.
9. Originally the Administration's position, as reflected in the Extradition Act of 1981,
S. 1639, was to have the political offense exception removed from judicial consideration and
made discretionary with the Secretary of State. See Note, State Department Determina-
tions of Political Offenses: Death Knell for the Political Offense Exception in Extradition
Law 15 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 137 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, State Department
Determination]. Subsequent bills referred back to the judicial determination of a political
offense. The administration's efforts with respect to those bills were aimed at limiting the
discretion of the judiciary. See generally, supra note 8. When the Administration came to
the conclusion that the individual would still have a right to claim the defense with respect
to crimes of violence if "exceptional circumstances" could be demonstrated, the Administra-
tion's focus shifted to the development of bilateral treaties. See United States and United
Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 99-8 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 71(1985) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings] (statement of William J. Hughes) p. 23.
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eigns and states practiced extradition.10 Extradition was then viewed as a
process designed to benefit the mutual interests of political allies, to be
used against those individuals who affected the political order or stability
of the cooperating monarch or state. The bilateral treaty approach also
reflects a definite choice to revert back to the nineteenth-century view
that extradition is a contract between states where individuals are
deemed objects, rather than subjects, of the process."
Congress may not accept such a short-sighted policy approach and
may, instead, continue its efforts toward comprehensive reform of U.S.
extradition law. Nevertheless, the reform of national extradition legisla-
tion would not have a significant impact on national policy if the Execu-
tive pursues a different policy of negotiating bilateral agreements that
derogate from, or make major exceptions to, the provisions of national
law. If that is the case, the Senate, in the exercise of its constitutional
power of "advice and consent," would have to be the watchdog of na-
tional consistency, a role that is not well suited to the functions of that
body. Even so, however, the Senate may be understandably reluctant to
make discriminating judgments on a proposed bilateral treaty, or make
significant reservations or even deny ratification of a treaty, after a Presi-
dent had authorized its signature. The establishment and preservation of
a policy of national consistency is best entrusted to the Executive branch.
The tensions between the Executive and the Senate were all too ap-
parent in the ratification of the Supplementary Treaty, which the Senate
ratified with "amendments" in the nature of reservations, accompanied
by a "Resolution of Ratification," which was a binding source for that
treaty's interpretation in United States courts.'2 The Senate, in an un-
precedented manner, re-drafted the text of the Supplementary Treaty
signed by the U.S. and the U.K., adding new provisions, deleting existing
ones, and rewriting what remained of the original text. To a great extent,
the Senate departed from its constitutional role of advice and consent,
and virtually took over the President's prerogative to make treaties by re-
drafting a treaty that had already been signed. 3 Should that procedure
become a precedent, the powers of the Executive would be undermined,
and diplomatic relations between the U.S. and other states could be
strained if a country which signed a treaty found itself with new textual
10. See, e.g., 1 M.C. BASSiOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE,
at 1-7(1983) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION].
11. See generally A. BILLOT, TRAITE DE L'EXTRADITION (1874); J.B. MOORE, A TREATISE
ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION (1891). See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 100
n.7 (statement of Christopher Pyle).
12. 132 CONG. REC. S91119 (daily ed. July 16, 1986); 132 CONG. REC. S9251 (daily ed.
July 17, 1986).
13. Article II, §2 of the United States Constitution states: "The President...shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties..." The Sen-
ate's function of advice and consent is distinct from the President's power to negotiate, or
make, treaties. U.S Const. art.II,[2]. For a discussion of this principle see L. HENKIN, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 130-36 (1972).
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language to which it had never agreed and about which it was never
presented a choice. In this case, however, the U.K. did not protest or re-
ject the ratified version of the Supplementary Treaty, but since treaties
are non-self-executing in the U.K., it must yet be embodied in national
legislation.
I. NATURE OF THE EXTRADITION PROCESS: A CONTRACT OF CONVENIENCE
BETWEEN STATES OR AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS?
Before going into an analysis of the Supplementary Treaty, it is first
necessary to state the premises articulated here concerning the nature of
the extradition process in order to provide a basis for some subsequent
appraisals. Extradition can be described as the legal process based on
treaty, reciprocity, comity, or national law, whereby one state delivers to
another the person charged or convicted of a criminal offense against the
laws of the requesting state, or in violation of international criminal law,
in order to be tried or punished in the requesting state for the particular
crime stated in the request. 4
Extradition is conducted by and between two or more sovereign
states in accordance with international law and the national laws of the
respective states. It is not an exclusively political process between govern-
ments designed to serve only their political interests. Some governments
and writers have, however, taken the position that extradition is predomi-
nantly a political process between states that involves their foreign rela-
tions, and that it is, therefore, in the nature of a "contract" or "compact"
between states.'5 The Supplementary Treaty reflects this orientation. The
implication of that conception is that the individual is only an "object"
and not a "subject" of this legal process.' 6 Consequently, the individual
would have no rights except those that each of the two states choose to
concede, without regard to other sources of international rights and obli-
gations, and sometimes even in derogation of rights under national laws.7
State-granted concessions to individuals will, of course, depend on the
degree of political closeness of the respective states, regardless of the
rights of the individual under national or international law. Thus, states
14. This definition is based on BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, ch. I, at 6-7.
15. See supra note 11.
16. Bassiouni, World Public Order and Extradition: A Conceptual Evaluation, in AK-
TUELLE PROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS 10, 12, 13 (D. Oehler & P. -G. Potz eds.
1970).
17. For example, some cases in the United States have held that the right to claim a
violation of the rule of specialty is a state's right, and that in the absence of a protest by the
interested state, the individual does not have an independent right to protest a violation of
the rule. See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jetter,
722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983); Fiocconi V. Attorney General of United States, 462 F.2d
475(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972). These decisions rely on a strained inter-
pretation of United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), which established the principle.
See BASSOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, ch. VII, section 6, at 6-10; Note, Toward a More
Principled Approach to the Principle of Specialty, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 309 (1979).
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desiring to strengthen their respective public orders will make extradition
easiest between themselves. They will also reduce or eliminate some or all
the substantive and procedural rights of the relator, which they would
otherwise uphold with respect to states not enjoying such favored treat-
ment. 8 Individual rights would thus depend upon state interests, irre-
spective of the other values and policies that might be at stake. 9 The
better view, however, is that individuals are legal subjects entitled to as-
sert rights that inure to their benefit under international law, applicable
treaties, and national laws." This view requires that such rights be af-
forded to individuals uniformly and consistently and that they not be de-
pendent upon the tergiversations of political interests. Such a view de-
rives from the concept of extradition as a tripartite international process
involving the requesting state, the requested state and the relator, whose
interests must be taken into account.
While relations between the interested states may be predicated on
their perceived national interests, which legitimately include the preser-
vation of public order and the duty to cooperate in the prevention and
control of crime, there are nonetheless other interests that reflect certain
national and international values, which must also be secured. These in-
terests include protecting the integrity of governmental and judicial
processes, observing and strengthening of the rule of law, and adhering to
internationally recognized norms of human rights.2 The preservation of
these values requires that the relator's nationally and internationally de-
fined rights, whether substantive or procedural, may not be overridden by
state interests.
Furthermore, these values and interests must be defined with suffi-
cient specificity and applied with a high level of consistency that would
provide needed predictability in order to contribute to the preservation of
world public order.2 2 The consistent application of uniform standards of
practice between states and the relator is self-evidently a sound policy.
Such an application avoids competing claims and differing expectations
by states that are not treated similarly, which might otherwise produce
negative outcomes. Uniform and consistent practice is one of those com-
mon sense actions which is a wise policy in law and diplomatic relations.
18. See S. EXEC. REP. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 132 CONG. REC. S9119 (daily ed.
July 16, 1986).
19. See supra note 17. Compare Bassiouni, supra note 16.
20. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 48-50 (1980).
21 Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense exception in
Extradition: A proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem 19 DE PAUL L. REV.
217(1969).
22. See generally M. MCDOUGAL, H.D. LASWELL & L.C. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980); TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY (W. Reisman & B.
Weston eds. 1976); M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1961).
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II. THE BASES AND RATIONALE OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY
In its relations with the United Kingdom, the United States has con-
cluded a number of treaties, the first of which was the Jay Treaty of
1794.23 The Supplementary Treaty, is, however, the first time in the his-
tory of the U.S.-U.K. relations that the "political offense exception" has
been removed from a treaty. 4
The version of the Supplementary Treaty that was signed by the
U.S. and the U.K. in 1985 bears only a slight resemblance to the essen-
tially rewritten text as ratified by the Senate in 1986. The analysis that
follows is based on the Senate's ratified text, with occasional references to
the original 1985 text that was signed by the two governments. The Sup-
plementary Treaty is in the nature of an amendment to the 1972 Extradi-
tion Treaty and is meant to "form an integral part of the Extradition
Treaty. 
s5
A. Scope of the Supplementary Treaty
Article I of the Supplementary Treaty amends and limits the scope of
Article V, Paragraph (1)(c)(i) of the 1972 Extradition Treaty. It removes
certain crimes from the purview of the "political offense exception." The
new text of Article 1 states:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following
shall be regarded as an offense of political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obliga-
tion pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite
the person sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities
for decision as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous
bodily harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, includ-
ing taking a hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, fire-
arm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endan-
gers any person;
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or partici-
pation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to com-
mit such an offense.
23. For a discussion of the historical background of the treaties, see BASSIOUNI, EXTRA-
DITION, supra note 10, at 1-107.
24. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain (Jay's Treaty),
November 19, 1794, [1795] 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, reprinted in 1 W. MALLOY, TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICAN AND OTHER POWERS 590 (1910). See also S. BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A
STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1965). For a discussion of the treaty and its
effect of American extradition, see MOORE, supra note 11, at 90.
25. See supra note 1.
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As revised, the committee's amendment to Article I has five sub-
parts.2 6 Subpart (a) excludes offenses listed in certain multilateral con-
ventions from consideration as a political offense. These are conventions
in which two governments have agreed either to extradite or try an indi-
vidual sought for such an offense. The four conventions to which this at
present would apply are:
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
opened for signature at the Hague on 16 December 1970; The Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
opened for signature at Montreal on 23 September 1971; The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature at New
York on 14 December 1973; and The International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 Decem-
ber 1979.
Subpart (b) covers serious violent crimes against the person. The
term "voluntary manslaughter" is intended to cover crimes which have
been held by the U.K. courts to be manslaughter and which in many U.S.
states would amount to second degree murder.
Manslaughter under the law of many states of the United States is
an offense punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and under the law
of the United Kingdom is punishable by a maximum of life imprison-
ment. In most states of the United States it applies primarily to such
involuntary offenses as the grossly negligent and reckless driving of an
automobile where a life is lost or such voluntary offenses as killing in the
heat of passion.
The remaining subparts of Article I are for the most part self-explan-
atory. Subpart (c) excludes any offense involving kidnapping, abduction,
or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage. Subpart (d) ex-
cludes any offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm,
letter bomb, parcel bomb or any type of incendiary device from the politi-
cal offense exception if that use endangers even a single person. Subpart
(e) carries the exclusion forward to attempts and to those who are accom-
plices. For example, an individual accused of helping to construct a bomb,
the use of which endangered a person, would not be able to assert the
political offense exception."
In Article III, an exception is made that allows a showing that the
extradition request is made on a discriminatory basis or for purposes of
persecuting the relator. That showing, if proven, would constitute a bar to
extradition.
The Senate's new text of Article III states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Supplementary
26. S. EXEC. Rzp. 17, supra note 18, at 6-9.
27. Id. at 6,7.
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Treaty, extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to
the satisfaction of the competent judicial authority by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been
made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion,
nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be
prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his per-
sonal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions.
(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only
consider the defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for de-
fenses listed in Article I of the Supplementary Treaty. A finding
under paragraph (a) shall be immediately appealable by either party
to the United States district court, or court of appeals, as appropriate.
The appeal shall receive expedited consideration at every stage. The
time for filing a notice of appeal shall be 30 days from the date of the
filing of the decision. In all other respects the applicable provisions of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as ap-
propriate, shall govern the appeals process.2 8
In its "Section by Section Analysis," the Senate Report states:
Article III(a) provides that, notwithstanding Article I, "extradition
shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of
the competent judicial authority by the preponderance of the evidence
that the request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to
try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or polit-
ical opinions or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his
trial or punished, detained, or restricted in his personal liberty by rea-
son of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. ' 29
A number of committee members expressed unease at permitting
U.S. courts to entertain an inquiry as sensitive as that contemplated
by Article III(a). This is particularly the case given the nature of dis-
covery under U.S. law which has no counterpart in British or Euro-
pean practice. The committee wishes to caution that sensitive foreign
policy issues may be involved even at the discovery stage and that use
of protective orders may be appropriate.
Article III(b) applies only to the United States. It does two
things: First it limits the scope of Article 111(a) in the U.S. extradition
proceedings to offenses listed in Article I of the Supplementary
Treaty. In other words, if an individual is wanted for extradition to
the United Kingdom for Fraud, drug smuggling or some other offense
not listed in Article I, that individual may not invoke Article III(a)
before a Federal magistrate or judge.
Article III(b) gives either party to the extradition proceeding the
right to appeal a finding under Article Ill(a). Because an initial find-
ing may either be made by a Federal magistrate or Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "as appro-
priate", controlling on appeal. If the appeal is from a Federal magis-
28. Id. at 16. See also 132 CONG. REC. S9119 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
29. S. ExEc. REP. 17, supra note 18.
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trate's decision, it is to be lodged in Federal district court and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply. If it is from a Federal
district court, the appeal, of course, is to be lodged with the appropri-
ate U.S. court of appeals and the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure are to control. This article is not intended to make the Federal
Rules generally applicable to the extradition hearing itself, but only to
the appeal of a decision under Article III(a).
In either case, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days
from the date the decision containing the initial finding is filed. The
appeal is to be expedited at every stage. Nothing in Article 1II(b) is to
be interpreted as permitting interlocutory appeals or otherwise upset-
ting established rules of appellate procedure. 30
B. The Purposes of the Supplementary Treaty: An Overstatement
The purposes of the Supplementary Treaty are stated in the Presi-
dent's Transmittal Letter to the Senate of July 17, 1985, in that "it repre-
sents a significant step in improving law enforcement cooperation and
combating terrorism, by excluding from the scope of the political offense
exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists." The De-
partment of State Transmittal Letter of July 3, 1985, signed by Secretary
of State George Schultz, reiterates this theme and states that "it there-
fore represents a significant step to improve law enforcement cooperation
and counter the threat of international terrorism and other crimes of vio-
lence." To a large extent these lofty purposes are overstated, and their
factual basis is questionable. The actual purpose of the Supplementary
Treaty is to assist Great Britain in quelling Irish resistance in both its
lawful and unlawful forms, the latter constituting the resort to wanton
violence or violence directed against impermissible targets.3'
The stated purpose and unarticulated premise of the Treaty are
somewhat misleading. The United States has not had the occasion to seek
the extradition of a "terrorist" from the U.K. under the current 1972
treaty."2 Thus, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. needed the Sup-
plementary Treaty. Furthermore, there is no basis to believe that the
Supplementary Treaty will benefit the U.S. in the future, because the
U.K. law and jurisprudence as to the "political offense exception" are ad-
equate to protect the interests of the U.S., particularly with respect to
any eventual extradition case involving "international terrorists""3 in
30. Id. at 7-8.
31. Hearings, supra note 9, at 97 (statement of Christopher Pyle). See also, Nation
Mourns its Loss, Time, Sept. 10, 1979, at 30-33.
32. The issue was raised by the relator and rejected by the court in Matter of Budlong
and Kember, 1 ALL ENc. REP. 714 (1980). The same applies to the Dawes-Simon Treaty of
1932, 47 Stat. 2122, and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 572.
33. "International Terrorism" consists of those acts of violence prohibited by multilat-
eral conventions, irrespective of whether or not the acts occur exclusively within a national
jurisdictional context. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 2; Bassiouni, International Terror-
ism, supra note 2.
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which the U.S. would be the requesting state and the U.K. the requested
state.3 4 The real purpose of the Supplementary Treaty is to avoid the
U.S. application of the "political offense exception" with respect to re-
quests by the U.K. for Irish resisters who engage in acts of violence.
There have been three cases decided in the U.S. involving persons who
committed acts of violence in the U.K. and Northern Ireland, who were
sought for extradition by the U.K., and whose extradition was denied by
U.S. courts on the grounds that the "political offense exception" applied
to them: In re McMullen," In re Mackin," and Matter of Doherty.7 In
addition to these three cases, the District Court in Quinn v. Robinson
recognized the applicability of the "political offense exception,"3 " but the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed it.39 The Supple-
mentary Treaty came about because of these cases. It was due in part to
secure the return of these four individuals to the U.K. that the original
text of the 1985 Supplementary Treaty contained a retroactive applica-
tion provision and a provision removing the application of the requested
state's statute of limitation.' The Senate's ratified version precludes that
result.
The three cases that denied the U.K.'s extradition requests were de-
cided under the 1972 Extradition Treaty"' in accordance with the long-
standing jurisprudence of the U.S. on the "political offense exception' '42 .
None of these cases constitutes a departure from the jurisprudence in ex-
34. See infra note 45.
35. Magistrate's Decision No. 3-78-1099 M.G. at 3 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
36. 8 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), alI'd, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1981).
37. Matter of Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also 85 Civ. 935-C.F.H.
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1985) (Government's declaratory judgment petition denied).
38. C-82-6688 R.P.A. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1983).
39. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1983).
40. See Article V of the Supplementary Treaty as ratified by the Senate, 132 CONG.
REC. S9119 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
41. See supra notes 35-38.
42. See Ornalez v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896); Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1986) (extradition granted); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980); Jhirad v. Fer-
randina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Shapiro v. Fer-
randina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1962); Matter of Sindona,
450 F.Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) aff'd sub nor Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.
1980); In re Gonzalez, 217 F.Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F.Supp. 459
(S.D. Fla. 1959); Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F.Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (no extradition treaty
between U.S. and Yugoslavia), rev'd sub nom Ivancevic v. Artukovic, on remand sub nom
Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F.Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (political offense exception precluded
extradition), a/f'd sub nom Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355
U.S. 898 (1958) (full hearing on political offense exception required), on remand sub nom
U.S. v. Artukovic, 170 F.Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (political offense exception precluded
extradition); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal.
1894); See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 477
comment (g), reporters' notes 4 and 5 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
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istence in the U.S." Furthermore, there has historically been no signifi-
cant difference between the decisions of the U.S. and those of the U.K. on
the interpretation and application of the "political offense exception."""
The U.S. position is predicated on the same English cases upon which the
U.K. relies." Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the U.S. courts does not
suggest that "wanton violence" would benefit from the "political offense
exception."" The conclusion is thus inescapable that the Supplementary
Treaty is intended to benefit the U.K. in its ongoing civil strife in North-
ern Ireland, regardless of the merits of the issue, the nature of the act, the
potential legitimacy of the act under existing U.S. and international legal
standards, and the fact that such preferential treatment is reserved for
the U.K. and is denied, at least at present, to all other states with which
the U.S. has extradition relations.
III. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION" IN THE
SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY
A. International Crimes and Crimes Under National Law
The purpose and policies of the "political offense exception" and the
values embodied therein should be first identified before appraising their
significance. They include inter alia: 1) political neutrality in foreign in-
ternal conflicts; 2) the individual and collective right of resistance, includ-
ing armed resistance under certain conditions and subject to certain rules;
3) the application of internationally recognized norms of human rights
with respect to the rendition of a requested person; and 4) an interna-
tional duty to cooperate in the prevention and suppression of interna-
tional criminality as a means of preserving world order."7 It is in light of
these purposes, policies and values of the "political offense exception"
that the following analysis is made with respect to the relevant provisions
of the Supplementary Treaty.
43. Id.
44. See Cantrell, The Political Offense Exception in International Extradition: A
Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L.
REV. 777 (1977).
45. See Re Castioni, [1891] 7 Q.B. 149, subsequently expanded in Re Meunier [1894] 2
Q.B. 415, and in Regina v. Governor Brixton Prison ex parte Kolcynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
See also Schtracks v. Government of Israel, (1964) A.C. 556; Cheng v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison, (1973) A.C. 931; Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Tzu-
Tsai, (1975) 7 W.L.R. 893. See generally V. E. HARTLEY BOOTH, BRITISH EXTRADITION LAW
AND PROCEDURE (1980); 2 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND (1883). Ste-
phen states, "fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes if those
crimes were incidental to and form part of political disturbance .. " Id. at 71 (emphasis
added). See also Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695 (1985).
46. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). See Ba-
noff & Pyle, To Surrender Political Offenders: The Political Offense Exception to Extradi-
tion in United States Law, 16 N.Y U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 169 (1984).
47. See Bassiouni, supra note 21.
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The exclusions contained in Article I of the Supplementary Treaty
can be divided into two categories:"international crimes" and "ordinary
crimes of violence." Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) cover "international
crimes," with respect to which a number of applicable international crim-
inal law conventions provide for the alternative duty to prosecute or ex-
tradite, aut dedere aut iudicare.4 s Thus, these provisions of the Supple-
mentary Treaty are in conformity with the international legal obligations
of the United States and the United Kingdom, to the extent that the two
countries have ratified the relevant international criminal law conven-
tions,4 and to the extent that these obligations are part of customary
international law.50 However, the exclusions in the Supplementary Treaty
are more restrictive than their counterparts in the relevant international
criminal conventions." The Supplementary Treaty unconditionally obli-
gates the parties to extradite, whereas the relevant international criminal
law conventions provide for the alternative right to prosecute.5 2 The Sup-
plementary Treaty allows for the alternative of prosecution. However,
there is no such jurisdictional basis for prosecution under existing U.S.
law unless the act charged has an impact in the U.S.;53 thus the alterna-
tive does not exist.
Paragraphs (b) through (e) of the Supplementary Treaty apply to
"ordinary crimes of violence". These exclusions are not supported by any
international duty to extradite, except for the portion of paragraph (d)
that concerns the mailing of explosive devices. All the other enumerated
offenses are ordinary crimes of violence, which, when linked to an actor's
political motives, have usually been regarded as non-extraditable under
the "political offense exception" as applied in the U.S. the U.K., and
most Western European states.54 Thus, these exclusions constitute a de-
48. See, e.g., Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International
Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 35 n.31 (1983).
49. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
STRUMENTS 1815 TO 1985 (2 vols. 1985) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, DIGEST]. The author identi-
fies twenty-two categories of international crimes that are the subject of 312 international
instruments, a number of which contain provisions on extradition, which are listed at the
end of each of the twenty-two categories of crimes.
50. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. See generally A. D'AMATO,
THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968); 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1968).
51. See BASSIOUNI, DIGEST, supra note 49. Under each category of crime, references are
made in the relevant conventions to the specific treaty provisions on extradition and prose-
cution. Also at the end of each category of crime, a summary of these provisions is
contained.
52. Id.
53. See infra note 69. See also H.R. 4151, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H5944
(daily ed. Aug. 12, 1986); Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 3 (1986).
54. For a listing of cases from over twenty countries, see C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra
note 20. See also 2 BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 1-108; S. BEDI, EXTRADITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968); HARTLEY-BooTH, supra note 45; I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977). For earlier seminal works, see A. BiLLoT, supra note 11; E.
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parture from existing precedent in the United States and the United
Kingdom"' because they remove from the judicial and executive branches
consideration of the applicability of the "political offense exception" for
any of the acts enumerated, regardless of their insignificance, purpose,
justification, or excusability."6
Because of the differences in applicable sources of law, the two cate-
gories of Article I, paragraph (a) and that portion of paragraph (d) con-
cerning the mailing of explosive devices, are consistent with the relevant
international criminal law conventions ratified by both the U.S. and U.K.,
and embodied in U.S. law. These are the 1970 Hague Convention,5 7 the
1971 Montreal Convention on Aircraft Sabotage,58 the 1974 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons,59 and the Convention on Taking of Hostages.60
A number of international conventions prohibit the use of the mails
to send dangerous explosives.6 1 Because this is a technique used in terror-
violence, whether committed by individuals, small groups or governmen-
tal secret services, it must be included among those international crimes
that are "exceptions to the exception."" That type of conduct should
have been included in Article I, paragraph (a) rather than paragraph (h),
but the error appears to have been a technical oversight by the drafter.
It must be noted that the 1977 European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism 63 excludes from the "political offense exception"
those same "international crimes" excludable under Article I, paragraph
CLARKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION (4th ed. 1903); J.B. MOORE, supra note 11.
For a critical review of the political offense exception and some of its applications, see
Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception To Extradition and Transnational Ter-
rorists: Old Doctrine Reformulated And New Norms Created, 1 ASILS INT'L L.J. 1 (1977);
Gilbert, supra note 45; Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Excep-
tion to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1980); Lubet & Czackes, The Role of
the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 193 (1980).
55. See supra notes 42, 45.
56. See generally P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES (1984).
57. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Hijacking
Convention), 26 January 1973, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 25 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
58. Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety on Civil Avia-
tion (Montreal Hijacking Convention), 26 January 1973, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 25 U.S.T. 564,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
59. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention), 20 February 1977,
U.N. G.A. Res. 3166 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doc. a/9030
(1974), 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
60. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146
(XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. a/34/46 (1979), entered into
force, 3 June 1983.
61. For a list of the postal conventions from 1891 to 1984, see BASSIOUNI, DIGEST, supra
note 49, at 331-401.
62. See BASSIOuNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 74-78.
63. E.T.S. No. 90 (1977).
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(a) and portions of paragraph (d) of the Supplementary Treaty.6 4 The
U.K. is a signatory to the European Convention,68 but the U.S. is not. In
order to implement the relevant treaty obligations, the U.K. passed the
Suppression of Terrorism Act of 1978. The Terrorism Act does not define
"terrorism," but it amends Section III of the Extradition Act of 1870 as
amended by the Acts of 1965 and 1967, the basic statute of the United
Kingdom applicable to extradition with non-Commonwealth countries. 6
The second category, "ordinary crimes of violence." contains exclu-
sions that are a departure from existing U.S. and U.K. law and practice
concerning the denial of extradition on "political offense exception"
grounds. Nothing precludes the U.K. from entering into a treaty with a
foreign government to change that position, but the U.K. will have to
embody the provisions of such a treaty in an act of Parliament in accor-
dance with that country's statutory enactment requirements. Since such
legislation has not yet been passed it is difficult to assess the impact of
the Supplementary Treaty or the interpretation and application of the
current U.K. extradition law and practice.
The Supplementary Treaty's provisions excluding ordinary crimes of
violence are also a departure from existing U.S. law and practice, but
since extradition treaties are deemed self-executing in the U.S., there is
no need for additional implementing legislation. While nothing pre-
cludes the U.S. from entering into a treaty that limits the rights of indi-
viduals in extradition proceedings, such limitations cannot however, be
contrary to the Constitution." Thus, it is necessary to examine whether
the Supplementary Treaty contains any provisions that may be deemed
contrary to the United States Constitution.
B. Constitutional Questions
The first question is whether the Article I exclusions can be viewed
as violating the United States Constitution. In this context, the Article I
exclusions should be examined under the two categories: "international
crimes" and "ordinary crimes of violence."
The first category of exclusions, "international crimes," is not a viola-
tion of any constitutional provision. It adds nothing to the existing inter-
64. But see HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 311-12 (statement of Charles E. Rice) (Supple-
mentary Treaty limits political offense exception to greater extent than does European Con-
vention on Terrorism).
65. As of June, 1986, seventeen States had ratified the Convention: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, F.R. Germany, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Some States have ratified it with reservations. Several States have not yet ratified the Con-
vention: France, Greece, Ireland, and Malta. Israel, Canada and the United States, which
can accede to European Conventions, have neither signed nor acceded.
66. See HARTLEY-BOOTH, supra note 45 at 265-335.
67. See, RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 131
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
68. See, e.g., Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
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national legal obligations of the United States under the relevant interna-
tional conventions, which the United States has ratified, on aircraft
hijacking and sabotage, the kidnaping of diplomats and internationally
protected persons, the taking of civilian hostages, and the unlawful use of
the mails for violence. These treaty obligations are also embodied in both
Title 18 of the United States Code and in the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984.69 Thus, such crimes are extraditable if charged in an
extradition request by any state with which the U.S. has an extradition
treaty. Alternatively, a requesting state may in the absence of a bilateral
extradition treaty, rely upon the provisions of the applicable multilateral
conventions as the legal basis for extradition." Thus, U.S. courts could,
as they have, reject the defense of the "political offense exception" on the
grounds that the offense for which the relator is sought constitutes an
international crime.7
The 1984 Extradition Act, still pending before the House, contains
exclusions from the "political offense exception" similar to those in Arti-
cle I of the Supplementary Treaty but allows the courts to consider "ex-
ceptional circumstances,"72 under which the exception could still apply.
Proponents of the Administrations's view oppose even that limited judi-
cial inquiry.73
The second category of exclusions, "ordinary crimes of violence,"
raises constitutional questions on two grounds, although this writer be-
lieves that neither one the these grounds are sufficient to invalidate the
Supplementary Treaty. They are: equal protection under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment; and the supremacy of international law
under the Constitution.
1. The Equal Protection Argument
The exclusions in question are aimed solely at persons charged with
committing such "ordinary crimes of violence" under U.K. law. The same
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32, 34-35 (destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 12, 1116 (violence
against foreign officials); 18 U.S.C. §§ 231, 371, 1117 (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-33, 921-
22 (illegal possession of firearms); 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 1751 (kidnaping public officials); 18
U.S.C. §§ 552, 871, 877-879 (threats); 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-842 (possession of explosives); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1111-1114, 1751, 2031 (killing or assaulting federal officials); 18 U.S.C. § 1716
(mailed explosives); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2151-52 (sabotage); Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 853, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1865; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). See also
B.J. GEORGE, THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 147-216 (1986).
70. See Derby, Duties and Powers Respecting Foreign Crimes, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 523,
531 (Supp. 1982).
71. See Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Artukovic v. Rison, 784
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
72. Extradition Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3194 (e)(2) 1984. See H.R. 3347, 98th
Cong., 18 U.S.C. 2d Sess. 27-31 (1984).
73. See, e.g., The Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 3,4 (statement of Daniel McGovern).
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exclusions do not apply to persons who commit the same offenses in other
states with which the U.S. also has extradition treaties. Thus, persons
committing the same acts could benefit from the "political offense excep-
tion" depending on the country where the act is committed. In other
words, the acts of violence that are no longer part of the "political offense
exception" where the requesting state is the U.K., would still be part of
the exception where the requesting state is any of the other states with
which the U.S. has extradition relations. 4 This "double standard ' 75 may
be a violation of equal protection under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. There is no valid legal basis for discriminating against
persons in the U.S., including U.S. citizens, who commit an offense in the
U.K. for which they could be extradited, but who would not be extradita-
ble if the same offense were committed in another State. A political value
judgment on the importance of relations between the United States and
the United Kingdom should not be a sufficient basis for such a distinc-
tion.76 Since that distinction, however, is made by treaty, the question
remains whether a bilateral treaty can override the Constitution. Since
the issue of unwarranted class discriminations does not seem, to this
writer's knowledge of constitutional law, to be supported by existing ju-
risprudence, the ultimate issue of an eventual conflict between the Sup-
plementary Treaty and the Constitution cannot be reached. The most ob-
vious contrary argument is that the various U.S. extradition treaties with
different countries have historically contained different extraditable of-
fenses and differing provisions on certain defenses, and the issue of ine-
quality of legal standards has never been ruled upon as being
unconstitutional.
In practice, the exclusions in question are likely to involve only U.K.
or Irish citizens engaged in armed rebellion against the U.K. Thus, they
are essentially "IRA exclusions."" This raises another issue o f unconsti-
tutional discrimination on the basis of race and political conviction. 7 An
Irish resister engaging in armed rebellion against the U.K., who is part of
an organized resistance group and whose target is legally permissible
under both existing U.S. and U.K. interpretations of the "political offense
exception" and the international regulation of armed conflicts,79 would be
74. See generally, I KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES: UNITED
STATES (1980).
75. HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 73 (statement of William J. Hughes). See also Pyle,
Defining Terrorism, 62 FOREIGN POLICY 63 (1986).
76. Under traditional equal protection analysis, a classification must be at least ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976). See also HEARINGS, supra note 9 at 73 (statement of William J. Hughes).
77. See HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 281 (statement of this author).
78. The term "race" is used here in its non-technical meaning and refers to an identifi-
able ethnic group in violation of the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 820
U.N.T.S. 454. See The 1980 Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 242(h). See also Symposium, Transna-
tional Legal Problems of Refugees, 1982 MICH Y.B. INT'L LEG. STUD. 1.
79. See infra notes 85, 86.
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extradited to the U.K. A member of another national group who commit-
ted a similar act against any other country would be protected by the
"political offense exception." Admittedly, these are novel arguments with
respect to the application of equal protection to extradition, and there is
no precedent or authority to support it.
2. The Supremacy of International Law Argument
The Constitution implies a supremacy of international law over na-
tional legislation, and presumably over bilateral treaties. Such a ranking
arises from the provisions conferring upon Congress the power "to define
and punish offenses against the Law of Nations" (Article I, § 9), and
those concerning ambassadors, treaties, war and other international acts
and relations.80 The implication is that a bilateral treaty cannot derogate
from an established rule of international law, because of its higher rank-
ing. To the best of this writer's knowledge (who admittedly is not a con-
stitutional law expert), treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, are "the
supreme law of the land,"'" and no case known to this writer holds that a
treaty, once ratified, can be judicially tested on the basis of its lack of
conformity to other sources of international law. That does not mean,
however, that the question cannot be raised. The arguments in this in-
stance would be that the Supplementary Treaty derogates from custom-
ary international law.
At present, every legal system similar to that of the U.S., or with
equivalent concepts and practices of fairness and due process, allows the
"political offense exception" to include the offenses unconditionally ex-
cluded under the provisions of Article I, paragraphs (b) through (e).82 An
argument can thus be made that there exists a customary international
law regarding the political offense exception and that, the U.S. is subject
to it. 3 It is this writer's belief, however, that such an argument is of ques-
tionable constitutional merit.
Another related constitutional argument, is however, meritorious.
The U.S. has certain treaty obligations under the four Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949,84 and other sources of the customary rules of
80. See e.g., HENKIN, supra note 13; H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 562-652 (1986).
81. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
82. See supra note 54.
83. See supra note 50.
84. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: No. I For the Amelioration of the
Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces of the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; No. II. For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3115, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S.
85.; No. III. Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; No. IV. Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in War, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949, June 10, 1977, U.N.Doc. A/32/144 (1977); Hague Convention of
October 18, 1907: Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 3
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war, which exclude lawful combatants in a conflict of a "non-international
character," acting according to the regulations of armed conflicts, from
being considered common criminals.8s
The Supplementary Treaty does not include provisions consistent
with these treaty obligations and with the customary rules of war as they
apply to this question. Thus, under the Supplementary Treaty the U.S.
could be in violation of these treaty obligations, as well as customary
rules of war."'
The exclusions unconditionally remove the enumerated acts of vio-
lence from the "political offense exception," irrespective of their nature,
intensity, the harm they produce, the motives and goals of the actor, and
the circumstances that may have compelled the actor to commit them.
The exclusions are, contrary to customary international law and certain
aspects of conventional international law that permit their inclusion, sub-
ject to certain conditions. Acts that are regulated by these sources of in-
ternational law are also protected by the Constitution, which makes inter-
national law part of the supreme law of the land. To permit a bilateral
treaty to derogate from a customary or conventional rule of international
law may be found to be constitutional, but is it wise? The question of
wisdom leads one to ask why the Supplementary Treaty did not include
any of the provisions of the regulation of armed conflicts. The answer is
the inclusion of these provisions would appear to give some legitimacy to
the Northern Irish resistance movement, which the U.K. has always re-
Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) :360, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536; Convention (II) respecting
the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, 3 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (3d) 414, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537; Convention (III) relative to the
Opening of Hostilities, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 437, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 539;
Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
war on Land, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 504, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540; Convention
(VI) relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities, 3 Mar-
tens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 533; Convention (VII) relating to the Conversion of Merchant
Ships into War-Ships, :3 Martens Nouveau (3d) 557; Conventions (VIII) relative to the Lay-
ing of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 580, 36 Stat.
2332, T.S. No. 541; convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval forces in Time of
War, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 604, 35 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542; Convention (X) for
the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of July 6,
1907, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 630, 36 Stat 2371, T.S. No. 543; Convention (XI)
relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Na-
val War, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 663, 36 Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544; Convention
(XIII) relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(3d) 688; Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 713, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545; Declaration (XIV)
Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosive from Balloons, 3 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (3d) 745, 36 Stat. 2439, T.S. No. 546.
85. See generally H. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, (1986).
86. See e.g., SCHINDLER & TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 1982); Levie,
Documents on Prisoners of War, in 60 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: U.S. NAVAL WAR COL-
LEGE (1979); Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, in 59 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES: U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1977).
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jected, and which is now also rejected by the U.S. The political implica-
tion for the U.S. is that it aligns itself with the U.K., abandoning its his-
torical neutrality in the Northern Ireland conflict, and that may not be a
wise policy, especially if it means that the U.S. will take similar positions,
or refuse to do so, with respect to other countries involved.
IV. THE WISDOM OF ARTICLE I ExCLUSIONs: THE DEMISE OF JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION AND THE RISE OF AD Hoc POLITICAL JUDGMENT
The category of "international crimes" exclusions does not need to be
embodied in a bilateral extradition treaty with a given country, because
these crimes are already subject to U.S. international legal obligations
under the relevant multilateral conventions and are also part of federal
criminal law. These crimes would be excludable from the "political of-
fense exception" as "exceptions to the exception," unless the U.S. chooses
to prosecute a person accused of such a violation as an alternative to ex-
tradition. The federal judiciary, however, does not have such jurisdiction
under present law, and the U.S. is not a party to a convention, such as
the European Convention on Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Mat-
ters 8 7 that would permit it to accept a transfer of proceedings and prose-
cute in the U.S. Interestingly, however, the Senate's ratified version of the
Supplementary Treaty provides in Article I(a) that the U.S. may choose
"... to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to the competent
authorities for decision as to prosecution . . ." This provision may be
moot or it may provide for prosecution of international crimes committed
outside the U.S. 8
Under present U.S. jurisprudence, extradition can be granted for in-
ternational crimes,89 yet these crimes are specifically included in the Sup-
plementary Treaty. There are several reasons for their inclusion: 1) In
Quinn,90 the U.S. District Court did not consider the mailing of letters
containing explosives as an "exception to the exception," although it is an
international crime.9' The government, however, failed to raise this issue.
It is this writer's suspicion that the Government's attorneys in this case
were unaware of that fact. Considering, however, that the Senate drafters
of the ratified version of the Supplementary Treaty did not place this
exclusion in the category of international crimes, it must be assumed that
the Government's experts on the subject failed to note the applicable
multilateral conventions prohibiting the unlawful use of the mails, includ-
ing the unlawful mailing of explosives. 2 2) Arguments concerning the sta-
87. Europ. T.S. No. 73 (1972). See Schutte, The European System, in 2 M.C. BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 319 (1986).
88. See Blakesley, supra note 53.
89. See Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Artukovic v. Rison, 784
F.2d 1254 (9th cir. 1986).
90. No. C-82-6688 R.P.A. (N.D.Cal. 1983) 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1983).
91. See BASSlOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 78-93.
92. See supra note 61.
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tus of accused IRA members as lawful combatants in a "conflict of non-
international character" under the international regulation of armed con-
flict could be accepted by U.S. courts,9 3 thus accepting that certain acts of
violence by irregular combatants against regular combatants, and against
permissible military targets, are non-extraditable as common criminals.
Both the U.K. and the U.S. would want to avoid such an exception and
such a legitimizing label being affixed to IRA members who engage in acts
of violence, irrespective of whether or not they are in conformity with the
international regulation of armed conflicts. 4 3) The litigation of such is-
sues before U.S. courts would be lengthy and costly. 4) The U.S. might
give an impression of being a haven for persons who engage in violence in
internal political conflicts, particularly the conflict in Northern Ireland.
While there is some legitimate U.S. concern with respect to all these
considerations, a sounder approach would have been to pursue legislative
reform of U.S. extradition laws. Legislation was proposed at the time of
the Supplementary Treaty, and is still pending before Congress.95 Since
1981, however, when the first Extradition Reform Act was before the
House, the question of whether to exclude entirely the "political offense
exception" has been hotly debated. " ' Congress appears to have accepted a
qualified approach, which recognizes that under "exceptional circum-
stances" the acts of violence excluded from consideration under the "po-
litical offense exception" could still be recognized. 97 Since the Adminis-
tration opposed this qualification, it probably decided instead to pursue
the bilateral treaty approach exemplified by the Supplementary Treaty.98
The exclusion of any judicial consideration of exceptional or extraordi-
nary circumstances is, in the opinion of this writer, an unwise policy;
there are bound to be cases where judicial discretion would be warranted
and welcomed.
Many of the arguments raised with respect to the wisdom of the ex-
clusion of international crimes also apply to the second category of exclu-
sions, "ordinary crimes of violence." These crimes should not have been
singled out for exclusion from the "political offense exception" in a single
extradition treaty with a single state, contrary to customary international
law and to the law and practice of the United States since 1848.
It is ironic in this respect that the first extradition statute passed in
93. See supra notes 84-86. See also HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 170-73 (statement of
William Hannay); Id. at 873 (resolution of American Bar Association).
94. See supra notes 84-86.
95. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H4102 (1983).
96. See, e.g., The Extradition Act of 1984: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [herein-
after Hearings on H.R. 2643]; The Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227
of the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5227; The Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S.
1639 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981).
97. H.R. 3347, supra note 95, § 3194.
98. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Abraham D. Sofaer).
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the U.S. in 184811 was in response to the Robbins case, in which the Presi-
dent had improvidently supported the Secretary of State's request that a
court order the surrender of an accused person to England.100 The 1848
statute was intended to curb executive power and to make extradition a
judicial rather than a political determination.101 In this respect, the Sup-
plementary Treaty reveals the Administration's attempt to return extra-
dition practice in the U.S. to its position before 1848. In fact, the Admin-
istration sponsored the 1981 Senate Bill (the "Extradition Reform Act"),
which sought to give the power to determine the applicability of the "po-
litical offense exception" to the Secretary of State.0 2 Opposition in Con-
gress led to a removal of that provision in favor of the traditional judicial
determination.10 3
As stated by this writer before Committees of the Senate and House
in hearings on the 1981 Extradition Reform Act, the concern that the
U.S. may become a "haven for terrorists," as advanced by Administration
proponents of the Act, is simply preposterous. 0 4 In the last thirty years,
the "political offense exception" has been raised no more than two dozen
times. ' 5 It has been granted in only three cases. 06 To attempt, by means
of a treaty with a particular state, to preclude U.S. courts from the valid
exercise of their judicial prerogatives, which have been so well exercised
over a period of 140 years, is not only unwise, but is also an unconsciona-
ble statement of lack of confidence in the judiciary. For obvious reasons,
judicial determination is always preferable to ad hoc political judgments.
V. THE NON-DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PERSECUTION PROVISION OF
ARTICLE III: THE NEW "POLITICAL EXCEPTION"
Having provided in Article I for exclusion of international crimes and
certain common crimes of violence from the meaning of the "political of-
fense exception," the Supplementary Treaty nonetheless provides in Arti-
cle III for new grounds to bar extradition. That provision allows a relator
who is accused of having committed any of the crimes enumerated in Ar-
ticle I to argue that, regardless of the commission of such crimes, he or
99. Act of August 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302.
100. In re Pobbins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (No. 16,175) (D.S.C. 1799).
101. For a scholarly discussion of the impact of In re Robbins, see In re Mackin, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
102. See supra note 73.
103. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983,
17 AKRON L. REv. 495, 547-53 (1984).
104. The Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981); The Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 98 (1982).
105. Id.
106. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Matter of Doherty, 559 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D.Cal. May 11, 1979). See also
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F. 2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
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she is really sought in order to be tried or punished on account of race,
religion, nationality or political opinion, or, if surrendered, that he or she
may be prejudiced in his or her trial or punishment for the same
reasons.'
0 7
The language of Article III parallels the political asylum provisions of
the 1980 Refugee Act, 08 which embodies the terms of the 1967 Protocol
Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention.O9 Laudable as this provision
may seem, in effect it shifts the judicial inquiry from the "political of-
fense exception" to the more difficult inquiry into either the motives of
the U.K. as a requesting state, or the internal legal and administrative
processes of trial and detention in the U.K. There is no precedent in U.S.
legal history for such determination in the extradition context. It is hard
to conceive of the legal standards that the U.S. courts will use and the
evidence that will be admissible. This approach is certainly a departure
from the traditional "rule of non-inquiry" in extradition proceedings." 0
U.K. law enforcement practices and proceedings concerning Irish re-
sisters have been fraught with questions of discrimination and persecu-
tion. These questions can now be raised at U.S. extradition proceedings
with the U.K. Article III may potentially overwhelm the intended effect
of the Article I exclusions.
Article III(b) also introduces a novelty in U.S. extradition. It allows
the Government to appeal decisions on Article III rulings." 1 There is no
general right of Government appeal on adverse rulings. Curiously, Article
III provides for such a right, but limits it to that issue.
107. For a proposal to supplement the political offense exception with the individual's
absolute right to freedom from discrimination in extradition, see C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT,
supra note 20, at 207-18. See also Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offense Exception to
Extradition: Defining the Issues and Searching a Feasible Alternative, 1983 REVUE BELGE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 741-54.
108. See The 1980 Refugee Act supra note 78.
109. See the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 820 U.N.T.S. 454.
110. BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 1-17. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rauscher, 199
U.S. 407 (1886); U.S. v. Rossi, 545 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d
894 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of United
States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); U.S. ex rel. Donnelley v.
Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935); Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979).
See also Note, Toward a More Principles Approach to the Principle of Specialty, 12 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 309 (1979); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F. 2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1977); Gallina v. Fraser,
278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960) (indicating in dicta that rule of non-inquiry may be abandoned).
Amendments to the 1981-83 Extradition Acts contained a partial consideration of inquiry
into a request for extradition if based on discrimination or persecution grounds and a lim-
ited right to raise issues about the future treatment of a relator. See Bassiouni, supra note
103; H.R. Rep. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
111. See supra note 1.
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VI. THE WISDOM OF ARTICLE III - BARRING EXTRADITION
ON DISCRIMINATION AND PERSECUTION GROUNDS:
SUBSTITUTING THE UNMANAGEABLE FOR THE MANAGEABLE
Under Article III, a relator has the opportunity to raise questions
about the motives of the extradition request and the treatment he may
expect upon his return to the U.K."2 The U.K.'s treatment of Irish pris-
oners and detainees has been the subject of unfavorable decisions by the
European Commission on Human Rights'1 3 and the European Court of
Human Rights."' The so-called "Diplock Courts" use special procedures
for accused Irish resisters that deprive them of the traditional right to
trial by jury." 5 These and similar questions may now be raised before
U.S. courts under Article III. But what standards will the U.S. courts
adopt? Nothing in extradition law and jurisprudence exists upon which
the courts can rely as precedent, and the Senate provides no guidance.
Among the questions likely to arise are the following:
1. Will such hearings turn into a trial of U.K. policies and practices in
Northern Ireland or against Irish resisters? Will it be a trial of the
Irish resistance history and movement?
2. Will the U.K.'s legal and administrative proceedings, and law en-
forcement practices, be on trial?
3. How, and to what extent, will the U.S. government, on behalf of the
U.K., defend it?
4. To what extent will the U.S. government, on behalf of the U.K., be
compelled to present what would be tantamount to exculpatory
evidence?
5. What type of evidence can the relator introduce?
6. What evidence is the relator entitled to ask for in discovery?
7. How does a relator satisfy the burden of a preponderance of the
evidence to show that he or she falls within the confines of Article III?
8. On what precedents or analogy is the court to rely? Are the prece-
dents concerning the similar provisions on political asylum in the 1980
Refugee Act applicable in these proceedings?
9. What standards shall the Court of Appeals follow?
10. How will an appellate court objectively review the factual, politi-
112. Id.
113. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 512 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights).
114. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTs. 602 (Eur. Ct.
of Hum. Rts.)(inhuman treatment); Lawless v. United Kingdom, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUM. RTS.. 430 (Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rts.) (detention in violation of Art.5 of European Conven-
tion). See also O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention
on Human Rights: Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1977); Moseley,
Amnesty International Denied Ulster Inquiry, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 30, 1986, §1, at 6,
col. 1. See generally Bassiouni & Derby, An Appraisal of Torture in International Law, 48
REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL 17 (1977).
115. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 512, 532-542
(Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.); Hearings, supra note 9, at 327-35 (statement of Charles E.
Rice).
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cal, and judgmental appraisals of the magistrate or trial court?
These and other issues promise to make Article III hearings the most
exciting, if not entertaining, judicial proceedings ever heard in the U.S. A
foreign government and a resistance movement will be on trial. Gone will
be the wisdom of political neutrality and judicial limitation of adjudicat-
ing foreign political conflicts. Farewell also to the "rule of non-inquiry,"
even though it merits introduction into the extradition system. In that
respect, the debates in the House and Senate on the 1981-84 Extradition
Reform Act should have been more carefully considered.""0
Is it conceivable that the U.K. will accept being subjected to such
proceedings by pressing for the extradition of such Irish resisters as Mc-
Mullen, Doherty, Mackin, and Quinn? Did the Senate, in its political wis-
dom, intend Article III to deter the U.K. from pursuing extradition in
certain thorny cases? If that is the case, it is surely an ingenious political
expedient to ratify the Supplementary Treaty, thus appearing to make all
parties concerned happy with it, while having a provision that might de-
ter the U.K. from using the Supplementary Treaty in certain cases. Fur-
thermore, it allows Irish resisters their day in court. It would indeed be
quite a day for Irish resisters to vilify the U.K. and glorify their cause in
an Article III hearing. The Senate and the Administration should have
been wise enough to leave the "political offense exception" as it stood,
rather than to create this new situation.
Paragraph (b) of Article III provides for a right of appeal for both
the government and the relator on Article III issues. Is it conceivable,
regardless of which party prevails, that the other side will not appeal?
Article III(b) is the first time in the history of U.S. extradition that the
government has a right to appeal, even though only on that narrow issue.
Such an approach is difficult to understand. The Extradition Reform Act,
in all its versions from 1981 to 1984, contained a provision on the govern-
ment's right to appeal irrespective of the issue." 7 Would that not have
been the better approach? Once again, an ad hoc solution of dubious wis-
dom has been used.
Based on all the arguments raised above, this author cannot help but
wonder whether the Senate may have ratified the Supplementary Treaty
with such revisions in order to generate momentum for the passage of the
Extradition Reform Act of 1984."1 If so, the Administration, which has
been reluctant to endorse the Act, may now find it best to support it. The
half-measures that crept into Article III and other provisions of the Sup-
plementary Treaty could then be restored to fuller legislative
consideration.
116. See H.R. 3347, § 3194(d); Hearings on H.R. 2643, 96 at 274-77 (statement of this
author); Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 96 at 104,105 (statement of this author).
117. H.R. 3347, § 3195. See H.R. 3347, 129 CON.. REc. H4102 (1983).
118. See H.R. 3347, 129 CON(,. REc. H4102 (1983).
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VII. APPRAISAL
The decision of the Administration to tamper with the "political of-
fense exception," can only be explained by the presumed pressures of the
U.K. government in light of its experiences and policies with Irish resist-
ers. The attempt on Prime Minister Thatcher's life at Brighton was most
likely an important factor." 9 Additionally, the three cases discussed
above were an embarrassment to the U.K. 20 That government would cer-
tainly like to put an end to the possibility that Irish resisters who commit
acts of terror-violence can find sanctuary in the U.S. Thus, the original
text of the Supplementary Treaty contained a provision on the applica-
bility of the statute of limitation of the requesting state (Article 11(h)).
The combination of this Article with Articles I and IV (retroactivity)
would have enabled the U.K. to make new requests for the extradition of
Messrs. McMullen,' 2' Doherty'22 and Mackin.123 Their extradition would
have been a significant blow to the IRA and PIRA. However, the Senate's
ratified version, and in particular Article III, makes the prompt return of
these three persons improbable. If the Administration wanted to alter the
judicial application of the "political offense exception," it should have
done so through legislation rather than through an ad hoc treaty, which
implies a special relationship with our country, but not with others. Such
a precedent opens the floodgates for the amendment or supplementation
of existing U.S. extradition treaties, which the U.S. has with more than
one hundred countries,'24 yet does not provide any consistent policy and
application for a legal process that requires both.
The Supplementary Treaty reverses a historical trend in the U.S.,
which, since the 1860's Irish rebellion against British rule in Ireland, has
never surrendered an Irish political resister to Great Britain. Such a re-
versal, under the terms established in the Supplementary Treaty, means
only that the U.S. has taken sides in an internal political conflict, which it
had carefully avoided doing in the past. A policy of neutrality toward for-
eign internal civil strife is wisest in light of the many ongoing civil con-
flicts occurring all over the world. The U.S. has thus placed itself in a
difficult position with respect to other countries seeking similar favored
treatment. In order to avoid embroiling itself in all sorts of difficult situa-
tions with a large number of countries, and becoming, indirectly, a party
to foreign internal civil strife, the U.S. should have continued its histori-
cal neutrality.
The Administration has thus opened a Pandora's box. Other coun-
119. See, The Target: Thatcher, Time, Oct. 22, 1984, at 50. See also infra note 127.
120. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
121. In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.F. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
122. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
123. In re Mackin, 688 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
124. See I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, supra note 74.
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tries are now likely to seek the favored treatment afforded the U.K. The
Administration will have to make hard judgments in granting or denying
requests by other states that desire similar extradition provisions. Denial
of the requests of some states will surely have a negative effect on U.S.
relations with those countries. Acceptance of such requests may require
the U.S. to review periodically the internal conditions in particular coun-
tries in order to determine whether such favored treatment should con-
tinue, thus altering its extradition treaties with the changing internal po-
litical circumstances of these countries as they are perceived in the U.S.
Considering the change in U.S. perceptions of foreign regimes (e.g.
apartheid in South Africa, the former Marcos regime in the Philippines,
Pinochet's regime in Chile, and others), this would require a constant
process of evaluation. 2 ' The Senate would be faced with ratification of
many new supplementary extradition treaties and the abrogation of older
ones, which would unnecessarily occupy its time and energy. Moreover,
the U.S. would signal internal insurgents in countries given such favored
treatment that it is opposed to them. The U.S. could then become a tar-
get of their acts of terror-violence. In addition, if one of these groups
should become the new ruling regime in any of these countries, the U.S.
would have unnecessarily created enmity with that new regime. The Sen-
ate has already stumbled into this pitfall by stating in its ratification
"Declaration:"
The Senate of the United States declares it will not give its advice
and consent to any treaty that would narrow the political offense ex-
ception with a totalitarian or other non-democratic regime and that
nothing in the Supplementary Treaty with the United Kingdom shall
be considered a precedent by the executive branch or the Senate for
other treaties.
26
Mutatis mutandi, a non-totalitarian or democratic regime, however these
terms are to be defined or perceived, may rely on the Supplementary
Treaty as a valid precedent.
The U.K. exerted much effort to obtain the ratification of the Sup-
125. The Administration and the Senate should be reminded of the draft United States
- Philippines Treaty on Extradition, which was concluded with the government of Ferdi-
nand Marcos. Under that Treaty, the Marcos regime could have sought the extradition of
the late Benigno Aquino. At the hearings before the Senate on that Treaty, the Administra-
tion and members of the Senate supporting it raised similar arguments to those raised re-
garding the political offense exception in the context of the Supplementary Treaty. Fortu-
nately, the Senate did not ratify the draft United States - Philippines treaty. Subsequent
events in the Philippines proved the wisdom of not rushing into ad hoc bilateral treaties.
See Hearings, supra note 9, at 119-21 (statement of Christopher Pyle).
126. 132 CONG. REc. S9120 (daily ed. July 16, 1986); S. ExEc. REP. 17, supra note 18, at
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plementary Treaty 2 ' which may benefit that country. The U.S., however,
needs both comprehensive reform of legislation and a consistent policy.' 28
127. See Kennedy, Why were F-Ills 'Misused' in the Raid on Libya? Chicago Tribune,
Aug. 19, 1986, §1, at 15, col. 2. The author, who was an Air Force intelligence officer and a
strategic analyst with the U.S. Army War College, is of the opinion that the issue was the
political agenda of both President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that
made dramatic British support for some aspect of American policy highly desirable. That
matter was an extradition treaty aimed at members of the Irish Republican Army seeking
sanctuary in the United States. The treaty had been blocked in the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee for nearly a year, despite Reagan's endorsement. (Committee members who op-
posed it thought the United States was being pressured to violate a long tradition of support
for opponents of tyranny and oppression.) "Thatcher, of course, has a particular enmity
toward the IRA; it has tried to kill her once and has vowed to try again."
128. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 73 (statement of William J. Hughes); Id. at 136,37
(statement of this author). See also Bassiouni, supra note 103.
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Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Strategy and
Law
HARRY H. ALMOND, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The primary issue that Professor Fried raises in his critical essay in
the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy is:
Whether international law - particularly the law of war (jus in bello) -
makes the use of nuclear weapons against other states impermissible.'
Professor Fried asserts that international law establishes the illegal-
ity of nuclear weapons as illegal per se; that is, that nuclear weapons are
impermissible regardless of use. It follows that the first use of nuclear
weapons is unlawful and Professor Fried supports the no-first-use pledge.
Fried opposes the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), because he believes
that it will not provide a comprehensive defense system and is incompati-
ble with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Fried recognizes that
states may invoke nuclear weapons by way of reprisals, but he observes:
[I]t is questionable whether nuclear reprisal could achieve the very
purpose of reprisal, namely, to induce the opponent to discontinue its
illegal behavior.2
Professor Fried believes that the no-first-use pledge can have "legally
binding character," because this is what the International Court of Jus-
tice declared in 1974. 3 "Governments," according to Fried, "can make for-
mal declarations" and these can be made "unilaterally at any time."4
And, "if governments wish," they can become "binding at once."5 While
Fried recognizes that the Soviet and Chinese versions of the no-first-use
pledge, "neither promises nor expects any renunciation of the right to
nuclear reprisals (second use)," the pledge is not "useless."" Presumably,
* B.S. Yale; J.D. Harvard Law School; LL.M. and Ph.D. with highest distinction in
international law, London School of Economics; member, New York Bar; Bar of the United
States Supreme Court; Barrister-at-law, of Gray's Inn, London. No attribution of the com-
ments and opinions set forth in this paper should be made to the National Defense Univer-
sity, the United States Government, nor to Georgetown University where the author is a
professor in the National Security Studies Program of the Graduate School.
1. Fried, The Nuclear Collision Course: Can International Law Be Of Help?, 14 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 97 (1985).
2. Id. at 113.
3. Id. at 114.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 115. For an article that illustrates the sharp difference between democratic
states and the Soviet Union, see TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (W.E. Poufler
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it would provide what amounts to a mind-set among decision makers: a
psychological barrier to the future use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the
act of pledging would wind down the "systematic preparations for instan-
taneous nuclear response."7
A number of propositions subordinate to the primary issue of the le-
gality of nuclear weapons appear in Professor Fried's commentary. They
form the basis for this brief response. However, I must say at the outset
that I share with Fried an abhorrence of nuclear weapons and of war con-
ducted with weapons of any kind. The experience among states that we
both invoke, however, discloses new conventional weapons that have the
destructive force equivalent to nuclear weapons, and include chemical
and biological weapons that would augment the destructiveness of war-
fare in general. Our differences lie in a perception of the measures that
might realistically be taken by the United States and the Soviet Union,
coupled with participation by other states, that would make nuclear war
less likely.
I respond to Fried's essay by making the following argument. First,
an analysis of international law and specifically, the law of war, shows
that nuclear weapons are not, as Fried contends, illegal per se. The law of
war addresses itself to the use of weapons during war, rarely prohibiting,
under all conditions, the use of specific types of weapons. In some situa-
tions, the use of nuclear weapons may cause less destruction and suffering
than some conventional weapons, and therefore better conforms to the
spirit of the law of war. Second, deterrence has always been a fundamen-
tal aspect of nuclear arms control, but works only when the threat of ag-
gression is backed by stocked and ready arsenals. Finally, the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) need not be the comprehensive defense system
Fried portrays; it is, rather, a defensive system aimed at enhancing deter-
rence policy and as such, it is not only legal, but a necessary element in
shaping our policy with the Soviet Union. I will discuss some of the rele-
vant propositions raised by Fried.
I. LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
First, contrary to Fried's opinion, nuclear weapons are not illegal per
se under international law, nor in particular, under the law of war. This
proposition raises three related points to be examined together: whether
nuclear weapons are treated as illegal under all circumstances in wartime
use; when such weapons are treated as illegal because they violate the law
of war; and whether such weapons are unlawful if first used for the pur-
poses of self-defense in response to aggression.
The law of war, emanating from the practice of states and from the
agreements they adhere to with regard to the use of weapons during com-
trans. 1974).
7. Id.
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bat, has prohibited only a few weapons as illegal per se. Moreover, these
prohibitions are not all based upon the application of law, because some,
such as those applied to dum-dum bullets, were finally adopted as a re-
sult of political pressures. The wounds created by dum-dum bullets may
be more extensive than those created by other devices such as shrapnel,
or modern field rifles.
The application of the prohibitions of the law of war to weapons ap-
pears in three separate categories. The first consists of weapons or agents
which are subject to absolute or positive prohibitions under the usages
and practices of states. These include poisons and poisoned weapons, pro-
hibited by Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations.' According to the De-
partment of Army's Field Manual, other examples are found in certain
usages:
Usage has, however, established the illegality of the use of lances with
barbed heads, irregular-shaped bullets, and projectiles filled with
glass, the use of any substance on the bullets that would tend unnec-
essarily to inflame a wound inflicted by them, and the scoring of the
surface or the filing off of the ends of the hard cases of bullets.9
However, with respect to poisons and poisonous weapons, the Man-
ual notes that Article 23(a):
[D]oes not prohibit measures being taken to dry up springs, to divert
rivers and aqueducts from their courses, or to destroy, through chemi-
cal or bacterial agents harmless to man, crops intended solely for con-
sumption by the armed forces (if that fact can be determined)."0
Clearly, the belligerents are free to impose upon themselves re-
straints or conditions which are more restrictive than those to be found in
the law of war. This, in fact, the United States did under its rules of
engagement as to the war in Vietnam. But decisions to impose those ad-
ditional restrictions are made by the belligerents among themselves and
do not arise from the restraints in the law of war that are shared with
other belligerents.
The second category of prohibitions is set out in Article 23(e) of the
Hague Regulations:
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is
especially forbidden: (e) to employ arms, projectiles, or material calcu-
lated to cause unnecessary suffering.'
Under this article the belligerents are prohibited from the use of
weapons unless they justify such use through the necessities of warfare:
8. The Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 18 (annex), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
9. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, at 18 (1956) f hereinafter
cited as U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL].
10. Id.
11. Supra note 8.
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that is, the necessary suffering, legally established, that must be endured
during warfare or in combat conditions. In this connection, the Declara-
tion of St. Petersburg of 1868 12 is at times invoked. Its preamble declares
that the legitimate object of war would "be exceeded by the employment
of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their death inevitable" and "that the employment of such arms
would therefore be contrary to the law of humanity." 3
These prohibitions must be read against the context of modern war-
fare, where the "law of humanity" does not prohibit all weapons that kill,
because all weapons, under at least some circumstances, foreseeably cause
death. A United States Air Force Pamphlet observes:
All weapons cause suffering. The critical factor in the prohibition
against unnecessary suffering is whether the suffering is needless or
disproportionate to the military advantages secured by the weapon,
not the degree of suffering itself. 4
This turns us back to the legal principle of military necessity as the
justification upon which the suffering is based. 5 There is, of course, the
additional element of humanity, noted by the Pamphlet:
The rule against unnecessary suffering applies also to the manner of
use of a weapon or method of warfare against combatants or enemy
military objectives. In this context, the prohibition precludes the in-
fliction of suffering upon individuals for its own sake or mere indul-
gence in cruelty.16
Professor Fried suggests that nuclear weapons are prohibited under
this proposition because they violate the rule against unnecessary suffer-
ing, but his analysis seemingly draws upon the physiological element of
suffering. He fails to recognize that the legal principle of military neces-
sity and the general principles in the law of war apply to all weapons.
War itself is justified by necessity, while the law of war simply regulates
the conduct of hostilities to prohibit conduct which is excessive, inhu-
mane, or deliberately, but unnecessarily, invoked.17
The third category is based upon the proposition that the legal prin-
ciple of military necessity is subject to standards of reasonableness.
Under such standards, the use of force must be both necessary and
12. The Declaration of St. Petersburg, cited in FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR, 192-193
(1972). See also M. McDoUc.AL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER,
660 (1961).
13. Id.
14. DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE, AFP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE].
15. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 72
(1961) offering a comprehensive approach to the matter of military necessity [hereinafter
cited as LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER].
16. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 14.
17. See II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, Oct. 1946 - Apr. 1949, at 1253, 1254.
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designed to attain military objectives. These objectives must be limited to
legitimate military targets and the amount of force used against these
targets must be proportionate to the military objectives sought.
The legality of attacks during wartime is not restricted to those that
might cause damage exclusively to legitimate military objectives, because
this would be impossible under real world conditions. Some civilian casu-
alties must be anticipated or indirect damage incurred. Article 51 of the
Protocol I provides in paragraph 5(b) that attacks would be considered as
"indiscriminate" if they constitute an "attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Thus a standard
of "reasonableness"-reasonableness in the context of licensed violence
during wartime-is imposed.
Professors McDougal and Feliciano have formulated the application
of this principle under this concept in terms of widely shared expecta-
tions that even violence unleashed during wartime will not lead to the
unnecessary destruction of values:
[T]he fundamental policy of minimum unnecessary destruction may
be seen to underlie questions of legitimacy ... [W]here the suffering
or deprivation of values incidental to the use of a particular weapon is
not excessively disproportionate to the military advantage accruing to
the belligerent user, the violence and the weapon by which it is ef-
fected may be regarded as permissible. All war instruments are
"cruel" and "inhuman" in the sense that they cause destruction and
human suffering. It is not, however, the simple fact of destruction, nor
even the amount thereof, that is relevant in the appraisal of such in-
struments; it is rather the needlessness, the superfluity of harm, the
gross imbalance between the military result, and the incidental injury
that is commonly regarded as decisive of illegitimacy. 8
The military commander, no less than the layman, is sensitive to the
principles of economy in the use of scarce resources, and seeks, through
the invocation of military measures, to achieve the objective prize without
unnecessary destruction. These are the perspectives that have led to the
policy base for the law of war and unquestionably, will be the perspec-
tives that will apply to the use of nuclear weapons.19 There are no mili-
tary advantages to be gained through the retaliatory destruction of ur-
banized areas through use of nuclear weapons."
The Department of Army Manual observes that "atomic weapons"
are not "regarded as violative of international law," and notes that such
law does not point to any "customary rule of international law or interna-
18. LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 15, at 72.
19. See McDOUUAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960).
20. See, e.g., DEPT OF THE ARMY PUBLICATION, FM 100-1 (1981).
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tional convention that specifically restricts their employment."'" The Air
Force Pamphlet in its discussion of "indiscriminate weapons," in particu-
lar the weapons or methods of warfare which may cause "excessive injury
or damage to civilians or civilian objectives," declares:
The extent to which a weapon discriminates between military objec-
tives and protected persons and objects depends usually on the man-
ner in which the weapon is employed rather than on the design quali-
ties of the weapon itself. Where a weapon is designed so that it can be
used against military objectives, its employment in a different man-
ner, such as against the civilian population, does not make the weapon
itself unlawful. Indiscriminate weapons are those incapable of being
controlled, through design or function, and thus they cannot, with any
degree of certainty, be directed at military objectives.22
While there is a grave risk that the use of tactical nuclear weapons,
or the impacts of massive force imposed by conventional weapons, or even
military doctrine, might lead to a large scale use of nuclear weapons of
greater destructive force, none of these facts alone enables us to condemn
such weapons under the existing law. Misuse of nuclear weapons, such as
uses contrary to the legal principle of military necessity, are violations of
the law of war, as is the use of other weapons under these conditions. The
use of nuclear weapons among naval forces in combat on the high seas is
likely to be a use which falls well within the permissibility of interna-
tional law and the law of war.
The juridical feature of the principle of military necessity operating
pursuant to law, is to encompass the process of claims and counterclaims
among states. If the principle is invoked, for example, in an international
tribunal, past practice indicates that there will be claims of justification
and opposing claims of illegality in numerous situations. This character-
ized the proceedings at Nuremburg. Because a legal principle of interna-
tional law embraces the overall claims process, the application of the
principle enables a tribunal to formulate more specific directives, drawing
upon the claims introduced, and the context in which the weapons or at-
tacks were launched or took place.23
Professor Fried is concerned with promoting the no-first-use pledge,
and seemingly raises his analysis relating to no-first-use in this connec-
tion. If his assumptions of illegality of nuclear weapons are accepted, then
it simply follows that the first use of such weapons, either by way of ag-
gression or during hostilities under way, would be illegal.
II. AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION AND PRACTICALITY
OF THE No-FIRST-USE PLEDGE
The no-first-use pledge, applicable during hostilities, might be ex-
21. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 9, at 18.
22. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 14, at 6-3.
23. LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 15, at 56.
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amined against the experience of the United States with the allegations
made by the Soviet Union and China that it had used bacteriological
agents in the Korean War. The United States at that time had not rati-
fied the Geneva Protocol of 1925,24 but it had recognized that the use of
chemical and biological agents were violations of customary international
law and that customary international law could be construed as applying
to any use of such agents. If it were construed this liberally, it would
impose restraints more substantial than those imposed by the Geneva
Protocol, because most of the states that ratified the Protocol, added a
reservation that they had the right to respond to any first use made
against them. Moreover, the Protocol itself limited its restraints to other
contracting parties. And some states, such as the Soviet Union, reserved
the right to respond to a first use against their allies as well as against
themselves.
In a real sense, the Protocol established the applicable law, which
tended to limit the content and reach of customary international law.
While it is arguable that the customary international law, with its wider
reach to all uses and subject to no reservations, was the law jus cogens,
and therefore was expected to override more restrictive law adopted by
way of treaties, such as the Protocol, the practice - the declarations and
behavior of states - indicates that they intend to adhere to the Protocol
and have thrown the customary international law restraints in doubt.
Our experience with the no-first-use pledge of the Geneva Protocol of
1925 leads to further consideration. The allegations of first-use by the
United States in the Korean War by the communist states were unques-
tionably fraudulent. This experience suggests that in future wars the no-
first-use pledge, combined with fraudulent allegations can lead to a justi-
fication to what will amount to a first-use by those making the allega-
tions. Because the Protocol as a treaty is expected to establish the rules
of restraint, this action would be tantamount to breaching the Protocol
and making it no longer applicable during the remainder of the conflict.
Clearly, if customary international law applies or continued to apply in
the example given, the right would be incorporated into a right of reprisal
and then limited to correcting the incident, but not extending to elimina-
tion of the application of the law to the remainder of the hostilities.
But states must look to their security. It is apparent that whether
they are prepared to retaliate by way of reprisal or through the freedom
to retaliate during hostilities by terminating the Protocol, they must have
the weapons stockpiled, tested, reliable and ready. They may need to
have their military forces and civilian population prepared to be immu-
nized against the use of such weapons. The entire no-first-use posture
during hostilities is fraught with uncertainty and for this reason the
United States, by way of general policy, has sought more than no-first-use
24. Geneva Protocol, June 17, 1925 - Apr. 29, 1975; see ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMA-
MENT AGREEMENTS (1982).
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pledges and has looked to a more effective disarmament agreement.
The experience with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 points to another
lesson in current practice among states. The Protocol does not serve arms
control objectives as such, it provides instead for controls over use of
weapons, such as those covered in the Protocol, during wartime. It does
not even apply to peacetime, or to the use of the agents it covers if in-
voked for other activities than "warfare". It operates under the law of
war, and its effectiveness is the effectiveness afforded by that law. The
reservations taken by states seem to recognize this. While those are reser-
vations to respond to a first use, in the wartime setting of violations of
customary international law, rather than under treaty law as found in the
Protocol, the response would be identified as a reprisal. However, the re-
prisal is conditional or limited under international law. It must be termi-
nated once the corrective action sought in its use has been accomplished.
States'reserving their right of response under treaties, are in a position to
claim that the breach of the treaty terminates the application of that
treaty with regard to the hostilities with the belligerent involved. Hence,
the Protocol provides at best, a limited barrier and once broken, provides
none at all, unless of course we shift to the application of customary in-
ternational law, emerging upon the breach of the Protocol to cover the
same activities.
Clearly, the Protocol, with its reservations and customary interna-
tional law, and with its, rights of reprisal, afford a deterrent to using
chemical or bacteriological agents. However, it is noteworthy that even
the deterrent element during World War II that made President
Roosevelt's warning to Germany effective, regarding any use that Ger-
many might make of chemical weapons against the United States or its
allies, lay in German perceptions that that element was enforceable. The
Germans believed that the United States would retaliate in attacks with
chemical weapons and more importantly, that the United States had the
lethality and destructive force in those weapons and the delivery capabil-
ity which would make the retaliation even more formidable than the ini-
tial attack.
We are justified, then, in distinguishing between the controls in arms
control measures and capabilities and the control measures to be found in
the law of war. This distinction turns on how the use of weapons is to be
controlled. The law of war imposes its controls upon the use of weapons
during wartime and those controls reflect expectations shared among bel-
ligerents with regard to both weapons and methods of attack occurring
during wartime. These controls are largely identified with responses in
kind or other responses to enforce a legal claim. Arms control agreements
do not usually provide for controls over the use of the weapons covered in
the agreements. Even when such controls are added to the agreements, it
is essential that they be incorporated in the understandings and decisions
of the parties to the applicable agreements to be applied with the law of
war, should they go to war. The control features of arms control govern
the weapons per se: how they are produced; tested and deployed; stock-
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piled; the number of them in inventories; and the number produced.
Furthermore, the no-first-use pledge of Professor Fried and others
would have strategic consequences which affect the freedom and capacity
of decision-makers to invoke defensive measures in a variety of situa-
tions.2" An aggressor could for example, launch a massive conventional
attack, under conditions where a response by conventional means would
be ineffectual. But the commander may find, in that aggression, that he
could respond effectively with nuclear weapons. Should that option be
foreclosed? Moreover, should its deterrent value also be foreclosed, as
would occur with the pledge? The pledge would foreclose him from all
uses of nuclear weapons for all purposes. He could not use them for tacti-
cal response, or tactical use. He would be unable to invoke the highly
discriminating nuclear weapons already in the arsenals of both the United
States and the Soviet Union. His planning, doctrine and strategy would
be materially changed and he would be unable to justify the weapons,
provide for their readied and tested use and their reliability.
Democratic states such as the United States must be exceedingly
careful to "keep their powder dry" when faced with the mounting threats
from the totalitarian communist states, because the ripple effect of secur-
ity decisions extends deeply into the democratic processes and to the op-
position engendered in terms of the allocation of resources and power.
Confusion and ambiguity in these processes can be readily exploited with
regard to security issues when they can only be superficially assessed by
the citizen.
The no-first-use pledge has separate implications for the arms con-
trol process. According to Professor Fried, it stems from the purported
illegality of nuclear weapons. However, if adopted, it would make the
threats and counter-threats involved in the arms control equilibrium un-
certain. It would not lead to reducing accidental or negligent launches,
because those by their nature are unintentional. The pledge itself is un-
verifiable as are all undertakings not to use or be the first to use weapons
or engage in attacks and for this reason would be unacceptable as an arms
control measure. Breach of such understandings occurs when the aggres-
sor or belligerent acts, and by then, the controls have lost their
effectiveness.
Hence, Professor Fried concludes:
[I]f the pledge were broken or rescinded, the legal and factual situa-
tion would be the same as if no pledge has been made . . . [but] a
mutual no first-use pledge can, as much as humanly possible, guaran-
25. The relationship of strategy, defense and security in terms of the perspectives of
the "statesman," is examined in EARLE, MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY 117-118 (1982).
"More than three hundred years ago, Francis Bacon pointed out that the ability of a nation
to defend itself depended upon its material possessions than upon the spirit of the people,
less upon its stocks of gold than upon the iron of determination of the body politic." Id. at
124
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tee the prevention of the ultimate blasphemy - an unintended end of
civilization.26
Professor Fried's proposals simply do not reach to the decision pro-
cess shared by the United States and the Soviet Union. They fail to weigh
the interdependence of decisions and fail to lead to the strategy they
share about arms control and the arms control deterrence equilibrium.
Such proposals, however, upset that strategy and leave both sides open to
conventional warfare or, more likely, lead to one side securing strategic
nuclear advantage through clandestine activities.
Arms control processes unquestionably fall short of producing a sta-
ble strategic situation, largely because they are dependant upon the rela-
tions between two sides. Those relations may even be adversely affected
by pledges or declarations of unverifiable professions of no-first-use or
even of moratoria on a unilateral basis.27 Both sides have shown in their
practice that they are willing to communicate, even if tenuously, about
maintaining the strategic weapons stand-off. We cannot proceed to better
ordering processes among them if we deny this minimal level of commu-
nications, or the practice that it establishes.
III. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)
The reasons for proposing the Strategic Defense Initiative and the
actions to be taken under the initiative at times become confusing.2" Pres-
ident Reagan has stressed that SDI is a research and technology program
and Congress has provided funding and authorization exclusively for
those purposes. 29 Both the executive and legislative branches are, to that
extent, committed to determining whether the strategies for attaining or
maintaining deterrence are sufficient, and whether they can be improved
upon by new strategies, including the deployment of defensive weaponry.
One of the important reasons for pursuing SDI is to seek the means to
strengthen a deterrence equilibrium that is in danger of breaking down.
The strategic perspective is that of the security of the United States and
its allies in a global order and the security sought, is that which will as-
sure that nuclear war will not break out.
SDI and the retention of the right of first use share in common a
strategy of deterrence that has been adopted by the United States. That
26. Fried, supra note 1, at 115.
27. For example, verification of activities in outer space - particularly of anti-satellite
activities - has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the United States according to Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth Adelman in his statement before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Outer Space, May 18, 1983 quoted in DOCUMENTS
ON DISARMAMENT, WASHINGTON ACDA PuB. 125, released Feb. 1986, USGPO, 420-430 (1986)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
28. See President Reagan's speech of March 23, 1983 announcing SDI, quoted in Docu-
MENTS at 199-201.
29. President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive on Defense Against Strate-
gic Weapons (Mar. 25, 1983), quoted in DOCUMENTS at 206, 207.
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strategy depends upon several assumptions, the foremost of which is that
the use of the strategic nuclear weapons would cause intolerable destruc-
tion. It is assumed that our rivals are influenced by a credible threat that
any such attack upon us would be the subject of a comparable re-
sponse-a response in kind or otherwise-causing the same destructive
force or greater. But a credible threat presupposes the
capabilites-reliable, tested, and mobilized for response. The strike that
causes severe destruction to us need not be limited to the nuclear threat,
but may be caused by a massive attack with the modern conventional
weapons. The no first use pledge would destroy this strategy-both its
deterrence and the credibility of its deterrence, and leave us bare to the
possibility of facing situations that are not subject to deterrence. More-
over, the illegality of nuclear weapons or the no first use form of illegality
would lead to serious consequences in terms of our governmental
processes relating to defense preparedness.
Professor Fried has attacked SDI for a number of reasons, familiar to
the public debate, but mounted by the groups antagonistic to SDI. These
attacks tend to miss the fundamental points. If SDI identifies an effective
defense system, that system must be one that is cost-effective. It must be
invulnerable to the kind of destruction during, or at the initiation of, war-
fare or aggression which would make it inoperable. It must contribute to
arms control objectives of deterrence. Fried has already resolved the
question of its feasibility, though, because he sides with those who find it
technologically infeasible. Fried has posited his own strategy of an effec-
tive or strategic defense and his conception of SDI is exclusively a com-
prehensive defense against any attack, by any weapon, at any time. Stra-
tegic defense is not limited to illusions or utopian claims, but extends to
measures that will enhance deterrence.
3 0
Professor Fried is troubled by the impact SDI will have on the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty),3 ' but that treaty was designed for
the strategic nuclear weapons equilibrium, for example, making all targets
except either the capital city or land based strategic weapons hostage to a
nuclear attack. This perspective would thus embrace Fried's "illegal"
weapons for the balancing process, but necessarily embroils him in the
inconsistencies of his argument.
More importantly, the ABM Treaty is a strategy in itself, and not
sacrosanct. It is a desirable strategy only if it promises to achieve the
objectives wanted from arms control. If those objectives cannot be
achieved, then the challenge is to establish either more realistic objec-
tives, or to change the overall strategy.32 SDI provides us with an oppor-
30. See WHITE HOUSE PAMPHLET, THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, PR
40-2: St 8/985 (1985).
31. ABM Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No.
7503.
32. The Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Apr. 6, 1983), pub-
lished in DOCUMENTS at 272 [hereinafter Snowcroft Report].
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tunity to conduct this appraisal with empirical rather than speculative
data.
Moreover, the realities of practice with the Soviet Union relating to
arms control under the current system, must be closely and continuously
assessed."3 The assessments of the United States government indicate
that the Soviet Union has been vigorously pursuing its own SDI program
and has been doing so for a number of years. The Soviet Union has also
been strengthening its defense programs and defense deployments in gen-
eral, weakening the thrusts of the ABM system. The Soviet funding for
these-defense efforts has been substantial and an effective defense strat-
egy coupled with Soviet offensive arms provides the possibility of a major
strategic breakthrough. As the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) has indicated:
The Soviets have devoted about as much financially to defenses of all
kinds, including ABM, as they have to their strategic offensive forces.
The prospect of the Soviet Union deploying an effective, nationwide
defensive system along with extensive air defenses would raise a seri-
ous challenge to deterrence and stability in the absence of an effective
defense response by the West. 4
In short, the United States, under the checks and balances process of
arms control, must respond to the actions of the Soviet Union if deter-
rence equilibria is to be maintained. The United States has not protested
the Soviet research efforts simply because they are permitted under
SALT and ABM Treaties, and are not readily reached through arms con-
trol agreements because, at the research or early development stage, there
is no way of monitoring or verifying what is taking place. 5 For the United
States, verification goes to the heart of the arms control process,36 so that
arms control cannot extend to that which cannot be verified.
ACDA publications observe that SDI falls within our arms control
perspectives, citing the President's speech to the United Nations in 1984:
In the near term, the SDI research program responds to the Soviet
ABM effort, which includes actual deployments. In the long term, SDI
research will be a crucial means by which the United States and the
Soviet Union can safely agree to very deep reductions, and eventually,
even the elimination of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads....
33. Id. at 275. The Snowcroft Report does not claim that arms control can prevent war,
only that it can reduce the risk of war. Moreover, arms control must be achieved through
agreements that control, and the primary objective is "stability" in the weapons equilib-
rium, and presumably in relations with the Soviet Union.
34. ACDA, FISCAL YEAR 1986 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, at viii (Apr. 1985).
35. See PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE SPECIAL REP. No. 136, SOVIET NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (1985).
36. In pursuing verification, we must apply rigor to ensure the appropriate use of terms
that are stipulated or defined, or the policy implications may be garbled. For a discussion on
this subject, see Marshall, Dour Thoughts on Inspection, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 24,
1962), cited in A. KATZ, VERIFICATION AND SALT 2 (1979).
VOL. 15:2,3
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND LAW
SDI programs are consistent with present U.S. positions in arms con-
trol talks. The President stated in his September 24, 1984 speech to
the United Nations General Assembly that the United States is com-
mitted to getting real results in the search for "ways to reduce the
vast stockpile of armaments in the world" and restated United States
willingness to discuss, among other topics, the relationship between
offensive and defensive forces.
37
United States' policy is not that proclaimed by those who attack the
SDI for whatever reasons they adduce. United States' policy is pro-
claimed by the President, and, through Congress, SDI has secured the
support of the people of the United States. In its 1984 Annual Report,
the ACDA makes this policy clear, stressing again the research objectives
of the SDI program. The full thrust of this policy comes from a statement
that cannot be misunderstood:
The fundamental objective of arms control, from the United States
perspective, is to reduce the risk of war, especially nuclear war, by
strengthening deterrence and by lowering levels of arms on an equita-
ble and verifiable basis thereby fostering a more stable East-West re-
lationship. Other goals include facilitating crisis management, reduc-
ing the destructiveness of war should it occur and lessening the cost of
military forces. But the key test is can arms control lessen the chances
of conflict, particularly any nuclear conflict, and thereby improve U.S.
security?38
Arms control under these perspectives is not part of the far reaching
policy and strategy of the democratic nations to establish global order
itself and make that order serve the security of the global community.39
Through arms control, we must attend to those matters that raise ques-
tions of the minimal security upon which we can proceed.4 0 As the ACDA
Report continues:
Past negotiations, as the President's Commission on Strategic Forces
pointed out in April 1983, have "produced neither agreement among
ourselves, restraint by the Soviets, nor lasting mutual limitations on
strategic offensive weapons." Moreover, new technologies may chal-
lenge longheld assumptions about deterrence, stability and the rela-
tionship between offensive and defensive forces. On both counts, a re-
assessment is needed of our arms control approaches to see how
progress might best be made.
President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), proposed in
37. See supra note 34, at viii.
38. 1984 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ANN. REP. 1.
39. Cf. address delivered by Secretary Shultz in San Francisco, October 14, 1985, re-
printed in ARMS CONTROL, STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND GLOBAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
CURRENT POLICY No. 750.
40. It appears that even though the ABM Treaty is of definite duration and the strate-
gic offensive arms agreements are limited in duration, it is intended that the link between
retaliatory capabilities of offensive weapons and the ABM regime cannot be broken, or the
ABM Treaty would lose its rationale.
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March 1983, reflected that need. It called for a major research pro-
gram to determine the feasibility for shifting strategic nuclear strategy
toward more reliance on defensive forces, that is, integrating strategic
defense into strategic deterrence. This shift's ultimate goal would be
to move away from the doctrine of mutually assured destruction and
eventually eliminate the threat posed by nuclear-armed missiles.'
This framework of policy and policy goals stands sharply at variance
with Professor Fried's perspectives. In this framework, we have embodied
a search into controlling the emerging technologies, while recognizing that
the military and peacetime technologies are independent. The possibili-
ties of Soviet adventurism continuing as it has in the past must be in-
cluded; these may lead to a strategic imbalance outweighing the arms
control process. Deterrence limited to nuclear war is identified, but there
is implied the need to thrust our deterrence perspectives more deeply
into the full array of Soviet interactions with the democratic states of the
West.
CONCLUSION
Under current practice, states invoke a variety of strategic instru-
ments of policy to have their own way. They seek to influence each other,
acquire power, or deny power to their rivals. Military measures provide
the instrument that appears to afford effective results, even if limited to
backing up other policy instruments that are ideological, economic or dip-
lomatic in nature. Arms control processes do not restrain these activities
or reshape the competitive policies of states. They can, at best, serve us in
seeking a more effective global public order, and, if they do not work,
they warn us that we must depend more heavily upon capabilities that
assure deterrence through military capabilities and military readiness.
Arms control processes depend upon the establishment of an effec-
tive practice among states in which we can develop and rely upon their
shared expectations about the decisions they are making or intending to
make. Such a practice depends upon reliable, timely, continuing and com-
prehensive intercommunications. The processes to check aggression are
currently linked to improvement of these communications in order to
provide the assurance of a reliable practice of control, in a reliable, shared
enterprise.
Professor Fried falls back on rules and moral precepts that character-
ized the outlook on law of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but in to-
day's world in which decisions and policy are the sources upon which con-
trol must rest, the earlier perspectives can no longer serve us. Our present
policies relate to how the military capabilities can serve our maintaining
minimal security in a world where hostility can break out and escalate to
uncontrollable levels of violence and break out readily from the frame-
work of rules, as Fried himself has noted.
41. See supra note 38, at 1, 2.
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These larger perspectives are appropriately summarized by Profes-
sors McDougal, Reisman, and Willard:
The use of a strategic instrument [in the power process] must be un-
derstood broadly. We speak of the use of the military instrument, for
example, not only when bullets have been fired and forces are moved
in large numbers from their garrisons. Instruments of strategy, like
the whole of the process of effective power, operate on participants all
the time. The military instrument is used even when weapons remain
in the armory and troops in the garrison. As long as the availability of
troops and weapons are perceived by other participants and taken
into account in the formation of their own goals and their ongoing
behavior, the military instrument is being used. The same observation
applies to all other instruments of strategy; they are everpresent and
especially influential when other participants perceive their availabil-
ity and the predispositions of those having control over such instru-
ments to exploit them. Hence, much of the strategic use of bases in
the world effective power process involves prepositioning and commu-
nication rather than actual use. The rapid deployment of a long dis-
tance fleet to a critical area may be enough to deter participants
within or outside of that area from adventures they may have contem-
plated. The mere availability of a rapid deployment force which can
be expeditiously sent to any part of the planet may perform the same
function.42
In sum, the strategies among the major rivals in a global and compet-
itive power process are of contending public orders, of contentions that
involve strategies emanating from the social process itself, but manifested
most often in military strategies. Significantly, the element of threat, the
perceptions of power and of credible use, the assurance of the will to act,
and of firm commitment executed through action, are features of this
changing rivalry.
Clausewitz caught the political element that occurs when states re-
sort to war, but in today's strategic setting, the interdeterminancy of
combat and the perception of combat through credible power is apparent.
As to this, Clausewitz observed:
Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the
enemy's forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no
actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption
that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. It follows
that the destruction of the enemy's force underlies all military actions;
all plans are ultimately based on it, resting like an arch on its abut-
ment. Consequently, all action is undertaken in the belief that if the
ultimate test of arms should actually occur, the outcome would be
favorable. The decision by arms is for all major and minor operations
in war what cash payment is in commerce. Regardless how complex
the relationship between the two parties, regardless how rarely settle-
42. M. McDoUGAL, W. REISMAN & A. WILLARD, The World Process of Effective Power:
The Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 376 (1985).
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ments actually occur, they can never be entirely absent. (emphasis
added) . 3
In its foreign policy, the United States seeks from the Soviet Union
common objectives of global order; but to achieve the global order that is
acceptable to us, we shall be compelled over a long period of time to
shape Soviet policy toward the values that we prize. When these efforts
prove unavailing, we must take up the strategies of nations that are under
threat and attack, even if those threats are immersed in the peacetime
processes we identify with influence and power. Law, always policy-ori-
ented in this context of global competition, is shaped primarily to pre-
serve the limited security arrayed against the nature of the threat. To
expect more from our law or policy, or worse, to expect law or policy to
deny us the choices we must make to ensure our security, is fatuous.
An effective policy-oriented analysis of nuclear weapons, their use in
war-fighting, and their use as a component of a strategic instrument in
"peacetime" must clarify the goals of the policy-maker and provide him
with operable alternatives in facing threats to his policy or strategy - or to
his nation.4
Crises or future opportunities, whether they are "found" to occur or
induced, are the future "missions" for similar strategies that can couple
nuclear weapons threats, subversion, or various forms of coercion. In
these, too, we can anticipate that the nuclear weapons would be invoked
without any expectation, that they will be used, or perhaps as in the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis, under conditions in which an accommodation can be
reached in return for diminishing or dropping the threat. Our perspec-
tives about what constitutes a "threat" under such conditions as these
must be extended to the realities of nuclear and other weaponry; those
realities are affected by strategies using organized groups posing as "free-
dom fighters" involved in "wars of liberation," or using deployment and
other strategies and threats aimed at us or our allies.
We cannot sever the strategic aspects of law from the larger perspec-
tives of global order and the continuing imminence of threat. When law is
perceived as part of the global ordering among adversaries, it is then
readily identified with strategic goals. As in other relations, as the claims
and demands processes of states over their competitive policies, the stra-
tegic goals are competing goals. What the Soviet Union wants from the
43. K. v. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 97 (M. Howard & P. Paret eds. and trans. 1976).
44. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides us with an ample illustration of a deployment
use of nuclear weapons during peacetime, and might be compared with the deployment of
the Soviet nuclear weapons targeted on NATO allies in Europe. The Soviet Union, a nation
then "inferior" to the United States in such weapons, and a great distance away, was able to
introduce these weapons, to preserve its grip on Cuba, and strengthen its relations with its
government, and to ensure through President Kennedy's message to Premier Khrushchev of
October 27, 1962 that we would "give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." excerpted in
THE ART AND PRACTICE OF MILITARY STRATEGY 224 (G.E. Thibault ed. 1984).
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global order is not what the democratic states are seeking and herein lie
the seeds of conflict. 4"
45. See Almond, The Struggle for a World Legal Order: An Overview of an Adversary
Process, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1977).
Editor's Note
The Leonard v.B. Sutton Award Papers are being published in the
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy for the first time. The Sut-
ton Award was established through the generosity of one of the Journal's
most dedicated supporters, Leonard von Bibra Sutton, in 1975. Since
1985, it has enabled the winner of the writing competition to attend the
Hague Academy of International Law for a summer session.
Leonard v.B. Sutton Award
Papers
Can International Law Prevent Another
Bhopal Tragedy?
TODD HOWLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Bhopal reminds us that our lifestyles will determine other peoples
chances."' What we find unwelcome about Bhopal is that it challenges
our way of life. While the catastrophe in Bhopal was certainly not the
first technologically related disaster,' it can be counted as being among
the worst industrial accidents in history. Accordingly, it has generated a
great deal of attention in the international legal community.'
The attention generated in the Bhopal tragedy has, for the most
part, elicited three categories of responses from various international en-
tities. They are:
1. To take a Guiness Book of World Records approach, by citing
mainly to the number of dead and injured.4 It is important to realize that
in early December 1984 deadly gas escaped from Union Carbide's pesti-
cide plant in Bhopal resulting officially in over 2,000 deaths and 200,000
injured.5 For the sheer magnitude, it is equally important to note that
those figures are debated, that the death toll could be much higher,' and
that the long-term effects are uncertain;
* Todd Howland was the recipient of the Leonard v.B. Sutton award for 1985. Mr.
Howland received his J.D. from the University of Denver College of Law 1986.
1. L.K. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EMERGENCE AND DIMENSIONS
(1984).
2. Other names such as Seveso, Mexico City, Flixborough, and now Chernobyl also con-
note non-natural disaster. See Hawke, The Law and Control of Major Industrial Hazards,
1986 J. PLANNING AND ENV'TL. L. 324. See also Schmemann, Soviet said to Try Encasing
Reactor in Concrete Coat, N.Y.Times, May 10, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
3. Accident is Among Worst, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
4. This approach is criticized as being impersonal and thus resulting in the ability to
rationalize the disaster away. See Visvanathan, Bhopal: The Imagination of a Disaster, 11
ALTERNATIVES 147, 149 (1986).
5. Diamond, The Bhopal Disaster: How It Happened, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at Al,
col. 1.
6. Some reports state the death count could be between 5,000-10,000 dead. See Varma,
Bhopal: The Unfolding of a Tragedy, 11 ALTERNATIVES 133, 134 (1986).
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2. To state how dangerous non-conventional pollutants can be, and to
juxtapose those risks against jobs and economic well-being. The negative
health effects of Bhopal,8 and pollutants in general are well documented."
The relationship to cancer,"0 and the need for improved regulation is al-
ways mentioned.' The "hard reality" of mainstream economic "science"
points to the well accepted "fact" that there is a contradiction between
economic well-being and environmental protection.' 2 This results in the
attitude that pollution and non-natural disasters are bound to happen, 3
and that the best we can hope for is to fine tune an acceptable risk
formula; 4
3. To focus on the compensation suits as a means to "right the
wrong." This is especially true for the legal community, whose responses
are traditionally tied to reaction as opposed to action." The sheer size of
the suit, the amount of compensation sought and statements of the adver-
saries has resulted in a good deal of media attention.'6 Exactly what will
happen to the victims compensation suits given the U.S. District Court's
decision and subsequent appeal, is a matter of conjecture. (In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F.
7. Id. at 133.
8. A good example of this are the two stories that appear on the front page of the N.Y.
Times on its second day of its Bhopal tragedy coverage. See Diamond, Jobs and Risks are
Linked at Sister Plant in the U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1984, at Al, col. 4. See also Gas
Deaths in India Exceed 1,000, with Thousands Hurt; Gandhi Seeks Compensation, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 5, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
9. The survivors are currently showing signs of cyanide-poisoning, and medical experts
indicate the exposure to methyl isocyanate could lead to temporary blindness, paralysis, and
damage to the respiratory system as well as damage to the Kidney and Liver. The effects of
the leak were so severe because contact with methyl isocyanate in liquid form causes tissue
to die. The leak's ability to effect human health in the future is uncertain, little information
is available on how long the poison will remain in the environment lingering in pockets in
concentrations high enough to cause damage. See Sullivan, Chemical, Widely Used, Is Very
Toxic, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
10. For an outline of the seriousness of health impacts caused by toxics, see, Sugerman,
Controlling Toxics on the Great Lakes: United States-Canada Toxic Problems and Control
Program, 12 SR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 299 (1985). It is also known that it is not only toxics
which endanger human health, but simply the exceeding of the earth's natural ability to to
absorb pollution. See NASCIMENTO, Pending Problems on International Law of the Environ-
ment, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 217 (R. Dupuy, ed.
1984).
11. Van den Heuvel, Health Risk Assessment of Chemicals, 6 Toxic SUB. J. 119 (1984).
12. Kamlet, Industrial Pollution Control in the Aftermath of Bhopal, 6 Toxic SUB. J.
13 (1984).
13. See generally E. MILLS, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1978).
14. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM.
J. ENV'TL. L. 1 (1986).
15. Dominguez, Approaches to Risk Assessment/Management, 6 Toxic SUB. J. 97
(1984).
16. Thus far almost everything appearing in law journals on Bhopal focuses on the
compensation suit, and its assorted issues (e.g. standing, forum nonconviens). For good ex-
ample of this, see Symposium, The Bhopal Tragedy: Social and Legal Issues, 20 TEx. INT'L
L. J. 267 (1985).
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The intent of this article is to provide a "fourth alternative," or a
non-traditional response to the Bhopal tragedy. This will be accom-
plished by examining how international law could be used to prevent
other Bhopals. Therefore, the focus of this article will be directed at the
relationship between environmental problems and other aspects of soci-
ety, and how it is crucial that any legal change be reflected in a societal
change for the law to be effective in this area.
II. THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES
Although the Bhopal tragedy occurred entirely within the boundaries
of India, and did not have any important transboundary consequences,
three relevant bodies of international law may be applied to a situation
involving such a catastrophe: international environmental law, interna-
tional trade law (technological transfer), and the law of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order (NIEO). This section of the article will attempt to
illustrate three points which relate to the applicability of international
law to this situation: how these bodies of international law relate to the
tragedy; the inadequacies of these bodies of law; and a discussion of the
need for an alternative.
While the specific focus of international environmental law is on
transboundary pollution,1" there is, however, a general trend in the inter-
national legal community towards the development of policy for the pro-
tection of the biosphere. 1" This development indicates a growing under-
standing in the world community of the earth as a self-sustaining,
interdependent, biological system, which does not recognize political
boundaries."9 This trend also indicates an emerging appreciation for the
dangers presented by industrial "advancement. 20
17. See, U.S. Executive Sees a High Indian Aide, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984, at A22, col.
1. Union Carbide and the Indian government are treating the tragedy like a tort claim.
Union Carbide's president Warren Anderson has said: "Union Carbide has a moral responsi-
bility in this whole issue, and we are not ducking it .... I am confident that the victims can
be fairly and equitably compensated without a material adverse affect on the financial con-
dition [of the company]. . . .You can't put a secondhand facility some place outside the
U.S. and expect it to operate."
Melvin Belli, an attorney for many of the victims, counters Anderson's statements.
"This can happen in the U.S., but why doesn't it? Every manufacturer knows there are
inspectors in each of the fifty states, and they can't get by with [poor safety procedures].
They get by with it abroad and it is criminal. It is shocking." Rocky Mountain News, Dec.
11, 1984, at 36, col. 1.
18. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW, UNEP Report No. 2
(1981).
19. See supra note 1.
20. Id. See also, Lehman, Can Pollution Be Destroyed?, 12 EPA J. 12 (1986). Lehman
states: "Experience has taught us that there is no such place as 'away,' especially for hazard-
ous wastes." This idea is supported by the idea that toxics threaten people who are close to
the site, and those who are far from it. See Anderson, Hazardous Wastes: Superfund Solu-
tion, 1 WM. MITCHELL ENV'TL L.J. 162, 163 (1983).
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 15:2,3
Another important development in international law that makes in-
ternational environmental law applicable to the Bhopal tragedy is move-
ment of international law toward addressing issues which have timeless
vdimensions." The inference drawn from the United Nations Declaration
on the Human Environment is environmental protection for present and
future generations. 2 Some scholars have suggested that the present gen-
eration has a fiduciary obligation to future generations.23
Bhopal is a reminder that the effect of industrial tragedies and envi-
ronmental degradation are not exclusively problems of More Developed
Countries (MDC), 4 they also effect Less Developed Countries (LDC). It
stands as testimony to the fact that every society on earth is vulnerable to
the effects of environmental degradation."
III. INADEQUACIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The continued growth and influence of multinational corporations is
an important aspect of the Bhopal tragedy. Union Carbide is only one of
the many major multinationals based in the United States.2" The theories
which support (e.g. comparative advantage),27 and criticize (e.g. imperial-
21. The problems presented by human "advancement" namely, toxic chemicals and ra-
dioactive substances have been identified by nine common characteristics: 1) Ignorance to
mechanism, i.e. the present state of knowledge is limited and limiting; 2) Potential for cata-
strophic costs; 3) Relatively modest benefit associated with the environmental risk gamble;
4) Low subjective probability of catastrophic outcome; 5) Internal transfer of benefits
i.e.,use of dangerous product allows for lower market price; 6) External transfer of costs to
those not in market transaction; 7) Collective risk (many people may be affected simultane-
ously; 8) Latency, the health effects of cancer are not immediately detectable as an effect; 9)
Irreversibility - e.g. plutonium's half life is 24,000 years. See Page, A Generic View of Toxic
Chemical and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978). Another problem is that the prob-
lem has advanced more quickly than a legal response. "Pesticides, toxic chemicals, and haz-
ardous wastes are diffused into the environment in ways that make it impossible to trace
casual relationships between exposure and harm. As such, science can only demonstrate that
various risk levels of future harm are thereby created." See Tarlock & Tarak, An Overview
of Comparative Environmental Law, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 85 (1983).
22. Weiss, International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity: Re-
search in Progress, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 445 (R.
Dupuy ed. 1984).
23. Thatcher, Serving Future Generations, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 451, 453 (Dupuy ed. 1984).
24. Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equality, 11
ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984).
25. For example, even though the U.S. is considered to have relatively strict environ-
ment regulations the Bhopal accident has brought out reports that show the extent of the
nonconventional pollutant problem. 1) Union Carbide knew of the possibility of a runaway
reaction at its West Virginia plant as well as its sister plant in Bhopal. 2) Files show that 12
pounds of poisonous gas are released into the air from the West Virginia plant each hour in
the manufacture of the deadly chemical. 3) There have been 61 leaks or in plant losses of
deadly chemicals from January 1, 1980 - December 14, 1984, at the West Virginia plant. See
Varma, supra note 6, at 142, citing an Environmental Protection Agency Report.
26. See generally W. OPHULUS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977).
27. Three fourths of multinationals with sales over 10 billion a year are based in the
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ism) 2 s multinationals are well know and greatly debated.
Some scholars believe that the only connection to international law
arises from the multinational character of Union Carbide. 29 Others insist
on the existence of a greater connection between international law, mul-
tinationals, environmental quality, and the NIEO. 0
A. Criticism of the Existing System and a Need for a New Alternative.
The NIEO is a group of values, ideas and laws developed as a reac-
tion to the lack of economic and political equality in the world commu-
nity.3' The NIEO action plan calls for the redistribution of wealth, politi-
cal power, technology and the industrial infrastructure from the More
Developed Countries (MDC) to LDC in order that the world community
truly exist as equals.32 While Union Carbide's presence in India cannot be
attributed to the NIEO, the acceptance of the type of development that
industrialization brings to LDC is congruent with the NIEO policy.
None of the three legal regimes was, or is, currently equipped with
the mechanisms necessary to prevent other tragedies such as the one that
occurred in Bhopal. Scholars believe that the inadequacies exist for two
reasons: international institutions are fundamentally tied to an industrial
development world view; and States are not connected in any way to the
natural ecological balance.
33
The mainstream approach to international environmental law, is to
treat it like any other body of public international law, by positing that
the law gives no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of States when
there are no transboundary effects.3" The focus of international environ-
mental law is on transboundary effects, supported by the two major oc-
currences in international environmental law, the Trail Smelter case,3 5
United States. See A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2d ed.) VOL II INTERNA-
TIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT (1982).
28. A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2d. ed.)VOL I INTERNATIONAL PRI-
VATE TRADE (1981).
29. H. MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM (1969).
30. Wali, The Interface of Ecology and Law: Science, the Legal Obligation, and Public
Policy, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 221 (1985).
31. "Bhopal and Seveso further demonstrate that the technologies which produce in-
dustrial poisons know no frontier and require international law." See Layton, One Europe:
One World, 20 J.W.T.L. 1 (Special Supp. No. 4 1986).
32. Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of the New International
Economic Order, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1984).
33. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May
1, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc A/9556 (1974), reprinted in
13 I.L.M. 715, 720 (1974). See also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec.
12, 1974, G.A. Res. 3281, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975),
reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
34. Ecological Balance, in I TOWARD A JUST WORLD ORDER 435 (R. Falk, S. Kim, & S.
Mendlovitz eds. 1982).
35. Von Muench, International Environmental Law: Some Remarks, 23 INDIAN J. INT'L
L. 210 (1983).
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and the 1972 Declaration on the Human Environment. 6
Developments since 1972 have begun to broaden international envi-
ronmental law from simply a prohibition of transboundary effects to rec-
ognition of a duty of individuals and states to preserve and protect the
environment for future generations.37 This concept goes beyond the tradi-
tional public international law idea of international personality, by mak-
ing a State responsible to its citizens and future global citizens as op-
posed to States being responsible to other States.3"
Very little work has been done in the area of international environ-
mental law outside the rubric of transboundary pollution, and what work
that has been done beyond that rubric has mostly been on the State to
State level. 9 The NIEO movement was able to legislate the idea that
MDC's would have to financially assist LDC's in their implementation of
stricter environmental controls into the 1972 Declaration and Environ-
mental Action Plan." While there has been some limited assistance,4 ' the
more fundamental problem of the interaction of industrialization and en-
vironmental law in developing countries (e.g. restrictions on multination-
36. The 1949 Trail Smelter case is considered one of the founding precedents upon
which international environmental law was built. The case held, "[n]o state has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to
the territory of another or properties or person therein. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.),
U.N. Rep., 3 Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949).
37. Principle 21 was one of the most important statements in the Declaration: "States
have in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental policies, and responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or con-
trol do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." June 16, 1972, 48/14 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 21 (1972).
38. From the changes made in the general language of the evolving international princi-
ples, from the Stockholm conference and the progression toward the Nairobi session, a new
attention to the special quantities of nonconventional pollution is inferable. A good example
of the new futuristic tendency is found in the Law of the Sea treaty, which will obligate
every state to protect and to preserve the marine environment. Law of the Sea Treaty,
opened for signature Oct. 7, 1982 U.N. Doc. A/Conf/62/122 reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982). Another example of the international legal communities heightened awareness of
environmental concerns was the creation of the United Nations Environmental programme
(UNEP). Probably one of the most significant statements to come out of UNEP occurred
during a conference held in Nairobi ten years after the Stockholm conference. The Nairobi
Declaration Principle 10 states: "The world community of states solemnly reaffirms its com-
mitment to the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan . . . [and] urges all governments
and peoples of the world to discharge their historical responsibility, collectively and individ-
ually, to ensure that our small planet is passed over to future generations in a condition
which guarantees a life in human dignity for all." See Struthers, U.N. Environmental Pro-
gramme After a Decade, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 269 (1983).
39. See generally Barberis, La Personalidad Juridica Internacional, in VOLKERRECHT
ALS RECHTS ORDNUNG INTERNATIONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT MENSCHENRECHTE- FESTCHRIFT FOR
HERMAN MOSLER 25 (1983).
40. See generally Caldwell, supra note 1.
41. Ramakrishna, Interest Articulation By The Developing Countries in The Interna-
tional Environmental Movement, 1984, 2 INT'L REV. CONTEMP. L. 45 (1984).
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als) has not been addressed by international environmental law."2 This
may be one of the reasons that even though international environmental
law has grown immensely in the past two decades, the quality of the
global environment continues to deteriorate. "3
LDC's have attempted to regulate multinationals' activities mainly
through taxation and agreements."" When those routes have failed, some
LDC's have resorted to exportation. 4 5 GATT and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have completed stud-
ies on international pollution control and international trade, focusing on
whether the stricter environmental standards of MDC's would impede
imports from LDC's.4' GATT has done nothing to prevent the further
deterioration of LDC's environment; the closest GATT has come to ap-
proaching the subject is its provision against dumping, however, that pro-
vision is not sufficiently broad to encompass "eco-dumping.' 4
Multinationals and the current law of international trade brought
more industrialization and increased environmental degradation to
LDC's. The law only protects the MDC's from environmental degradation
and risk.4
8
The NIEO is a reaction to the dominance of MDC's both politically
and economically, and has been designed to redistribute power and
wealth from rich countries to poor countries." The NIEO focuses on
countries rather than on individuals." Human rights thinking and the
need to include a Basic Needs approach are not important factors in the
formulation of the NIEO.' Alston wrote:
[I]t is not difficult to conceive of the future existence of a NIEO
characterized by automatic and greatly enhanced North-South re-
source transfers, higher and more stable prices for primary commodi-
ties, democratically run international financial institutions, more equi-
table arrangements of transfer of technology, the location of a higher
proportion of the world's industrial capacity in the South, and the
42. Id. at 52.
43. Caldwell, supra note 1.
44. Id.
45. See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 28.
46. Id.
47. An example of the issues dealt with would be if the use a pesticide is prohibited in
the U.S., and the prohibited pesticide is used in Mexico, would that usage prevent Mexico
from importing its produce to the U.S. See, Ramakrishna, supra note 41, at 50. See also
Schwartz, Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding? 11 INT'L L. 529 (1977).
48. "Eco-dumping" is when a product is produced in a State that has lax environmental
standards and is exported to compete with products produced under more stringent envi-
ronmental standards. According to one scholar this inadequacy is not due to the inability of
GATT mechanisms to deal with the problems, but because of some purposeful oversight.
See Rehbinder, Environmental Protection and the Law of International Trade, in THE Fu-
TURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 357 (R. Dupuy ed. 1984).
49. Id.
50. Boczek, supra note 32.
51. Id.
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achievement of a more effective control by host countries over the ac-
tivities of transnational corporations but which is nevertheless not ac-
companied by significant improvement in the human rights
situation."2
The failure of the NIEO to integrate a Basic Needs approach, has re-
sulted in an LDC "developing" in the same fashion as an MDC. This
failure would invite and nurture pollution prone industries.
There is now a greater understanding of the need to integrate the
Basic Needs and NIEO approaches. 4 The major obstacle toward the de-
velopment of a NIEO that would contribute to ensuring that all citizens
exist in a clean and healthy environment, is the continued inability of the
MDC positive alternatives." While the possibility for progress exists, the
results thus far have been unfortunate: the income gap between South
and North continues to widen,5 6 and the environment degradation of
LDC's continues to grow.57 The ability of society to create a tragedy as
demonstrated in Bhopal: human beings can enter into social relations
with one another which, no doubt, they themselves created, but work be-
hind their backs or above their heads and lead to consequences which
become independent of human motives and goals.5" Hopefully, such a
statement will assist policy makers to understand that environmental
problems cannot be isolated from the broader questions underlying the
administration of society. 9
The usual response to environmental degradation and industrial acci-
dents has been to rationalize and compartmentalize them. ° The required
response should be holistic, emphasizing organic and functional rela-
tions6 in attempting to create legislation directed at avoiding other
Bhopals. It must be understood that a certain world view has been insti-
tutionalized,6 2 and any regulations or laws growing from those institutions
will ceremoniously, not consciously, be attached to that world view.63
Scholars suggest that social dilemmas, such as environmental degra-
dation, cannot be effectively prevented unless there is a change within the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 232, citing Alston, Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention versus
Cure as a Human Rights Strategy, in DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
31, 90 (1981).
54. Visvanathan, supra note 4, at 154.
55. Baxi, supra note 57.
56. Rostow, Terms of a North-South Economic Partnership, 14 J. INT'L STUD. 22
(1985).
57. Boczek, supra note 32.
58. Caldwell, supra note 1.
59. Sarkar, The Green Movement in West Germany, 11 ALTERNATIVES 219 (1986).
60. Bouchardeau, On the Combating of Industrial Pollution, 1984, 1 INT'L REV. CON-
TEMP. L. 23, 30 (1984).
61. Visvanathan, supra note 4.
62. Ragsdale, Ecology, Growth and Law, 16 CALIF. W.L. REV. 214, 218 (1980).
63. See generally id.
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dominant social paradigm."4 International law is beginning to adhere to
the interconnected view, indicated by acceptance of the right to develop-
ment,6 5 and various UN activities.6
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
There have been numerous proposals for change demonstrated by the
three legal regimes discussed. Of those proposals that have been written
with environmental disasters in mind, a limited number of them will be
outlined.
Most suggestions have dealt with improving the effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of compensation for victims of pollution. The ideas include: en-
terprise liability, 7 the polluter pays principle, 8 State responsibility, 9
emphasizing the common law, 0 legislative balancing,7 ' and insurance. 72
The problem with focusing on compensation as opposed to preven-
tion is explained by one scholar: "In theory a potential tortfeasor could
calculate the cost of liability, discounted by the probability of its imposi-
tion, and thereby determine whether the benefit derived from risky activ-
ity was worth seeking." The problem is with toxics whereby "the goal of
compensation and 'optimal' deterrence may be meaningless" due to the
special properties of nonconventional pollutants. 73
Suggestions which would be congruent with this idea include: equita-
ble use,74 public trust,73 planetary trust,76 clean environment as a human
64. Reynolds, Foundations of an Institutional Theory of Regulation, 15 J. ECONOMIC
ISSUES 641 (1981).
65. Pirages, The Origins of Eco-Politics, in TOWARD A JUST WORLD ORDER VOL. I (R.
Falk, S. Kim, S. Mendlovitz eds. 1982).
66. Nanda, Development as an Emerging Human Right Under International Law, 13
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 161 (1984).
67. An example is the statement of the UN Symposium on Interrelations Among Re-
sources, Environment, Population and Development: Stockholm, 6-10 August 1979, re-
printed in 5 ALTERNATIVES 418 (1980).
68. Klemme, Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976).
69. HANSMEYER, Cost Apportionment Principles in Environmental Protection, in
TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 51 (M. Bothe ed. 1980).
70. Goldie, Transfrontier Pollution -From Concepts of Liability to Administrative
Conciliation, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 185 (1985).
71. Tracey, Hazardous Wastes and Strict Liability: A Case for Holding Producers of
Hazardous Wastes Responsible for their Actions, 59 N.D.L. REV. 605 (1983).
72. Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981).
73. Bo Bramsen, Transnational Pollution and International Law, 42-43 NoRDISK
TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 153 (1972-73). For a suggestion where insurance would
cover damage to nature as well as humans, see Bilder, Settlement of Disputes in the Field
of the International Law of the Environment, 144 (1) Recueil Des Cours-Academie De
Droit International 139 (1975).
74. Shavell, Strict Liability vs. Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
75. Handl, The Principle of 'Equitable Use' as Applied to Internationally Shared
Natural Resources: its Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes over Trans-
frontier Pollution, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 40 (1978).
76. Nanda & Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to International En-
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right," and the common heritage of humanity doctrine.7 8
Whether a new international law would be effective in preventing an-
other Bhopal, one must consider many things, among them being: the
goals of the NIEO, human rights thinking, economic aspects, and the re-
ality of human tragedy.
On both a national and international level, the basic philosophy un-
derlying environmental regulation is to preserve the environment in a
wholesome state and safeguard it against disastrous and irreversible deg-
radation. International environmental concerns, at least in the last resort,
aim at the prevention of transnational inflictions of such degradations.
Hence, potentially catastrophic consequences dwarf the legal relevance of
the probability of such consequences and may alone warrant prevention
of the hazardous activity.
7
The above is contrasted by other scholars who view a healthy envi-
ronment as essential to one's Basic Needs,80 and believe that other values,
such as GNP, must be measured in terms of sustainable development as
opposed to numbers growth.8 Innovative approaches needed in this area,
given its complexity, are crucial. To a certain extent, the ideas that have
come forward have had, and will continue to have, positive repercussions
for the mainstream of international legal theory.8"
This development seems to indicate that many of the world's schol-
ars are in agreement with McDougal. McDougal believes that humanity's
problems today are transnational and interconnected in origin and im-
pact.83 Scholars have proposed various programs and principles to provide
the ideals with "teeth." So far the international community has balked at
implementation of any of the proposed theories.
IV. "NEW" SUGGESTION-FORCED INTERNALIZATION
OF EXTERNAL COSTS
The suggested principle of international law is that no individual can
operate a production process unless all costs of that production process
are internalized. 84
vironmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 291 (1976).
77. Weiss, supra note 24.
78. W. GORMELY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-
OPERATION (1976).
79. Which appears in the Law of the Sea Treaty, opened for signature Oct. 7, 1982
U.N. Doc. A/Conf/62/122 reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
80. Kirgis, Technological Challenge to Shared Environment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 290,
335 (1972).
81. Steiger, DEMEL, FEY, & MALANCZUK, The Fundamental Right to a Decent Environ-
ment, in TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 1 (M. Bothe ed. 1980).
82. See generally Kothari, Environment and Alternative Development, 5 ALTERNA-
TIVES 427 (1980).
83. Sand, Environmental Law in the United Nations Environmental Programme, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT (R. Dupuy ed. 1984).
84. M. MCDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
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Externalities are undemocratic, the benefactors of the transaction are
rarely the same people as the victims of the transaction. According to
Rawls, that scenario runs counter to the natural duty all persons owe to
others, "to do no harm." 8 This idea is further defined by scholars in the
area of toxics, by pointing out that the combination of involuntary risk
and the dangers of toxics justify strong restrictions."6
Left alone, our government will not always look after the public in-
terest. In the environmental area there is a natural, built-in imbalance.
Private industry, driven by its own profit incentives to exploit and pollute
our natural resources uses its inherent advantage to exert political pres-
sure to resist environmental requirements. The machinations of industry
explain at least in part why the abuses of pollution become so severe
before steps are taken to establish controls.8 7
International markets create a situation that motivates individuals to
seek methods of production that will make their commodities less expen-
sive than their competitors (i.e. many of these production means are car-
ried out at the expense of the environment). 8 This need for more efficient
means of production is exaggerated in the LDC's that are striving for eco-
nomic "development," the result of which is severe environmental degra-
dation. 9 In many cases people of LDC's face the risks and costs of eco-
nomic "development" (e.g. pollution) directly, however, they receive only
indirect benefits, if any. Benefits received from industrial development
will not necessarily go to all the inhabitants of the LDC's90
V. CRITICISM-RESPONSE
In the 1960's and 1970's LDC's did not consider environmental costs.
at xvii (1981).
85. Returning to the automobile example, under this principle an individual could not
purchase gasoline, unless their would not be any negative effect on people who are not in the
transaction. Gasoline could only be purchased if their car was designed in such a way that
no externality would be created by the transaction.
86. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 114 (1971).
87. "A powerful justification for regulating pesticide use or discharge of toxic sub-
stances... is the fact that those who are involuntarily exposed to the risk of future ill health
often have little or no idea of the dangers of such exposure." Tarlock & Tarak, supra note
21, at 88. See also Starr, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk-What is Our Society
Willing to Pay for Safety? 165 SCIENCE 1232 (1969).
88. Duvall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299, 319 (1980).
89. This holds true no matter if a firm is trying to maximize profit (traditional western
method of measuring economic success), or maximizing throughput (traditional eastern
method of measuring economic success), or minimizing costs, or just trying to continue in
business with some kind of rate of return. A method often chosen to better the position of a
firm/individual operating in the competitive framework is to sacrifice environmental quality
(i.e. the process of creating a negative externality). See generally Varma, supra note 6.
90. Handl, An International Legal Perspective on the Conduct of Abnormally Danger-
ous Activities in Frontier Areas: the Case of Nuclear Plant Siting, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 7
(1979).
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They felt that a clean environment was a luxury for developed nations. 1
Scholars reflecting this sentiment state that considerable debate exists
about the priority to be given environmental issues in developing coun-
tries. Many of these nations view stringent environmental protection poli-
cies as luxuries they cannot afford or, worse yet, as a plot by the devel-
oped nations to perpetuate the present unequal distribution of wealth
throughout the world.2 Before and during the Stockholm conference the
majority of LDC's adhered to their position in the Founex Report, which
basically stated that environmental protection should not get in the way
of the overriding task of development. That idea influenced the Action
Plan of the Declaration on the Human Environment.9 At that time
LDC's realized that the right to a clean environment is not fundamen-
tal . 4 In 1972, Prime Minister Gandhi expressed the position of develop-
ing nations at Stockholm: "The rich countries may look upon develop-
ment as the cause of environment destruction, but to us it is one of the
primary means of improving the environment of living. . . .How can we
speak to those who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans,
rivers and air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the
source?"'9 5
In the decade that followed the Stockholm Conference the LDC's
struggled between environmental degradation and the views in which
they had previously held." Some became increasingly aware that pollu-
tion-generating and disaster-prone industrial plants 'exported' from the
MDC's, which had been gratefully accepted by some Third World elites,
91. An example of unequal distribution of income exists in Chile. In Chile economic
growth will lead to an increase in income for a small percentage of the population, while
most people do not receive direct benefits from the increase. Chile (Distribution of Income
1978): Highest Fifth-5.2"I., Second Fifth-9.3", Third Fifth-13.6"1, Fourth Fifth-20.9"e,
Lowest Fifth-51.0",. See, Foxely, Stabilization Policies and Their Effects on Employment
and Income Distribution: A Latin American Perspective, in ECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 191 (W. Cline and S. Weintraub eds. 1981). On the other hand a coun-
try like Sweden which enjoys one of the highest living standards in the world, shares both
the costs and benefits of economic "development" among its citizens because of the equality
of income distribution. Sweden (Distribution of Income 1976): Highest Fifth-37.0'1., Second
Fifth-24.8',, Third Fifth-18.5', Fourth Fifth-13.1'1%, Lowest Fifth-6.6%. See R. O'CONNOR,
E. O'MALLEY & A. FOLEY, ASPECTS OF THE SWEDISH ECONOMY AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO IRE-
LAND 13 (1978).
92. Biswas, Environment and Law: A Perspective from Developing Countries, in THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 389 (R. Dupuy ed. 1984).
93. Tarlock & Tarak, supra note 21. The idea that the environment is a luxury good is
supported by one scholar feels "environmental amenities are, from the viewpoint of eco-
nomic analysis, luxury goods for the affluent." Kmiec, Environmental Inequities-Observa-
tions on Mandelker's Environment and Equity-A Regulatory Challenge, 57 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 313, 319 (1981).
94. For example recommendation 103 of the Action Plan. See, Ramakrishna, supra
note 41.
95. Nascimento, supra note 10, at 229.
96. Struthers, supra note 38.
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may not be the route to true development." It is gradually accepted that
the environment and development are two sides of the same coin. 8
This change is reflected in the following statements attributed once
again to Mrs. Gandhi: "Interest in conservation is not a sentimental one
but rediscovery of the truth well-known to our ancient sages. The Indian
tradition teaches us that all forms of life-human, animal and plant-are
so closely interlinked that disturbance in one gives rise to imbalance in
the others."9 We do not attach priority to the environment. We have to
make our people more alive to the fact that conservation is not something
extra, but is essential in the counting of costs - social costs and even basic
economic costs.' 00
Even though this new awareness of the interconnection of the impor-
tance of the environment and real long term development is shared by
many developing nations,' it is still very difficult to get States to forego
immediate industrial and economic advances in favor of long-run, sound
development policies. 0 2 At an environmental session in Nairobi "the del-
egates generally agreed that poverty and war formed the greatest obsta-
cles to improving environmental conditions."'0 3
A new focus on Basic Needs of all countries is required in order that
citizens of LDC's and MDC's can enjoy their fundamental rights, includ-
ing the right to a clean environment. Such a commitment will take more
than just a declaration of support, 04 rather, it requires a restructuring or
rediscovery of values, 10 5 and a redistribution of resource usage.
0 6
97. Biswas, Environment and Law: A Perspective from Developing Countries, in THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 389 (R. Dupuy ed. 1984).
98. Varma, supra note 6, at 144. This new realization is congruent with an idea of de-
velopment which stresses participation rather than industrialization. "Let them come and
see men and women and children who knew how to live, whose joy of life had not yet been
killed by those who claimed to teach other nations how to live." C. ACHEBE, No LONGER AT
EASE 45 (1960). Cited in Koehn, African Approaches to Environmental Stress: A Focus on
Ethiopia and Nigeria in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 253 (R.
Barrett ed. 1982).
99. Biswas, supra note 97, at 391.
100. Id.
101. Mrs. Gandhi interviewed at the 1981 United Nations Conference on New and Re-
newable Sources of Energy. See Struthers, supra note 38.
102. In 1982, the developing nations are among the ardent supporters of ecological
planning and protection, and there seems to be wide spread recognition that development
and environmental protection are inseparable and that some long-range restraint on ex-
ploitation is essential. See id.
103. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 297.
104. Struthers, supra note 38.
105. The Indian Constitution in the section on Directive Principles of State Policy Art.
51-A states: "It shall be the duty of every citizen of India... to protect and improve the
natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for
living creatures," quoted in, Biswas, supra note 97, at 395.
106. Gandhi has said: "Earth provides enough to satisfy every[one's] need but not for
every[one's] greed." Scholars have also stated that in the traditional Indian world view jus-
tice, ecological and social stability are intrinsically linked. See Shiva, Ecology Movements in
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Forced internalization of costs would, according to mainstream eco-
nomic theory, result in less production at a higher price. 07 This idea is
the basis of the well known dichotomy between the environment and the
economy.0 8 While accepting the mainstream (supply and demand) logic
as all powerful is unwise,0 9 most scholars have accepted the mainstream
theory as their starting point, plowing forward from there. 10 Both ap-
proaches treat the environment as a resource, or a "good" which is bought
and sold according to the "laws" of supply and demand."' Therefore, ec-
onomics is perceived to be a tool to efficiently distribute resources or
"goods."'"2
This approach can be criticized from two perspectives: first, a clean
environment is a right, and not a "good" which is traded in the market-
place. Thus, the environment should enjoy a higher place in society's
value structure and, therefore, a more protected position than accorded to
"goods" no matter what economic theory would apply." 3 Second, the un-
derlying economic theory is faulty and, therefore, any theory developed
from that faulty basis suffers from the same weaknesses." 4
Judge Posner furthers the view that economic efficiency i.e. wealth
maximization, is society's goal." 5 This goal can be reached by allowing
the market to operate freely."' Posner believes this framework can be
useful in dealing with all legal problems.'1 7
India, 11 ALTERNATIVES 255 (1986).
107. The incredible sums spent on military spending dwarfs current spending on envi-
ronmental preservation and indicates that implementation of internalization is financially
possible. "As a matter of record and perspective for the decade, the nations of the United
Nations will in 1982 spend more money on arms and armies in a mere six hours than they
have provided over the past ten years to implement the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme." See Struthers, supra note 38. See also Hettne, Transcending the European
Model of Peace and Development, 10 ALTERNATIVES 453 (1985).
108. This can be shown by the use of a simple supply and demand curve. As costs of
production/transaction rise the supply curve shifts to the left, if all other elements remain
constant, the price rises and the quantity produced falls. See M. Bronfenbrenner, W. Sichel,
and W. Gardner, Economics 708 (1984).
109. E.g., E. MILLS, supra note 13.
110. For one criticism of the mainstream approach, see D. LEVINE, CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIc THEORY (1977).
111. Even though many scholars have pointed out the weaknesses in mainstream (neo-
classical) economics, it is adhered to as if it was some kind of "self-perpetuating religious
order." G. ROTH, THE ORIGIN OF ECONOMIC IDEAS 311 (1977).
112. See Hansmeyer, supra note 69.
113. See generally Bronfenbrenner supra note 108.
114. Examples of this line of reasoning can be found in the following works: Tribe,
Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592
(1985). R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). TINBERGEN, The Right to Health-An
Economist's View, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT (R. Dupuy ed. 1979).
115. See Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of
'Law and Economics,' 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 274 (1983).
116. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUBLIC
POL'Y 85 (1985).
117. See generally POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
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Judge Posner's theory is only useful when a private right can be cre-
ated." 8 This framework proves to be inadequate when dealing with non-
conventional pollutants because of their special qualities." 9 Under Pos-
ner's application of mainstream economics the basket of "goods" one
chooses is the one that maximizes their "utility" or pleasure. 20 This
means that all people make a voluntary choice about the "goods" they
consume. Such an assumption is inappropriate for the poor of Bhopal and
others who do not have enough money to make the choices Posner's ap-
plication of mainstream economic theory discusses.' 2'
VI. CONCLUSION
Under a forced internalization cost structure, individuals and firms
compete on the same level. There would no longer be any incentive to
develop where the environment would be sacrificed. A law that creates an
internalized cost structure is one way to ensure that another Bhopal will
not occur.
The internalization approach is workable for "developed" as well as
"developing" countries, requiring change in the current dominant social
paradigm of "growth at any cost" for the individual's dominance over na-
ture, and also requiring an understanding that everyone is a very small
part of an on-going process.' This new Weltanschauung has been
dubbed deep-ecology.'23 Other scholars have called it the second Coperni-
can revolution.
24
It must be recognized that the problems of poverty, hunger and devel-
opment are long term problems. There is no short term easy answer.
118. Id.
119. See generally Coleman, Economics and Law: Critical Review of the Foundations
of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHIcs 649 (1984).
120. For example some pollutants lifespan and migration abilities. See generally Varma
supra note 6.
121. Posner supra note 116, at 10.
122. One can not characterize poor children living in Los Angeles as having made a
voluntary choice; their is no basket of goods to choose from. See Silver, The Common Law
of Environmental Risk and Some Recent Applications, 10 HARv. ENV'TL L. REV. 61 (1986).
123. This requires that the traditional, Judeo-Christian idea of individuals dominance
over nature is to be traded for an idea that individuals are a part of nature. For example the
current concept of wilderness builds a division between what is "natural" and what is "civi-
lized," it is this idea that the environment is something extra that must be changed. Henry
Skolimowski,a philosopher, said:"We are in a period of ferment and turmoil, in which we
have to challenge the limits of the analytical and empiricist comprehension of the world as
we must work out a new conceptual and philosophical framework in which the multitude of
new social, ethical, ecological, epistemological, and ontological problems can be accommo-
dated and fruitfully tackled." See Duvall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 299, 309 (1980).
124. "Deep ecologists are committed to rapid movement to a 'steady state' or 'conservor
society' both from ethical principles of harmonious integration of humans with nature and
from appreciation of ecological realities." Id., at 312. "[Individuals] are part of the world
ecosystem, we cannot talk of this ecosystem on Earth, this nature, without [Individuals]."
Lee, infra note 149.
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It has been said that: [Humanity] must become the steward of its
'body', the eco-system upon which it depends and which now depends
upon it for its health.""
The solution to the problems of industrial pollution does not simply
lie in a law calling for the internalization of costs, or any other law. Pro-
gress toward a solution can only be made when individuals begin to par-
ticipate in the decisions that effect their lives and pollute their
environment.12"
Since it is in the best interest of humanity to avoid another Bhopal,
there are few alternatives. This article offers the forced internalization of
costs, its workability and its congruence with the current trends in inter-
national law as one alternative.
To espouse and enforce such a principle: "...means development of
a better theoretical understanding of nature, production, and soci-
ety. . .to move forward fully conscious of the reciprocality and interde-
pendence of nonhuman nature and human needs and aspirations." '12 7
If we do not vigorously pursue such an alternative, incidents such as
that of Bhopal will not only be revisited, but may very well become the
rule.128
125. This revolution would remove humans from the center of the biosphere, just as the
first removed earth for the center of the universe. See Caldwell, supra note 1.
126. Lee, On Marxian View of the Relationship Between Man and Nature, 2 ENV'T.
ETHICS 1, 2 (1980).
127. Bouchardeau, supra note 60, at 27. See also P. FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OP-
PRESSED (1968); PAUL & DIAS, Developing Human rights for Human Needs Centered Devel-
opment, (1985)(available from the International Center for Law in Development).
128. Tolman, Karl Marx, Alienation and the Mystery of Nature, 3 ENV'T. ETHICS 63
(1981). An example of that understanding can be found in the Dia Dong Declaration: Inde-
pendent Declaration on the Environment, reprinted in 1 TOWARD A JUST WORLD ORDER 492
(R. Falk, S. Kim, S. Mendlovitz eds. 1892).
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Portugal's Accession and Integration Into
the European Economic Community
NANCY WEINGARDT*
I. INTRODUCTION
March 29, 1985 marked the end of eight years of arduous negotia-
tions over the terms of Portugal's admission into the European Economic
Community (E.E.C.)' The accession treaty culminating from these negoti-
ations was signed by Portugal on July 11, 1985, and ratified by the E.E.C.
member countries later that same year. On January 1, 1986 Portugal fi-
nally became a full member of the Community.
For the Community, Portugal's admission symbolizes significant sup-
port of the new Portuguese democracy which will ultimately further the
E.E.C.'s goal to strengthen peace and liberty throughout Western Europe.
For the Portuguese, admission signifies not only support for their democ-
racy, but also the official end of centuries of economic, political, and so-
cial isolation from the rest of Europe. According to former Portuguese
Prime Minister Mario Soares (1976-1978), "everything will change."2
This paper focuses on the problems and benefits that Portugal's
membership will pose to both the Community and Portugal. Special con-
sideration is given to Portugal's unique political and economic history
and its place in a unified European system. A review is also given of fu-
ture developments in Portugal's industry, Portugal's wine trade with the
United States, and the E.E.C.'s textile trade with third-world countries.
* Nancy Weingardt was the recipient of the Leonard v.B. Sutton award for 1986. Ms.
Weingardt received her J.D. from the University of Denver College of Law in 1986.
1. What is known today as the E.E.C. began in 1951 with the creation of the first of the
three communities, comprising the E.E.C., the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). Member nations were West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the
Netherlands. Its success encouraged the original six to apply the same approach to the en-
tire European economy. Two treaties creating the remaining communities, the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed
in Rome in 1957. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined. In 1981,
Greece was admitted. With the addition of Portugal and Spain in 1986, the Community of
Twelve encompasses most of Western Europe. See generally The European Community,
Eua. 27-30 (July-Aug. 1985) (hereinafter cited as The European Community). In this paper
the acronyms: the E.E.C., the Community, and the Common Market all refer to the Euro-
pean Economic Community in its entirety.
2. Schumacher, For Spain and Portugal, Isolation is About to End, N.Y. Times, July 8,
1985, at 12, col. 3 (hereinafter cited as Schumacher).
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II. PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY AND UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
A. Portugal's Isolation from the Rest of Western Europe
Portugal is by far the poorest and least developed country in West-
ern Europe. The country's gross domestic product is only about one-
fourth of that of the E.E.C. average.' It is classified as semi-industrial-
ized, as compared with the majority of Western European countries
which are fully industrialized." It also trails Western Europe in literacy
and education, as well as a higher infant mortality rate.3 Some sixty-eight
percent of the populace still lives in rural villages." Wooden-wheeled carts
are common in the countryside, and appropriately so, considering the fact
that the country has very few roads suitable for automobiles. 7 Basically,
Portugal's development is comparable to that of France and Italy in the
1950's, and Spain in the 1960's.8
This lapse is due largely to Portugal's isolation from the rest of Eu-
rope. The Portuguese have historically searched out their fortunes from
the sea. They were the first white men to follow the African coast around
the Cape of Good Hope and then to cross the Indian Ocean to China and
Japan. They established colonies in the Far East, Africa, and South
America. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Portugal was Eu-
rope's richest nation.'
Although the colonies brought the Portuguese fantastic wealth, they
also brought dangerous illusions. Portugal's kings squandered fortunes on
extravagances and disabling wars.10 They refused to join the Enlighten-
ment of other European political and social movements."
Portugal's dictator from 1928 through 1968, Antonio de Oliviera
Salazar, made every attempt to freeze what remained of Portugal's em-
pire. Opposed to all forms of internationalism, Salazar kept the Portu-
guese economy almost entirely dependent on the colonies until the mid-
3. In 1981, Portugal's gross domestic product was 24.4 percent of the Community
average.
4. See R. MORRISON, PORTUGAL: A REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN AN OPEN ECONOMY 168
(1981)(hereinafter cited as R. MORRISON); THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC: THE
INTEGRATION OF UNEQUAL PARTNERS 246, 254 (D. Seers and C. Vaitos ed. 1982)(hereinafter
cited as THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C.); Redston, The Impact of E.C. Member-
ship on Portugal and Spain, INTERECONOMICS, Sept.-Oct. 1983 at 207-208 (hereinafter cited
as Redston).
5. Bruneau, Discovering Democracy, WILSON Q. 67, 68 (Jan. 1985)(hereinafter cited as
Bruneau).
6. Id. at 78.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 78; Opinion on the Portuguese Applications for Membership, BULL. EUR.
COMM. 13 (Supp. May 1978)(hereinafter cited as Opinion on the Portuguese Applications
for Membership).
9. For an historical account see Maxwell, Prisoners of Glory, WILSON Q. 49-66 (Jan.
1985)(hereinafter cited as Maxwell).
10. Id. at 55-62.
11. Id. at 58-59.
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1960's. Raw materials were obtained only from the colonies and any prod-
ucts which were unable to be sold elsewhere were unloaded in Africa."
In the 1950's, when West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
Belgium, and the Netherlands were planning the creation of the E.E.C.,
Salazar and the Portuguese refused to acknowledge the grave social, polit-
ical, and economic devastations of World War II that made development
of new forms of European cooperation imperative.' 3
B. Demise of Portuguese Isolation
Not until the 1960's did it become apparent that Salazar's isolationist
economy would not last forever. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-
man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to "conquer or die."' 4 In
Africa, as the French and British were "freeing" their colonies, uprisings
led by black nationalist guerrillas broke out in Portugal's colonies, e.g.
Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. Portugal poured its treasury, as well as
its military force, into its colonies in an attempt to stifle the uprisings.' 5
With half the governmental budget going to the military, Portugal's
rate of fixed investment was the lowestin Western Europe."0 The nation
was hit extremely hard by the global recession and inflation that followed
the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil em-
bargo.17 Consumer products' prices raced above wages and although both
unions and strikes were illegal in Portugal, disgruntled workers staged
some forty major walkouts.' s Plants owned by ITT and others were
forced to close down and resulting unrest grew in the military. On April
24, 1974, the successor government of Salazar Caetano was defeated in a
bloodless coup led by the military. 9
By March 1975, Portugal's colonies had been set free and ties with
the E.E.C. became increasingly important. The new Portuguese revolu-
tionary government expressed full acceptance of the 1972 agreements
with the E.E.C. 0 The E.E.C. began to play a role in internal Portuguese
politics by providing emergency assistance to Portugal, beginning in Oc-
tober of 1975, which included: emergency loans; long-term financial ar-
12. See generally id. at 62-66.
13. See THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 131 (J. Sampedro and J.
Payno ed.; L. Gorman and M. KilIjunen english ed. 1983)(hereinafter cited as THE ENLARGE-
MENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY).
14. Maxwell, supra note 9, at 64.
15. In 1968, Portugal had 130,000 troops deployed in Africa. Id. at 65.
16. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 68.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id.
19. Independence was given to Guinea (Guinea-Bissau), Mozambique, and the islands
off Africa-the Cape Verde Islands, and Sao Tome and Principe. Timor (later seized by
Indonesia) declared its independence. China declined to take over Macao, the Portuguese
enclave near Hong Kong, and it remains today in Lisbon's hands. Portuguese troops with-
drew from Angola. Today all that remains of the Portuguese empire, besides Macao, are the
island provinces of Madeira and the Azores. Id. at 73.
20. THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at 137.
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rangements; and a Financial Protocol." Such funds were conditioned on
Portugal following "the path of pluralistic democracy.".22 Portugal
achieved this goal on April 25, 1975 when elections for a constituent as-
sembly were held. Seventy-two percent of the vote went to pro-demo-
cratic parties.2"
The Portuguese adopted a constitution in 1976, which divided power
between a President, elected every five years, and an Assembly of the
Republic. In 1976 General Antonio Ramalho Eanes, was elected president
with 61.5 percent of the popular vote.24 This election, and resolute gov-
ernmental stability, led to application and admission into the E.E.C.
C. Application and Admission into the E.E.C.
On March 28, 1977, with their new democracy in place, the Portu-
guese formally applied for admission into the Community. Under the Pre-
amble to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
the signatory states proclaimed their resolution "to preserve and
strengthen peace and liberty" and called "upon the other peoples of Eu-
rope who share their ideal to join in their efforts."25 Article 237 of this
treaty states that "[a]ny European State may apply to become a mem-
ber."26 Of course, this did not necessarily mean that all applicants would
be admitted. The E.E.C.'s primary concern in considering Portugal's ap-
plication was whether their admission would pose a threat to the preser-
vation of democracy in Europe.27
In the ensuing nine years of negotiations, the Portuguese proved
their commitment to democracy. Portugal had a succession of sixteen dif-
ferent coalition governments since 1974, which fully enjoyed Western
freedoms such as universal suffrage, freedom of religion and freedom of
the press.2 ' Portugal's admission into the E.E.C. brought expectations of
strength in democracy, 9 which would further the E.E.C.'s goal to pro-
mote peace and liberty throughout all of Europe.
21. Id. at 138.
22. See R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 144.
23. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 73.
24. Id. at 75.
25. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 1 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) paragraph 151 (March 25, 1957)(hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome), included
the countries of: West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and The Netherlands.
26. Id.
27. See Opinion on the Portuguese Application for Membership, supra note 8, at 1.
28. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 75.
29. See SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, EUR. REP. (No. 1119) 1 (Mar. 30,
1985)(hereinafter cited as SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT); see also Problems of En-
largement: Taking Stock and Proposals, BULL. EUR. COMM. (DE 46) 12 (Supp. Aug.
1982)(hereinafter cited as Problems of Enlargement); Opinion on the Portuguese Applica-
tion for Membership, supra note 8, at 1; see generally Dagtoglou, The Southern Enlarge-
ment of the European Community, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 149, 161 (1984)(hereinafter
cited as Dagtoglou).
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III. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
Portugal's economy was a main barrier to admission into the E.E.C.
The founders of the E.E.C. saw economic integration as a step to higher
degrees of military and political cooperation, leading into a possible
"United States of Europe", with the European Commission3" becoming a
transnational government, and permeating the emergence of the concept
of European citizenship.3 Today, however, the E.E.C. remains basically
an economic union. The E.E.C. has been successful to the extent of elimi-
nating tariffs and duties among member states, establishing a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and imposing a value-added tax (VAT). The
E.E.C. claims that in addition to this, some E.E.C. policies are gradually
replacing those of member states." No common defense policy has yet
emerged, although all of the member states, except Ireland and the two
acceding states,3 3 belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). There is not yet a central "European government," nor do citi-
zens of member states consider themselves first and foremost citizens of
Europe.
The seven years of negotiations leading to admission of Portugal into
the E.E.C. focused on the economic difficulties of integrating into the
E.E.C. a poor, semi-industrialized country with high unemployment, pro-
ducing products not generally favored by the E.E.C. 4 The main concerns
of the E.E.C. were integrating Portugal into the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), carrying forth the policy of free movement of workers, in-
creasing the E.E.C. budget, and the need to change E.E.C. decision mak-
ing processes.
A. Agricultural Policy
The E.E.C. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) plays a central role
in E.E.C. economic and social affairs. CAP accounts for two thirds of the
E.E.C.'s twenty billion dollar budget. 5 Goals of the CAP have never been
30. The Commission is made up of fourteen Commissioners appointed jointly by the
national governments. Commissioners act in the E.E.C. interests, independently of the
member-state governments, and are answerable only to the European Parliament. See
Treaty of Rome, supra note 25.
31. See generally THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C., supra note 4, at 1-21.
32. The European Community, supra note 1, at 27-30.
33. Spain, as well as Portugal, acceded on Jan. 1, 1986.
34. SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29; Problems of Enlargement, supra
note 29; Opinion on the Portuguese Application for Membership, supra note 8; see gener-
ally THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C., supra note 4, at 1-21, 243-66; The Enlarge-
ment of the European Community, EUR. FILE 1-7 (March 1979); Redston, supra note 4, at
207 -212.
35. The E.E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was fundamental to the birth of
the Community. The initial agreement sought to provide economic security for producers of
industrial goods and agricultural products. The answer was the "Europeanization" of the
support mechanisms being introduced in France-the guarantee of a price for what the
farmer could grow, backed up by protection at the external frontiers of the E.E.C. It corre-
sponded to the political need to give France a major vested interest in the creation of the
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free trade in agriculture, but rather insuring a "fair standard of living for
the agricultural population, particularly by increasing the individual
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture." 36
The CAP is a policy of high prices for producers through guaranteed
prices and variable levees. Annual target prices are established by the
E.E.C. Council of Ministers. Producers are guaranteed this price, because
the E.E.C. will buy all the produce it is offered at slightly below the tar-
get price; that is, at an "intervention price". The cost of these subsidies is
becoming increasingly prohibitive." In order to maintain high prices,
cheaper import goods are discouraged from entering the market place
through a variable levy. This additional cost is set at levels insuring that
import goods will not undersell E.E.C. goods.
E.E.C. farmers are able to offer surplus goods into world markets at
competitive prices since the E.E.C. then refunds to the producer an
amount insuring a greater return than the cost of production.38
The addition of Portugal will further burden the E.E.C.'s agricultural
budget. The burden stems not so much from the fact that Portugal pro-
duces Mediterranean products, which are already posing surplus
problems within the E.E.C., but from the fact that Portugal will require
aid to modernize its agricultural sector.3 9 Small farms in northern Portu-
gal are neither competitive nor productive compared to other E.E.C.
countries. Large farms in southern Portugal are still recovering from the
nationalization after the revolution.4 Agriculture comprises only 14.9 per-
cent of the Portuguese gross domestic product.' The nation imports ap-
proximately half of its food, being self sufficient only in certain Mediter-
ranean products.'2
The cost of modernizing Portugal's agricultural sector may be offset
by imposing the principles of Community preference which would allow
the E.E.C.'s northern countries to sell more of their agricultural products
to the Portuguese. Portugal will have to open its markets to other Medi-
terranean products, thus benefiting other southern countries. Portugal
fears that this increased openness will threaten its own farmers.
The application of the CAP variable levy on imports from non-E.E.C.
Community of open markets, and the social requirement to make sure that the rapid indus-
trial modernization of Europe did not create prosperity which passed the peasant by. Farm
Policy is Fundamental to E.E.C., EUR. 36-37 (July-Aug. 1985).
36. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Agricultural
Policy, EUR. EcON. COMM. 24 (1982).
37. Id. at 36.
38. E.E.C., AuRIC. POL'Y EUR. COMM. (1979).
39. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at A1-A9.
40. Redston, supra note 4, at 208.
41. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at Al.
42. Food imports constitute one fifth of Portugal's total import bill. The country is self-
sufficient in the following products: 48 percent in wheat, 8 percent in sugar, 68 percent in
beef and veal and 100 percent only in wine, oil, fruits, and vegetables. See R. MORRISON,
supra note 4, at 153-54.
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countries will raise food costs in Portugal. In partial response to these
problems, the E.E.C. has agreed to allow the Portuguese to gradually re-
duce its import restrictions on E.E.C. agricultural products, and to
"phase-in" a variable levy after accession. 43 Even with these concessions,
the effect on Portuguese agriculture will be severe.
44
B. Free Movement of Workers
Although not as important as the CAP, the policy of free movement
of workers was fundamental to establishment of the E.E.C. Member
states are obliged to admit nationals of other member states who wish to
pursue specific economic activities and to treat them equally, giving them
protections and benefits, which their own nationals would be given. Even
though the Portuguese would certainly benefit if their workers were al-
lowed to migrate freely throughout the E.E.C., the host countries, who
already have enough trouble taking care of their own workers, 45 would
suffer.
As a result, freedom of movement of workers will be phased in gradu-
ally. Portuguese workers who already have jobs in other member coun-
tries will be entitled to the equal treatment from the host country, even if
they are unemployed at the time of accession. However, other Portuguese
workers will not be able to emigrate and seek employment for seven more
years.46
C. Community Budget
CAP, as well as other programs for increasing technological advance-
ment 47 , made it necessary to increase the Community budget before an
enlargement could be accomplished. 48 Preliminarily, the Community esti-
mates the addition of Spain as well as Portugal would result in a need to
increase the E.E.C. budget by approximately 15 to 20 percent. 9 Remit-
tances from the two countries were only expected to total 4 to 6 percent
of the increase.5 ° To make up the additional funds, the European Council
43. See generally SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 20-21 (This
provides a product by product schedule).
44. Id. at 2.
45. Dagtoglou, supra note 29, at 151.
46. See generally SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 22-24.
47. E.S.P.R.I.T., a ten-year $1 billion European program for research and development
in information technology is being implemented this year. See, E.S.P.R.I.T. Program is Un-
derway, EUR. 47 (March-April 1985).
48. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 6; The E.E.C. revenue sources comprise
agricultural levies, customs duties, and 1 percent (up to 1.4 percent in 1986) of the VAT, the
consumer's tax, the consumer tax on goods and services collected in each of the member
states. The 1985 budget amounts to 30.556 ECU ($22.32 bill). See The European Commu-
nity, supra note 1, at 30.
49. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 6.
50. Portugal will pay its share of its own resources in full but will be reimbursed on a
sliding scale until 1995. Portugal will receive some 1200 million ECO for 6 years. Id. at 7.
For details see SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 15.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
of the E.E.C.' adopted a proposal to increase the VAT to 1.4 percent, 0.4
percent over its 1 percent ceiling, which is now before the member states
for ratification." If this new tax is not adopted, E.E.C. experts predict
that harmonious economic development and access of all members to the
New Industrial Revolution will be impossible. 3
D. Decision Making
A semi-paralysis which has plagued the Community over the past
five years with respect to such projects as reform of the CAP, develop-
ment of internal markets, and instigation of common transport and envi-
ronmental policies is expected to be further complicated by the admission
of Portugal and Spain. 4 The unanimity of voting presently required by
the Community on this type of matter is expected to further paralyze the
Community's decision-making when the two developing countries which
manufacture products not favored by the Community become entitled to
vote. 5
Proposals have been made to remedy the conflict between the ex-
isting E.E.C. members and Portugal and Spain if they were to be admit-
ted. These include: use by the European Council of Article 155 of the
E.E.C. Treaty for developing executive powers in the Commission;" a
more systematic use of the vote by a qualified majority an extension of
majority voting in areas which now require unanimity; and reconstruction
of the entire institutional framework of the Community through a new
European Treaty of the Union which would encompass and supersede the
other Treaties. Under the Treaty of the Union, decision-making would
rest with the Parliament"' and the Council of the Union.' Deadlines
would then prevent decision-making from being delayed indefinitely in
either body. 9
Thus far, none of these proposals has been adopted, nor is it likely
51. The heads of government of member states and the President of the E.E.C. Com-
mission comprise the European Council which provides the main political guidance for the
Community. See generally The European Community, supra note 1, at 29-30.
52. SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 2.
53. Id.
54. See generally Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 7 (Enlargement will
compound deadlock); Dagtoglou, supra note 29 (Community's operational ability will be
diminished and it will no longer be able to speak with one voice); Wyles, Debate Heats Up
on the Community, EUR. 24 (Jan.-Feb. 1985)(hereinafter cited as Wyles)(Paralysis may be-
come total).
55. Id.
56. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 8.
57. At present, the European Parliament scrutinizes proposed Community laws through
its 15 specialized committees and acts as the E.E.C.'s public forum, debating issues of public
importance and questioning the Commission and Council. It also supervises the Commission
and has the power-never yet exercised-to dismiss it by a vote of censure. See generally
The European Community, supra note 1, at 29.
58. This is made up of representatives of the member countries' governments. Id.
59. See Dastoli, Parliament Has New Plan for European Union, EuR. 30-31 (Sept.-Oct.
1984).
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that any of them will be. Seven nations, excluding the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Greece favor such a move. These nations would also like to
see greater power extended to the European Parliament. The minority
three, while not directly opposed to such measure, are skeptical about the
desirability of abandoning the right of national veto in favor of majority
voting and of sharing legislative powers with the Parliament.6 The
"Dodge Committee", which is comprised of the personal representatives
of the Heads of Government working to reshape the E.E.C., suggests that
all issues covered by the Treaty of Rome be decided by majority voting."
For Portugal, adoption of these proposals would mean that it would
not have as much power in Community affairs. First, it would not have a
national veto, and second, Portugal would inevitably share a large share
of its national interests with other less-developed Mediterranean coun-
tries, which do not constitute a majority. 2
IV. PORTUGUESE INDUSTRY: WINDOW TO WESTERN EUROPE
A. Present State of Industry in Relation to that of the Community
The earnings, skill of workers, size of operations, diversification, in-
ternational competitiveness, and state of technology are lower in Portugal
than in any of the other E.E.C. countries. 3 Even large, efficient firms ca-
pable of competing in the Common Market have lower average productiv-
ity rates than other E.E.C. industries. This is true in most sectors of in-
dustry, excepting textiles and clothing, footwear, port wine, tomato paste,
and sardines.6 ' Without modernization, it is very unlikely that most of
the Portuguese industry will be able to withstand the increased competi-
tion from Community products.
As a member of the E.E.C., Portugal will have to dismantle all tariff
and non-tariff protections from Community industrial goods. To some
concerned, particularly the small businesses, increased competition from
the Community signifies the "holocaust and destruction of Portuguese in-
dustry," which has not yet completed the transition from a "supplier" to
its own colonies to an "independent competitor" in the world market. 5
60. See Wyles, supra note 54, at 24.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C., supra note 4, at 254.
64. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Portugal,
FET 85-32 at 12 (Dep't Comm. April 1985).(hereinafter cited as Foreign Economic Trends:
Portugal)
65. Opposition comes mainly from small businessmen and owners of firms which rely
on protectionism for their survival and are too small to reap the benefits of economies of
scale. Statement by Pedro Ferraz da Costa, head of the Confederation of Portuguese Indus-
try. Schumacher, supra note 2, at 12, col. 6. See generally R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at
145-150
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B. Prospects for Investments: Window to Western Europe
Portugal is almost entirely dependent on the E.E.C. for technology.6
Portuguese growth in 1984 took place only in low-tech, labor intensive
industries such as footwear, machinery, metal products, wood and cork
products, textiles and clothing, and parts for electronic equipment.6 7
While the Community recognizes Portugal's need to become techno-
logically self-sufficient and to move out of traditional labor intensive in-
dustries,68 financial restrictions prevent the Community from helping
Portugal with the achievement of these goals.6 9 For the moment, it ap-
pears that Portugal's success in restructuring and modernizing its indus-
try will be highly dependent on their ability to attract non-E.E.C. invest-
ment and technology. Accession is expected to attract foreign investment
from non-E.E.C. countries who wish to establish a foothold in Commu-
nity Markets."0 However, these expectations are unfounded. With the ex-
ception of textiles and clothing, Portugal's basic industrial goods enter
the Community without restriction. Accession of Portugal into the E.E.C.
will not avail a non-E.E.C. company investing in Portugal any avenue
into Community markets which was not present prior to accession.7
Portugal is in a relatively accessible location to the E.E.C. market.
Although the Portuguese public is a relatively small market in which a
foreign firm may sell its products, any foreign investor will and has had
the entire E.E.C. market at its disposal. Additionally, Portugal has con-
tinued to strengthen its ties to its ex-colonies in Africa. 72 This may serve
as an added incentive to investors who wish to establish a foothold in
both the Community and in Africa.
Portugal does provide a relatively accessible market, however, the
willingness of non-E.E.C. firms to invest in Portugal will ultimately de-
pend on Portugal's: (1) foreign investment incentives; and (2) wage level
and adaptability of the work force.
66. With the exception of approximately twenty percent imported from the United
States, Sweden, and Switzerland, Portugal imports all of its technology from E.E.C. coun-
tries and Spain. See THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at
173-75.
67. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 10-11.
68. See Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 6,9-11; SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUP-
PLEMENT, supra note 29, at 24.
69. One author has suggested that a strategy of "leap-frogging" into high-tech areas be
applied to Portuguese industry. Under this approach the E.E.C. would avail Portugal much
needed technology under a common industrial policy. THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE
E.E.C., supra note 4, at 265. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at A-12; see gener-
ally The Enlargement of the European Community, supra note 34, at 173. (The companies
with foreign participation are more productive and employ more workers than domestic
firms); Artisien & Buckley, Investment Legislation in Greece, Portugal, and Spain 7
J.W.T.L. 513, 517 (1983)(hereinafter cited as Artisien & Buckley).
70. Artisien & Buckley, supra note 69, at 517.
71. Id. at 514.
72. 1977 law (348/177); Id. at 518.
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1. Foreign Investment Legislation
Although Portugal's foreign investment legislation provides generous
tax exemptions and subsidies to foreign investors, it is highly complex
and lends itself to conflicting interpretations. Basically, under Portugal's
"general regime '73 foreign firms are entitled to all the incentives available
in Portuguese legislation without discrimination regarding the origin of
foreign capital. Foreign direct investment is permitted in all sectors ex-
cept those which are closed to private capital, foreign or domestic, and
these include: post and telecommunication, scheduled air and rail service,
and electricity. 4 Banking, insurance, cement, and fertilizers formerly con-
fined to the public sector, were opened to private investment in 1983.71
Steel making, petroleum refining, basic chemicals, and the arms industry
are open to private joint ventures.""
The state guarantees the transfer of dividends after deductions are
made for legal amortization and taxes. No restrictions exist on transfers
of capital arising from a sale or liquidation of a foreign investment, unless
there is a significant deterioration in the country's balance of payments
due to the withdrawal. In that case, capital repatriation may be spread
out over a period of up to five years.7 7 Additional incentives including tax
holidayss7 8 interest rate subsidies, and grants are available to certain in-
vestors under the "contractual regime. '79 These incentives are distributed
under a point system derived from the following criteria: economic per-
formance, sectorial priority, and regional priority.
Portugal's three ultimate goals in such an investment scheme are:
first, to encourage foreign investment in heavy industry which draws on
domestic supplies of raw materials, particularly iron ore, copper, lead and
zinc; second, to develop international competitiveness in traditional in-
dustries such as textiles; and third, to attract foreign investment in indus-
tries where Portugal already has a technological or other comparative ad-
vantage such as light electrical equipment, electronics and
telecommunication equipment.8 0
The Foreign Investment Institute operating under the authority of
the Minister of State for Finance and Planning, is entrusted with foreign
investment and technology transfer applications and is responsible for is-
suing authorization to foreign investors. According to the Foreign Invest-
73. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 12.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 9.
76. See Artisien & Buckley, supra note 69, at 513-523.
77. These include a fifty percent reduction on the following: conveyance tax on prop-
erty purchases, manufacturing and complementary taxes for up to nine years, value added
tax on gains from capital increases, capital gains tax on loan interest, and speedy write-offs
of property assets. Id.
78. This was provided under the 1980 System of Integrated Investment Incentives
(SIIC). Id.
79. Id.
80. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 13.
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ment Institute, approvals for foreign investment reached $191 million
dollars in 1984, an increase of thirty-one percent over 1983.81 Although
these figures appear promising, a closer look reveals that, of the total in-
flow, only twenty percent went to new enterprises, the type of investment
Portugal needs in order to restructure and diversify its technological mar-
ket. The remaining eighty percent went to increases in capital or expan-
sion of already existing facilities.8 2 Portugal's bureaucratic controls which
seem to scare off the new investors and favor the investors who are al-
ready present in the country are largely to blame.
In response to this problem Portuguese foreign investment legislation
is being extensively revised to facilitate investment procedures and to
make new investment more attractive. 3 Proposals include legislation sim-
ilar to that of Spain which contains fewer bureaucratic controls and
greater grants and loans to foreign investors. In Spain, foreign participa-
tion accounts for less than fifty percent of total investment and does not
require government authorization. Such a scheme has resulted in great
inflows of foreign capital into Spain over the past twenty years.8 4
Even though Portugal does not have the transport advantages, tech-
nologically sophisticated work force, and large domestic buying market of
Spain, legislation adopting the "fifty percent rule" would certainly be
beneficial to Portugal's foreign investment potential.8 5
2. Wage Levels and Adaptability of the Work Force
Portugal's wages are lower than any in the Community and resemble
more closely those of Mexico and Southwest Asia than those of other
Western European countries.86 Because much of Portugal's policy for in-
dustrialization is so linked with its low wages, the government has kept
salary levels low through a devaluation trend of the Portuguese escudo by
one-percent per month.8 7 Although this has worked to promote foreign
investment, it has also caused a steady increase in inflation. Real income
declined by four percent in 1982, seven percent in 1982, and ten percent
81. Investment from the E.E.C., led by France with twelve percent and the United
Kingdom with ten percent, accounted for thirty-six percent of total inflows in 1984. The
United States was the total largest investor, with thirty-five percent of total. Broken up by
sector, banking and finance received fifteen percent, tourism and commerce received eleven
percent, industry received twenty-nine percent, while agriculture, fisheries, and mining com-
bined accounted for only nine percent. Id. at 14.
82. Id.
83. For a more detailed discussion of Spain's investment legislation see Artisien &
Buckley, supra note 69, at 519-523.
84. Echickson, Portugal-Seeking a Path to Modernization, Christian Science Moni-
tor, Feb. 7, 1985 at 13, col. 4.
85. R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 151.
86. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 8.
87. Portugal will have to apply the variable levy to products imported from outside the
Community or the higher Community price for products imported from within the Commu-
nity. The policy will gradually be phased in so that the effects will not be felt all at once.
For details see SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 20-21.
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in 1984.
Portugal's admission to the E.E.C. will further complicate this prob-
lem in the form of an increase in food prices, caused by the imposition of
CAP." Even though wage increases have been promised, it is doubtful
that they will be forthcoming due to the dismal state of the Portuguese
economy.89
Unfortunately, as might be expected with such low wages, most of
the Portuguese work force is either unskilled or semi-skilled, which poses
a problem in attracting the high-tech investment that the country needs.
A new massive training center, financed through the World Bank, is pres-
ently being organized and should help to alleviate this problem.9 0
V. PORTUGUESE WINE INDUSTRY:
E.E.C. AND U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE WAR
Presently, Portugal, as a poor, small country playing a relatively in-
significant role in total world trade, is not directly involved in the
E.E.C.-United States-Japan trade wars. Membership in the Commu-
nity would change this. Portugal will be a member of one of the world's
largest exporting entities and as such will be subject to all the sanctions
imposed against that entity by Japan and the U.S. Of particular impor-
tance to Portugal will be the sanctions that the U.S. imposes against the
Community's wines.
A. Potential U.S. Sanctions Against the Imports of Community Wines
The U.S. and the E.E.C. have been engaged for the past decade in a
trade war over agricultural subsidies. Both sides claim that the subsidies
of the other constitute an unfair practice of world trade and therefore
must be discontinued. Each side has imposed sanctions ranging from quo-
tas to increased duties on certain agricultural products, such as sugar and
wheat.9 ' The E.E.C. fears a move by the U.S. towards the wine industry,
as permitted by the United States Wine Equity and Export Expansion
Act of 1984.92
1. Community Subsidies for Wine
The Community supports the wine industries of member countries in
five significant ways. First, it provides distillation subsidies which enable
producers of wine to sell their lowest utility, surplus bulk wines and by-
88. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 8.
89. Id.
90. See Boger, The United States-European Community Agricultural Export Subsi-
dies Dispute, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 173-238; Dunne, Shall They Beat Their Plow-
shares Into Swords, EUR. 10 (Sept-Oct. 1983); Renshaw, Farm Trade: Tensions Escalate,
EUR. 39 (July-Aug. 1985).
91. Wine Equity and Export Expansion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §10, 98 Stat.
3048, 19 U.S.C. 2801 et. seq.(1984)(hereinafter cited as Wine Equity Act).
92. American Grape Growers Alliance for Trade v. France and Italy, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-
210 and 731-TA-167, USITC Pub. 1502 (1984).
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products to distillers at artificially high prices for conversion to alcohol.
Second, its "intervention program" compensates producers of table wines
for conversion to alcohol. Third, its "export fund" provides subsidies to
exporters to enable them to sell E.E.C wines at a competitive price in
foreign markets; Fourth, it provides grants to grower cooperatives for the
replanting or converting of vineyards to other uses, and for the abandon-
ment of vineyards in locations which are ill-suited for wine production.
Finally, the community provides wine industries with grants for build-
ings, equipment and marketing purposes."
2. Protest by American Grape Growers
In a recent case before the United States International Trade Com-
mission (ITC), the American Grape Growers Alliance (the Alliance) at-
tacked E.E.C.'s subsidies, when applied in conjunction with French and
Italian wine subsidies, as a violation of the anti-dumping provisions of the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1930."4 The Alliance maintained that these subsi-
dies allowed French and Italian wines to sell below the market price in
the United States. In turn, the lower price enabled France and Italy to
sell more wine to American consumers, which displaced sales of domestic
wines. The result was an injury to American grape growers.95
The ITC dismissed the claim for lack of standing, holding that the
Alliance had not shown injury, and in the event injury could have been
proved, there was no causal connection between the injury of the Alliance
and E.E.C.'s wine subsidies. 6
3. Wine Equity and Export Act of 1984
In response to this decision, the United States Congress enacted the
Wine Equity and Export Act of 1984.11 Section 904(b)(3) of the Act spe-
cifically allows producers of "grape products" to initiate complaints
against "each country, or group of foreign countries represented as an ec-
onomic union. . .[that]. . .is a potential significant market for United
States wine, and maintains tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade in United
States wine." '98 Thus, under the Act, the Alliance may reintroduce its
complaint against France and Italy, or, as feared by the E.E.C., against
the entire Community.
93. Tariff Act of 1930, Public L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 590, 19 U.S.C. 1001 et. seq. (June 17,
1930)
94. Id.
95. Wine Equity Act, supra note 92.
96. Id. at §904(b)(3).
97. General Agreement on Trade & Tariff Act (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, part 5, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
98. Grape growers are more likely to lodge a complaint than are wine producers. This is
so because, as a group, grape growers are much more cohesive than wine producers and thus
in a better position to launch a complaint. Moreover, the grape growers, unlike the wine
producers, have not invested in the Community wine industry to any significant degree. See
9 BULL. EUR. COMM. 54-55 (1984); 10 BULL. EUR. COMM. 46 (1984); E.E.C. Asks G.A.T.T. to
Examine U.S. Trade Act, EUR. 46 (Mar.-April 1985).
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The Community's response was that Section 904(b)(3) was in clear
violation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)99 rules
which require that the complaint for an industry alleging injury from un-
fair trade practices be lodged by the producer of the product."'0 Whether
or not this section is in violation of GATT rules is beyond the scope of
this paper; however, if the U.S.-E.E.C. disputes over wheat and sugar
are any example, it is likely that the U.S., acting on the successful com-
plaint of grape growers, will impose anti-dumping and countervailing du-
ties on E.E.C. wines at least until the dispute is resolved.
B. Potential for Attack on the Portuguese Wine Industry
1. As a Wine Exporting Country or as a Member of the E.E.C.
The Wine Equity and Export Act permits petitions against countries,
standing on their own, and against "any group of countries compromising
an economic union."10' It is doubtful that Portugal will be attacked as a
country standing on its own, even after it becomes the recipient of
EAGGF funds.' This is because Portugal produces a relatively small
share, four percent, of total United States wine imports.103 It is unlikely
that the Alliance would launch a petition against Portugal when it did not
launch a similar petition against West Germany, also a recipient of
EAGGF funds and producer of a much greater quantity- seventeen per-
cent-of all United States wine imports.0 4 The two countries which were
attacked, France and Italy, accounted for forty and thirty-four percent of
imports, respectively.10 5
It is more likely that a petition will be launched against the entire
Community and this in turn will effect Portugal as a member. The Wine
Equity and Export Act invites this type of petition. When Congress said
"any group of countries compromising an economic union ' 6 they proba-
bly meant the E.E.C., which is the largest producer of wine in the world.
Three E.E.C. countries, Italy, France, and West Germany, account for
ninety-one percent of all United States wine imports.0 7 With the addi-
tion of Portugal and Spain, this figure will increase to ninety-six per-
cent.'0 8 If the Alliance does reintroduce petitions against foreign wines, it
is difficult to believe that they would not include the Community as at
least one of the defendants, especially in light of the wording of the Act.
99. Wine Equity Act, supra note 92.
100. Id.
101. American Grape Growers Alliance v. France and Italy, supra note 93, at A-8.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Wine Equity Act, supra note 92.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Macleod, Portugal's Wine-Makers: Coping with Competition, cited in
Bruneau, supra note 5, at 76.
108. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 84.
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2. Effect on Portuguese Economy
Wine is Portugal's leading export. In 1983 the wine industry em-
ployed fifteen percent of the country's work force and earned the country
$200 million dollars in foreign exchange."0 9 United States imports ac-
counted for fourteen percent of this figure. " If petitions are successfully
introduced against the Community or against Portugal, the price of Por-
tuguese wine sold in the U.S. will increase and the demand in Portugal
will lessen. This could severely damage Portugal's economy.
It is possible that the potential decrease in exports to the United
States will be off-set by the amount Portugal receives in subsidies from
the EAGGF. It is also possible that such a petition will not be successful
against Portugal or the Community.
If sanctions are not introduced, the price of Portuguese wine and
port wine sold in the United States would go down, due to the E.E.C.
subsidies for wine, particularly those which allow E.E.C. exports to sell at
competitive world prices. The demand and sale of Portuguese wine, which
is currently higher priced than most European wines sold in the U.S.,
should increase. This would ultimately benefit the Portuguese economy.
VI. EFFECT OF E.E.C.'s GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN POLICY
ON PORTUGAL'S TEXTILES
A. Textiles and the Global Mediterranean Policy
The concept of a Global Mediterranean Policy was begun by the
E.E.C. in 1971 in an effort to aid the industrial and social development of
non-E.E.C. Mediterranean countries as well as to provide a way for im-
proving mutual relations between the E.E.C. and these countries."' An
essential element of the global approach was to grant the less developed
Mediterranean countries free access to E.E.C.'s markets. Textiles and
clothing, the most important group of industrial exports of these Mediter-
ranean countries, were allowed into the Common Market at reduced or
zero duties, but subject to certain quantitative restrictions." 2
109. At this time there already existed association agreements between the E.E.C. and
Greece (1961), Turkey (1963), Morocco (1967), Tunisia (1967), Malta (1970), and Cyprus
(1972) as well as free trade agreements with Spain (1970), and Portugal (1972). The object
of the "global approach" was to include the remaining countries in the contractual system of
preferential economic relations. As an outcome the E.E.C. concluded a free trade agreement
with Israel (1975) and cooperation agreements with the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia 1976), the Mashrik countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria in 1977) and
Yugoslavia (1980).
110. These concessions were not completely new but had been granted by the E.E.C.'s
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which applied to all developing countries and
came into force on January 1, 1971. See generally Ashoff, The Textile Policy of the Euro-
pean Community Towards the Mediterranean Countries: Effects and Future Options, 22 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 17 (1983)(hereinafter cited as Ashoff).
111. PROBLEMS OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 29, at A-16.
112. There is the potential for trade diversion resulting in other sectors as well as cloth-
ing and textiles. Portugal's exports to countries outside the E.E.C. closely resemble the
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B. Potential Effects on Portugal's Accession
As a developing Mediterranean country, Portugal was granted con-
cessions and subject to quantitative restrictions for exports of its textiles
and clothing into the Community under the Global Mediterranean Policy.
In view of the upcoming accession, in 1982 the E.E.C. and Portugal nego-
tiated an agreement whereby the quantitative restrictions would gradu-
ally be phased out until four years after the accession date; thus, by 1990
all Portuguese textiles will enter the Community without restriction." s
Other Mediterranean countries fear that a gradual reduction in quotas
will further increase the over-supply within the Community and therefore
lessen the demand for outside products."' Additionally, they expect the
role Portugal will play in the decision-making process to have a detrimen-
tal effect on imports from other developing countries."' These fears could
become reality.
Portugal's textile and clothing industry has consistently held an im-
portant place in the Portuguese economy. In 1980, the industry employed
200,000 workers and accounted for one-tenth of Portugal's gross domestic
product and one-third of the country's entire exports." 6 The Portuguese
have regularly petitioned and received increased quotas from the E.E.C.
due to its special needs. It is reasonable to assume that once a member of
the E.E.C., Portugal will attempt to shape the textile policy according to
its own interests which encompass not only the defense of its own domes-
tic market from cheaper imports, but also protection and expansion of
the market for Portuguese goods within the Community. When the quo-
tas are finally reduced, it is more than probable that the Portuguese
products sold to the Community will work to displace exports from other
Mediterranean countries.
In 1980, total E.E.C. textile and clothing imports from the Mediter-
ranean countries, including Portugal, Spain, and Greece, totaled twenty-
five percent of all textile imports of the E.E.C. Portugal accounted for
one-sixth of this figure, even though only sixty-one percent of Portuguese
textiles and clothing were permitted to enter the Common Market."' If
all other factors were equal and the only drawback to the sale of Portu-
guese clothing and textiles in the Community were the quotas, Portugal
would have been responsible for one-fourth of the total exports from the
sixteen countries." 8 Under this estimate alone, assuming that the E.E.C.
will only import a fixed percentage from various regions, Portugal, with-
out any quotas, could possibly displace one-fourth of all sales by the
E.E.C. imports from low cost non-E.E.C. suppliers. Ashoff, supra note 110, at 34-40; see
generally R.. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 147.
113. Ashoff, supra note 112, at 34-40.
114. R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 149-50.
115. See Ashoff, supra note 112, at 35-36.
116. Id. at 37.
117. Id.
118. See id. generally, at 37.
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Mediterranean countries, including the one-sixth share which it already
accounts for.
However, this estimate is dependent on several variables. Whether or
not Portuguese exports to the E.E.C will increase as quotas are gradually
reduced is basically dependent on the competitiveness in relation to other
Mediterranean countries. Although future competitiveness is difficult to
measure, three factors are highly indicative of competitiveness in the tex-
tile and clothing industry: (1) wage levels; (2) productivity; and (3) stan-
dards of quality and degree of specialization." 9
1. Wages
In the textile and clothing industry, lower wages are the single most
important variable giving the less developed countries a comparative ad-
vantage. Portugal's wages have been kept competitive with those of other
Mediterranean countries through the devaluation of the escudo and the
decline in real income of workers. 20 Once Portugal joins the E.E.C.,
wages are expected to rise in response to higher food costs.' 2 ' An increase
in wages without a corresponding increase in productivity or quality, will
most likely decrease Portugal's comparative advantage, thus decreasing
its share of exports to the E.E.C.
2. Productivity
Another very important factor in international competitiveness is
productivity. In Portugal, there are approximately thirty firms which are
the sources of all textile and clothing exports. These firms are run with
modern equipment and efficient management and the productivity of
such firms is comparable to similar firms in other textile-exporting coun-
tries.'22 There is no reason to believe that the productivity of these firms
will decline due to accession. If productivity changes at all upon acces-
sion, it will probably improve. Portugal's investment legislation, as well as
eventual free access to the Common Market, may attract new manufac-
turers which are internationally competitive, thus increasing the total
productivity of the industry.
3. Standards of Quality and Degree of Specialization
Comparable information with regard to standards of quality and de-
gree of specialization are difficult to obtain. Because many E.E.C.-based
firms have established major exporting firms in Portugal, these firms usu-
ally meet E.E.C. standards. The exporting national firms generally keep
their standards up to those of the E.E.C.-based firms.' 23 However, it
should be noted that the main attraction of the Portuguese and other
Mediterranean firms is not their quality or innovation, but rather their
inexpensive products. However, an increase in Portugal's quality or spe-
119. See generally supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
120. See Ashoff, supra note 110, at 37.
121. Id. at 38.
122. See PROBLEMS OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 29, at A-16.
123. Ashoff, supra note 112, at 42.
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cialization,would probably not damage Mediterranean markets, since Por-
tugal would be supplying a new kind of product to a different group of
buyers.
Overall, accession opens possibilities for increased exports of Portu-
guese products to the E.E.C., yet the extent of utilization is dependent
upon the effect of the CAP on Portugal's wages, and the effect of acces-
sion on productivity. Generally, any favorable developments for Portugal
will work to the detriment of third countries. (Cyprus having the greatest
potential damage as both Portugal and Cyprus have concentrated on the
British market.) However, if there is a trade diversion, the impact will be
mitigated by a gradual reduction in tariffs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Economic Detriments to Portugal
Overall, neither Portugal nor the E.E.C. will benefit economically
from the Portuguese membership. Basically both parties will suffer, and
in that respect, Portugal more than the E.E.C. Without steps by the Por-
tuguese government to increase foreign investment, the country's entire
industry will either face the possibility of failing under increased compe-
tition from the Community or will be forced to specialize in peripheral
products. Portugal's exports, such as wine, will be subject to all sanctions
against the E.E.C., even though Portugal poses no threat to international
trade. And the imposition of CAP will cause food costs to rise in the
country, possibly threatening Portugal's comparative wage advantage and
definitely harming the Portuguese consumer. The aid that Portugal will
receive to modernize its farm sector and its industry, as well the gradual
decrease in quotas for textiles, the eventual free movement of workers,
and the entitlement of farmers to the benefits of CAP, will off-set the cost
to Portugal. Nevertheless, this off-set will not be enough to paint a rosy
economic forecast for the Portuguese.
B. Economic Detriments to the Community
Economic consequences to the E.E.C., however do not look as bleak.
It will have to pump funds into Portugal in order to modernize the na-
tion's agricultural sector, and the already burdened Community budget
will need to be further increased. Additionally, member states will gradu-
ally be forced to extend employment benefits to Portuguese workers rap-
idly migrating into the Community. These costs will be off-set by the
opening up of the Portuguese markets to Community's agricultural and
industrial goods, yet overall, the E.E.C. will not benefit economically from
Portugal's membership.
C. Unification of Europe
Without economics as a motivating factor, it can truly be said that
Portugal's membership is a move towards a unified Europe. It demon-
strates the E.E.C.'s willingness to incorporate a small, poor nation into
the Community's union of relatively rich nations merely because that na-
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tion is European and shares in the E.E.C.'s ideals to strengthen peace and
liberty throughout Europe by cooperation among member states.
Portugal's accession also demonstrates that the E.E.C. is still a union
worth joining. Portugal could have survived alone but instead, despite se-
vere effects, it chose to be part of the E.E.C.'s union; a union which car-
ries significant weight in world trade and has the potential of becoming a
formidable political power.

Editor's Note
The Human Rights Advocacy Clinic Documents are a special 'addi-
tion to the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy. The Human
Rights Advocacy Clinic has been held for two summers under the direc-
tion of Ved P. Nanda. The Clinic has addressed a number of important
human rights questions, and for the summer of 1986, two of its topics
concerned the "Big Mountain" situation and the gross violations of
human rights by the government of Sri Lanka.
Human Rights Clinic Documents
Human Rights Violations by the U.S.
Government Against Native Americans in
the Passage and Enforcement of Pub. L. No.
93-531*
INTRODUCTION
Pub. L. 93-531 is the U.S. law behind the forced removal of over
10,000 people from their homeland,' the largest relocation of an ethnic
group since the internment of the Japanese during World War 11.2 This
development examines the violations of international human rights law
against the traditional Native Americans affected by Pub. L. No. 93-531.
FACTS
Pub. L. No. 93-531 partitions land known as the "joint use area" be-
tween the Hopi and Navajo and mandates the removal, by force if neces-
sary, of Native Americans from lands they have inhabited for centuries
and consider their own.
In 1882, a section of northeastern Arizona was set aside "for the use
and occupancy of the [Hopi] and such other Indians. . ."I In 1942, Dis-
trict 6 was separated from the 1882 reservation and specifically reserved
*This piece was originally written as a brief to assist in the court challenge to Pub. L.
No. 93-531. The content and form have remained the same, but footnotes have been added.
The brief was prepared by the Big Mountain Project at the University of Denver's
Human Rights Clinic. This Clinic at the University of Denver selects certain contemporary
human rights cases or issues, which are in need of assistance and prepares briefs and
memorandum to be used by the attorneys directly involved in the cases. The Human Rights
Clinic of 1986 worked on three issues: indigenous rights, patterns of human rights violations
in Sri Lanka, and detentions and political repression in Chile.
The Big Mountain Project members were: Lucy Hawley, Todd Howland, Ved P. Nanda,
Judith Rhedin and Sandra Shwayder. The Project would like to thank Rich Garcia and
Barb Cashman for their assistance throughout the duration of the project, and to those
individuals and organizations that provided us with current information and resources.
1. Whitson, A Policy Review of the Federal Government's Relocation of Navajo Indi-
ans Under P.L. 93-531 and P.L. 96-305, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 371 (1985).
2. Over 112,000 Japanese-Americans were temporarily "relocated" to "camps." See,
Blodgett, Justice at Last? 72 A.B.A.J. 24 (July 1, 1986).
3. Executive Order of President Arthur dated December 16, 1882, found in Healing v.
Jones, 210 F.Supp. 125, 129 (D.Ariz. 1962).
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for the Hopi, leaving the remainder to be shared among the Hopi and
other Indians living there.' In 1962, the U.S. in Healing v. Jones officially
recognized that both the Hopi and Navajo had shared this land for centu-
ries and designated the area a "joint use area."'
Pub. L. No. 93-531 requires that both Navajo and Hopi living on the
"wrong side" of the arbitrarily drawn partition be removed and relocated,
the majority to urban areas or to other land off the reservation.' In the
case of the Navajo, the number of people who are to be removed exceeds
10,000.7
Although Pub. L. No. 93-531 purports to set up guidelines to com-
pensate relocatees with lands and homes, but suitable lands have not in
fact been offered;8 nor is it possible to compensate traditional Native
Americans with substitutes when this land is of a unique nature, the focal
point of the religious, cultural, economic and psychological life of the Na-
tive Americans who occupy it. The result of relocation thus far has been
loss of a way of life. Denying these Native Americans access to what for
them is their spiritual center has resulted in suicides, alcoholism, and se-
vere depression, as well as loss of the homes provided them in compensa-
tion due to their difficulty in functioning effectively in a cash economy.
This has resulted in their loss of dignity which had come from self-suffi-
ciency and degradation due to welfare dependency.10 Anthropologists con-
tend that the traditional Native Americans are becoming extinct because
their cultures are dying in a process of assimilation.1 This process occurs
because U.S. lawmakers have failed to see that the laws they enact in fact
destroy the essential nexus between the traditional Native Americans' an-
cestral lands and their traditional ways of life. The result is the perma-
nent destruction of part of our own human heritage.
This case presents special difficulties because there are more than
two "sides" to the dispute, so the problem does not fit easily into the
legal categories attorneys and judges are accustomed to. Players in this
drama range from the "traditional" Indians to the "progressive" Indians,
as well as the non-Indian mining companies interested in the land's natu-
ral resources. Therefore, a just and workable remedy requires an appreci-
ation of the traditional Native American culture and a willingness to go
beyond the traditional framework of our domestic law. 2
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-531 (1974).
7. Whitson, supra note 1.
8. J. KAMMER, THE SECOND LONG WALK (1980). See also Farrell, The New Indian
Wars, Denver Post, Nov. 20, 1983, at 11, col. 2.
9. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, CONTINUITIES OF HoPI CULTURE CHANCE (1978).
10. T. SCUDDER, No PLACE TO Go (1982).
11. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
12. See the "Brandeis Brief" in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See also, Bikle,
Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legis-
lative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924).
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The effect of Pub. L. 93-531 must be interpreted in light of the inter-
nationally required minimum standards for the protection of human
rights." The current violations of the Native Americans' human rights
have resulted in part from mistaken justifications arising from past
abuses. In 1934, the United States government unilaterally acted to
change the system of governance that had previously existed in Indian
tribes. 4 Some tribes accepted the new form of government; others did
not."6 For most tribes, including the Hopi and Navajo, the result has been
a form of dual authority: the traditional Indian form of leadership is ac-
cepted by some members of the tribe, while the Indian Tribal Council is
accepted by others.'6 The U.S. government, in recognizing only the Tribal
Councils, denies traditional Indians participation in critical decisions that
have an impact on their lives in devastating ways.
Although the validity of the Tribal Councils is not at issue here, this
denial of participation to traditional Indians in the passage of the law, as
well as the enforcement of the law, are violative of international mini-
mum standards set for the protection of human rights. These and other
human rights violations are enumerated and analyzed in arguments 1-7
below. Each of the arguments can be applied in domestic U.S. courts as
violations of the traditionalists internationally guaranteed human
rights.'7
13. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
14. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §467 et. seq. [hereinafter cited as
I.R.A.].
15. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
16. Id.
17. International law is a body of law which is binding upon all nations. It is derived
from two major sources: conventional law and customary international law. See, Bilder, An
Overview of International Human Rights Law, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE, (H. Hannum ed. 1984). These laws set out the minimum standards of behavior for
activities between States (e.g. extradition), and between States and citizens (e.g. human
rights). Evolving rules of international law, called "developing international law," are laws
which have yet to be accepted in state practice as binding customary international law, but
which nonetheless have an aspirational character attributed to them by those states which
do not consider the rules binding.
The United States Constitution states that treaties made under the authority of the
United States are the supreme law of the land. U.S. courts have applied international
human rights law in three ways: directly, through the application of conventions; through
the recognition of customary international law; and in conjunction with domestic law for
interpretive guidance of domestic laws. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing
International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 223
(H. Hannum 1984).
Courts have consistently applied international human rights law as evidenced by inter-
national custom. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the court held that "deliberate tor-
ture. . .violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights." Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). The court in Filartiga. referred to the
following international legal instruments: the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against Torture, as well as other international conven-
tions and national laws, judicial opinions, and writings of publicists. International human
rights law was also applied in Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980),
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Point 1: Indigenous Peoples are a Specially Protected Group under In-
ternational Law. Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates Internationally Protected
Indigenous Rights.
All law in this area must be considered developing international law.
The international community has begun to recognize the special problems
of the protection of the rights Indigenous populations as well as to appre-
ciate the effort necessary to maintain respect for these rights.
The 1957 International Labor Organization Convention 107, Con-
cerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries [hereinafter ILO Convention] in
Article 4 states: "In applying the provisions of this Convention relating to
the integration of populations concerned: a) due account shall be taken of
the cultural and religious values. . . existing among these popula-
tions. . .; b) the danger involved in disrupting the values and institutions
of the said populations unless they can be replaced by appropriate struc-
tures. . . shall be recognized.""8
and in von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., the court awarded injunctive relief and damages for the viola-
tion of customary international law. In the von Dardel case, which concerned the disappear-
ance of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, the court stated that "proof of a tort in
violation of international law as that law is currently understood establishes both a cause of
action and jurisdiction in the District Court." von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 256
(D.D.C. 1985). It is a long-standing principle that international law is used to shape the
content and reach of constitutional and statutory standards. In Murray v. Schooner Charm-
ing Betsy, the court held that "an Act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
International human rights instruments have been used to interpret and widen consti-
tutional and statutory standards in many cases. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650,
673 (1948)(Black, J., & Douglas, J., concurring) (Murphy,J. & Rutledge, J., concurring);
Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 604, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949); Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub noma. Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1981); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D.Conn.
1980).
Although there is no specific precedent for determining the outcome or status of inter-
national law when there is an inconsistency between it and pre-existing U.S. law or agree-
ments, the Reporters of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
state that:
Since international customary law and an international agreement have equal
authority in international law (section 102, comment j) and both are law of the
United States (section 131), arguably later customary law should be given ef-
fect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or
agreement.
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) §135 Re-
porters' note 4, at 83 (Tent. Draft No. 6, April 12, 1985).
International law guarantees that each individual and each individual group member is enti-
tled to basic protections, regardless of whether their government recognizes those rights.
These protections hold even if the majority has decided that other values are more impor-
tant; there is no balancing human rights with other values. The traditional Native Ameri-
cans are entitled to their basic human rights as outlined below.
18. 1957 International Labor Organization Convention 107, Concerning the Protection
and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal Populations in Independent Countries,
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Article 2 of the ILO Convention expressly prohibits: a) "trespass
upon human dignity and individual initiative" and b) "recourse to force
or coercion and the use of measures tending towards their artificial
assimilation." 9
The purpose of Pub. L. No. 93-531 is not necessarily the integration
of Native American relocatees, their forced assimilation into the domi-
nant culture is in fact the result. Furthermore, having their traditional
primary means of livelihood taken from them by the relocation, reduces
them to welfare dependency which degrades a once self-sufficient peo-
ple. o Their culture and religious values are disregarded and devastated
by the forced move into more urban surroundings.2 This is in violation of
the provisions of Article 7 of the ILO Convention which states: "In defin-
ing the rights and duties of the populations concerned regard shall be had
to their customary laws. . .Indigenous populations shall be allowed the
retention of their own customs and institutions. .. 22
International law recognizes the special relationship that traditional
Native Americans have with the land they have inhabited for centuries.
The World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination Ar-
ticle 2(a) (pertaining specifically to Indigenous peoples) declares:
The Conference endorses the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain
their traditional structure of economy and culture including their own
language and also recognizes the special relationship of indigenous
peoples to their land, and stresses that their land, land rights and nat-
ural resources should not be taken away from them.2 3
International law specifically prohibits the forced relocation of indig-
enous populations. Article 12(2) of the ILO Convention states: "When in
such cases removal of these populations is necessary as an exceptional
measure they shall be provided with lands of quality at least equal to
that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for
their present needs and future development." (emphasis added).2 4
Pub. L. No. 96-305, passed as an amendment to Pub. L. No. 93-531,
reduces the amount of surface land owned by both Navajo and Hopi.2
The law orders that Navajo be removed from 911,000 acres of land but
provides only 400,000 acres as compensation, only 250,000 of which has
opened for signature, June 26, 1957 ,328 U.N.T.S. 247 (1957). [Hereinafter cited as ILO
Convention].
19. Id.
20. See generally J. REDHOUSE, GEOPOLITICS OF THE NAVAJO-HoPi LAND DISPUTE (1985).
21. Sills, Relocation Reconsidered: Competing Explanations of the Navajo-Hopi Land
Settlement Act of 1974, 14(3) J. ETHNIC STUD. 53, 56 (1986).
22. ILO Convention, supra note 17.
23. G.A. Res. 17:260, Jan. 1978, Res. 3157(XXVIII).
24. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
25. Pub. L. No. 93-531 (1974); (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. Secs. 640-640d-28
(1982)).
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actually been awarded the Navajo (after eight years of negotiations).2"
Under the law, the Hopi lose the right to use the surface of over a half
million acres." Quantity considerations aside, the Big Mountain area of
the Joint Use Area has unique qualities that cannot be equaled as it is
unique for its inhabitants.
The Declaration of Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
articles 8 and 4 state:
No State shall participate financially or militarily in the involuntary
displacement of indigenous populations, or in the subsequent eco-
nomic exploitation or military use of their territory.
Indigenous nations and peoples are entitled to the permanent control
and enjoyment of their aboriginal ancestral-historical territories. This
includes surface and sub-surface rights, in land and coastal waters,
renewable and non-renewable resources, and the economies based on
these resources.28
Point 2: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates the Native Americans Right to their
Traditional Culture.
The right to observe one's culture is well-established in both conven-
tional and customary international law. Article 1(1) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right
to all people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development."2 9
In the Declaration of Barbados II, the concept of cultural domina-
tion, where governmental policies, foreign education and mass media pre-
sent Western culture as the only "civilized" culture was condemned. 0
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights article 27
further states: "persons. . .shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to pro-
fess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. '31
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborates on this right
to culture, stating:
Article 16(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and state.
26. Big Mountain Notes, at 5, col. 1 (Summ. 1986).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-531, supra note 25.
28. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/WP.4/Add.4.
29. U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
30. Declaration of Barbados 1I cited in J.R. Cobo, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, STUDY OF THE PROB-
LEM OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS Vol. I, at 237. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/
7 [hereinafter cited as Cobo Report].
31. U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974). For a guarantee of one's
right to culture that explicitly mentions Indigenous people see: The World Conference to
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination article 2(a), G.A. Res. 17:260, Jan. 1978, Res.
3157 (XXVIII).
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Article 26(3) Parents have the prior right to choose the kind of educa-
tion that shall be given their children.
Article 27(1) Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cul-
tural life of the community. .. 3
These diverse rights, all of which fall under the rubric of "culture"
are violated by the relocation in several ways. The extended family units
(rather than merely nuclear family units) are not relocated together to
environments similar to the land they have previously occupied.3 3 The
education of the traditional Navajo children includes education in the
sheep herding culture and religious ceremonies that can only be pursued
in the unique environment of the homeland.3 The cultural life of the
traditional Native Americans is dependent on the land and natural reli-
gious centers located thereon.3 5
Further, the Universal Declaration of Human Rightsstates in more
general terms in article 22 that:
Everyone as a member of society, has the right to social security and
is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation, and in accordance with the organization and resources of
each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and the free development of his personality. 6
By rendering the conduct of traditional Native American culture, society
and economy extremely difficult or impossible to pursue, the broad rights
articulated above are totally denied.
Point 3: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Prevents Traditional Native Americans from
Practicing and Continuing their Religion in Violation of International
Law.
Traditional Native American religious practices are tied to the land,
both in terms of nature and specific geographical areas. Pub. L. No. 93-
531 puts a barrier between the traditional Native Americans and their
natural religious centers.
The United Nations Charter article 55(c) pledges members to cooper-
ate in the achievement of: "universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, language or religion."3 "
Other international legal documents set out more specific norms. The
American Convention on Human Rights article 12(2) states: "No one
shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to main-
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
33. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
37. U.N. CHARTER (1945).
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tain. . .his religion ... 38
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination article 5(d) reaffirms the oft-stated right to "freedom
of thought, conscience and religion." 9
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights article
18(2) states: "No one shall be subject to coercion which impairs his free-
dom to have ... a religion or belief of his choice." Article 27 further
states: "persons. . .shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.
40
A recent significant development is the adoption in 1981 of the U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimi-
nation Based on Religion or Belief.4 ' This declaration was part of the
ongoing efforts of the United Nations since its inception to provide con-
crete content for the U.N. Charter's prescription of "human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion. 4
2
Article 1(1) and article 4(2) of the Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
state:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have religion or whatever
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
All states shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where
necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appro-
priate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or
other beliefs in this matter.4
Based upon the plain language of the Declaration and its preparatory
work the conclusion is inescapable that the Declaration extends to theis-
tic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs.
Many of those Indians involved in the Tribal Councils who have cre-
ated the perceived need for Pub. L. No. 93-531 have given up their tradi-
tional religion and beliefs." Developing international law protects those
traditional Native Americans from both those inside and outside the tribe
38. American Convention on Human Rights 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M.
352 (1966).
39. Id.
40. U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
41. U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, adopted, Jan. 18, 1982, G.A. Res. 55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.51) at
171, U.N. Doc. A/Res./36/55 (1982).
42. U.N. CHARTER (1945).
43. G.A. Res. 36/55 (1981).
44. Sills, supra note 21.
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who are attempting to impose a different religion upon them.4 The im-
plementation of Pub. L. No. 93-531 does not negatively impact every Na-
tive American's right to religion. Only the traditional Native Americans
are affected, but that effect is devastating and constitutes a violation of
their internationally protected human rights.
Point 4: The Lack of Participation by Traditional Native Americans in
the Formulation of Pub. L. No. 93-531 is a Violation of Their Protected
Rights to Political Participation.
Traditionally, Native Americans have made decisions by consensus.
Following the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,4s representative democ-
racy was introduced into Indian Tribes. Some Indians accepted the new
method, others boycotted it.4 Traditional Native Americans continue to
boycott the elections in protest of the imposed form of governance."8 To-
day "representatives" control a vast amount of power, but have not de-
rived that power from the people that are most affected by their
decisions.49
International law does not mandate one form of political participa-
tion (e.g. U.S. style elections) at the expense of another, but does man-
date that every individual participate in the decisions that affect them.
Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of
government."0
Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights guarantees the right to all people to "freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."'"
The passage of PL 93-531 is an example of mandated lack of partici-
pation by the traditional Native Americans in the decisions made by the
Tribal Council that adversely affect the traditionals. Article 2 of the ILO
Convention states: "The right of ownership, collective or individual, of
the members of the populations concerned over the lands which these
populations traditionally occupy shall be recognized.52 This protection
should be taken into consideration along with article 13(2) of the ILO
Convention which states: "Arrangements shall be made to prevent per-
sons who are not members of populations concerned from taking advan-
45. See the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, reprinted in 3 ALTERNA-
TIVES 280 (1977).
46. I.R.A., supra note 14.
47. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
51. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
52. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
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tage of these customs or lack of understanding of the laws on the part of
members of these populations to secure ownership or use of the lands
belonging to such members."5
It is essential to recognize that traditional Native Americans have a
customary relationship to their land which effectively governs their use of
the land that is not commensurate with the Western conception of prop-
erty. By imposing legal restrictions on ownership along with governmen-
tal procedures and structures (i.e., "elected" representatives among a peo-
ple who govern themselves by consensus) which traditional Indigenous
people also could not clearly understand, the U.S. government violated
article 13(2) of the ILO Convention, thereby rendering any expressed rec-
ognition in accordance with article 2 of the ILO Convention virtually
meaningless.
Article 7 of the ILO Convention addresses this issue as follows: "In
defining the rights and duties of the populations concerned regard shall
be had to their customary laws."54 The traditional Native Americans do
not govern themselves according to the rule of the majority.5 As a result,
the majority of them did not participate in elections of representatives. 6
In negotiating for their land with "elected" representatives rather than
the traditional elders of the tribes involved, the U.S. violated article 7 of
the ILO Convention.
Point 5: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Forces Economically Self-Sufficient Native
Americans into a Position of Economic Dependence in Violation of In-
ternational Law.
Since the first European settlers came into contact with the Native
Americans in the U.S., the latter's self-sufficient economy has been ad-
versely affected by the introduction of an exchange economy. 7 The self-
sufficiency of the Native Americans has been continuously undermined by
laws affecting the disposition of their property."' Pub. L. No. 93-531 and
its amendment Pub. L. No. 96-305 mandate the removal of the traditional
Native Americans from their source of self-sufficiency: their land.5 9 Pub.
L. No. 96-305 severely limits the size of the traditional peoples livestock
herds, thus, undermining their means to self-sufficiency.6
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. E.g., V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMER-
ICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984).
59. Pub. L. No. 93-531 removes the traditional Native Americans from the land they
have historically inhabited, and Pub. L. No. 96-305 almost completely eliminates the possi-
bility of self-sufficiency for those who our allowed to stay on the land they have historically
inhabited.
60. Pub. L. No. 93-531, supra note 25.
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International law recognizes the right of the traditional Native Amer-
icans to choose the type of economic system in which they will partici-
pate. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples
states: "Every people has the right to choose its own economic and social
system and pursue its own path to economic development freely and
without foreign interference.""1
The traditional Native Americans right to control their resources is
recognized by international law. Article 1(1) of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right to all
people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." Article 1(2) further states
unequivocally: "In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence. '"62
Point 6: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Completely Eliminates the Ability of the
Affected Traditional Native Americans to Implement their Right to
Development.
Point 6, like point 1 is based on developing international law. The
right to development can be inferred from existing customary interna-
tional law as the following United Nation's document indicates:
The right to development stands for the development of human be-
ings and not for the development of countries, the production of
things, their distribution, within social systems or the transformation
of social structures. These may be means towards the end but they
should not be confused with the end, which is that of developing the
entire human being and human beings.6"
The right to development allows different views of development to
exist simultaneously. 4 Pub. L. No. 93-531 severely impedes the chances
61. Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, supra note 45.
62. See supra note 29.
63. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT AND
TEcHNOLOGY-ToWARDS A TECHNOLOGY FOR SELF-RELIANCE, 3 (1979). In a 1979 Report of the
Secretary General concerning the international dimensions of the right to development as a
human right, various legal sources were supplied as bases of the right to development. Seven
elements were articulated in this document:
(i) The realization of the potentialities of the human person in harmony with the commu-
nity should be seen as the central purpose of development.
(ii) The human person should be regarded as the subject and not the object of the develop-
ment process.
(iii) Development requires the satisfaction of both material and nonmaterial basic needs.
(iv) Respect for human rights is fundamental to the development process.
(v) The human person must be able to participate fully in shaping his own reality.
(vi) Respect for the principles of equality and nondiscrimination is essential.
(vii) The achievement of a degree of individual and collective self-reliance must be an inte-
gral part of the process.
Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979).
64. Nanda, Development as an Emerging Human Right Under International Law, 13
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 161 (1984). See also, Schachter, The Evolving International Law
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of the traditional Native Americans to develop as they define the term.
Offering monetary compensation and modern homes to satisfy the relo-
catees does not meet the international standard for development.
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples states:
"Every people has the right to choose its own economic and social system
and pursue its own path to economic development freely and without for-
eign interference." 5 The right to development insures that the people
most affected by a decision, have a role in making the decision."6
Point 7: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates the Traditional Native American's
Right to Live in One's Homeland.
The right to live in one's homeland is a basic need which has been recog-
nized by all civilized nations and is expressly guaranteed in several inter-
national instruments to which the U.S. has been a signatory. 7 The Amer-
ican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, article 8 provides:
"Every person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of a
State of which he is a national, to move freely within such territory, and
not leave it except by his own will." (emphasis added).6 s
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 13(2) states: "Ev-
eryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to re-
turn to his country."6 9 The final report made to the Subcommission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities addressed
the problem of discrimination and indigenous populations. Some of these
points are relevant to the Big Mountain dilemma:
513. Indigenous peoples have a natural and inalienable right to keep
the territories they possess and to claim the lands which have been
taken from them. In other words, they are entitled to the natural and
cultural patrimony contained in the territory and to determine freely
how to use it and how to benefit from it.
514. Recognition must be given to the right of all indigenous nations
or peoples, as a minimum, to the return and control of sufficient and
suitable land to enable them to live an economically existence in ac-
cordance with their own customs and traditions, and to develop fully
at their own pace. All possible efforts should be made to ensure that
State governments give legal recognition to the indigenous people's
right to land. States that do not have indigenous land rights legisla-
of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976); Rich, The Right to Development as
an Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1983).
65. Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, supra note 45.
66. This is especially important given the lack of political participation of the tradi-
tional Native Americans, as outlined in point 4, supra.
67. See e.g. OAS/Ser L/VI 11.66, Doc 17, Sept. 27, 1985.
68. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the 9th Int'l
Conference of American States, Bogota (1948) reprinted in Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, OAS, HANDBOOK ON EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS 48-74
(OEA/Ser L/V/11-23, Doc. 21, rev. 6, 1979).
69. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
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tion should review their policies towards indigenous people and make
an early commitment to enacting such legislation.
519. Ownership of indigenous land by the respective indigenous popu-
lations should be immediately recognized by all States ...
525. Legal measures should be taken guaranteeing the indigenous
populations more comprehensive protection in the possession and ef-
fective control of their territories.
7 0
Forcibly removing Native Americans from their ancestral homeland
is a violation of international law. The International Labor Organization
Convention article 12(2) states: "When in such cases removal of these
populations is necessary as an exceptional measure they shall be provided
with lands of quality at least equal to that of the lands previously occu-
pied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future
development."7
Point 8: Pub. L. No. 93-531 and Pub. L. No. 9-305 Violate the Right of
the Traditional Native Americans to Own Property as a Group and the
their Freedom from Arbitrary Deprivation of Communal Property.
Collective ownership of land by Native Americans has been accorded
lower status by the U.S. Congress and courts than individually-owned
land which would be entitled to Fifth Amendment protection under the
U.S. Constitution.7 2
Specifically, under Pub. L. No. 93-531 both the Navajo and Hopi are
deprived of their right to collective ownership. This violates article 17(1)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: "Everyone
has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others. '73 Further, Point 2 of Article 1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out
of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be de-
prived of its own means of subsistence.
74
Article 2 of the ILO Convention is even more explicit on this point:
"The right of ownership, collective or individual, of the members of the
populations concerned over the lands which these populations tradition-
ally occupy shall be recognized.""
70. Cobo Report, supra note 30, at 68-70.
71. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
72. See Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property Rights:
A Study in Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 15 (1982).
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
74. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N.Doc. A/6546.
75. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
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Point 9: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates the Traditional Native American's
Right under International Law to be Treated Equally to other Ethnic
Groups when Faced with Similar Circumstances.
When faced with a similar situation involving settlers who had en-
croached upon Indian lands, Congress allowed the settlers to pay for the
land rather than forcibly removing the settlers. Thus, the passage of Pub.
L. No. 93-531 constitutes unequal treatment of Navajo and Hopi peoples
from similarly situated settlers.7"
The United Nations Charter article 55(c) pledges members to cooper-
ate in the achievement of "universal respect for and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, language or religion."
'7
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Ev-
eryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion without distinction of any kind such as race. .. '"s These points are
also enumerated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Articles 26 and 27 provide:
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled with-
out any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this re-
spect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 27. In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic mi-
norities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or
to use their own language."9
International law mandates that any practice that discriminates on
the basis of ethnic origin must be overturned. The International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination articles
II(c) and (d) states:
Each State party shall take effective measures to review governmen-
tal, national and local policies and to amend, rescind or nullify any
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetrating
racial discrimination wherever it exists.
Each State party shall prohibit and bring to an end by all appropriate
means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial
discrimination...8s
76. See, e.g., In the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act, Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636,
and again in the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Pub. L. No. 92-203.
77. U. N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 31.
80. U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
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The International Convention on Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid article 2(b) prohibits: "deliberate imposition on a ra-
cial group or groups living conditions calculated to cause its or their phys-
ical destruction in whole or in part."'" Given the long history of interac-
tion between the traditional Native Americans and the U.S. government,
a correlation can be drawn which indicates that the decline in numbers of
traditional Native Americans relates to U.S. governmental policies.82 The
ramifications of Pub. L. No. 93-531 on traditional Native Americans will
exacerbate the situation. Congress passed the bill without full compre-
hension of the ramifications and consequently international law has been
violated.
CONCLUSION
In light of the inevitable cross-cultural misunderstandings between a
modern, technological society on the one hand and an indigenous culture
predicated on a spiritual relationship to the means of survival and devel-
opment on the other, there are bound to be arguments against the allega-
tions of international law violations cited above that may sound plausible
within the context of our contemporary societal perceptions and values.
The special challenge to the Court in this case is in understanding the
values and needs of. a people that have no easy translation in our own
society.
Terms such as "development" and "property" and even "ownership"
are normatively ambiguous and create difficulties of precise analysis. In-
ternational law has been created with contributions from various cultures
and, therefore, is of assistance in overcoming this obstacle to justice. The
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, for example, con-
sistently equates spiritual development with material development as an
essential goal of International Human Rights.83 Nowhere is spiritual de-
velopment subordinated to material development in the articles drafted
for the protection of the right to development. Yet, the spiritual develop-
ment, as well as the traditional economy, of the Native Americans is ef-
fectively cut off by relocation and submersion in the dominant culture.
And when economic development is rooted in spiritual relationship with
the source of material supplies (i.e., food, materials for clothing and hous-
ing), both subsistence and religious activity are dictated by natural phe-
nomena. This is a very different but equally worthwhile kind of economic
development. By relegating Native American's traditional economy to
history rather than being allowed to continue and thrive, offering them
economic options within our market economy is nothing more than an
Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 35, U.N.Doc. A/5603.
81. G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
82. See generally NATIONAL LAWYER'S GUILD, COMMITTEE ON NATIVE AMERICAN STRUG-
GLES, RETHINKING INDIAN LAW (1982).
83. Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/1.4(1963), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 133 (Supp. 1949).
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empty gesture.
It is difficult for U.S. law makers who conceive of land as "real es-
tate" or "property" to truly understand the relationship of the traditional
Native Americans to their homeland. Their relationship is custodial
rather than one of ownership and land is not "property" but spirit, the
place from which they came and to which they will return. It cannot be
sold or exploited for its resources. The land gives life and in return they
protect the life of the land: this is their sacred obligation, which they
abandon at their spiritual, psychological and physical peril (as the results
of relocation indicate). In recognition of the rights of the assimilated
Hopi and Navajo who prefer to abandon the old ways and adopt the new
(as is their right) there is always the solution of monetary compensation.
The land is unique. Monetary compensation, on the other hand, deals
with the easy universal of the dollar and would cost no more than the
escalating costs of compliance with Pub. L. No. 93-531 by the U.S.
government.
In view of these considerations, we recommend that the court declare
Pub. L. No. 93-531 and Pub. L. No. 96-305 unconstitutional due to inter-
national human rights violations, and order the cessation of all forced re-
location efforts and allow those relocatees currently living away from
their homes to return.
VOL. 15:2,3
The Human Rights Crisis in Sri Lanka: Its
Background and Possible Solutions*
I. INTRODUCTION
This report is concerned with the grave human rights abuses which
are taking place in Sri Lanka against certain political and cultural ele-
ments of its society. An examination of the current human rights situa-
tion in Sri Lanka is set forth and subsequently, the applicable interna-
tional human rights standards are discussed. In the process of arriving at
a possible explanation of these abuses in Sri Lanka, special attention is
paid to particular policies promulgated or sanctioned by the government.
In an attempt to avoid what might otherwise appear to be'a description
of a hopeless situation, certain alternatives are suggested by the authors
as a means by which the government might adequately and effectively
come to terms with the violence in Sri Lanka. Finally, some cursory con-
clusions are made in an attempt to illustrate the pressing need for
changes in Sri Lanka.
A. Factual Background to the Current Problem
Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is not an entirely new phenomenon,' but
the recent increase in political and cultural unrest in this small island
country has added new dimensions to the effective resolution of such
conflict.
It would probably be impossible and of no particular value to deter-
mine how or by whom the current cycle of violence was started. A signifi-
* This report was prepared by Barbara Cashman, Jeanette Laffoon and Ved P. Nanda
as a project of the 1986 Human Rights Advocacy Clinic at the University of Denver College
of Law. The authors would like to thank Laurie Wiseburg of the Human Rights Internet at
Harvard Law School for her assistance in providing valuable research information.
1. The Sinhalese and the Tamils are two separate and distinct races, so it is not sur-
prising that their nineteen century coexistence on the island has not always been peaceful.
The predominantly Buddhist Sinhala race is of Aryan origin, and is believed to have been
founded by an exiled prince from northern India in the fifth century B.C.. The predomi-
nantly Hindu Tamil race is Dravidian, and has its roots in southern India. There are actu-
ally two separate Tamil groups in Sri Lanka. The "Ceylon Tamils" arrived in Sri Lanka as
invaders during the first century A.D., and eventually established their own independent
kingdom in the north. The "Indian Tamils" were brought to the country by the British
during the 19th century to work as laborers on tea and rubber plantations. The Ceylon
Tamils are generally wealthier and more educated than the Indian Tamils, who still live in
extremely impoverished conditions. The Indian Tamils have much closer ties with India
than their wealthier cousins, due to their relatively recent arrival and the fact that they
were disenfranchised by the Sri Lankan government in 1956. Both Tamil groups, however,
share the same ethnic origin and language, which provides a bond that does not exist be-
tween either Tamil group and the Sinhalese.
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cant factor contributing to its continuation, however, has been the re-
sponse of the government. The current government is predominantly of
the Sinhalese majority, and many of its policies directly reflect the major-
ity orientation and the tragic consequences which can stem from an in-
transigence based on a perceived minority threat to its current form of
existence. The Ceylon Tamils as well as certain other groups view such
policies as further steps to entrench the dominance of the majority
Sinhalese, thus supplying their often violent separatist cause with a read-
ily available raison d'etre.
The determination of whether there is in fact a recognizable trend
that may be identified as state terrorism provides useful insights into an-
alyzing the human rights crisis in Sri Lanka. The government of Sri
Lanka is engaging in a policy of what otherwise appears to be systema-
tized coercion and violence against the Tamils.' This policy is met by the
Tamil call for a separate and independent state,3 which in turn perpetu-
ates governmental actions resulting in gross violations of human rights.
Much of the current turmoil in the political climate can be identified
as stemming from the particular form of government and from the effi-
cacy of localized governmental control. A large part of the problem arises
from a fundamental discontinuity which exists between the national ad-
ministration of government and the treatment of local and more regional-
ized concerns. Claims to secede, based on an asserted right to self-deter-
mination, threaten governmental unity, and provide a focus for
government over-reaching. To illustrate the gravity of the human rights
violations which are sanctioned by the Sri Lankan government, violations
of international human rights standards, particular actions and policies of
the government, as well as the reaction of the government against terror-
ist insurgents will be examined below.
2. In recent years a number of reports from such reputable human rights organizations
as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists have documented
such incidents. See generally, Sri Lanka: Reports of Recent Violations of Human Rights
and Amnesty International's Opposition to Refoulement of the Tamil Community to Sri
Lanka, Amnesty International (Jan. 1985); "Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary,
Amnesty International (June 1986); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1985, Sri Lanka, at
242-246 (1986); Sri Lanka: Allegations of Extrajudicial Killings by Army Personnel: De-
tails of Some Cases Reported During December 1984 and January 1984, Amnesty Interna-
tional (Apr. 1985); Sri Lanka: Current Human Rights Concerns and Evidence of Extra judi-
cial Killings by the Security Forces, July 1983-April 1984, Amnesty International (1985);
Sri Lanka: A Mounting Tragedy of Errors, International Commission of Jurists (British
Section) (Mar. 1984). See also references to publications by other groups in 10 HUM. RTS.
INTERNET REP. 244-246 (Sept.-Dec. 1984); 10 Hum. RTS. INTERNET REP. 393-396 (Jan.-Apr.
1985); 10 HUM. RTS INTERNET REP. 704-707 (May-Aug. 1985).
3. The separatist movement is especially popular among students, but the political ex-
pression of these sentiments is well-organized and well-funded. Many of the Tamil separa-
tist sympathizers are located in countries other than Sri Lanka (most notably in the United
Kingdom) and engage in very successful publicity efforts. For the titles of some of their
published literature, see infra notes 24 and 46.
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B. Violations of International Human Rights Standards
Under international law, states are prohibited from violating the
human rights of individuals found within a nation's borders. Many docu-
ments provide clarification for this norm and also enumerate the more
specific provisions relating to the rights and duties of states concerning
their obligation to respect individual, as well as group human rights.4
Although it does not contain any specific references to the rights of
persons belonging to minority groups, the United Nations Charter pro-
vides a basis for most of the treaties, conventions and other international
instruments which figure importantly in the international promotion and
protection of human rights.6 One of the most important of these instru-
ments, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, prescribes particular
obligations of states concerning the respect of individual human rights.'
The Covenant extends the protection of the various freedoms to all indi-
viduals, without regard to whether they are nationals of the High Con-
tracting Parties.' The most important include: the right to life (Art. 6),
the right to be free from torture (Art. 7), the right to be free from arbi-
trary arrest and detention (Art. 9), the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to chose one's residence (Art. 12), the right to a fair trial with
the presumption of innocence (Art. 14), the right to the protection of the
law against arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home (Art.
17), the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18), the
right to hold opinions without interference (Art. 19), and the right of as-
sociation (Art. 22). Sri Lanka is a signatory to the Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and thus is
bound by its terms and provisions.
4. See generally, A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1982); T. MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE U.N., 83-126 (1986); P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 51-67 (1983).
5. Another important document in this context is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Particular provisions provide for both political and social rights of minority group
members. For a broad and in-depth discussion of minority rights considerations under inter-
national law, see also F. CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETH-
NIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as CAPOTORTI].
6. The basis of each state's obligations is expressed in Article 2(1) which reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
For a discussion of this particular provision, see Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure:
State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (L.
Henkin ed., 1980).
7. For a discussion of international treaties concerning the protection of international
human rights and how they interact with state sovereignty, see Geck, International Protec-
tion of Fundamental Freedoms and National Sovereignty, 21 LAW AND STATE 7 (1980). For
a brief discussion of human rights and non-interference, see Bossuyt, Human Rights and
Non-Intervention in Domestic Matters, I.C.J. REV. 45 (Dec. 1985).
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Article 27 of the Covenant states that "[i]n those States in which
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and prac-
tise their own religion, or to use their own language." The principles
enunciated in Article 27 of the Covenant provide for a variety of types of
actions which would constitute a reasonable effort to discontinue and re-
dress the grave human rights situation in Sri Lanka for which the govern-
ment (perhaps not so much for its instigation as for its continuation) is
primarily to blame.
1. The Concept of "Minority" Under International Law And Its
Application To The Tamils of Sri Lanka'
A primary part of the alleged discriminatory practices of the Sri
Lankan government against Tamils stems from the status of the Tamils
as a minority within the Sri Lankan culture, society and government.9
Although the definition and description of the common elements shared
may serve to identify some of the outer bounds of what is known as a
minority, the concept itself is very problematic, particularly under inter-
national law. In a United Nations study of the rights of persons who be-
long to minorities, Francesco Capotorti provides a broad basis for
analysis:
Despite the many references to minorities found in international legal
instruments of all kinds (multilateral conventions, bilateral treaties
and resolution of international organizations), there is no generally ac-
cepted definition of the term "minority." The preparation of a defini-
tion capable of being universally accepted has always proved a task of
such difficulty and complexity that neither the experts in this field
nor the organs of the international agencies have been able to accom-
plish it to date. The reason for this is the number of different aspects
to be considered. Should the concept of a minority be based on the
numerical ratio of the "minority" group to the population as a whole
or is this quantitative aspect secondary or even unimportant? Is it
necessary to limit the concept by introducing the idea of a minimum
size? Should any objective criteria be taken into account. .. ?"
The definition proposed by the the Subcommittee on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (at its third, fourth and fifth
sessions) encompassed six important elements which enabled the Sub-
8. For a discussion of the minority concept as it relates to U.N. bodies and interna-
tional law, see CAPOTORTI, supra note 5.
9. For an historical look at the development of particular forms of resentment between
the two groups, see generally A.J. WILSON, POLITICS IN SRI LANKA 1947-1979 (2d. ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as POLITICS IN SRI LANKA]; SRI LANKA: A SURVEY (K.M. de Silva ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as SRI LANKA: A SURVEY]; MODERN SRI LANKA: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION
(T. Fernando & R.N. Kearney eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MODERN SRI LANKA: A SOCl-
ETY IN TRANSITION].
10. CAPOTORTI, supra note 5 at 5.
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Commission at its fifth session to draft a resolution concerning the defini-
tion of "minority." This definition was based primarily on the following
elements: (i) the term minority includes only those non-dominant groups
in a population which possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religious
or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different from those of
the rest of the population; (ii) such minorities should properly include a
number of persons sufficient to preserve such traditions or characteristics;
(iii) such minorities must be loyal to the State of which they are
nationals.1
While it may be difficult to concisely define a minority, it is equally
difficult to conceive of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka as anything but
a minority. The Tamils have their own ethnic, religious and linguistic tra-
ditions which are distinct from those of the Sinhalese, they make up al-
most 20% of the population of Sri Lanka, and at least the Ceylon Tamils
are citizens, and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, in-
cluding loyalty to their country. As a minority, the Tamils must be af-
forded the protections specifically provided for and alluded to in interna-
tional documents.
II. ACTIONS BY THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT
In examining the allegations of serious human rights violations by
the Sri Lankan government and determining the source of these viola-
tions (i.e., whether a policy of gross violations of human rights is being
pursued by the government), it is important to keep in mind the unique
characteristics of state terror. The concept of state terror is a fairly re-
cently recognized means through which a state itself comes to grips with a
perceived internal or external terrorist threat. The methods of state ter-
ror may be either legal or extralegal, but the techniques employed in the
pursuit of this activity are especially illuminating concerning the possible
existence of a policy of state terror against a particular group within the
country's boundaries. The state has some very powerful tools at its dispo-
sal to utilize in the effort to achieve its goals. It may employ discrimina-
tory legislation, fail to provide protection against the crimes or terrorist
acts of others, and may order arbitrary or mass arrests.12
There are various avenues available to the state which pursues the
practice of terror against its inhabitants. Particular policies undertaken
by the Sri Lankan government include the the anti-terrorist campaign
which was begun intensively in 1978, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of
1979, and particular emergency regulations which have given rise to nu-
merous reports of human rights abuse by government officials. Perhaps
11. See E/CN.4/Sub.2/119, para. 32; E/CN.4/Sub.2/140, annex I, draft resolution II; E/
CN.4/Sub.2/149, para. 26.
12. For a discussion of the particular elements and types of character of state terror,
see Lopez, A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as Terrorist, in THE STATE AS TER-
RORIST : THE DYNAMICS OF GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION (M. Stohl & G. Lopez
eds.1984) [hereinafter cited as THE STATE AS TERRORIST].
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even more frightening are the grave human rights abuses perpetrated by
individual members of the police and armed forces of Sri Lanka. Death
by torture and unexplained disappearances are not formally condoned by
the government, but these activities are, to varying degrees, state-
sanctioned. 3
In addition to the "state-sanctioned" human rights abuses, there is
also a formidable element of backlash in the Sinhalese majority popula-
tion which has been largely uncontrolled in the ranks of the military and
in the civilian sector.'4
A. Legislation and Enforcement Policies
1. The 1948 Constitution
Ceylon's first Constitution was drafted by Lord Soulbury in 1948,
and remained in force until 1972. This Constitution provided for the
rights of minorities; "No . . . law shall . . . make persons of any commu-
nity or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of
other communities or religions are not made liable; or ... confer on per-
sons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not
conferred on persons of other communities or religions."' 5 Unfortunately
this provision was ignored by the government when it adopted the Official
Language Act of 1956.
2. The Official Language Act of 1956
While there has been a myriad of social and cultural differences be-
tween the Tamils and Sinhalese which may account for some of the eth-
nic conflicts since independence, the Official Language Act is to blame for
much of the tension which led to early Tamil violence. Its existence con-
tinues to be a source of alienation between the various language groups in
13. A number of documents have illustrated these occurrences. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
14. This lack of control has its roots in attitudes reflected by particular government
officials, as illustrated in an article published in the New York Times:
The Tigers [referring to the separatist terrorist group] flourish because Mr.
Jayewardene tolerates an undisciplined Home Guard force that rampages
freely through Tamil villages. Killings, torture and "disappearances" are rou-
tine, according to an Amnesty International report. Yet as conditions worsen,
the President presents himself as a pro-Western victim of unprovoked terror-
ism and now talks ominously of the "complete liquidation" of Tamil
extremists.
The Peril in Sri Lanka, N.Y.Times, June 13, 1986, at 34, col. 1. See also infra notes (con-
cerning the government's attitude toward the problem as evidenced by its publications re-
lating to Tamil insurgency).
15. 1948 CONSTITUTION OF SRI LANKA, § 29. For a discussion of relevant sections of the
Constitution, see V. A. LEARY, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA: REPORT OF A
MISSION TO SRI LANKA IN JULY AND AUGUST 1981 (on behalf of the International Commission
of Jurists) (1983), at 11.
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Sri Lanka. 6 It was drafted and adopted by a Sinhalese majority govern-
ment. Three provisions of the Act particularly angered the Tamils. First,
it provided that "Sinhala only" would be the official language of Sri
Lanka." This placed the Tamil language in an inferior position and pro-
vided a rationale for refusing Tamil-speaking people important civil ser-
vice positions. Second, the Act deprived Indian Tamils of their Sri
Lankan citizenship and disenfranchised them.'" This was a slap in the
face to Indian Tamils, and also worked to decrease the official Tamil pop-
ulation in Sri Lanka. Finally, the Act created a quota and standardization
program based on race for university admission. This provision effectively
reduced and limited the number of Tamils who could be admitted to the
universities.
3. The 1972 Constitution
The second Constitution severed legal ties with England and de-
clared Sri Lanka a republic. The protection of minorities found in section
29 of the first Constitution was eliminated, and the statutory "Sinhala
only" language policy was enshrined as a Constitutional provision. The
Tamil party refused to support this new Constitution, and boycotted the
Constituent Assembly that drafted it. Express discrimination against the
Tamil language and the absence of protective provisions for minorities
were the bases for the boycott. 9
4. The 1977 Constitution
Sri Lanka's third Constitution was drafted by the United National
Party (UNP) when it came to power in 1977. The UNP, like the Sri
Lankan Freedom Party (the previous ruling party), is predominantly
Sinhalese. The UNP, however, was more sympathetic to the plight of the
Tamils, and it was hoped that the new Constitution would be responsive
to their grievances. It did declare that Sinhala and Tamil both be recog-
nized as national languages of Sri Lanka, but Sinhala remained the sole
16. The English language, prior to the enactment of the Official Language Act, had
provided an important bridge between these groups.
... Government policies, especially the Official Language Act of 1956 by which
Sinhala replaced English as the official tongue, split residents along ethnic
lines and eroded the linguistic link that might have made the separation less
complete. With 80 percent of the population ethnic Sinhalese, the effect of this
and other laws, Tamils say, was to eclipse their language and to ghettoize their
people, who then suffered further discrimination at work and in school.
Crossette, Sri Lankans Lament Loss of a Linguistic Bridge, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at
2, col. 3.
17. See LEARY, supra note 16 at 12 for a discussion of the "Sinhala only" Act.
18. See id.
19. The framework for the Soulbury Constitution was disregarded by the Constituent
Assembly which formulated and adopted the 1972 constitution. The provision in § 29 of the
1948 Constitution protecting certain Tamil rights (especially those relating to language and
culture) was dropped entirely in the 1972 constitution. See id. at 13.
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official language. Official documents must be published in both languages,
both languages may be used in Parliament, and students may be taught
and examined in the language of their choice. Government service, how-
ever may still be dependent on a working knowledge of the official lan-
guage.20 The new Constitution dropped the requirement of standardiza-
tion of examination scores for university entrance, but maintained the
quota system that limits the number of Tamils that may be admitted.2 '
Some very important additions to the 1977 Constitution are provisions
guaranteeing fundamental rights. These provisions are unfortunately di-
luted by article 15 which permits curtailment of these rights in certain
circumstances, such as during a state of emergency. Attempts were obvi-
ously made to placate the Tamils in the 1977 Constitution, but they were
disappointingly inadequate. As in 1972, the Tamil parties refused to en-
dorse the new Constitution.
5. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No.
48 of 1979
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was enacted by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka as a temporary measure in 1979, as a response to the
increasing terrorist activity in the northern regions of the country. Sec-
tion 29 provided that "[t]he provisions of this Act shall be in operation
for a period of three years from the date of its commencement." The Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, No. 10 of
1982, however, repealed this section, making the PTA a permanent part
of Sri Lankan law. This was a frightening development which makes the
many human rights complaints lodged particularly against the PTA even
more serious.
The Official Language Act of 1956 and the Constitutions of 1972 and
1977 effectively placed the language, culture, and educational and em-
ployment opportunities of the Tamil minority in an inferior position. It is
reprehensible, but not surprising, that certain members of the minority
reacted with violence. There were no effective legal or political means
available for redressing their grievances. It is of interest to note that the
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF, the minority political party that
primarily represents the interests of the northern Ceylon Tamils) did not
ratify either of the Constitutions. The PTA, designed to alleviate the ter-
rorist activities, effectively legitimized the government's use of violence in
its efforts to bring "peace" to the island. Rather than quelling the terror-
ist activities, it provided a focus for Tamil anger. The clarity of hindsight
has shown that these legislative policies have fueled the violence and ter-
20. A distinction is drawn between the "official" language of Sinhala and the "national"
languages of Sinhala and Tamil. Persons taking the official examination required for govern-
ment service may be required to learn the official language (Sinhala) within a reasonable
time if they do not already have a sufficient working knowledge of Sinhala. No such require-
ment exists for knowledge of Tamil. See id. at 36-37.
21. Id. at 37.
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rorist activity in Sri Lanka.22
There are a number of techniques available to the state which is in-
terested in bringing a particular group more closely under the govern-
ment's control. Many of these techniques stem from the PTA, but others
employed are based on a broader rhetoric aimed at the preservation of
national unity through the eradication of the internal terrorist threat.
Law enforcement techniques" are probably the single most effective
means of achieving these ends. Apart from a lack of protection against
the terrorist crimes of other citizens,24 violence is the primary means for
the Sri Lankan government to attempt to meet or react to the Tamil
groups' demands for a separate state. Some of these uses of violence are
arbitrary arrest and detention,2" which often result in or are associated
with disappearances and extrajudicial killings.2 6 Allegations of torture
have also been made as examples of serious human rights abuses by the
government of Sri Lanka.2
7
22. For a more in-depth examination of the effect of these early legislation policies, see
LEARY, supra note 16.
23. For a detailed description of actions, either "legal" or "extralegal" by the govern-
ment, and in particular the armed forces, see Genocide Sri Lanka - Report for November
and December 1985, 3 TRANSATLANTIC TAMIL TIMES 11 (Jan.-Feb. 1985).
24. This lack of protection may be experienced by civilians who are victims of violence
by militant pro-government groups, and also those being detained in jails under the Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act. See LAWASIA at 46-47 (Oct. 1985).
25. The gross violations of human rights include not only the "preventive" means of
arbitrary arrest, but the conditions under which the suspected terrorists are held. For a
description of activities carried out under Emergency Regulation 15A, which permits secur-
ity forces to cremate or bury a dead body without a post-mortem, see Violence and Gross
Violations of Human Rights in Sri Lanka, 9 HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET REPORTER 144-146
(Sept.-Nov. 1983).
26. Amnesty International has issued a number of reports concerning disappearances in
Sri Lanka. See generally, Sri Lanka: Reports of Disappearances in the Eastern Province
(May, 1985); Updated Statement of Amnesty International's Position on Refoulement of
Tamils to Sri Lanka (May, 1985); Sri Lanka: Allegations of Extrajudicial Executions and
"Disappearances" in May 1985 (Oct., 1985); "Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary
(June, 1986) [hereinafter cited as "Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary]. An extract
from the last document is particularly illustrative:
In many cases officials deny knowledge of their arrest or detention. In others,
officials have stated that they were released. As of early 1986, Al had received
reports, often accompanied by eye-witness accounts of the arrest, of 194 people
who had "disappeared" between June 1984 and November 1985. All these re-
ports concern members of the Tamil community who were reportedly arrested
in the north and east but Amnesty International also received one report of a
Sinhalese who "disappeared" in July 1983 in the capital Columbo allegedly in
connection with his political activities as a member of the Sri Lankan Freedom
Party at the height of the communal disturbances when a curfew was in force
and when the police had a free hand to operate. Fears have been expressed
that some of the "disappeared" may have died in custody, by having been shot
by security forces personnel or as a result of injuries received under torture.
"Disappearances" in Sri Lanka, A Summary, at 23.
27. Human rights organizations in Sri Lanka, and in particular the Civil Rights Move-
ment (CRM), are concerned with these allegations of torture, especially as they stem pri-
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B. The Ideological Underpinnings of State Terror
What are referred to here as "ideological underpinnings" provide the
rationale and policy justifications for pursuing the particular course of
action the government has chosen. These are important to mention as
they provide insight into both the pattern and character of state terror,
and also determine the parameters of how far the state might go in its
pursuit of such policies.
The particular "form" of government, not in its theoretical or ideo-
logical sense, but rather in response to the form into which it has evolved
(especially regarding participation, representation in government) is the
focal point for discussion concerning any speculation on why the Sri
Lankan government is pursuing this particular policy. The primary
problems which stem from the administration of the Sri Lankan govern-
ment relate primarily to the pluralistic nature of the nation itself. Be-
neath the political machinations, economic considerations have played
and continue to play a very important role.
2 8
In post-colonial Sri Lanka, political processes have taken on a variety
of characters. This development has in turn provided a rationale and a
causal connection for the politically-based grievances expressed by certain
groups in contemporary Sri Lanka, namely the Tamils.2 9
The situation characterized by either minority or majority group in
Sri Lanka at present is the result of the process of evolutionary develop-
ment which has been affected by a number of concerns. These concerns
have often been conflicting, and through the course of development of its
political institutions, any identifiable "balance" which may have once ex-
isted with regard to the influence of particular groups has become a shift-
ing balance3 0 (or perhaps more appropriately termed, a shifting imbal-
ance). By 1978, the Sinhalese Buddhists had had the balance more than
redressed in their favor by successive governments in the post-1956
phase. This has especially been evident in the employment, educational
and commercial sectors.3 ' These concerns continue to be of critical impor-
marily from other serious human rights violations, most notably mass arrests and incommu-
nicado detention (conducted under particular Emergency Regulations). See 10 HUMAN
RIGHTS INTERNET REPORTER 393-395 (Jan.-Apr. 1985); 10 HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET RE-
PORTER 704-707 (May-Aug. 1985).
28. For a discussion of the interplay between the variety of economic and cultural fac-
tors which have played important roles in the development of Sri Lankan political culture,
see de Silva, Historical Survey, in SRI LANKA: A SURVEY, supra note 9 at 31-85.
29. The mosaic that comprises Sri Lanka's multiracial society has presented two press-
ing problems since independence. The Sinhalese Buddhist majority (Low Country and
Kandyan) have had more specific grievances against the leading ethnic majority, the Ceylon
and Indian Tamils, than the other principal religious grouping the Roman Catholics in par-
ticular, as well as the Protestants (comprising Sinhalese, Tamils, and Burghers). D. Smith,
Religion, Politics, and the Myth of Reconquest in MODERN SRI LANKA: A SOCIETY IN TRANSI-
TION 83 (T. Fernando & R. Kearney, eds. 1979).
30. See generally, id.
31. See POLITICS IN SRI LANKA supra note 9 at 10-51 for a discussion of economic fac-
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•tance not only with respect to the continuation of violence and counter-
violence, but will also remain important factors in any possible peaceful
solutions to the problems.
When seen in an historical light, the political climate and what has
up to the present time developed, can be examined as indications of
changes which have affected the political efficacy of the government.3 2
What may simply have developed in the 1950's as a concern with secta-
rian politics and later became a major concern of continuing govern-
ments, has in large part delineated the ideological course of the govern-
ments headed by members of the Sinhalese majority."3 As the Sinhalese
moved to make Sinhala the only official language and institute a quota
system for university admissions, 3' it became quite apparent that the
Sinhalese were attempting to consolidate their own power in terms of pre-
dominance over rivals in the educational and ethnic fields. These prefer-
ences later found expression in government policies in the 1960's and
1970's and also in the constitution of 1972 (and 1978) in its stated prefer-
ence for fostering and protecting the place of Buddhism. 5
The minority-majority conflict is a recurring theme in any discussion
of Tamil dissatisfaction since the time of independence. State policies re-
lating to religion, language, education, colonization, and police and army
occupation all seem to deny the separate cultural identity of the Tamil
people. The predominantly Sinhalese government refuses to consider an
independent Tamil State, and claims that Sri Lanka is a united country
for Tamils and Sinhalese alike. Yet the Tamils are expected to speak
Sinhala, tolerate a Constitution that elevates Buddhism, accept discrimi-
natory education barriers, and obey Sinhalese police and army officials.
Since 1976 there has been increasing support among the Tamil popu-
lation for a separate state of Tamil Eelam.3 6 Many Tamils consider them-
selves to be an identifiable people with a defined territory and an interna-
tionally protected right of self-determination. Some argue that when ties
were broken with Great Britain in 1972, the Tamil sovereignty that had
existed before colonization was restored. The Tamil boycott of the 1972
and 1977 Constitutions was an indication that they never consented to
Sinhalese sovereignty, and thus the independent Tamil nation remained
intact.3 7 The validity of the self-determination claim is not the issue at
tors in interracial disputes.
32. See, e.g., Samaraweera, The Evolution of a Plural Society, in SRI LANKA: A SURVEY,
supra note 9 at 86-107.
33. See POLITICS IN SRI LANKA, supra note 9, at 14.
34. Id. at 15.
35. The current constitution provides that Buddhism shall occupy the foremost place
relative to other religions (which are not mentioned), and establishes a duty on the part of
the government to protect and foster the Buddhist faith. The constitutionally-established
pre-eminence of Buddhism may be attributed to a "minority complex" which the Sinhalese
Buddhists since they are a minority in Asia. See LEARY, supra note 16 at 9-10.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 15.
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the moment. The point is that many Tamils ascribe to it, and that belief
has added to the tension and the conflict. The Sinhalese and the Tamils
may all be citizens of the same country, but they are also two distinct
races with different cultures. Somehow this distinction has been ignored
and the consequence was an inevitable escalation of racial tension and
violence.
C. The Action-Reaction Nexus of Violence in the Perpetuation of
Violence
Many of the counter-terrorist policies have been extreme, and have
had very harmful effects on the civil and human rights of all Sri Lankans.
Some of these government actions amount to "terror-tactics" which are
designed to subjugate the rights of those at whom certain actions are
aimed (primarily Ceylon Tamils in the North and Eastern districts)."8
Government actions which effectively amount to state terror-tactics in-
clude mass arrests, arbitrary detention of suspected terrorists, unex-
plained disappearances, and excesses, ill-treatment, and torture by armed
forces and police. Amnesty International has extensively documented a
variety of these actions.3 9
One observer of the situation in Sri Lanka has classified the vio-
lence as three different types. Each type of violence has a different under-
lying basis, and requires a different approach in the search for a solution.
"Communal violence" occurs when the individuals of one ethnic group
attack members of another ethnic group.4 ' In Sri Lanka there have been
four major outbreaks of communal violence between the Sinhalese and
the Tamils, which occurred in 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983."' The wide-
spread acts of communal violence have for the most part been attacks
against the Tamil people and their property. Much of it appeared to have
been sparked by the terrorist activities in the North against police and
army personnel. Although these activities are perpetrated primarily by a
small group of Tamil militants, the entire race has been implicated in the
minds of many. There is also evidence that the Sinhalese have been in-
38. Concerns of Amnesty International in Sri Lanka have encompassed a broad spec-
trum of human rights violation. A report of substantial importance which concerned disap-
pearances was published in June of 1986 and noted that:
Although some reports of "disappearances" were received during 1983 and the
first half of 1984, a pattern of these human rights violations began to converge
in late 1984, when "disappearances" were reported with increasing frequency:
for example, on one day, 2 December 1984, 99 persons were reportedly taken
away by security forces personnel and have "disappeared."
"Disappearances" in Sri Lanka: A Summary, supra note 27 at 7.
39. See generally, Amnesty International publications at supra notes 2, 27.
40. See Leary, supra note 16.
41. For an expansion on the definition of "communal violence" and a detailed examina-
tion of the events that occurred during these outbreaks of violence in 1958, 1977, 1981, and
1983, see LEARY, supra note 16, at 18.
42. Id. at 24.
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cited to mindless discriminatory anger through speeches made by govern-
ment officials, aided by anti-Tamil slogans and posters.
43
The second type of violence can be labelled "political violence," or
"terrorism." This form of violence, perpetrated by Tamil youths, began
substantially in 1977,"1 and has continued unabated to this day. There are
four major active Tamil "liberation" groups: the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE); the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO);
the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS); and the Ee-
lam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). 5 A fifth group,
the People's Liberation Organization of Tamileelam (PLOT), appears to
be more moderate, but it has been known to attack police stations. 41
The third recognizable form of violence in Sri Lanka is "state terror-
ism," or violence by police and security forces. This type of violence has
been a recurring theme since 1974,"' but has tended to grow in intensity
along with the increase in political violence. State terrorism is especially
reprehensible, as many aspects of it are strictly forbidden under the in-
ternational law of human rights. Terrorism is generally thought to be an
activity engaged in by individuals or groups (i.e., non-state actors), but as
the phenomenon of terrorism has become a major concern in the area of
international relations, the study of terrorism by scholars who are inter-
ested in its causes, effects and seemingly different varieties has signifi-
cantly increased." Through the application of a relatively broad "defini-
43. Id. at 25.
44. Another significant element of violence which is an offshoot of this political violence
is the result of inter-group rivalry. This rivalry has often been bloody, and its impact is felt
not only in the domestic environment, but also has important geopolitical implications as it
has related to the type of support which Prime Minister Gandhi has been willing to provide.
See, Sri Lanka Discovers Bombs as Peace Talks Begin [EROS claimed responsibility for
the planting of two large bombs in Columbo at the time Gandhi was arriving to negotiate
with the government], N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1986, at 19, col. 1; 25 Die as Sri Lanka Rebels
Clash, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1986, at 6, col. 3. See also infra note 53.
45. 1 TAMIL INFORMATION, Issue No.8, (May 15, 1985), at 21.
46. LEARY, supra note 16, at 30.
47. See, e.g., THE STATE As TERRORIST, supra note 13.
48. As a result of U.N. studies on terrorism, and in particular, state-sanctioned terror,
much of the debate regarding terrorism has focused on the role of the rule of law in formu-
lating a response of international organizations to terrorist activity. Three particular legal
claims have been identified in United Nations discussions regarding the nature and scope of
terrorism. Stohl and Lopez have identified these three sources of stalemate concerning the
expression of an idea which would express a working definition of terrorism.
1. The position that terrorism is defined and constituted by the "criminal acts"
taken against governments by individuals or groups. This position was sup-
ported by most of the advanced industrial Western states and some Latin
governments.
2. The position that terrorism should be defined by acts, but in a broader con-
text than 1. above so as to include acts of governmental groups that violate
human rights and reinforce policies such as apartheid. This position was ad-
vanced primarily by the African states.
3. The position that the definition of terrorism resides in the motivation of the
actor and the context of the act. This argument claims that to consider terror-
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tion" of terrorism, "state terrorism" has emerged as a variation of the
more broadly recognized concept of terrorism."9 These three typologies of
violence in Sri Lanka help further to shed light on the need for funda-
mental changes in the political processes. They serve to identify the ac-
tion and reaction elements of violence, as well as the contexts in which
both are expressed.
From the emphasis on non-state actors as terrorists emerged a con-
cern on the part of some observers that the role of state actors in terrorist
activities was being neglected."0 Based on such fundamental tenets of in-
ternational relations as national sovereignty and national security, some
have viewed the role of state actors in the perpetration of terrorism as
evidence of employing a "cloak" to disguise the true nature or purpose of
the particular governmental policy.5 1 One author has stated that the use
of terror tactics "is common in international relations and [that] the state
has been and remains a more likely employer of terrorism within the in-
ternational system than insurgents and with much greater effect. The
state is as much a user of terror in its international affairs as in its do-
mestic activities. 5 2
Terrorism in Sri Lanka is thus recognizable on two levels: that perpe-
trated by the Tamil groups, as well as the policies promulgated and sanc-
ism narrowly, outside of national liberation movements, is to label inappropri-
ately a freedom fighter as a "terrorist." A variety of developing nations and
Arab states held this view.
Stohl & Lopez, Introduction, in THE STATE AS TERRORIST, supra note 13 at 4.
49. For an excellent treatment of the background to this analysis, as well as a descrip-
tion of sources available for the study of state terror as evidenced by political history, see id.
50. These policies may be observed in terms of their behavior toward particular groups
in the domestic political context, without regard to the "moral" considerations which the
actors may be pursuing on what they perceive to be a large scale. Stohl, International
Dimensions of State Terrorism, in THE STATE As TERRORIST, supra note 13 at 44. Stohl goes
on to describe three broad categories of state terrorism in international relations: coercive
diplomacy, covert behavior, and surrogate terrorism. Id.
51. Id. at 43.
52. With regard to the variety of internal pressures which a state may be faced with,
whether they are internally or externally generated, the government must respond to the
pressures. One author has identified particularly certain factors which can be attributed to
the government's attempts to maintain an adequate hold on its power, in particular through
the use of repressive means and serious curtailment of civil rights and increased use of the
military to implement the coercion.
Of all types of dynamic changes in the "state" of the state, this pattern is the
most pervasive in the recent political history of Second and Third World
states. It leads to questions concerning the particular political, legal, or extra-
legal mechanisms that actualize these alterations in governance and of the ide-
ologies of symbolic constructs that spark and legitimize them. This form of
rule has clearly emerged as a reaction to pressure for internal change of either
government policies and/or social structure. The government response has
been to withstand such pressure via new methods of persuasion, enforcement,
and coercive rule called "state terror."
Lopez, A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as Terrorist, in THE STATE AS TERRORIST,
supra note 13 at 61.
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tioned by the government designed primarily to act as "counterterrorism"
measures. These two levels are recognizable in that their perpetrators are
employing different means available to either group, as well as in the dif-
ferent ends sought by either group. Both types of terrorism play an essen-
tial role in the continuation of violence.
III. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AS AN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN
While it is true that the government of Sri Lanka faces a grave threat
to its national security and national unity from the Tamil terrorist
groups, it must respect human rights in its attempt to defeat that threat.
This involves more than merely balancing the damage due to terrorism
against the "relative value" of human rights. Protection of human rights
has been elevated as an elemental concern among international scholars
and policy makers, and as such must be respected at all costs. The gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka may not take action that defies the basic human
rights of its inhabitants, even though the very valid goal of this action is
the purported attainment of peace.
The political climate of Sri Lanka is especially illustrative with re-
gard to the promotion of certain repressive policies, and these more re-
pressive policies can be traced to the particular evolutionary patterns of
some of the government's institutions." The political climate of Sri
Lanka, involving both the actors and the setting in which they operate is
of crucial importance to any evaluation of counter-terrorist policies. The
use of repressive policies to counter the real or imagined terrorist threat
has had serious consequences for human rights in Sri Lanka. For this rea-
son, it will be illustrated below by identifying the relevant policies, that
the government is employing terror tactics violative of international
human rights standards in pursuit of its policy of state terrorism against
Tamil separatists and other groups.
A. Institutionalized Government Inflexibility and Overreaching
The government of Sri Lanka and the militant Tamil groups are
caught up in a cycle of violence. The government is in the better position
to break this cycle, and, we submit, is under an obligation to change the
policies that perpetuate the violence and violate international standards
of human rights. The PTA is a particularly reprehensible document, as it
undermines the inalienable human rights of certain citizens of Sri Lanka,
both on its face and in its application. The government has no valid inter-
est in its continued application, since after eight years it has proven itself
to be ineffective as a tool to curb terrorist activity. State terror is not an
appropriate response to the violent activities perpetrated by certain
groups in the country - it is illegal and counter-productive. The govern-
ment must attempt to reformulate its anti-terrorist policies, rather than
53. See generally, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1985, supra note 2 at 243.
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inflexibly adhering to an inappropriate course of action chosen in the
past.
1. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No.
48 of 1979
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was enacted by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka as a temporary measure in 1979, as a response to the
increasing terrorist activity in the North. Section 29 provided that "[t]he
provisions of this Act shall be in operation for a period of three years
from the date of its commencement." The Prevention of Terrorism (Tem-
porary Provisions)(Amendment) Act, No.10 of 1982, however, repealed
this section, making the PTA a permanent part of Sri Lankan law.54
(a) Encouragement of improper interrogation techniques
Part IV of the PTA permits trial under special procedures which cur-
tail normal legal safeguards.5 For example, section 16.(1) provides ex-
tremely liberal rules on the admissibility of certain statements made to
the police, so that effectively anything a suspect mutters can be used as
evidence in court. Under normal Sri Lankan law, this is not the case. 6
Section 7(3)(a) of the PTA gives police the authority to take any suspect
"to any place for the purpose of interrogation and from place to place for
the purposes of investigation." These two provisions, read together, pro-
vide both means and motive for obtaining confessions and statements
under duress, and may encourage ill-treatment and torture during inter-
rogation. While these provisions do not, on their face, violate standards of
human rights, they have been included here because they are highly sus-
pect in their effective administration.
(b) Retroactivity of the PTA
Sections 22, 23, and 31(i) of the PTA attempt to make that docu-
ment and its provisions retroactive. The definition of "unlawful activity"
under section 31 expressly includes "any act committed prior to the date
of passing of this Act, which act would, if committed after such date, con-
stitute an offence under this Act." Sections 22 and 23 include similar lan-
guage. Such a provision is forbidden by both the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article
15 of the Covenant states that "[n]o one shall be held guilty of any crimi-
nal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed."
Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration also expressly prohibits retroac-
54. See generally, supra note 23.
55. See, e.g., Sri Lanka: Current Human Rights Concerns and Evidence of Extrajudi-
cial killings by the Security Forces, supra note 2. See also, supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
56. Id.
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tive imposition of criminal sanctions on actions that were not criminal
when committed. Thus the retroactive language of the PTA is invalid
under international law.
B. Allegations of State Terrorism and Self-Determination Issues
Concerning the issue of legitimization of "nationhood" which a state
is allowed to employ to effect its political goals (which may include engag-
ing in terrorist activities), both in the domestic context and often more
importantly, in the international context, Stohl has commented that
"[t]he legitimacy of the national state is itself normally conceived as pro-
viding legitimacy to actions that would be condemned as terrorism if such
behavior were executed by non-state actors."57
1. The Use of "Terror Tactics" by the Sri Lankan Government
Some of these means are discriminatory legislation, lack of protection
against the crimes and terrorist acts of other groups, and arbitrary or
mass arrests. Beyond merely cloaking such actions in otherwise "legal"
garb, the state as terrorist also may exercise extralegal activities and orga-
nizations for the goal of fulfilling other policies which may be too contro-
versial for the state to otherwise acknowledge its association.
Repressive policies conducted by The Sri Lankan government have
in many respects worked as a catalyst for the further escalation of vio-
lence and they have also fueled the desire on the part of many groups to
demand self-determination (through the formation of an independent
state). These actions by Tamil militants have in turn precipitated more
violent and drastic measures by the government. The consequences are
tragic in terms of the loss of lives and the human rights violations, but
another result of this escalation is the further alienation of previously
"neutral" groups, who are left with fewer options as a result of the height-
ened distrust and violence. 8
57. There also has been a continuation of inter-group rivalry among the Tamil separat-
ists. These have often produced bloody confrontations, as well as increased fear on the part
of moderates. Condemnation by Tamil groups of the violence perpetrated by the guerillas
has not brought progress, as the government has been unswerving in its demand for what it
deems "loyalty" on the part of its citizens. Moderates such as the TULF (Tamil United
Liberation Front) have found their position between the government and the Tamil gueril-
las more difficult as they were driven out of Parliament after the group refused to take an
oath supporting a unitary state. Crossette, Sri Lanka Violence Said to Open Critical Stage,
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986 §1, at 9, col. 1.
58. One of the highly controversial policies instituted recently (1956) by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka was the recognition of Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka.
Although this might otherwise be seen as an act to exclude Tamils from official recognition,
this action should also be considered in the particular light in which it was promoted. The
declaration of Sinhala as the official language was designed and promulgated as a counter-
imperialist effort, designed to effect the restoration of a basic form of national identity. See
Smith, supra note 30, at 90. This original purpose of the Official Language Act, however, has
proved to undermine the "national" identity it was meant to promote. See supra note 16.
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2. The Cycle of Violence
The government of Sri Lanka faces a very grave challenge - the elim-
ination of terrorist violence within its borders. It appears, however, that
its efforts, in the guise of the PTA and other anti-terrorist activities and
policies, have not met this challenge. Repressive government policies are
a major factor in Tamil complaints, so it is not surprising that additional
repression has not worked to decrease the violence. As terrorists react to
further government repression with renewed violence, the government is
placed in the uncomfortable position of either having to bear down even
further on policy implementation, or losing face. Thus, each side feeds off
the reactions of the other, and the violence is perpetuated. This is the
cycle of violence that must be broken before peace can be achieved in Sri
Lanka.
IV. OPTIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM
The calls by Tamil groups for a separate state may be viewed as a
consequence of the government's policy of state terror against the Tamils.
Self-determination in this respect might be viewed as the only viable al-
ternative to a continuation of the present policies, or as a last resort. In
light of the situation which for so long had remained dormant in most
respects, the use of state terror has worked as a catalyst for the rise and
militancy of these claims by Tamil separatists.
The claims by Tamil militants stem primarily from the particular de-
velopments which have manifested themselves in the political environ-
ment of Sri Lanka in the last several years. The Sri Lankan government,
in its efforts to develop stronger political foundations of its own creation,
has implemented certain policies which have caused protest among many
members of its political community. It has become painfully apparent to
those in the forefront of the Sri Lankan political leadership, that main-
taining a multi-cultural democracy can at times lead to controversial deci-
sions and policies.5 9
A large part of Sri Lanka's history - especially dating back to Portu-
guese, Dutch and later English colonial rule until 1948 - has reflected at
least the potential for conflict among its ethnic groups (particularly be-
tween the Sinhalese and Tamils). This situation has been used for politi-
cal advantage on many occasions by the fostering of turmoil and distrust
among the groups by following a variation of the divide and conquer
technique."
This potential conflict became a political issue when Sri Lanka
59. For a discussion of some of the effects of colonial domination, see B. PFAFFEN-
BERGER, CASTE IN TAMIL CULTURE: THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATION OF SUDRA DOMINATION IN
TAMIL SRI LANKA 35-59 (1982).
60. See supra note 41. This attitude is not uncommon among government officials, who
choose to define narrowly the actual conflict.
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gained its independence and the British left. The Tamils had more read-
ily assimilated with the British institutions (especially the educational
system), and when the majority government began taking measures which
were designed to establish a Sri Lankan national identity, these pro-Sri
Lankan policies in effect worked as anti-Tamil policies. This view of na-
tional unity has provided the national security consciousness espoused by
many of the members of the government, who view the Tamil separatists
as ordinary terrorists who are simply trying to promote anarchy."
The government's response to movements for change as an attempt
to cope with difficulties is based on ethnic problems which have been and
remain an important consideration for both parties. The question of
whether the ethnic conflict is essentially a matter of differences based on
intergroup rivalry in certain spheres of influence within the political and
cultural setting of Sri Lankan society as it is currently ordered, or
whether the conflict runs deeper, in that the form of government is un-
suitable for the amicable conduct of relations between the parties remains
an important issue. The importance of this question relates back to the
nature of the conflict and the policies undertaken by the government. An
examination of this question consequently refers to larger issues concern-
ing the efficacy of the governmental institutions.2
The governmental responses to internal pressures for change which
have been expressed by the Tamils are especially indicative of its concern
for protecting what it views as democracy based on national unity. The
government's means of protecting this have very high costs, 3 and its re-
sponses to internal pressures for any change clearly point to an unwilling-
ness to identify problems facing the government in broader but perhaps
more realistic terms. As a result, the political climate has been and re-
61. For a discussion of this conflict, in terms of its sources and how these are reflected
in the administration of the government, see Samarasinghe, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri
Lanka: The Role of the NGOs, 24 ETHOS 1 (1985). Samarasinghe is of the opinion that the
choice is essentially up to the people - i.e., those who vote:
The people of this country entrusted their political future to the government
of J.R. Jayewardene in 1977. They did not give that power to priests, histori-
ans or self-appointed defenders of the Sinhala race .... There are three
choices open to the government. The first is for the government to push
through a solution of its own, which it has either been unwilling or unable to
do for the past seven years. The second is to hold a general election in the near
future. The third and most pragmatic choice is to form a transitional national
government with the sole purpose of negotiating an end to the ethnic problem,
and shortly thereafter hold a general election.
Id. at 13.
62. The government of Sri Lanka recognizes its role in the continuation of violence in
only a very limited fashion. It has admitted that there have been some problems with secur-
ity forces, but this "lack of discipline" which they have attributed as the major problem
concerning the conduct of the security forces, is viewed in only individual terms, and defi-
nitely not as part of any policy.
63. In this respect, the Sri Lanka government has been very astute in identifying the
goals of its counterterrorist policies. It has been able to "legitimize" many of its actions
under the guise of promoting national unity.
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mains turbulent." The extreme means of safeguarding the Sri Lankan
national unity by means of securing the state against the separatist Tamil
threat actually work against the ideal (formulated and espoused by the
government) of the Sri Lankan sovereign unity. The government will not
be able to extract national unity at any cost, and its means of dealing
with the Tamil threat are backfiring in many ways.
The policies of the current Sri Lankan government may prove to
have very substantial consequences for the future leadership of a govern-
ment which hopes to lead and support all members of Sri Lankan society.
Currently, as the results of certain policies over the last several years
emerge, the prospects for effective national leadership have become pre-
carious. In this light, the claim for self-determination (secession) ad-
vanced by certain Tamil groups will be examined, as well as a less drastic
alternative which has been the subject of speculation recently: devolution.
A. Analysis of Claims to Secede
In the Sri Lankan context, self-determination claims asserted by the
Tamils can be identified as a consequence of the state terrorism currently
being conducted in that country. In an analysis of claims for self-determi-
nation which would give rise to secession in this instance, certain consid-
erations must be carefully weighed.
Self-determination is considered a drastic step in the current interna-
tional order. The elimination of colonialism was the primary force behind
self-determination in its early stages, but it might now also be applied to
noncolonial situations. Standards for recognizing the legitimacy of claims
to the right to secede impose difficult hurdles upon the group claiming
the right. The establishment of minimum standards of legitimacy of the
claim require the identification of at least four elements: identification of
the group claiming the right - including objective and subjective ele-
ments; the nature and scope of the minority group's claim as articulated
by the elites of the group; the underlying reasons for their claim, whether
they are compelling - these include consideration of the divergent politi-
cal beliefs, strength of desire to control their own resources more effec-
tively, and the strength of the ethnic or cultural identification with the
neighboring group; and the degree of deprivation of basic human rights -
the severity of the deprivation, whether the group suffers subjugation,
domination or exploitation, and the extent to which individuals are de-
nied the right to participate.6 5
64. This turbulence is also indicated by the calls of some Tamil groups for secession
and self-determination. Self-determination does not appear to be a reasonable or viable op-
tion for the Tamils. Tamil secession from this small island nation is not likely to provide a
peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict. The concept of self-determination is problematic
under international law, although its parameters have often been identified and discussed.
See, e.g., H. GROS-EsPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 405/ Rev. 1 (1980).
65. These elements are taken from Nanda, Self-Determination Under International
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Alienation of the subgroup will be considered in the first element.
This will include the treatment of the subgroup by the dominant group in
their political system. Also considered here is whether the articulated de-
mands stated by the subgroup are widely held within the group. In the
Sri Lankan context, the Tamils do not appear to be unified in their call
for secession. The groups calling for a separate state of Eelam do not es-
pouse the majority view of the Tamils. The reasons underlying the claim
for secession should also be compelling. Self-determination must be con-
sidered in the political context of the state from which the subgroup
wishes to secede. Participation may be a critical factor in the Sri Lankan
context, but it is unlikely that the founding of a separate state of Eelam
will provide peaceful settlement. On the contrary, it would likely add fur-
ther to the existing alienation and the "minority complex" which the
Sinhalese feel. Finally, deprivation of basic human rights of the group
and individuals within the group is considered. Once again, strict stan-
dard is applied, and given the Sri Lankan parliamentary system, some
form of peaceful settlement with the use of further communication and
negotiation between the groups is highly recommended. Although it has
been suggested for several years by the Sri Lankan government, devolu-
tion appears to be the most promising means by which a peaceful settle-
ment might be reached.
B. Devolution of Power
Pluralism and integration need not be competing factors in govern-
mental efforts to improve minority relations, and non-discrimination may
be seen as a precondition concerning the implementation of rights of per-
sons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Generally, the
rights of minority groups are comprised primarily of the right of persons
belonging to ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture; to profess and
practice their own religion; and the right of persons belonging to linguis-
tic minorities to use their own language. 6
Devolution in the Sri Lankan context would provide governmental
competency to provincial institutions, and if certain concessions were
made by the national government (especially in the field of education),
Tamils would have the benefit of controlling their way of life. 7
The prospects for devolution in the current Sri Lankan political sys-
tem remain tentative at best. It is also apparent, however, that devolution
will not cause further splintering of an already fragmented populace. The
release of certain governmental competencies of a local nature to local
Law: Validity of Claims to Secede. 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
66. Devolution has also been discussed in some of the Peace Talks. See supra note 41.
67. A brief discussion of some of these conciliation efforts (New Delhi, June 1985;
Thimpu, July and August 1985; and New Delhi, August 1985) is contained in Address to
Parliament By The President on 20th February, 1986 (1986), English version at 2-4.
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authorities will ease ethnic tensions and provide a wider and more mean-
ingful base of authority for particular (i.e. Tamil) groups.
In light of the prior discussion of the claim to secede it appears that
few substantial problems would actually be resolved were the Tamils to
form their separate state of Eelam. In order to put an end to the violence
in Sri Lanka the government must take some kind of action to address
the grievances of the Tamil minority. Perhaps a devolution of government
authority will achieve these ends, without the destruction of territorial
integrity inherent in secession.
C. Implementation of Devolution
Efforts at resolving the Tamil problem have been made in a number
of different settings. The government, as well as some of the Tamil
groups, has sought help from other nations.68 These efforts have not been
characterized by successful negotiations, but the fact that these have
taken place remains an important factor.6 9
The viable prospects for the government of Sri Lanka regarding the
resolution of the Tamil problem as well as considerations for the future
efficacy of current political institutions are, in the view of the govern-
ment, quite limited. Based partly on its intransigence concerning the
character of the current political conflict, the government has identified
the conflict as one in which the actors must decide their allegiance based
upon their loyalty to Sri Lankan political institutions, with the current
administration as the embodiment thereof.70 This extremely narrow view
can be attributed to the stage of political development of Sri Lanka's sys-
tem of government. Although this is not meant to explain away any of its
abusive practices, it does shed some light on why the government has
drawn the reins so tightly.
V. CONCLUSION
The government's response to this basic problem is inadequate. Al-
though it has often not been a carefully calculated or coordinated effort,
the government's response to Tamil militancy indicates a strong willing-
68. Prime Minister Gandhi has been involved in many of these efforts, but the "good
neighbor" policy has brought about little effective change, and controversies and accusations
of bad faith resulted in disappointment. Weisman, A Region Has Difficulty Staying on
Speaking Terms, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, §4, at 3, col. 1. Shifts in India's policy toward
the Tamil separatists who had previously been using the Indian state of Tamil Nadu as a
sanctuary have also had a significant impact on the relationship between the Tamils and the
Sri Lankan government. Weisman, India Arrests Several Top Leaders of Sri Lanka Sepa-
ratist Guerillas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at 15, col. 1. The endorsement of the Sri
Lankan government's offers played an important role in certain regional efforts to resolve
the problem. Weisman, Gandhi Endorses Sri Lankan Stand on Strife, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18,
1986, at 14, col. 1.
69. See supra note 52.
70. See generally, supra notes 16, 17.
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ness to employ terror tactics to repress vocal elements. The policy might
be characterized as one which is reflective of the existing inconsistencies
of the current form of government.7' The incapability of the government
to control various forms and means of its authority has frequently re-
sulted in violence initiated by (in particular the armed forces) elements
within the government or actively supported by it which demand and re-
ceive legitimization from the government.
71. Whether this legitimization is actually indicative of a concerted effort to repress
certain elements (largely Tamil) is irrelevant. This phenomenon relates back, and signifi-
cantly so, to the incapabilities of the government.
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Encountering Counterclaims
ALISON DUNDES RENTELN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A study of international arbitral procedures provides a way to gain
some insight into questions of international conflict and cooperation. This
article considers the role that counterclaims play in international tribu-
nals and the conditions under which counterclaims may be brought.' I
begin by clarifying the notion of a counterclaim and then discuss what
principles govern the admissibility of counterclaims before national and
international bodies.
To determine what role counterclaims have traditionally played in
international legal process, I will examine various rules on counterclaims:
domestic rules, rules of the International Court of Justice, and rules of
international arbitral tribunals. After having investigated the different
counterclaims rules and the principles which govern their admissibility, I
will discuss whether or not human rights counterclaims might be possible.
Some parties may choose not to submit to the jurisdiction of a tribu-
nal if they anticipate encountering human rights counterclaims, but
others might be willing to do so in order to clear their names before the
* B.A., Harvard-Radcliffe, 1981; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1987. Assis-
tant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California. The author is grateful
to Professor Stefan Riesenfeld for drawing her attention to many important references.
1. Although the use of counterclaims is a widespread practice in both domestic and
international litigation, there is virtually no theoretical discussion of them in the legal litera-
ture to date. Some articles of interest include: Larschan & Mirfendereski, The Status of
Counterclaims in International Law, with Particular Reference to International Arbitra-
tion Involving a Private Party and a Foreign State, 31 DEN. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 1 (1986); M.
Whiteman, 12 Digest of International Law, Dept. of State Pub. No. 8586, 1079 (Aug.1971);
Tigar, Automatic Extinction of Cross Demands: Compensation from Rome to California, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 224 (1965) [hereinafter Tigar]; Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory
Counterclaim Rule Under Modern Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423 (1954) [hereinafter
Wright]; Scelle, Report on Arbitration Procedure, A/CN.4/18 (March 21, 1950) at 58-59, II
Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM. (1950) at 136 - 137; Genet, Les Demandes Reconventionelles et la
Procedure de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, 65 R.D.I.L.C. 145, 178 (1938);
Anzilotti, La Demande Reconventionnelle en Procedure Internationale, 57 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 857 (1930); Anzilotti, La Reconvenzione Nella Procedura Interna-
zionale, SCRiTrl DELLA FACOLTA GIURIDICA DI ROMA IN ONORE DI ANTONIO SALANDRA 341-360
(1928).
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international community. In theory, nothing in the arbitral rules of proce-
dure precludes human rights counterclaims, but in practice social psycho-
logical factors such as a nation's fear of being vilified may make it diffi-
cult to use counterclaims as a vehicle for advancing human rights.
Assuming that counterclaims do have potential for raising human rights
issues in international dispute resolution, they deserve serious considera-
tion by the legal profession. Their use may have far-reaching implications
for diplomatic relations among nations.
II. U.S. COUNTERCLAIMS
A. Counterclaims in General
A counterclaim has been defined as "a claim presented by a defend-
ant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff."2 It is
distinguished from a defense in that it does not deny the cause of action
or the plaintiffs right to recover. Instead, it is an assertion of a separate
cause of action against the plaintiff which is intended to offset in whole or
in part the original claim. Often counterclaims and defenses are confused
because they are based upon the same set of facts. For this reason Rule
8(c) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on affirmative
defenses provides that "when a party has mistakenly designated a de-
fense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on
terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a
proper designation." Most scholars attribute the concept and definition of
the counterclaim to David Dudley Field, the prominent nineteenth cen-
tury legal reformer and codifier. Although the name itself may be mod-
ern, the basic idea of the counterclaim is not.'
The counterclaim is a legal device designed to enhance judicial effi-
ciency by coordinating the handling of multiple claims at once. Treating
the counterclaim and claim simultaneously insures consistent results
which would not be guaranteed if the claims were reviewed separately. A
counterclaim may serve the purpose of avoiding financial loss which can
occur if there is a delay between the adjudication of the original claim
and the second claim. Admitting a counterclaim may also yield a more
fair result by ensuring that additional facts and legal obligations are not
ignored.
B. Compulsory vs. Permissive Counterclaims
There are basically two different types of counterclaims in the
United States: compulsory and permissive. A compulsory counterclaim,
under Rule 13(a) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is defined
as any claim that a party to a civil suit in a federal court has which
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (5th ed. 1979)
3. For insightful conceptual and historical analyses, see Tigar, supra note 1, and White-
man, supra note 1.
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"arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction"
and "must be pleaded as a counterclaim in that suit, unless such claim is
the subject of another pending action at the time the suit commenced".
Failure to assert the compulsory counterclaim results in its loss through
the doctrine of res judicata.
A permissive counterclaim under Rule 13 (b) provides that a plead-
ing may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim. Underlying the provision for permissive coun-
terclaims is the notion that it is not fair to require a party to pay com-
pensation or damages before it has received its due from the party that
brought the original claim. It is in the interest of fairness that debts be-
tween the parties be settled, whether related or not, before compelling
payment in the instant case.
There is a basic difference between compulsory and permissive coun-
terclaims. The compulsory counterclaim is required to be based on a
claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the sub-
ject matter of the opposing party's claim. A permissive counterclaim, by
contrast, is any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim." The term 'transaction' has been the source of much debate
and has been the subject of many interpretations. Although U.S. judicial
experience indicates that there has been considerable difficulty in fixing a
specific meaning on the term, it continues to be utilized both in U.S. and
international dispute resolution.5
III. INTERNATIONAL COUNTERCLAIMS
A. Jurisdiction
The key criterion for determining the admissibility of counterclaims
in international tribunals is the degree to which the counterclaim is re-
4. The four tests that different courts have used to differentiate between compulsory
and permissive counterclaims are as follows:
1. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute both the plaintiff's
claim and the counterclaim?
2. Are the issues of fact and law on the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same?
3. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on the defendant's claim absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule?
4. Is there any logical relation between the plaintiff's claim and the
counterclaim?
For further discussion on these tests, see Wright, supra note 1, at 438.
5. For further discussion of the transaction definition problem, see Draft Convention on
Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States; see also 26 AM. J. INT'L LAW (Supp.
1932), at 493, and Wright, supra note 1, at 437.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
lated to the original claim. For the most part international tribunals will
only consider counterclaims which resemble what U.S. procedure terms
'compulsory'.' For compulsory counterclaims there is no real issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction because the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the
tribunal when the claim was brought. If there are other parties which
would have to be included as a consequence of admitting a counterclaim,
then there might be some obstacle posed by personal jurisdiction require-
ments. Generally the tribunal will have jurisdiction over the parties
linked to the claim and counterclaim, but this will not automatically pro-
vide it with subject matter jurisdiction. Insofar as there is a direct con-
nection between the counterclaim and the claim, the jurisdictional re-
quirement will be satisfied.' The main difficulty is to establish standards
by which to measure the direct connection. In theory it should be possible
to insist upon directness, but in practice it may prove difficult to use that
criterion.
It has been asserted that as with compulsory counterclaims in the
United States, these types of counterclaims are also subject to the doc-
trine of res judicata in international litigation. If a party had a counter-
claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and neglected to
raise it, then the party would not be able to do so later. One authority in
international arbitration law, Nantwi, takes this view:
The binding force of arbitration awards may also be found to be simi-
larly based on the principle of res judicata. It is inherent in the insti-
tution of arbitration as it is in judicial settlement. The most forthright
restatement of the principle in recent arbitration proceedings is to be
credited to the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal in its final award
(1941) where it was expressed as follows:
"That the sanctity of res judicata attaches to a final deci-
sion of an international tribunal is an essential and settled rule
of international law. If it is true that international relations
based on law and justice require arbitral and judicial adjudica-
tion of international disputes, it is equally true that such adjudi-
cation must, in principle, remain unchallenged, if it is to be ef-
fective to that end.
'
"
8
For the most part, however, there will be jurisdiction over claims so long
as both parties consent. Therefore, although one suspects that for inter-
national litigation there would be res judicata effect, it is not self-evident
and remains an open question.
6. Even though the terminology of 'compulsory' and 'permissive' counterclaims is de-
rived from U.S. judicial practices, it provides a useful framework for classifying counter-
claims in the international arena.
7. It was upon the jurisdictional questions and the issue of sufficient connection that
the noted publicist Brownlie laid emphasis. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 412 (1966).
8. NANTWi, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL
AWARDS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (1966).
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The assumption that permissive counterclaims are not admissible
before international tribunals must be questioned. Ordinarily, when the
tribunal is one of general as opposed to limited jurisdiction, the arbitra-
tors or judges have greater latitude in determining what falls within the
scope of the tribunal's authority. The argument could be made that it is
in the interest of justice to allow permissive counterclaims before interna-
tional tribunals, as the claims might otherwise not be heard. Moreover, in
some legal systems, once the tribunal has been convened to hear a dis-
pute, it is considered appropriate to resolve multiple issues and claims at
one time.9 As the objective of dispute settlement is catharsis, claims that
might be regarded as permissive counterclaims are allowed in order to
restore harmony.
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The first example of the way counterclaims are handled can be seen
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,1" which entered into force in
late 1976:
S.1607 Counterclaims
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state
intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign
state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under
section 1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate
action against the foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of the claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding
in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.
The same language characterizing acceptable counterclaims appears in
(b) that the counterclaim arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
as the subject matter of the original claim.
The legislative history of Section 1607 explains why immunity is de-
nied in three situations. First, Article I of the European Convention on
State Immunity" provides that "immunity would be denied as to any
counterclaim for which the foreign state would not be entitled to immu-
nity under 1605, if the counterclaim had been brought as a direct claim in
a separate action against the foreign state."'" The second situation in
which immunity is suspended is when the counterclaim arises out of the
9. See, e.g., GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHO-
DESIA (1955).
10. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 28 U.S.C.S. 1607.
11. Council of Europe: European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Proto-
col, Done at Basel, May 16, 1972, reprinted at 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).
12. 94th Cong. 2d sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5522
(1976).
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same transaction or occurrence as the main claim despite sections 1604-
1606 which grant immunity. Even if the foreign state would ordinarily be
entitled to immunity, in this circumstance it is denied because it would
be unfair to allow a foreign state to bring or intervene in a particular
transaction or occurrence and not face liabilities connected with the same
matter. In short, ". . .it should not obtain the benefits of litigation before
U.S. courts while avoiding any legal liabilities claimed against it and aris-
ing out of the same transaction or occurrence."' 3 Third, even if the for-
eign state is immune under subsections (a) and (b), it is nevertheless not
immune from subsection (c), which provides that the amount of the coun-
terclaim may not exceed the amount sought in the underlying claim.' In
setting out the extent of sovereign liability, the United States made it
clear that as far as direct counterclaims are concerned, immunity will not
be granted up to the amount of the original claim.
In a provocative article on counterclaims against a sovereign plaintiff,
Simmond criticizes the "same subject matter" test as failing to provide an
effective definition. He is interested in the question of whether "indepen-
dent" counterclaims may be asserted against sovereign plaintiffs. While
he does not take the position that all counterclaims should be allowed, he
does advocate clarification of the "limits within which 'disconnected' or
'unrelated' matters may be brought into, or excluded from a suit through
the counterclaim. '"1 5
C. International Court of Justice
Although it is not clear how often counterclaims are asserted before
international tribunals, some authorities contend that they have been rel-
atively rare.' Historically, the International Court of Justice did not rec-
ognize counterclaims. There were no provisions for them in the Hague
Conventions of 1899'" and 19078 or by the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice,' 9 the Convention of 1907 for the Establish-
13. Id.
14. Subsection (c) is the codification of the rule enunciated in National Bank v. Repub-
lic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
15. Simmonds, Implied Waiver of Immunity: Permissible Counterclaims Against a
Sovereign Plaintiff, 9 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 334, 340 (1960).
16. See Whiteman, supra note 1, at 1081; J.H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 139 (1910). Some of the cases in which counterclaims were used included:
Chorzow Factory Case, Series A, No.17, Sept.13, 1928; The Diversion of Water From the
Meuse, Series A/B, No.70, June 28, 1937; U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(provisional measures), ICJ Reports at 15 (1979).
17. Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences, concluded at
The Hague on July 29, 1899, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L. L. 107 (Supp. 1907). [Hague Con-
vention of 1899].
18. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, con-
cluded at The Hague on October 18, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43 (Supp. 1908).
19. See generally, FACH1RI, THE PERMANENT COURT OF JUSTICE-ITS CONSTITUTION,
PROCEDURE & WORK (1925).
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ment of a Central American Court of Justice,"0 or by the Convention of 7
February 1923 for the Establishment of an International Central Ameri-
can Tribunal.2 The Institute of International Law, in its Rules of 28 Au-
gust 1875 (Article 17) rejected the principle of admissibility of the coun-
terclaim whenever it had not been provided for in the compromis or
accepted by the parties.2"
The Statute of the Court is silent on the question of counterclaims,
but there is provision made for them in the rules. In the 1922 rules, Arti-
cle 40 elaborated on the elements of cases and counter-cases. The fourth
item mentioned under counter-cases was: conclusions based on the facts
stated, these conclusions may include counter-claims, in so far as the lat-
ter come within the jurisdiction of the Court.23 Since the Court has juris-
diction over the claim, if the counterclaim is directly related, there should
be no obstacle to jurisdiction. Implicit is that counterclaims not directly
related or permissive counterclaims in the American legal system would
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.2 4
Article 63, which was adopted in the amended 1946 Rules is a more
elaborate rule:
When proceedings have been instituted by means of an application, a
counter-claim may be presented in the submissions of the Counter-
Memorial, provided that such counter-claim is directly connected with
the subject-matter of the application and that it comes within the ju-
risdiction of the Court. In the event of doubt as to the connection
between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the sub-
ject-matter of the application of the Court shall, after due examina-
tion, direct whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined
to the original proceedings.25
Since the Court may "after due examination" permit the counter-
claim to be brought, a permissive counterclaim might be feasible, the only
limitation being jurisdiction. The court has jurisdiction over the subject-
matter only if both parties consent. Without mutual consent, the Court
would have difficulty justifying acceptance of permissive counterclaims.
The rules themselves, however, do not preclude the introduction of coun-
terclaims unrelated to the principal claim.
20. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, signed at
Washington, D.C., Dec. 20, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (Supp. 1908).
21. Convention for the Establishment of an International Central American Tribunal,
signed at Washington, D.C., Feb. 7, 1923, (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Costa Rica), reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (Supp. 1923).
22. See Solution Pacifique des Differences Internationaux, I ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUTE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 60 (art. 17) (1928 ed.).
23. 1926 P.C.I.J. Acts & Docs. 75 (ser. D) § 7.
24. See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920 - 1942 (1943),
at 430.
25. Rules of the Court, 1946 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 54, 74 (ser. D) No. 1. See also, Docu-
MENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 177 (S. Rosenne ed. 1979).
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The Court adopted revised rules once again in 1978 which contain
the same substantive content as the 1946 Rule. 6 Furthermore, Section 3
allows for substantially more discretion. The Court can decide whether or
not the counterclaim shall survive and for the sake of administrative con-
venience, the Court may join the proceedings in two or more cases (Arti-
cle 17). There are no procedural barriers to bringing counterclaims re-
lated only tangentially so long as the Court determines that the
counterclaim is directly connected.
Article 89 provides that if the course of proceedings began by means
of an application, discontinuance depends on the consent of both parties
unless the respondent has not yet taken any steps in the proceedings, in
which case the removal occurs immediately. If the consent of both parties
is required to end consideration of the case, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that the removal of the counterclaim would also require the consent
of both, particularly if the opportunity to present a counterclaim depends
on mutual agreement by both parties. It might then be possible to remove
the claim, but not the counterclaim. Since one purpose of allowing coun-
terclaims is to resolve all aspects of a particular dispute it might not
make sense to dismiss one without the other, but it does appear to be
procedurally feasible to allow the counterclaim to survive the demise of
the original claim.
There is a danger that counterclaims, because they would attract
more parties, might discourage the original parties from using the inter-
national dispute settlement mechanisms.27 Article 81(2)(c) provides for
third party intervention. Clearly, the more counterclaims which arise, the
greater the chances that third parties will wish to intervene.
D. Use of Counterclaims in International Arbitration
1. Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure
Article 19 of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, adopted by the
International Law Commission in 19588, makes clear the importance of
the direct connection standard. Although it addresses the question of
26. 1978 Rules of the Court, Part III, § D, subsec. 3, Article 80, Counterclaims:
1. A counterclaim may be presented provided that it is directly connected with
the subject matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
2. A counterclaim shall be made in the Counter-Memorial of the party
presenting it, and shall appear as part of the submissions of that party.
3. In the event of doubt as to the connection between the question presented
by way of counterclaim and the subject-matter of the claim of the other party
the Court shall, after hearing the parties, decide whether or not the question
thus presented shall be joined to the original proceedings.
27. See T.O. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-92 (1983).
28. The 1958 Convention was adopted as international law on June 7, 1959. 13 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) ch. II, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958), reprinted in 1958 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 78, 85.
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which counterclaims are admissible in the absence of provisions for a
counterclaim in a compromis, it may also suggest what the consensus is as
to the admissibility of counterclaims:
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary implied by the under-
taking to arbitrate or contained in the compromis, the tribunal shall
decide on any ancillary claims which it considers to be inseparable
from the subject-matter of the dispute and necessary for its final
settlement.2 9
In 1985 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) developed a model arbitration law30 , designed to assist na-
tions in drafting laws which adhere to the provisions of the 1958
Convention.
2. Rules of Arbitration Institutions3
In the Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission, there is a counterclaim provision in Article 19.1:
In his statement of defense, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceed-
ings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified under
the circumstances, the respondent may make a counterclaim arising
out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same
contract for the purpose of set-off.32
This provision is narrower in scope than others as it limits counterclaims
to those which relate to the same contract rather than the same transac-
tion or occurrence.
The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Committee of the China Committee for the Promotion of International
Trade also provides for counterclaims: "the defendant may file a counter-
claim against a claim over which the Arbitration Committee has assumed
jurisdiction. '3 The Rules of the Maritime Arbitration Committee of
China provide that a defendant may file a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff in cases "of which the Maritime Arbitration Commission has taken
29. 1958 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 38, 85.
30. The final draft of this model law on International Commercial Arbitration can be
found in the Report of the UNCITRAL Law on the Work of its 18th Session, June 3-21,
1985, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No.17) at 82-94, U.N.Doc. A/40/17 (1985). For further discus-
sion, see McNerney & Esplugues, International Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL
Model Law, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47 (1986).
31. Easy access to the rules of several international arbitral tribunals is found in 1
V.WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 305-307 (1979).
32. Article 19.3, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission, (as amended and in effect January 1, 1978), reprinted in III YEARBOOK: COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 235 (P. Sanders ed. 1978).
33. Rule 24, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commit-
tee of the China Committee for the promotion of International Trade (adopted March 31,
1956), I1 YEARBOOK: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 246 (P. Sanders ed. 1978).
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cognizance. ' 's34
The Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce state that any counterclaim or pleading by way of set-off may
be based only on a legal relationship covered by the arbitration agree-
ment." Rule 14.1(d) states that a specific counterclaim should be con-
tained in the Statement of Claim or Defense.
The rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in section 1, Article
11, provide that: "the respondent may introduce a counter-claim against
the claimant, provided that this counter-claim be directly connected with
the subject-matter of the request. The Tribunal, constituted in order to
decide on the principal claim, shall likewise decide on the counter-
claim.' '3 6 These rules allow for substantial discretion on the part of the
tribunal, and thus it is possible that permissive counterclaims might be
asserted.
Rule 40 of the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) is concerned with ancillary claims, includ-
ing counterclaims. Carefully constructed, it exemplifies a standard provi-
sion for counterclaims in several respects:
Rule 40 - Ancillary Claims
(1) Except as the parties otherwise agree, a party may present an inci-
dental or additional claim or counter-claim arising directly out of the
subject-matter dispute, provided that such ancillary claim is within
the scope of the consent of the parties and is otherwise within 'the
jurisdiction of the Centre.
(2) An incidental or additional claim shall be presented not later than
in the reply and a counter-claim no later than in the counter-memo-
rial, unless the Tribunal, upon justification by the party presenting
the ancillary claim and upon considering any objection of the other
party, authorizes the presentation of the claim at a later stage in the
proceedings.
(3) The Tribunal shall fix a time limit within which the party against
which an ancillary claim is presented may file its observations
thereon."
The ICSID rule stresses that the counterclaim must arise directly out of
the subject-matter of the original claim. The Notes elaborate further on
34. Rule 26, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Maritime Arbitration Commission of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (adopted January 8, 1959). Id.
at 257.
35. Rule 14.2(d), Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce (in force from October 1, 1976), III YEARBOOK: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 256 (1978).
36. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for the Set-
tlement of International Disputes between Two Parties of which Only One is a State, § I,
Art. 11 (1962), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Doc. 1.13 (C.
Schmitthoff ed. 1975).
37. Rule 40, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) repro-
duced from ICSID Regulations and Rules, in 4 V. WET-TER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL
PROCESs 526 (1979).
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the direct connection requirement; the factual connection between the
original claim and the ancillary claim must be so close that adjudication
of the ancillary claim is necessary to achieve the final settlement of the
dispute. The object is to dispose of claims arising out of the same subject-
matter. The provision that the claim must arise out of the same dispute is
a broader requirement than that it arise from the same transaction or
contract. Thus, the scope of the subject matter can be partly determined
by the phrasing of the source from which it is derived. There must also be
consent of the parties and the jurisdiction of the Centre. Section 41(2)
provides that the Tribunal "may on its own initiative consider, at any
stage of the proceeding, whether the dispute or any ancillary claim before
it is within the jurisdiction of the Centre and within its own compe-
tence". 38 Since the Tribunal is the judge of its own competence, it ulti-
mately has the discretion to admit whatever counterclaims it wishes.
3. UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules
Of great interest are the counterclaim provisions of the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). UNCI-
TRAL prepares new international conventions and model rules and advo-
cates uniform interpretation and application of them, in an effort to
harmonize the law of international trade. One of its priorities has been to
draft a set of rules for international commercial arbitration, particularly
for optional use in ad hoc arbitration. In May 1976, the Commission
adopted these UNCITRAL arbitral rules, and in December 1976 the U.N.
General Assembly recommended that they be used for the settlement of
disputes arising from various types of contracts in international com-
merce.3  So, UNCITRAL represents the culmination of efforts to devise a
draft set of arbitration rules. Since they may be widely used, the counter-
claim provision is important for the purposes of this discussion:
Article 19
1. Within a period of time to be determined by the arbitral tribunal,
the respondent shall communicate his statement of defense in writing
to the claimant and to each of the arbitrators.
3. In his statement of defense, or at a later stage in the arbitral pro-
ceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified
under the circumstances, the respondent may make a counterclaim
arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the
same contract for the purpose of a set-off.
4. The provisions of Article 18, paragraph 2, shall apply to a counter-
claim and a claim relied on for the purpose of a set-off.40
38. Rule 41(2), Rules of Procedure, supra note 33, at 527.
39. UNCITRAL adopted the Arbitral Rules on April 28, 1976, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/31/17, ch. V., § C. The U.N. General Assembly then recommended
their use for various contractual disputes in international commerce on Dec. 15, 1976, G.A.
Res. 31/98 (1976).
40. UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules, Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law, 9th sess., 12 April - 7 May, 1976, G.A. 31st sess., Supp.No.17 (A/31/17). Reprinted in 4
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Although the rule reflects a preference for having the counterclaim as-
serted in the statement of defense, the legislative history makes it clear
that it was considered desirable to retain flexibility."' The result was a
rule which stipulates that the counterclaim be raised in the statement of
defense unless circumstances are such that it becomes necessary to raise
it subsequently.
The arbitrators have considerable discretion with respect to jurisdic-
tion, when a counterclaim can be raised, and the interpretation of proce-
dures (Article 15(1)), but they are nonetheless constrained by the rules.
The respondent may only make a counterclaim which arises out of the
same contract for the purpose of a set-off. The counterclaim must, there-
fore, be directly related to the original claim, since both must be linked to
the contract in question. UNCITRAL's is a narrowly defined rule. In ad-
dition, claims may not be amended in such a manner that the amended
claim falls outside the scope of either the arbitration clause or the sepa-
rate arbitration agreement. 2 Underlying all the procedural rules is the
idea that the scope of the arbitral agreement is limited and not to be
expanded by amended claims or counterclaims. The UNCITRAL Rules
would most likely allow "compulsory" counterclaims, and disallow "per-
missive" counterclaims.43
The same considerations are reflected in all the arbitral rules; there
must be a relationship between the original claim and the counterclaim,
the arbitral tribunal must have jurisdiction, and time limits are imposed
within which the counterclaim must be presented. It is striking that the
discussion is so terse, since their impact can be great.
4. Permissive Counterclaims: The Del Rio Case
Some might object to the proposal to allow permissive counterclaims
to be brought up in arbitration on the ground that it would deter nations
from utilizing arbitration as a means of dispute settlement. The root of
the problem is attitudinal. A fear exists that arbitration will not resemble
a judicial process and that the arbitrators may substitute a political deci-
sion for a legal one.44 It is reasonable to assume that additional claims
would complicate the dispute settlement process with the possibility that
one party might be displeased with the result. If dissatisfied, the party
might well allege that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdictional author-
V. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 413, 421-2 (1952).
41. Id. at 180 - 181.
42. Id. at Article 20.
43. For an example of how the UNCITRAL Rules have been applied, see the Declara-
tion of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the U.S.A. and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981. This Tribunal modified and broadened Rule 19(3) some-
what, and allowed for counterclaims connected to the occurrence or transaction rather than
limiting them to issues arising out of the same contract.
44. See CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 37 (1946).
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ity.45 Although the challenge to jurisdiction might arise if permissive
counterclaims were admitted frequently, this is hardly a problem peculiar
to this device.
One reason for allowing those counterclaims which are directly re-
lated to the subject-matter of the original claim is that it is efficient in
cost and in time to settle both claims at the same time. Since a counter-
claim that is not directly related would not be efficient, it is likely that if
the efficiency rationale is primary, permissive counterclaims would not be
accepted. The efficiency rationale is not served by permissive
counterclaims.
There are very few cases in which the issue of permissive counter-
claims has arisen. One example, however, is the Del Rio case, where a
Mexican-Venezuelan Commission was set up to examine and decide
claims of Mexican citizens against Venezuela.4 6 According to the protocol
of Washington, February 26, 1903, the Commission did not have jurisdic-
tion to decide claims of the Government of Venezuela presented against
the Mexican Republic. The Commission, in an attempt to extricate itself
from the difficulties of the international agreement, sought the consent of
the two parties to consider Venezuelan counterclaims. After an exchange
of notes and telegrams, the Commission received authorization to ex-
amine and decide the counterclaims presented by Venezuela against the
Mexican government. The case demonstrates that it is possible to enlarge
the scope of jurisdiction. A tribunal may extend its competence beyond
that of the original subject matter if the parties consent and waive sub-
ject matter deficiencies. Since the consent of the two parties can confer
jurisdiction, it is possible that counterclaims of any kind could theoreti-
cally be brought before a tribunal. This is an important observation be-
cause it indicates that even though counterclaim rules offer a narrow defi-
nition of what counterclaims are admissible, the parties may consent to
the presentation of counterclaims that do not fit the rule.
5. Drafting Agreements to Provide for Counterclaims
An important reason why a provision for counterclaims should be de-
termined before the international arbitration gets underway is that par-
ties may have different concepts of counterclaims. When two parties and
their counsel come from different legal cultures, there is a danger that
conflict may arise. "Where countries having different legal systems are
represented before a tribunal, the use of technical procedural concepts
from the one or the other legal system is a dangerous matter. ' ' 47 To avoid
45. "The arbitrator has such powers of decision as the parties confer upon him. Unless
his powers are clearly stated and the exact question at issue is precisely stated, dissatisfac-
tion with his award may easily provoke the charge that he has exceeded his jurisdiction." Id.
at 33-34.
46. Del Rio case, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, Jackson H. Ralston, Senate Doc. No.
316, 58th Congress, 2d sess., at 879 - 888 (1904).
47. A.H. FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 228 (1935).
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clashes" between parties, it is advisable to include provisions for likely
points of contention. Carlston stresses the need for careful planning:
"Disputes and misunderstandings will inevitably arise because of clashes
caused by varying national backgrounds. If arbitration is to carry out suc-
cessfully its task of solving amicably such disputes, the utmost considera-
tion must be given to its procedural aspects."4 s It is not impossible to
overcome the problem of national differences. Lowenfeld argues that a
commitment to the fair administration of justice can allow arbitrators to
overcome the effect of different types of legal training: "Even if their legal
trdditions are different, they must have a common belief in the integrity
of the-Judicial (or arbitral) process."49 If the parties can agree on a coun-
terclaim rule, then there is some hope that the arbitrators could follow it
even if it differed from the rule with which they were familiar.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTERCLAIMS: THE U.S.-POLAND ARBITRATION
The potential for using counterclaims to raise human rights issues
has not yet been realized. On December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski im-
posed martial law in Poland." In response, President Reagan announced
that the United States would impose economic sanctions on Poland, one
of which was the suspension of Polish civil aviation privileges in the
United, States.' The U.S. decision to suspend Polish landing rights and
the subsequent demand by the Polish government for arbitration provide
a context in which to discuss the possibility of allowing the presentation
of human rights counterclaims.
!here was strong reason to believe that the U.S. action was in viola-
tion of a provision of the 1972 U.S.-Polish agreement on civil aviation,
which required that one party notify the other at least one year in ad-
vance of any termination or suspension of any provision."2 The Polish
government demanded that the U.S. enter into an arbitration to deter-
mine what damages LOT, the Polish airline, suffered as a result of the
suspension of its landing privileges. Unfortunately, even though the U.S.
and Poland each appointed an arbitrator, the two arbitrators could not
agree on a third to make up the tribunal, and so there was no progress.5"
48. Carlston, supra note 40, at 6-7.
49. A.F. Lowenfeld, The U.S.-Iranian Dispute Settlement Accords: An Arbitrator
Looks at the Prospects for Arbitration, 36(3) ARB. J. 7 (1981).
50. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 83 DEPT. STATE BULL. 48
(June 1983).
51. The President's News Conference of Dec.17, 1981, Presidential Doc. Vol.17, at 1379;
Christmas and the Situation in Poland: Address to the Nation, Presidential Doc. Vol.17, at
1404 - 1407 (Dec.23, 1981); Development in Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., App.4 at 42 (Feb.9, 1982).
52. Air Transport Agreement, July 19, 1972, U.S.-Poland, 23 U.S.T. 4269, T.I.A.S. No.
7535., see also Malamut, Aviation: Suspension of Landing Rights of Polish Airlines in the
United4,-tates, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 190 (1983).
53. In the interim, the U.S. gradually removed the sanctions. In January 1984 the U.S.
decided to allow 88 charter flights, and then in July 1984 lifted the suspension of landing
VOL. 15:2,3
ENCOUNTERING COUNTERCLAIMS
Had the arbitration commenced, however, the U.S. could have as-
serted the violation of Polish citizens' human rights as a counterclaim.
This would have been an extremely interesting development. Not only
would human rights violations have been raised as a counterclaim, but
even more significant would have been the U.S. counterclaim on behalf of
the Polish citizens. Ordinarily a state has standing to present claims and
counterclaims for its own citizens, but this action might have created a
landmark arbitral decision by allowing one state to raise a counterclaim
alleging the human rights violations of citizens of the state which brought
the original claim.
It was arguably in Poland's best interest not to insist upon arbitra-
tion. Poland was, and still is, trying to ameliorate diplomatic relations in
order to gain aid for its ailing economy. In the field of international
human rights the "finger of shame" '54 can be a tremendously powerful
weapon. The U.S. could have made greater efforts to facilitate the arbi-
tration, as it was only the need for a third arbitrator which led to the
stalemate. A more compromising approach might have made the arbitra-
tion possible. It has been suggested that the reason the U.S. sought to
avoid arbitration was that it expected to lose.5
The suspension of the U.S.-Polish civil aviation "illustrates the con-
flict between the great principles of international law, the inviolability of
treaties and the fundamental nature of human rights"." The U.S. reluc-
tance to pursue the arbitration may indicate that the former takes prece-
dence in the international context. Perhaps this is the assumption that
must be changed before counterclaims can be used effectively to cham-
pion human rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Having arranged a forum to settle claims, the parties might see fit to
consent to admitting counterclaims, compulsory or permissive. Cognizant
of a potential counterclaim, a nation might refuse to submit the original
claim to an arbitral tribunal. If, for instance, the counterclaim were the
violation of human rights of members of the other party's family or coun-
try, it is easy, on the one hand, to imagine how rapidly the nation would
withdraw its claim. On the other hand, the country might welcome the
rights for regularly scheduled flights by LOT. On April 16, 1985, in Warsaw, The U.S. and
Poland concluded a new Transport Agreement, there was an exchange of diplomatic notes
and a Memorandum of Understanding, and Poland agreed not to pursue the arbitration.
Letter of November 7, 1986, from John R. Byerly, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of
State. See also the Polish Diplomatic Note, Warsaw, April 16, 1985, certification of transla-
tion May 28, 1985 by Jorge R. Perez, Assistant Chief, translating branch, Dept. of State.
54. This approach has been advocated most strongly by Professor Frank Newman of
Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley, a leading human rights activist and scholar.
55. Malamut, .supra note 52, evaluates possible arguments that the U.S. might have
advanced, such as fraud, voidability, rebus sic stantibus, and human rights, and implies that
none of the arguments would have fared well in arbitration.
56. Id. at 198.
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opportunity to clear itself of charges. It is not obvious whether or not the
nation would automatically reject arbitration. If the country had no idea
that the counterclaim would be asserted, then the question becomes one
of time limits for withdrawing the original claim. There is little reason to
be optimistic about the future of permissive counterclaims before interna-
tional arbitral tribunals, even if allowing them would be a good idea in
theory. The result of admitting them might be to discourage international
arbitrations.
Inefficiency may be the reason given for disallowing human rights
counterclaims, but the underlying motivation is more likely to be the na-
tion's overall attitude towards human rights. Human rights abuses may
not be solved through the legal process until such attitudes change. Theo-
retically, however, counterclaims could provide an avenue to champion
human rights. International arbitration is sometimes the only feasible
method of dispute resolution, and it does have the advantage of usually
being a private, rather than a public, process. For these reasons, it may be
possible to induce states to confront allegations of human rights viola-
tions in an arbitral forum, through the procedure of permissive counter-
claims. This may sound idealistic, but in practical terms the incentive is
monetary. If a party wishes to collect an award through the arbitral pro-
cess, it might be more willing to agree to procedures that allow the human
rights violations to be heard. Individuals may not be able to change in-
grained social attitudes by legal procedure alone, but the use of human
rights counterclaims may be one step in the right direction.
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.: The Death Knell for
Predatory Price Fixing and the Avoidance
of a Standard for the Foreign Sovereign
Compulsion Defense
ALl GANJAEI*
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, represents
a significant step in antitrust law and a significant sidestep as to the in-
ternational implications of U.S. antitrust law. On the one hand, the Court
adopted a firm stance on policy towards predatory pricing, while on the
other, a decision on the weight to be given to a foreign sovereign's control
of defendant's actions was completely avoided. The two major issues
before the court involved a charge by American manufacturers that their
Japanese counterparts conspired to drive them out of the market through
a predatory price fixing scheme.
Generally, predatory pricing occurs when a company in a strong fi-
nancial position lowers its prices to drive out the competition even if it
sustains substantial losses. The reward is a market virtually devoid of
competition allowing unrestricted increases in the company's prices. The
Japanese manufacturers, in part, defended their concerted actions as an
involuntary compliance with their government's demands. The foreign
sovereign compulsion defense essentially immunizes defendants from U.S.
antitrust liability when their anti-competitive behavior is the result of a
foreign government's exercise of sovereign power. Since an enterprise
must comply with the domestic laws of its place of business, it would be
unfair to punish that enterprise merely because it complied with its own
government's demands.
The Supreme Court rendered an opinion that completely ignored the
evidentiary issues that subsumed the lower courts' decisions. This is not
to say, however, that the Court's decision is without merit. The opinion is
* J.D. 1986, University of Denver; B.A., B.S., 1981, University of Colorado.
1. 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
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decisive on several matters in predatory pricing which were left specula-
tive by prior case law. This comment shall endeavor to make a concise
historical presentation of the case and will be followed by an analysis of
the two issues mentioned above.
II. THE FACTS
In 1970, National Union Electric Corporation (NUE)5 filed a suit
against several Japanese manufacturers of consumer electrical products
(CEP).' NUE alleged that the Japanese manufacturers of CEPs had con-
spired to reduce their prices in order to drive American competitors out
of the U.S. market. This case was consolidated with an action filed by
Zenith Radio Corporation." Except for the fact that more defendants
were named, the allegations by Zenith were similar.5 The specific offenses
complained of were: (1) a conspiracy to violate sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act; (2) attempted and actual monopolization in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act; (3) the violation of the Robinson Patman
Act for discriminatory pricing among American purchasers;7 (4) violations
of section 7 of the Clayton Act 8 were alleged against defendants Sears,
Motorola, Matsushita and Sanyo; and (5) the violation of the 1916 An-
tidumping Act 9 for the systematic sale of CEPs below the Japanese mar-
ket price.'0 The evidence presented by Zenith approached mammoth pro-
portions and consequently District Judge Becker, through a pre-trial
order, required the plaintiffs to submit all of their evidence before trial in
a final pre-trial statement (FPS) with preclusive effect." The court's final
decision dismissing the case occurred during the pre-trial stage and an
evaluation of the antitrust legal issues never came to fruition.
In order to grasp the factual context of the allegations against the
2. NUE is the successor to Emerson Radio Company, one of the pioneers of the radio
and television industry. NUE terminated the production of television receivers in February
1970.
3. National Union Electric Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., No. 1706-70
(D.N.J. filed Dec. 21, 1970).
4. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Co., No. 74-2451 (E.D.Pa. filed Sept. 20,
1974). From this point on only Zenith will be named when referring to the plaintiffs.
5. The ten principal defendants were Mitsubishi Corporation, Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., Ltd., Toshiba Corp., Hitachi Ltd., Sharp Corp., Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
(MELCO), Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd., Sony Corp., Motorola, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck & Co.
The other companies are subsidiaries of the principal Japanese defendants. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970 & Supp. 1986).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) dismissed for failure to state a claim. Zenith, 402 F. Supp. 244
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
9. Revenue Act of 1916, § 801, 15 U.S.C § 72 (1970).
10. The case was dismissed on summary judgment and on appeal was affirmed only as
to three defendants. Zenith 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D.Pa. 1980) rev'd 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.
1983).
11. Zenith, 478 F. Supp. 889, 946 (E.D.Pa. 1979).
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Japanese manufacturers, it is best to summarize the alleged facts from
Zenith's point of view, as they urged the Supreme Court to consider. Ac-
cording to Zenith, the conspiracy began in the late 1950s and expanded
from radios to black and white television receivers and finally to color
television receivers as those products were introduced into the market-
place. The fullest strength of the conspiracy was realized when the Japa-
nese manufacturers sought and obtained permission to form a cartel from
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).' 2 After ob-
taining such permission in 1963 by "acting secretly and with mutual
knowledge and understanding" of their undisclosed common purposes,
"petitioners (Japanese manufacturers) jointly and systematically trans-
formed the character of the cartel.' 3
The cartel agreements and rules mandated minimum "check prices"
on receivers imported into the United States.' Violations of the "check
prices" were considered a violation of Japanese law.' 5 Even though the
"check prices" were found to be below U.S. market prices, Zenith did not
rest on this point in their conspiracy charge. Rather, Zenith alleged that
the manufacturers were involved in a scheme to sell to U.S. distributors
at prices much lower than the "check prices" while hiding the matter
from both the U.S. Customs Service and the Japanese authorities.'
In order to avert suspicion from the governmental authorities, the
manufacturers had to report their transactions at the "check prices" des-
ignated by the cartel.' Form 5515 used by importers in reporting to the
U.S. Customs Service indicates that the "check prices" were actually re-
ported. The scheme was effectuated through a refunding process to the
distributors. Zenith stressed the fact that the scheme could not work un-
less all of the manufacturers and all of the U.S. importers cooperated in
the conspiracy. 8 The difference between the "voluntary camouflaged
12. Respondent's Brief at 14, Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The Japanese Export and
Import Trading Act authorizes the MITI to exempt companies from the antitrust laws in
order to form a cartel. The proposed cartel would be granted only if:
(a) there is no fear of violating treaties and other arrangements concluded with
foreign governments or the international agencies; (b) the interests of import-
ers or enterprises concerned at the destination is not injured and there is no
fear of gravely injuring international confidence in Japanese exporters: and (c)
participation in or the withdrawal from the agreement is not unjustly
restricted.
13. Id.
14. The formal agreement called the "rationales" stated that the reason for the cartel
was to prevent Japanese CEP imports from "disrupting the United States market and injur-
ing United States manufacturers."Id.
15. This allegation became the central argument as to the foreign sovereign compulsion
issue avoided by the Supreme Court. See Petitioner's Brief at 36 and Respondent's Brief at
88. Matsushita 106 S. Ct. 1348.
16. Respondent's Brief at 15, Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
17. Id. at 15-16.
18. The different prices reported to the United States Customs Service would have
alerted the officials. Id. at 31.
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price" and the "contract price" was termed the "check price balance" or
the "difference money." The distributors would keep an accounting of the
"difference money," and the Japanese manufacturers would refund the
money principally through:
(a) checks that petitioners secretly drew on their Hong Kong, Japa-
nese and Swiss bank accounts and hand-delivered or mailed to the
United States; (b) secret telegraphic fund transfers to the United
States through petitioner's foreign bank accounts in Switzerland, Ger-
many and other countries; (c) "credits" disguised as offset credits on
tooling costs the buyer would ordinarily have paid, or credits for free
spare parts or credits toward the purchase price of other products not
subject to current dumping examination, including the "over-under"
or "over-and-under" billing technique;'0 (d) "usuance" or "usuance in-
terest"; 0 (e) deposits in the United States customers' yen bank ac-
counts in Japan; (f) travelers checks which petitioner's employees
while visiting the United States would hand-deliver to United States
buyers.2
Both sides of the lawsuit accounted for the transfers which were based
upon the same fictitious nomenclature. 2 While the cartel agreement was
not renewed in 1973, Zenith points to evidence that showed the continued
use of rebating among suppliers until 1977.23
In order to sustain their enterprises in view of continued losses in-
curred by the rebate scheme, the Japanese manufacturers optimized their
control of the closed Japanese domestic market. 4 By compiling a "war
19. "[Tlhe difference between the higher 'invoice' price and the 'actual' price is
credited toward and deducted from the actual agreed purchase price of another product
which the same buyer desired to purchase, thus reducing the agreed price on other products
to lower levels (and requiring further false declarations for those products and customs
fraud on shipments of such other products, as well as on TV products)." Id. at 36.
20. "[Pletitioners allowed extended payment terms, permitted the buyer to retain accu-
mulated interest on the letter of credit, and credited this sum against the 'difference money'
owed the buyer." Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 36-7 (citations and footnotes omitted).
22. The payments were placed in the books under commissions, loyalty discounts, ex-
cessive inspections and compensation for market research. Id. at 37.
23. By this time the scheme had unraveled, when two of the importers acknowledged
the practice to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Customs
Service. Another importer was indicted and pleaded guilty to customs fraud. Id. at 52.
24. As explained by Zenith,
[the] petitioners eliminated competition among themselves by agreeing to sta-
bilize and maintain high prices. These activities enhanced petitioner's conspir-
atorial control over their U.S.-Japan dumping margin, i.e. the difference be-
tween their Japanese market prices and their much lower U.S. prices. These
concerted activities furthered the objects of the conspiracy by (a) giving them
joint control over their prices in the closed Japanese market, (b) aggravating
the dumping margin on sales in the U.S., (c) stabilizing the Japanese price
component of the margin at artificially high prices, and (d) enhancing peti-
tioner's ability to achieve the common objectives by improving return on sales
in the Japanese market, and permitting them to deepen the dumping margin
on the U.S. side and continue the conspiracy over a longer period of time.
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chest" through domestic sales, the Japanese manufacturers subsidized
sales at a loss to the United States.
The theory finally presented by Zenith to the trial court" was as fol-
lows. There existed a single (unitary) conspiracy with two facets, the do-
mestic market and the export market. The aim of the conspiracy was to
take over the U.S. CEP market at the expense of the U.S. CEP industry.
The domestic market, closed to foreign firms through a combination of
government control and economic tradition, provided the resources to
subsidize the export facet by charging high prices to the Japanese con-
sumer. The export market was attacked at two levels. First, low "check
prices" were set by the cartel and second, the "check prices" were under-
cut with the cooperation of the American importers which compounded
the destruction. In addition, for the duration of the conspiracy, the Japa-
nese manufacturers never competed with each other. The ultimate goal
and reward of the predatory pricing conspiracy was to create an entire
market open for unchallenged high prices."8 This theory was supported by
numerous documents witnessing meetings, memoranda and diaries, all of
which were carefully scrutinized by the district court.
III. THE CASE HISTORY
A. The District Court
The basic task before the district court was to determine the admissi-
bility of the evidence compiled by Zenith within their final pre-trial state-
ment (FPS). The defendant manufacturers moved for summary judgment
based upon the FPS. The trial court considered the evidence in three
opinions,27 and in view of the scant evidence that was admissible, granted
the motion.2 8
An examination of all the evidence would have been an impossible
task. The pre-trial order designed to make the complex litigation manage-
able resulted in the submission of a 17,000 page FPS consisting of 250,000
documents, many of which were in Japanese.29 With the concurrence of
the plaintiffs, the court decided to rule on the admissibility of the docu-
ments essential to the plaintiffs' case. The documents fell into 13 catego-
ries, enumerated by the court as follows:
1. Documents, including certain findings, promulgated by the U.S.
Id. at 15.
25. Judge Becker showing some consternation as to the plaintiffs' conspiracy theory
stated: "One would expect, after ten years of litigation, that there would be no difficulty in
describing plaintiffs' conspiracy claims. Regrettably this is not true in this case, for plain-
tiffs' theory of defendants' alleged conspiracy has shifted on numerous occasions during the
recent course of this litigation. Zenith v. Matsushita, 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1124 (E.D.Pa.
1981).
26. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1124-25.
27. Zenith (I), 505 F. Supp. 1125; Zenith (II), 505 F. Supp. 1190; Zenith (III), 505
F.Supp. 1313 (E.D.Pa. 1980).
28. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1981).
29. Zenith (1), 505 F. Supp. at 1137.
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Treasury Department and the U.S. Tariff Commission in connection with
proceedings under the 1921 Antidumping Act.
2. Documents, including certain findings, promulgated by the U.S.
Tariff Commission and its successor, the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) as well as the Secretary of Labor under § 301(b)(1) and
(c)(1) and (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and §§ 201(b) and 221
of the Trade Act of 1974.
3. Certain purported findings and related documents of the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) arising out of proceedings in two cases
before the JFTC: one in 1957, brought against the Home Electric Market
Stabilization Council, some of whose members are defendants in this ac-
tion, alleging industry wide price fixing; and the second, brought in 1967,
alleging retail price maintenance against defendant Matsushita Electric
Industries Co., Ltd.
4. The findings of Judge Leon A. Higginbotham, Jr., a predecessor in
this case, regarding personal jurisdiction and venue.30
5. Statistical data from the statistical office of the United Nations
and a report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).
6. Diaries of officials of several of the Japanese defendants, alleged to
contain evidence of the conspiracy referenced in plaintiffs' complaint.
Also included in the category are a number of internal company memo-
randa seized by the JFTC.3 1
7. Transcripts of testimony and of protocols by witnesses in the Six
Company Case.
8. Various agreements and rules of certain Japanese manufacturers'
associations relating to export practices.
9. Various documents alleged to be minutes or memoranda of meet-
ings of committees of certain manufacturers' associations.
10. A purported internal memorandum allegedly reflecting the deci-
sion made by the Electronic Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) to
conceal from the Japanese MITI the discrepancy between domestic and
export prices and suggesting changes in accounting methods by which
such concealment could be accomplished.
11. Various memoranda, letters, telexes and transactional documents
produced by the defendants in discovery and involving the Japanese
manufacturers, their trading companies, their American sales subsidiaries
and various U.S. customers which, in plaintiffs' submission, show a pat-
tern of "under the table" or concealed rebates that reduced the price of
Japanese TV's to American customers below the so-called check prices
that were reported to U.S. customs, and which also reveal a "cover up" of
what plaintiffs describe as a predatory export scheme.
12. A potpourri of other documents, produced for the most part from
30. Zenith, 402 F.Supp. 262 (E.D.Pa. 1975).
31. The documents were seized as part of a JFTC case in 1966 known as the "Six Com-
pany Case."
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defendants' files during discovery.
13. Voluminous reports setting forth the opinions (with supporting
data) of plaintiffs' experts. 2
In the court's first evidentiary opinion, the first five categories were
considered together, since they fall under the public records and reports
exception to the hearsay rule.3 3 Only the documents printed by the U.N.
and the OECD were admissible, partly because the defendants did not
object strenuously to this point. 4
The district court's second opinion considered the evidence listed in
categories six through twelve. 35 Those documents basically related to the
manufacturers' activities in Japan. They were obtained mostly through
discovery and some were seized through a "raid" on the corporate head-
,quarters by the JFTC.3 8 Zenith claimed that a collective consideration of
that evidence would raise the inference that the manufacturers undertook
concerted action to deploy a predatory scheme.3 7 The trial court did not
consider this evidence as an essential segment of the plaintiffs' case, how-
ever. Its importance lay with the admissibility of the expert opinions.
Since the experts had relied on this evidence to form their opinion, a rul-
ing of inadmissibility based on untrustworthiness, would render the ex-
pert opinion of the same character.3 All of the diaries were ruled inad-
missible.3 9 The testimony of the employee-witnesses at the JFTC Six
Company Case was admissible as former testimony.40 The protocols were
32. Zenith (1), 505 F. Supp. at 1138-39.
33. FED. R. EvID. 803(8).
34. Categories (1), (2) and (3) were excluded because (a) they were not findings as re-
quired by Rule 803(8), (b) they were untrustworthy and (c) they should be excluded under
Rule 403 as unnecessarily cumulative anyway.
Category (4) was excluded because the statements by a judge could be given undue
weight by the jury and could also cause a confusion of the issues. Zenith (I), F. Supp. at
1150-84.
35. Zenith (II), 505 F. Supp. at 1190.
36. Id. at 1209.
37. Id. at 1211.
:38. Zenith (I), 505 F.Supp. at 1189.
39. Even though the plaintiffs never conducted a deposition in Japan in order to help
lay a foundation to authenticate the diaries, the court found enough circumstantial evidence
to meet the prima facie standard required by United States v. Goichmann, 547 F.2d 778 (3d
Cir 1976). Zenith (II), 505 F. Supp. at 1216. The evidence was presented for admission
under the hearsay exceptions of a business record, or as the admission of a party opponent.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 801(d)(2). In this case the diaries did not qualify as a record of regu-
larly conducted activity so as to be a business record. In order to be an admission, the
statement must be an assertion that was made in the scope of employment. Though there
exists a marginal validity as to the latter, no foundation was laid to show the statements
were assertions, thus the diaries did not qualify on the second ground either. Zenith (II),
505 F.Supp. at 1267-86.
40. The court agreed with the plaintiff that the cases had a similarity of issues and
purposes which would illicit a vigorous defense. The limitation, however, was that it applied
to only six of the defendants present in that case. References in the testimony to exports
were to be deleted since it was not the subject matter of the cases, as the proceedings were
based on charges of price fixing in Japan only. Id. at 1286-94.
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also admissible. The protocols were the statements of the defendants to
investigators, which were transcribed and signed by the defendants. 4' A
series of internal memoranda were excluded as not qualifying as business
records.42 The minutes and internal memoranda generated by the cartel
group, EIAJ, were also held to be inadmissible. 43
In the third and final evidentiary ruling, Judge Becker considered the
admissibility of the expert opinions contained in several prepared re-
ports.4 4 According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert can use
information that is inadmissible at trial as the basis of his opinion."5 That
information, however, must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject."4 Whether the information can be "reasonably relied" upon is to
be decided by the trial court.4 7 The court analyzed each report, section by
section, and concluded in each case, that the sections dealing with an al-
leged conspiracy were inadmissible.
4
1
The fourth opinion of the trial court was an in-depth analysis of the
41. The protocols were admitted under Rule 801(d)(2) as admissions of a party oppo-
nent. Id. at 1294-97.
42. The memoranda did not possess the necessary regularity and did not identify the
writer, therefore they did not qualify under Rule 803(6), as a business record. Id. at 1297-
1301.
43. The document of the EIAJ did not even identify who made the statements, thus
they could not be attributed to the assertions of the defendants. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2). Id.
at 1301-03.
The memorandum, termed the Japan Victor Document, amounted to an agreement "to
modify their (the manufacturers') accounting practices to cover up the disparity between
home markets and export practices."Id. at 1303. Zenith placed substantial importance and
reliance on this document. The company filed a forty-six page brief addressing the admissi-
bility of this document. It did not, however, meet any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule,
notably the business record exception, nor was it properly authenticated. FED R. EvID. 803
(6). Id. at 1303-10.
Another group, the TV Export Council, had also generated a substantial amount of
documents produced by Matsushita. At this point, the court, frustrated by repetitious anal-
ysis, summarily excluded these documents on similar grounds as the memoranda of the
EIAJ. Id. at 1310-13.
44. Zenith (III), 505 F. Supp. at 1313.
45. FED. R. EVID. 703.
46. Zenith (III), 505 F.Supp. at 1322.
47. Id. at 1324. The trial court struggled to find authority that would state a standard
to assess "reasonable reliance." The obvious points were that the source of information must
be "either intimately connected with his immediate sphere of expertise, . . .or upon un-
questionably permissible documentary research." Id. at 1326-27. The court, relying on Pitts-
burgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978), decided that when informa-
tion forming the foundation of the expert's opinion is excluded as untrustworthy and
unreliable, the court would balance the expert evidence in favor of exclusion. Id. at 1327-30.
48. The court took issue with the fact that the plaintiffs recruited economists to find a
conspiracy - a matter normally out of an economist's province. The conclusive findings of a
conspiracy through documents submitted as evidence would take over the function of the
fact finder. The experts had done no more than to read the evidentiary documents and
interpret them to show a conspiracy. Id. at 1342.
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evidence and the legal principles alleged to have been violated."9 Consid-
ering the fact that almost all of the evidence presented by Zenith had
been ruled inadmissible, the legal standards mandated by the statutes
could not be met. The court concluded that based upon the admissible
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and viewing all reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the plaintiff, no probative evidence was presented to
make a permissible inference of the existence of a conspiracy.5" The
plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact of a conspiracy in
order to defeat the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 summary
judgment motion.
B. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision, holding that the judge had incorrectly assessed the admissibility
of the evidence.5 ' The standard for summary judgment applied by the
district court was upheld; therefore, the decision was based on the in-
creased number of evidentiary documents admitted. Considering much of
what was excluded by the district court, the court of appeals decided
that, in fact, a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a con-
spiracy was presented by the record.8"
Of the documents urged by Zenith for admission, the U.S. adminis-
trative cases, the findings of the JFTC, the expert opinion reports and
some of the diaries were found to be admissible.53 As to the antidumping
administrative cases, the court concluded that the expectation of the trial
court as to the complexity and thoroughness of administrative hearings
was too high and that the opportunity for a defendant to challenge the
findings were adequate." Consequently, the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion in excluding the antidumping findings. The JFTC cases were ad-
missible on the same grounds, even though the cases did not go beyond
investigatory reports.56
The appellate court held that the standard for admitting expert
opinions was also incorrect. What constitutes the type of data an expert
can "reasonably rely" upon to form an opinion was for the experts to
49. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1100. The opinion spans over 300 pages and is integrated.
The evidentiary evaluations are numerous and cannot be consolidated into a few
statements.
50. "[A] jury is permitted to draw only those inferences of which the evidence is rea-
sonably susceptible: it may not resort to speculation." Id. at 1171 (quoting from British
Airways Board v. Boeing Co. 585 F.2d 946,-952 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 440 U.S. 981, 99
S.Ct. 1790, 60 L.Ed.2d 241 (1979)).
51. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983).
52. 723 F.2d at 316.
53. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
54. 723 F.2d at 268. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) was misconstrued to require
"an evidentiary hearing providing an opportunity for cross-examination."
55. Id. at 271-75.
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decide and not the trial court. 6 The uncontradicted affidavits by the ex-
perts, stating that "the data they relied on in forming their opinions were
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in their respective fields,"
should not have been ignored; rather they should have been dispositive of
the determination.5 7
Some of the diaries were found to be admissible by the court of ap-
peals as records of regularly conducted business activity 51 since the stan-
dard used by the trial court was too stringent. 9 The record is trustworthy
so long as it is regularly kept, and an ambiguity as to the meaning cannot
be grounds for exclusion.6
The additional evidence made available would seem to make the task
of overcoming a summary judgment easier. The court of appeals, how-
ever, still had to make the inferences of antitrust violations in a con-
clusory manner. The appellate court found that the admissible evidence
would lead a fact-finder to infer an agreement among the Japanese manu-
facturers to stabilize home market prices, which in turn assured profits.
The expert opinions also reinforced the finding of a domestic price fixing
cartel." Adding the excess capacity and the U.S. compatible CEPs of the
Japanese manufacturers would lead the fact finder to the inference of a
strong incentive to enter and compete in the U.S. market." By combining
the two, the court concluded that "it would permit a fact-finder to infer a
motive to sell at prices low enough to eliminate competition in the United
States market by American firms."'" The leap from the possibility of an
unfair trade practice to predatory pricing was substantial. Nevertheless,
the inferences, made possible in the court's view by the direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence, were sufficient to overcome a summary judgment
motion.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals briefly considered the sovereign
compulsion defense urged by the defendants. The-court did not dismiss
the claim as an issue not considered at trial. Rather, the court pointed to
some of the factual issues surrounding the claim of the Japanese Govern-
ment. The facts indicated that the compulsion may not have been genu-
ine and that the governmental mandate may have been created under the
manufacturers' direction. Because of the factual dispute arising from the
Japanese Government's statement, a summary judgment without the fac-
tual resolution as to the true nature of the Japanese Government's state-
56. Id. at 277.
57. Id. at 276.
58. FED. R. EvID. Rule 803(6).
59. Id. at 289. In order to decide on reliability, the court should not analyze the proce-
dures or employees making the records, rather that "record keeping is essential to an ongo-
ing business activity." 723 F.2d at 268.
60. Id. at 290.
61. Id. at 309.
62. Id. at 310.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
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ment was improper. In essence, the court of appeals turned the defense
against the defendants to rule against a summary judgment.64 The fact
that the court did not give conclusive effect to the statement became the
greatest controversy in the case. This was evidenced by the numerous
amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court."5
C. The Supreme Court
The district court decision relied heavily on the exclusion of a sub-
stantial portion of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Consequently,
the remaining admissible evidence could not overcome the summary judg-
ment motion. The court of appeals changed the standard of admissibility,
and, based upon the admission of more evidence, found the presence of a
genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court did not even consider
the admissibility of evidence issue that subsumed the lower courts.6" In-
stead, the Court went straight to the standard for evaluating a summary
judgment motion. Therefore, the Court reversed even though additional
evidence had been deemed admissible on appeal.
In addition to the showing of a genuine issue for trial under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e), the plaintiff must show an injury caused
by the alleged illegal conduct.6" The Court concluded summarily that
since all of the alleged conspiracies except the predatory pricing would
benefit the plaintiffs, they need not be considered.68 In other words, the
other conspiracies could not be used to make inferences about the preda-
tory price fixing conspiracy.
The other prong of Rule 56(e) is to show a genuine issue of material
fact. Direct evidence of a conspiracy is not necessary (and quite unlikely)
and inferences can be made from the evidence. However, the Court con-
cluded that "antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from
ambiguous evidence in a [Sherman Act] section 1 case."" The inferences
of conspiratorial activity must also overcome possible inferences of legal
conduct. As the Court stated in First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities
64. Id. at 315.
65. See infra notes 78 to 83 and accompanying text.
66. Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1352. The Court had limited the grant of certiorari to
exclude the evidentiary rulings. 471 U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1863 (1985).
67. 106 S. Ct. at 1356. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e) states that:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but in his response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
FED R. Civ. P. 56(e).
68. Id. An example of "other" conspiracies is the "Five Company Rule," whereby the
Japanese manufacturers agreed not to deal with more than five companies in the United
States.
69. 106 S. Ct. at 1357.
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Services Co.,7" when equally plausible explanations are legal conduct,
then no inference of a conspiracy can be made. Thus with equally plausi-
ble motives, the motion for summary judgment must be granted'.7 The
ambiguity presented by deciding on "equally plausible motives" was re-
solved in a later case in favor of a defendant, whereby a plaintiff must
submit evidence "that tends to exclude" the possibility of independent
action.
72
The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals failed to
consider whether any plausible motive existed to engage in predatory
pricing, and instead focused on the "direct evidence of concert of ac-
tion."73 Most of the direct evidence relied upon focused on "other" con-
spiracies that had no relevance to the predatory pricing conspiracy. With-
out evidence relating to the predatory pricing and without a plausible
motive to engage in a conspiracy, the appellate court committed a revers-
ible error.
The dissent took issue with the majority's use of Monsanto to give
the trial judge power to dismiss a case when the inferences are implausi-
ble.74 The dissent would probably reverse the trend started in Cities Ser-
vices. The role of the judge would only be to decide if one of the possibili-
ties revealed by the evidence indicated the presence of a conspiracy; if so,
the factual determination must be made by the fact finder at trial.7"
The foreign sovereign compulsion defense presented by the Japanese
manufacturers rested mainly on the official statement submitted by the
Government of Japan to the trial court through the U.S. Department of
State in 1974. The statement described the role of the MITI, among other
instances, to monitor Japanese exports so that they did not disrupt the
national economies of Japan's trading partners. In the case of the CEP
manufacturers, the MITI "directed" the relevant industries and trade as-
sociations to enter into "arrangements" and thereafter "supervised" the
operation of the exporters.7 6 The defendant-petitioners argued that the
court of appeals had relied upon the "check prices" and the "five-com-
pany rule" to find inferences of a predatory conspiracy. The failure in the
appellate court's ruling was that these two features were part of the activ-
ities mandated by the MITI and should have been excluded from the
consideration of the court.7 7 The official representations of the Govern-
ment of Japan as to these features should have been given conclusive ef-
70. 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968).
71. 106 S. Ct. at 1357.
72. Id. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (supplier and
several dealers conspired to exclude a single dealer).
73. 106 S. Ct. at 1361.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 1363 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1366.
76. Brief for the Government of Japan at 8a-lla, Matsushita.
77. Petitioner's Brief at 38, Matsushita.
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fect.78 Since the contents of the statement indicated both compulsion and
supervision, the petitioners concluded that it also applied to fulfill the
elements of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.79
The plaintiff-respondents did not rely on the compulsion of the Japa-
nese Government as enumerated in the arrangements to point out preda-
tory pricing. Rather the violation of the arrangements by the manufactur-
ers was crucial to show a conspiracy not protected by the defense."0
Zenith went further to argue that the sovereign compulsion defense
should not be available for "commercial" activities compelled by the gov-
ernment." The final argument made by Zenith related to the statement
by the Government of Japan. The respondents would place two require-
ments on governmental communications. First, to have them be specific
in order to assess the validity of the compulsion, and second, to have the
government statement be presented in a timely fashion. 2 Zenith con-
tended that the statement of the Japanese Government presented to the
court did not meet either requirement.
The foreign sovereign compulsion issue brought forth a deluge of
concern from various parties. Each amicus, except that of the Japanese
Government, had a specific issue to address that basically related to the
compulsion issue tangentially. The Japanese Government rightfully ob-
jected to the critical treatment by the appellate court of its statement
submitted to the trial court and the Department of State. In describing
its position, the Japanese Government stated that:
the formal representations of foreign governments are to be given con-
clusive effect, and when the exercise of a state's sovereignty involves
only control of the activity of its own nationals within its territory,
with respect to its own export trade, foreign governments and foreign
courts should not question or punish such activity.8
The United States Government agreed with this position. In a turn-
around from earlier opposition to the compulsion defense, the U.S. Gov-
ernment asked the Court to give the Japanese statement "dispositive
weight" and to hold that the court of appeals "erred in leaving open the
possibility that on remand, liability might be predicated on that agree-
78. Id. at 40-41. The petitioners based this argument on the act of state doctrine, where
inquiry by the courts into the validity of a foreign sovereign's acts is prohibited.
79. Id. at 42.
80. Respondent's Brief at 89, 91-92, Matsushita.
81. Id. at 92-93. The mistake made by the respondents in carving out a commercial
exception is similar to the petitioners. See supra note 74. By considering the compulsion
defense as a corollary to the act of state doctrine the analysis of its application becomes
incorrect. See infra notes 105 to 106 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 94. The statement had to be specific because the court should not accept the
government's statement at face value. For instance, the government had to define "under
the direction" in order to allow the court to assess the compulsive nature of the word. Id. at
95-96. The requirement for a timely statement was to not disrupt the judicial process during
the late stages of adjudication.
83. Brief for the Government of Japan, at 5-6.
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ment."' The new position adopted by the United States was due to
changes in foreign policy. In recent years, the Reagan administration has
requested Japan to adopt voluntary controls on the export of automobiles
to the United States, with the assurance that antitrust liability would not
be imposed upon participating Japanese exporters. The Government had
to give effect to the defense in order to preserve its own integrity.8
The governments of Australia, Canada, France and the United King-
dom used this opportunity to air their grievances. They pointed out that
the U.S. Government had given assurances of immunity based upon the
compulsion defense in order to accede to requests for government man-
dated export restraints." Actually there was a related issue that
prompted the response by these countries. They were dissatisfied with
the procedure adopted in 1978 of filing their concerns directly with the
court instead of the executive branch. They felt that such filings were
ineffective, as depicted by the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the amicus
curiae briefs in the Uranium case.8 7 The court disregarded the contents
of the briefs and continued to rule on the appeal. This action "prompted
the Legal Advisor of the State Department to request the Justice Depart-
ment to inform the court that the court's language has caused serious
embarrassment to the United States in its relation with some of our clos-
est allies."88
IV. THE END OF PREDATORY PRICING?
The issue of predatory pricing has been debated extensively in the
past ten years. Though predatory behavior has been considered un-
likely, 9 the introduction of a new economic analysis in 19750 sparked the
interest of many commentators."1 Up to this point, the analyses offered
84. Brief for the United States at 17, Matsushita.
85. Id. at 18.
86. Brief for the Governments of Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland at 4, Matsushita. [hereinafter cited as Allies Brief]
87. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
88. Allies Brief at 6.
89. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J. L. & ECON.
137 (1958).
90. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
91. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 144-60 (1978);
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 184-96 (1976); Scherer, Predatory
pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L REV. 869 (1976); Williamson, Preda-
tory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Baumol, Quasi-
Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE
L.J. 1 (1979); Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory Pricing, 24
ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (1979); Joskow & Klevorik, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Koller, When is Pricing Predatory?, 24 ANTITRUST
BULL. 283 (1979); McGee, supra note 85; Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-
strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predatory Product Innovation, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (S. Salop
ed. 1981).
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by the commentators had been ignored to a great extent by the courts.2
The courts had analyzed predatory pricing based upon the theories
formulated in the initial Sherman Act cases at the turn of the century
known as the "trust era. '9 3 This period in time was "characterized by the
uninhibited commercial warfare in the attempt of industrial giants to mo-
nopolize various fields of business activity in their battle for
supremacy."9 ' The paradigm case decided by the Supreme Court was
Standard Oil Company v United States.9 5 Standard Oil methodically ac-
quired control of the market by targeting one single wholesaler at a time.
One form of control was to obtain all information about its competitor's
customers and offer lower prices and rebates and even engage in decep-
tion to woo the dealer away from the competitor. 6 This action was cou-
pled with disciplinary actions against a recalcitrant dealer-customer."'
The theory of predation espoused by the Supreme Court was simple.
Predatory pricing was limited to considering whether a dominant firm
had sold their products at "below cost to eliminate rivals and subse-
quently earns monopoly profit."9 8 Its holding was based on a series of
presumptions raised by the behavior of the defendants. Under this the-
ory, the courts would find a predatory scheme if the evidence revealed:
(1) monopolistic power and large size advantage of the predator firm;
(2) for a firm serving several geographic or related product markets, a
pricing differential between a predator's 'monopoly' market and its
competitive market; (3) sales below average total cost in the competi-
tive market; (4) injury or exclusion of smaller competitors or new en-
trants as a result of such pricing ; and (5) intent of the predator firm
to exclude or discipline rivals.99
After 1975, with the advent of new economic models, the lower courts
have adopted various new legal standards that take into account eco-
nomic analyses.' 0 None of the legal standards has been reviewed by the
92. Calvani & Lynch, Predatory Pricing under the Robinson Patman and Sherman
Acts: An Introduction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 378 (1981).
93. Cassady & Brown, Exclusionary Tactics in American Business Competition: An
Historical Analysis, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 88, 89 (1961).
94. Id.
95. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
96. State v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 444, 116 S.W. 902 (1909).
97. Cassady & Brown, supra note 93, at 105.
98. Brodly & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolu-
tion of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738, 741 (1981).
99. Id. at 766. The relative importance of the criteria was dependent upon the claim.
See e.g. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)(Sherman Act); Utah Pie Co. V.
Continental Baking Co. 386 U.S. 685 (1967)(Robinson-Patman Act).
100. See Brodly & Hay, supra note 98, at 767-772. The legal standards followed by the
courts fall into three categories:
1. The marginal cost standard. Pricing below marginal cost or average variable
cost is unlawful: pricing above marginal cost or average variable cost is lawful.
This is the Areeda-Turner Rule [See supra note 90].
2. Augmented marginal cost standards. Although pricing below marginal cost
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Supreme Court; therefore there presently exists a disharmony in the fed-
eral courts.0 1 In view of the Matsushita opinion, the standards may be-
come irrelevant in the future.
The Supreme Court has placed a barrier in cases alleging predatory
pricing. If the dicta stated by the Court is adopted by the lower courts,
then such cases may rarely go beyond the pretrial stage."0 2 The Court
cited commentators that stand for the nonexistence of predatory pric-
ing.1 0 3 Of the many rules invented in the past ten years, there is a group
that espouses a "no rule" perspective. "The 'no rule' proponents argue
that even given the illegality of merger and collusion today, predation will
very unlikely be a profit-maximizing strategy."'0 4 Based upon "a consen-
sus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful," the Court set up a presumption that a
single firm, not to mention several conspiring firms, will not engage in a
predatory pricing scheme.10 5
When confronted with a summary judgment motion, courts must
now decide the reasonableness of the alleged conspiracy in view of other
possible inferences. 0 6 When the claim seems to be unreasonable or "if the
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense - [plaintiffs] must
come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would be otherwise necessary."' 01 The Court considered whether the
claim of predatory pricing by the Japanese manufacturers was reasonable
by first looking at predatory pricing from a general viewpoint. Since the
Court considered predatory pricing to be an unreasonable act by corpora-
tions, the conduct of a twenty year conspiracy by several firms in the
remains unlawful, pricing above marginal cost may also be unlawful, under the
following conditions:
a. The high entry barriers exception: Pricing above marginal cost is un-
lawful when entry barriers are "extremely high and the price is below
the "short run profit maximizing price."
b. The marginal cost-plus-other-factors standard: Pricing above margi-
nal cost is unlawful when other probative factors demonstrate that the
price is predatory; these factors may include intent, limit pricing, non-
pricing predation, and entry barriers.
3. The average total cost standard. Pricing below average total cost or "full
cost" (average cost plus capital return) is unlawful when, in light of all the
facts, the price is unreasonable or predatory.
Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 768-769. As the Court stated: "There is a good deal of debate, both in the
cases and in the law reviews, about what 'cost' is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve
this debate here, because unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act Section 1
case." Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1355 n. 8.
102. 106 S.Ct. at 1357.
103. Id. at 1358.
104. Calvani & Lynch, supra note 92, at 389.
105. 106 S. Ct. at 1357-58.
106. Id. at 1357.
107. Id. at 1356.
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hope of finally reaping monopoly profits was quite unreasonable.0 8
The standard set by Matsushita, indicates that a trial court has two
roles in the case of a summary judgment motion. First the court will have
to rule on the evidence. The evidence must raise an inference of illegal
conduct that excludes possible explanations of legal conduct. Secondly,
and as a subsidiary to the first, the court must engage in an economic
analysis of the violation charged. If the antitrust violation, as theoreti-
cally presented, seems objectively unlikely in an economic or business
sense, the evidence required must "be more persuasive. . . than would be
otherwise necessary."'10 Based on the Court's analysis of predatory pric-
ing,11 a trial court can presume the theoretical presence of predatory
pricing through a multi-corporate conspiracy to be highly unlikely, there-
fore, as to any such allegations in the future, the standard of proof placed
upon plaintiffs shall be higher.
V. A STANDARD FOR THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
COMPULSION DEFENSE
A. Re-defining the Defense
The sovereign compulsion defense applies when a foreign nation
mandates a private entity or a group of entities to engage in activities
that violate U.S. antitrust laws. Antitrust liability will not be imposed on
corporate activity compelled by a foreign sovereign. The essential inquiry
in all cases relates to the existence of a true "compulsion." The courts
have considered the defense of sovereign compulsion as a corollary to the
act of state doctrine."' This evaluation of the defense is erroneous. The
two defenses do overlap in certain ways, but the application of each is
quite distinct.
The act of state doctrine based on the separation of powers principle,
is a judicial formula reflecting deference to the executive branch,
which the courts presume to be better qualified to handle the diplo-
matic and political consequences of an act of state. Sovereign compul-
sion, on the other hand, is a substantive defense to an antitrust com-
plaint; it is based on the theory that defendants are engaged in illegal
activity only because a foreign sovereign compelled them to do so. De-
spite these differences, the measures taken by foreign sovereigns to
compel firms to engage in illegal business restraints remain in essence
acts of state."'
Four rationales for the sovereign compulsion defense have been de-
108. Id. at 1360-62.
109. Id. at 1356.
110. That analysis includes the adoption of Judge Bork's view on predatory pricing.
See R. BORK, supra note 91, at 145.
111. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976).
112. Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts
and Economic Coercion, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1976).
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veloped and they remain independent of the extension given to the act of
state. First, it would be unfair to hold a defendant liable for acts com-
pelled by a government authority." 3 Second, the foreign compulsion must
be recognized in order to foster commerce. Non-recognition could work
against an American company trying to do business within the laws of a
foreign sovereign." ' The third policy consideration parallels the act of
state doctrine in that a tribunal cannot engage in the valuation of foreign
laws and must exercise judicial restraint in such situations. ' 5 Finally, the
defense has been analogized to the state action doctrine formulated in
Parker v. Brown and its progeny."" The state action doctrine insulates
private parties from antitrust liability when their anticompetitive conduct
is a consequence of complying with domestic state regulation. The state
action doctrine provides the strongest analogy to sovereign compulsion." 7
The defense has only been established once in an independent form
by the courts. The court in Interamerican concluded that "sovereignty
includes the right to regulate commerce within the nation. When a nation
compels a trade practice, firms have no choice but to obey. Acts of busi-
ness become effectively acts of the sovereign. '"" s The rationale for inter-
preting the Sherman Act to exclude compelled actions was that commerce
is regulated by a sovereign and a refusal to comply with the regulation
eliminates commerce against the purpose of the Act which is to encourage
commerce." 9 The governmental mandate in Interamerican did compel
the defendants to act in an anti-competitive manner even though the gov-
ernment may have acted improperly.' The court did not provide any
guideline to finding genuine compulsion, but it did provide two instances
of unfounded compulsion: (1) when the defendants procure the govern-
mental action, and (2) when under an unspecified delegation of authority,
the defendant voluntarily acts in an uncompetitive manner.2
The Justice department rejected the holding in Interamerican.2
Through a hypothetical discussion of the same case, the Justice Depart-
113. 1 B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 614
(1986).
114. This is the rationale adopted in the only case upholding the defense, Interameri-
can Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
115. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606.
116. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
117. Note, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The
Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747, 793 (1982).
118. Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
119. Id. The proposition was first set out by then Professor Brewster. K. BREWSTER,
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 94 (1958).
120. Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99. The court used the act of state to bar
inquiry into the validity of the government order. In this manner, the court used the two
doctrines in their proper form.
121. Id. at 1297.
122. ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ANTI-
TRUST DIVISION (Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.(BNA), No. 799,
p. E-1 (1977).
VOL. 15:2,3
MATSUSHITA V. ZENITH
ment declared the use of the act of state doctrine and the sovereign com-
pulsion defense to be improper because the directed conduct is to be ef-
fectuated in U.S. territory. 2 ' The hypothetical case was analyzed under
the legal principle of conflict of laws and the equitable application of
comity. By balancing the stakes to each country, the Department con-
cluded that the threat to U.S. interests would be greater; therefore, the
court must not exercise comity to dismiss the case. 24
The defense is on the books. Unfortunately, however, the policy or
rationale that is to guide the courts in their decision making is nonexis-
tent. The Matsushita case was ideal to discern the parameters of the sov-
ereign compulsion defense. The most important factor presented by the
case was the ability to decide on the weight to be given to an official
governmental statement citing governmental compulsion as the cause of a
defendant's actions. A Supreme Court decision could have followed either
of two paths. One would be to give the governmental statement conclu-
sive effect thereby invoking the defense without discussion. The other
path would be to pierce the statement and to analyze the facts surround-
ing the allegations of anticompetitive conduct along with the relationship
between the government and defendant business. 25 A conclusive state-
ment would preclude a search into the factual setting of the case, but this
is too harsh a result. If the sovereign compulsion defense is to become
absolute in such situations, American based businesses could be subjected
to repeated anti-competitive actions from countries that blend govern-
mental policy and business expansion. 2 ' A solution to the potential ineq-
uities of such a defense is a set of criteria that looks beyond the final form
of the compulsion presented at trial to the raison d'etre of the rule or
123. Id. at E-15.
124. Id. The Department relied on the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
to determine the factors under the principles of comity.
125. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revealed some of the ambiguous ele-
ments of the Japanese manufacturers defense in Matsushita:
It is possible to conclude that the government merely provided an umbrella
under which the defendants gained an exemption from Japanese antitrust law,
and fixed their own export prices. Second, there is abundant evidence sug-
gesting that many defendants parted from the agreed-upon minimums and
took steps to conceal their departure from MITI. Thirdly, there is no record
evidence suggesting that the five-company rule originated with the Japanese
Government. Finally, the evidence about price stabilization in the Japanese
home market suggests unequivocally that this activity violated the laws of
Japan.
In re Japanese, 723 F.2d at 315.
126. An example of close government-business relations is the Swiss government partic-
ipation in the Swiss watch manufacturers cartel's effort to curb the international watch-
making industry. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
[19631 Trade Cas. (CCH) 77, 414, 77628-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) modified [1965] Trade Cas. 80,
490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the case was dismissed through a consent decree). The Japanese gov-
ernment (MITI) participation in the cartelization of industries is pervasive, with the Japa-
nese CEP exporters being one example of many. R. CAVES & M. VEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGAN-
IZATION IN JAPAN 6 (1976).
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laws and to analyze the degree of governmental participation, direct or
indirect, in forcing compliance by the business enterprise.
B. A Proposed Test to Analyze the Defense
Changes in the trade laws'27 and the ambiguity caused by the court
of appeal's treatment of the defense made a decision by the Supreme
Court necessary and timely. A standard is necessary to guide future liti-
gation. For instance, the semiconductor industry took an interest in the
Matsushita case fearing an opinion allowing the defense to be absolute in
light of the statement by the Government of Japan. The commentators,
possibly due to a lack of judicial guidance, are at odds on what the basis
for the defense should be.
Hawk proposes a standard based upon fairness to the defendants.'28
The focus of his test is the actual compulsion on the defendants. The
compulsion does not have to be through a particular form.'2 9 Upon a find-
ing of true compulsion, the inquiry should shift to the location of the
effect. Hawk opposes the absolute territorial limitation favored by the
Justice Department. 3 0 He considers that certain circumstances do exist
when the effect in the United States would still allow the sovereign com-
pulsion defense, however, he does not provide much guidance as to its
application."'
Another formula applies the domestic state action doctrine to the
sovereign compulsion defense.'32 The test enunciated in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 33 has two prongs: (1) an
affirmative articulation of state policy; and (2) active supervision of the
challenged restraint by the state. If both parts are met, the private entity
under the direction of the state would be exempt from antitrust liability.
Waller proposes to modify the first prong by changing the requirement of
legislation as a statement of policy to accepting those forms of decision-
making appropriate to a foreign sovereign. The second prong would be
modified to "active enforcement" instead of supervision. 3 This test
abandons the search for compulsion by "objectively address[ing] the
level, rather than the form, of government involvement.I' 3 Like Hawk,
Waller would not apply an absolute territorial limitation to the defense.
127. Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982) (voluntary restraint agree-
ments negotiated at the intergovernmental level).
128. 1 B. HAWK, supra note 113, at 614.
129. Id. at 626.
130. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
131. 1 B. HAWK, supra note 113, at 630.
132. Note, supra note 117, at 747.
133. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Though other cases on the doctrine were decided subsequent to
Midcal, the basic test remains the same. Kellman & Hiser, The Antitrust State Action
Exemption: An Essay on Doctrinal Organization from Parker to Hallie and Southern Mo-
tor Carriers, 29 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 83 (1985).
134. Note, supra note 117, at 801.
135. Id. at 799.
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The Department of Justice refuted a comparison of the compulsion
defense to the state action doctrine in Matsushita.-' First, the power of
the courts to initially determine the validity of the state's program does
not comport with the compulsion defense's need to avoid the comparison
of national interests. Second, there are practical difficulties in assessing
what comprises "state action" in a foreign legal system, including the dif-
ficulty in inquiring into the foreign state's conduct to find the presence of
supervision.' 37 The domestic courts just do not have the flexibility to
make the same determinations when a foreign government, as opposed to
a state, is involved.
All of the commentators, however, do agree with some basic factors.
If a private party actively solicits the compulsion from the government,
the sovereign compulsion defense will not apply.138 If a government only
encourages private parties to follow a general national policy, compulsion
will never be found.' 39
The facts in Matsushita reveal some of the peculiar hardships that
would confront a court deciding the validity of a foreign sovereign com-
pulsion. There is some efficacy to using a simple test to analyze the prob-
lem, such as the two prong test of Midcal; however, the unique circum-
stances of each case warrants the adoption of a multi-factor test that
would account for the multitude of possible variations. The proposed test
seeks to balance three interests: the need to defer to foreign sovereigns;
the fairness to the businesses under compulsion; and the need of U.S.-
based businesses to compete freely.
A court confronted with the compulsion defense must begin with two
premises before analyzing the facts. First, the court must not analyze the
legitimacy of the government order or legislation. The court must accept
it at face value for what it says. There must not be an inquiry as to au-
thority, i.e. an ultra vires act, because the result will not change the re-
quirement of compliance by a business. Second, the court must not con-
sider the form of the government order. The fact that a defendant
conducts his business in an anticompetitive manner, because of an oral
agency order does not automatically change the strength of the compul-
sion. This fact is especially true in view of the variant legal systems and
their true application by the officials. By disregarding these two matters,
the court can focus on the conduct of all of the relevant parties from the
time before the government mandate through the time the antitrust claim
arises. The factors are enumerated below.
136. Brief for the United States at 20, Matsushita.
137. Id. at 21.
138. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
139. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, [1963] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 77, 414 (S.D.N.Y.).
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1. Who Initiated the Compulsion?
The focus here is on the government and the defendants. As stated
before, the substantial efforts of the defendants in obtaining government
action would negate the compulsion defense. The efforts must be beyond
lobbying actions and would certainly include drafted proposals to be
adopted by the government or its instrumentality.
In the Matsushita case, the issue rests with the allegation by Zenith
that the Japanese manufacturers petitioned the government for permis-
sion to form the cartel.140 If this is a prescribed form of addressing the
government, then the effort is not as substantial as when the petition is a
unique circumstance. An additional concern is the presence of a third
party inducing the government to act. For instance, if the United States
plays a part in negotiating trade restraints with another government, the
pressure of such an initiating party would merit a finding in favor of the
defense.
2. Who Sets the Standards of the Compulsion?
The focus here is on the contents and particularity of the govern-
ment mandate. If the government legislates that no shoes will be exported
to the United States for six months, the standard is clear and compulsion
is present. However, if the government requires all manufacturers to
come to an agreement to set the conditions for exporting and to make
periodic revisions as they see fit, then the manufacturers anti-competitive
behavior would be suspect.
The court of appeals considered this factor in Matsushita."' A sum-
mary judgment was held to be improper, in part, because the pre-trial
evidence indicated that the Japanese Government did not participate in
setting the standards for exporting CEP's to the United States. The Japa-
nese manufacturers repeatedly pointed to their government's statement
sent to the U.S. Department of State. 2 While conceding that the manu-
facturers conducted the negotiations, the defendants emphasized that
"MITI supervised the preparation of such agreements and regulation so
that the MITI's intention was correctly reflected."'14 3
3. Is the Government's Role Administrative or Supervisory?
The role of the government after the passage of a mandate or regula-
tion can help define the character of the compulsion. Like the state action
doctrine, the participation of the government can be crucial to finding
compulsion.' 4 ' No matter what policy the government may have set to
140. Respondent's Brief at 14, Matsushita.
141. In re Japanese, 723 F.2d at 315.
142. Petitioner's Brief at 35, Matsushita.
143. Id. at 37.
144. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., though a state's regulation required a public util-
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justify the defendants' actions, unless their role is to effectuate compli-
ance with that policy, the compulsion may be illusory. An example of the
difference could be a periodic reporting requirement, as opposed to pre-
liminary approval of changes or modifications which the defendants de-
sire. In order to help define the role of the government, a court should
consider the sanctions for non-compliance. The presence of sanctions im-
plies a supervisory role because the intention of the government to par-
ticipate is manifested by the power to keep a party within the boundaries
of a regulation. The degree of supervision, however, will depend upon the
legal system under which the defendants function.
The 1975 Japanese Government Statement indicated that "[h]ad the
Japanese television manufacturers and exporters failed to comply with
MITI's direction to establish such an agreement or regulation, MITI
would have invoked its power [under Japanese law] to unilaterally control
television sales for export to the United States and carry out its estab-
lished trade policy."" 5 The court of appeals indicated that "[ilt is possi-
ble to conclude that the [Japanese] government merely provided an um-
brella under which the defendants gained an exemption from Japanese
antitrust law, and fixed their own prices."" 6 Since the allegations of a
conspiracy spans several decades, the role of the government in Matsu-
shita was important in deciding on the continued compliance with a gov-
ernment compulsion.
4. Is the Involvement of the Defendants Voluntary or Mandatory?
When participation is mandatory, the defendant's involvement ap-
proaches a duress or necessity argument that would excuse their non-
competitive behavior.1 4 7 It is important to see who falls within the pur-
view of the decree at the outset. If only half of the targeted industries
respond to the decree with no sanctions on the non-reacting half, then the
compulsive nature of the decree is diminished. If the decree or any other
final agreement specifies the right to exit from the grouping, then compli-
ance becomes voluntary and there is no actual compulsion.In Matsushita,
Zenith presented the "Rationales" agreement signed by the Japanese
manufacturers, which had a non-restrictive clause to allow any signatory
to leave the cartel.' 48 This clause indicates that the MITI did not have
the power to force the participation by all of the manufacturers in the
cartel, thus diminishing the efficacy of "true" compulsion.
ity to maintain a program that violated the Sherman Act, the public utility was liable be-
cause the program could be easily removed by filing for a tariff change. 428 U.S. 579, 593-94
(1976) Thus, state action without subsequent supervision would remove immunity from an-
titrust liability under the state action doctrine. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n V.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445. U.S. 97 (1980). See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
145. Petitioner's Brief at 37.
146. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d at 315.
147. Note, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 131, 144-45 (1980).
148. Respondents Brief at 14, Matsushita.
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5. At What Time was The State Policy Specified or Clarified?
This factor cannot have a substantial effect upon the decision of a
court, but it does help to analyze the compulsive nature, especially if the
government decree was known and practiced by the parties before the
presence of an impending litigation.
The emergence of this factor is due to the Matsushita case. The Jap-
anese manufacturers wanted the Court to define the nature of the foreign
sovereign compulsion through the contents of the 1975 Japanese Govern-
ment Statement."'9 The amicus brief of the U.S. Solicitor General agreed
with this point and urged the Court to give that statement conclusive
effect. 150 Such a proposition would neutralize a court's fact-finding role.
This factor must be viewed in conjunction with the first three. Since
the factual determinations made under the first three factors can contra-
dict a statement presented by a government during litigation, a con-
clusory effect on that statement would be improper. This is not to say
that a government is lying about the nature of its laws, but that under an
objective assessment of the facts the defendants would not have deemed
themselves to be under compulsion at the time they acted; thus, they are
not entitled to the defense as a matter of fairness. A policy statement
contemporaneous with the government mandate is probative of the fact
that the defendants were made aware of the compulsion. The statement
presented by the Japanese Government in the Matsushita case stated the
law and also presented facts that would weigh the first three factors in
their favor. On the basis of that letter alone, this test would satisfy the
sovereign compulsion defense. However, the facts alleged by Zenith show
otherwise. The resolution of the facts is not proper here, but a court
should look beyond a later governmental statement for earlier policy
statements that would support the defense. The only significant ramifica-
tion presented by such a rule would be that countries, who want to legis-
late or administer rules upon private parties in their trade with the
United States, would be on notice to clearly state why and how they want
to affect U.S. trade.
6. What is the Nature of the Trade Position Before and After the
Defendant's Anti-competitive Behavior?
A major concern in this factor is the territorial effect of the foreign
sovereign's actions. The position of the Department of Justice under the
International Antitrust Guide' 5 ' does not carry over to the Matsushita
case. The Department made no reference to the territorial effect of the
defendants's action nor to the MITI mandate, and instead emphasized
the harmful consequences to trade relations if a trial court were to rule on
149. Petitioner's Brief at 35, Matsushita.
150. Brief for the United States, Matsushita.
151. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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the nature of the compulsion.'5 2 The effect on the U.S. trade position
should be used as an auxiliary factor to support or contradict the policy
stated by the foreign sovereign. If the policy is to limit adverse effects
upon U.S. manufacturers and, in actuality, the U.S. production has fallen
to nominal amounts, it would be probative of actions contradictory to the
policy. A contradiction between what is said and what is done increases
the importance of the factual findings under the first three factors. If the
two elements support each other then a conclusive effect upon the gov-
ernmental statement of compulsion would be proper.
The six factor test is designed to define a new role for a court con-
fronted with the constraints of actions by foreign sovereigns. That role is
to allow a U.S. court to look beyond government edicts when private par-
ties are involved. The court must be able to look to the facts surrounding
a case. The six factor test does not seek to eliminate the defense; rather it
seeks to differentiate "true" compulsion in implementing trade policies
from a sovereign's protection of domestic companies. The Matsushita
case does not clearly show either finding based upon the facts considered
by the district court, and on that basis would have made an ideal case to
devise a standard for the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact of Matsushita upon the field of antitrust law and specifi-
cally on cases alleging predatory pricing is yet to be seen. The adoption of
a firm policy towards predation indicates the necessity of approaching
any future litigation with a very strong case. The ability to succeed with
only predatory pricing conspiracy will be rare; thus, a plaintiff will have
to present the court with some form of direct evidence in order to
succeed.
The issue of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense remains unan-
swered. The controversy surrounding this issue has not been preeminent,
and this may account for the avoidance of the issue by the Supreme
Court. However, there exists the possibility of a greater number of com-
plaints leading to the assertion of this defense. The trend in the trade
laws to resolve trade problems through inter-governmental negotiations
will necessarily involve foreign governmental participation. If such cases
do arise in conjunction with governmental statements indicating compul-
sion, the statements should not be given dispositive effect. The con-
clusory effect of such statements should only follow support in the facts
corroborating them. Such a policy will not negate the defense, but rather,
will only place the countries on notice to relate their trade policies toward
the United States in a prescribed manner.
152. Brief for the United States at 18-19, Matsushita.
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DEVELOPMENT
The Antarctica Mineral Resources
Convention: Developments from the October
1986 Tokyo Meeting of the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Parties
INTRODUCTION
Antarctica, geographically isolated at the southern pole, is a conti-
nent cloaked in uniqueness, both physically and legally. Due to the con-
tinuing depletion of world mineral resources, interest in Antarctica as a
potential resource production area has increased. Currently, the thirty-
two Antarctica Treaty members are developing a legal order to control
future resource exploration in this region. Antarctica Treaty members are
intent on keeping the new regime within the existing Antarctica Treaty
system. Thus far, drafts for the regime have been introduced as the
"Chairman's Informal Personal Reports" in order to assist parties in es-
tablishing the final convention.
This development will outline the proposed legal regime for Antarc-
tica and briefly discuss this region's resource potential. The main part of
this article will analyze the relevant language of the latest draft proposal
in order to understand how the proposed convention will operate. Finally,
important issues that should be considered in subsequent drafts will be
identified. It is important to understand the mechanics of the Convention
since it will be the future governing body authorizing and monitoring all
resource activities in Antarctica.
I. ANTARCTIC RESOURCES
Geological investigations comprise much of the scientific work done
in Antarctica. These studies have thus far been conducted under the
guise of "pure" scientific investigation with no proprietary rights to the
gathered information by private resource companies. Geologists have in-
dicated that Antarctica may contain substantial offshore petroleum re-
sources and onshore mineral deposits.'
1. Geophysical surveys in West Antarctica suggest the presence of several kilometer
thick sedimentary units beneath the ice sheets and continental shelves. A Deep Sea Drilling
Project drill hole in the Ross Sea in 1973 detected small amounts of methane and ethane.
An area of additional interest for offshore oil potential is the Weddell Sea See generally,
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No deposits have been discovered thus far, but occurrences of base
metals, chromium, cobalt, uranium, gold, and platinum have been found
throughout much of Antarctica.' Several logistical problems are antici-
pated for mineral ventures in Antarctica: 1) only two percent of the conti-
nent is not covered by ice and the portion that is covered may be buried
by up to two kilometers of ice; 2) harsh weather conditions persist over
the entire continent; 3) icebergs and their scouring effects would severely
hinder offshore oil exploration, drilling, and production; and 4) the antici-
pated high cost of operation and the current state of technology places
Antarctic resources, as a viable mineral source, far into the future.
Nevertheless, efforts to develop an Antarctic regime continue in the
anticipation that resources will be produced in the near future. The re-
gime will provide an administrative body to oversee the regulation and
operation of resource activities.
II. THE ANTARCTIC REGIME
Antarctica' is currently under the administration of the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs).4 The treaty evolved from the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (1959) and essentially established Antarctica
as a scientific laboratory. Under the terms of the Treaty, all members of
the United Nations may accede to it's provisions.5 Once a state has ac-
ceded to the treaty, it may reach consultative status by conducting sub-
stantial scientific research in Antarctica.6 Consultative parties (ATCPs)
are the only states entitled to make policy decisions for Antarctica. There
are currently eighteen ATCPs and fourteen non-consultative parties
(NCP).7 Seven countries have also claimed territorial sovereignty over
Mineral Resources of Antarctica, 705 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR (1974); Petroleum
and Mineral Resources of Antarctica, 909 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR (J.Brehendt
ed. 1983).
2. Mineral potential of onland areas is based upon geologic plate reconstruction models.
The supercontinent of Gondwanaland, composed of South America, Southern Africa, Ant-
arctica, and Australia broke up approximately 180 million years ago. Similar geologic struc-
tures in South America, South Africa, and Australia are projected into Antarctica. Included
in these structures are rocks containing base metals, precious metals, and diamonds. Coal is
also a potential resources. Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Antarctica, 909 U.S. GEO-
LOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 29 (J. Brehendt ed. 1983).
3. See generally, F. AUBURN, ANTARCTICA LAW AND POLITICS (1982); P. QUIGG, A POLE
APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA (1983).
4. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
5. Id. art. XIII, para. 1.
6. Id. art. IX, para. 1-2.
7. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) include:
Claimants Non-Claimants
Argentina Belgium South Africa
Australia Brazil USA
Chile W. Germany Uruguay
France India
New Zealand Japan
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portions of Antarctica.8 Article IV of the Treaty holds these claims in
abeyance, neither recognizing nor condemning the claims.
The Treaty applies to the lands, waters and ice shelves south of 60
degrees South Latitude9 and states that such lands shall be used for
peaceful purposes only."0 Military operations are expressly forbidden, 1 as
are nuclear explosions and the disposal of nuclear waste. 2 ATCPs are
also allowed inspection rights to all of Antarctica." Besides demilitariza-
tion and scientific cooperation, a third goal of the ATCPs is to protect the
environment and ecosystem of Antarctica. 4 No explicit language ex-
presses this goal, however, subsequent agreements in the Treaty system
seek to protect the Antarctic environment. 5 In 1964, the ATCPs unani-
mously accepted the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic
Flora and Fauna.' Marine life is protected through the Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals17 and the Convention on the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.'"
There has always been an interest in the mineral potential of Antarc-
tica, but there is no provision in the Treaty for mineral management, ex-
ploration or exploitation. The following factors explain the more recent
interest in mineral resources: 9 1) the new interest in the international
Norway China
United Kingdom Poland
Antarctic Treaty Non-Consultative Parties (NCPs)
Bulgaria E. Germany Italy
Cuba Hungary Romania
Netherlands Spain Czechoslovakia
Peru Finland Sweden
Denmark Papua New Guinea
8. Id.; These claims are based on such traditional theories as 1) the sector principle, 2)
propinquity, 3) uti possidetis, and 4) effective occupation. See generally, Conforti, Territo-
rial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal With an Old Problem, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 249 (1986); Parriott, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: Will the United States be Left
Out in the Cold?, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 67 (1986).
9. See supra note 4, art. VI.
10. Id., art. I, para. 1.
11. Id., art. 1, para. 1-2.
12. Id., art. V, para. 1.
13. Id., art. VII, para. 3.
14. Barcelo, The International Legal Regime of Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155,
157 (1986).
15. Joyner, Protection of the Environment: Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, 19
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259, 265 (1986).
16. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13,
1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, 998, T.I.A.S.No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692
(1973).
17.Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 441,
T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978).
18. Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 80 Stat. 271,
T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982).
19. Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 163, 164 (1986).
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law of common resources, such as the ocean floor2" and space;21 2) the
global concern for secure petroleum supplies following the 1973 oil shock;
and 3) the perception of Antarctica as a strategic region in the event of
global armed conflict. The Prime Minister of Malaysia urged the United
Nations to focus its attention on Antarctica as another area belonging to
the international community." Issues discussed have included territorial
claims of sovereignty, adequacy of the Treaty regime, and a proposed in-
ternational management of Antarctica.2" Currently, the central issue
before the General Assembly is whether a mineral regime is lawful under
international law. 4 The U.N interest in the Antarctica question has
spurred the ATCPs to intensify efforts to conclude a mineral regime
within the Treaty structure.
III. MINERAL REGIME
Work on a mineral regime for Antarctica began in 1973 with the
Nansen Foundation.2 5 Since then, numerous meetings between the
ATCPs have taken place. In July 1983, the chairman of the meeting in
Bonn, Christopher Beeby of New Zealand, introduced an "informal per-
sonal proposal" which became known as the "Beeby Draft." In the May
1984 Tokyo Minerals Meeting, a revised version, "Beeby II," was re-
leased. The latest version, "Beeby III", was submitted to the October
1986 meeting of Consultative Parties in Tokyo.2 7 These drafts are impor-
tant because they serve as a working paper that guides the "Contact
Groups" and discussion groups toward a final statement.
It is the ATCPs desire to remain involved in any future mineral
scheme and thus, they argue that any regime should be rooted in the
Antarctic Treaty system.28 Two opposing views regarding the legitimacy
of a proposed regime are that it would violate the Treaty because such
activities are not "pure" science, or that a regime is compatible with the
20. United States Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
21. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/664, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434
(1979)(entered into force July 11, 1984)(hereinafter cited as Moon Treaty); Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347,
610 U.N.T.S. 205.
22. Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
275 (1986).
23. Id. at 279.
24. Supra note 19, at 170.
25. Supra note 19, at 165.
26. The Antarctic Mineral Resources Regime: Beeby Draft II, reprinted in Greenpeace
Int'l., The Future of the Antarctic: Background for a Third U.N. Debate (Appendix 9)
(Nov. 25, 1985).
27. Antarctic Mineral Resources Convention: Beeby III, Sept. 19, 1986 (on file at the
offices of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy).
28. Supra note 19, at 165.
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treaty based on the "peaceful purpose" clause.2"
In past regime proposals, two issues were of great concern; those
dealing with territorial claims and the environment. Territorial claims
should neither be condemned nor confirmed in the regime, in accordance
with Article IV of the Treaty, nor should the issuance of prospecting
rights give a state the foundation for future territorial claims. Addition-
ally, environment safeguards should be established in the spirit of the
Treaty.
Two approaches have been suggested in establishing a mineral re-
gime.30 The ATCPs argue that the regime should be a part of the
Antarctic Treaty and any decision-making should remain with the
ATCPs. The other view, advocated by less developed countries (LDCs),
follows the "common heritage of mankind"3 doctrine adopted by the
Law of the Sea Convention,32 whereby all activities are guaranteed to be
for the benefit of all mankind. The common heritage principle is rela-
tively new, not being expressed in 1959 at the time of the Antarctic
Treaty, but later embodied in the Law of the Sea and the Moon Treaty. s3
Thus far, the members to the Antarctic Treaty have been the princi-
ple actors in forming a mineral regime, as witnessed by the Beeby drafts.
All versions call for an institutional body to oversee mineral activities.
There are two models for an institutional structure retaining jurisdiction:
1) all parties to the regime will be represented, or 2) the ."closed shop"
approach.3 4 Beeby II followed the former model affording Commission
status to "each Party to the regime which participated in the meeting at
which the regime was adopted."3 " However, the current draft has moved
more towards the closed shop model. Beeby III now stipulates that Com-
mission membership is extended to those parties that are ATCPs or be-
come ATCPs. s6
29. Id. at 166.
30. See supra note 19, at 169.
31. For an excellent discussion of the Common Heritage of Mankind doctrine written
by Professor Christopher Joyner, see Comment, Legal Implications of the Concept of the
Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986).
32. See supra note 20.
33. See supra note 21. The primary theme is that resources found in res communis
omnium should be used in such a way as to benefit all mankind. This principle would pre-
clude a state from asserting territorial claims to those areas in which mineral activities are
conducted. Additionally, due regard for the environment can be inferred. Another area of
contention is the allocation of captured rents from mineral exploitation. The common heri-
tage principle would allocate a portion of the revenues for the benefit of the international
community.
34. Id. at 182.
35. See supra note 26, art. X.
36. See supra note 27, art. 19.
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IV. THE BEEBY III DRAFT
Beeby III is now regarded as a "convention," 3 becoming part of the
Antarctic Treaty family. Beeby III also recognizes "the special responsi-
bility" of the ATCPs to "ensure that any activities in Antarctica are con-
sistent with the Treaty"38 The convention should be consistent with Arti-
cle IV of the Treaty concerning claimed territorial rights. Protection of
the environment should be a "basic consideration" in decisions on possi-
ble mineral activities, and regulation of resources is to be in "the interests
of the international community as a whole." Concerning who may explore
for minerals in Antarctica, the preamble states: "[Plarticipation in
Antarctic mineral resources should be open to all states which have an
interest in such activities and subscribe to a regime governing them and
that the special situation of developing countries party to the regime
should be taken into account."39
Mineral resource activities are defined as those associated with pros-
pecting, exploration, or development of mineral resources, exclusive of
pure scientific work. Prospecting is the broad reconnaissance scale geolog-
ical, geochemical, and geophysical investigations. Exploration is the iden-
tification, evaluation, and delineation of prospect targets. Development
means those activities associated with exploitation of a delineated
deposit.40
A central theme is that the Convention be an integral part of the
Antarctic Treaty system. Its objective is the establishment of means for:
1) assessing environmental impact; 2) determining whether activities are
acceptable; 3) governing the conduct of activities; and 4) ensuring strict
conformance to the Convention."' In addition, the Parties acknowledge
the need to: 1) protect the environment; 2) respect scientific and aesthetic
values; 3) ensure safe operations; 4) follow "orderly mining practices and
act in an economically rational manner;" 5) promote fair opportunities for
all parties; and 6) "take into account" the interests of the international
community as a whole.42 Only those activities conducted within the Con-
vention will be allowed in Antarctica. 43
No decision will be made without assessing the impact to the envi-
ronment, including harm to 1) the air, water, and atmospheric quality; 2)
terrestrial and marine life; and 3) the scientific, historic, or aesthetic sig-
nificance.44 No activity will take place unless the technology exists to
monitor key environmental parameters and to effectively respond to acci-
37. Id., preamble.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id., art. 1.
41. Id., art. 2, para. 1.
42. Id., art. 2, para. 3.
43. Id., art. 3.
44. Id., art. 4, para. 2.
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dents. Environmental judgments are to consider the cumulative effects of
mineral activity, alone or in combination with other legitimate
activities."'
The Convention applies to resource activities on the continent and
areas south of sixty degrees south latitude including ice shelves, continen-
tal shelves, or other offshore areas not inclusive of the deep sea bed."'
Mineral activities may be conducted by a Party to the Convention,
agency of a Party, natural person, juridical person, or joint venture of the
foregoing."7 Each operator will have a link with a Party, either through
nationality or the location of the central management and control in the
territory of a Party."'
The Convention calls for international participation by ATCPs and
other LDC Parties. Anyone can participate as long as they are a party to
the Convention. The Commission is responsible for detecting any activi-
ties being conducted by non-parties. Article IV of the Treaty is not af-
fected. Therefore, mineral activities will not constitute a basis for assert-
ing, supporting, or denying a claim of territorial sovereignty.'9 Activities
will be consistent with the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora,' 0 Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources,"' and the Convention For the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Seals. 2 Stations, installations, and equipment relating
to mineral activities will also be subject to inspection rights under the
Treaty. 3 Mineral activities will be prohibited in Specially Protected Ar-
eas or in a Site of Special Scientific Interest."'
Internal institutional bodies are established to carry out the provi-
sions of the Convention. Activities of the various institutions will be fi-
nanced through fees on permits and levies on operators."' The central in-
stitutional body will be the Antarctic Minerals Resources Commission
(Commission)."' Membership is extended to each Party which was an
ATCP at the adoption of the Convention, any other Party that reaches
ATCP status, or any Party which has applied for an exploration permit
that has an approved management scheme.' Each member will be repre-
sented by one representative. Non-Commission members and relevant in-
ternational organizations may have observer status in the Commission.
45. Id., art. 4, para. 5.
46. Id., art. 5.
47. Id., art. 6, para. 1.
48. Id., art. 6, para. 2.
49. Id., art. 7; art. 9, para. 2, art. II.
50. See supra note 16.
51. See supra note 18.
52. See supra note 17.
53. See supra note 13.
54. See supra note 27, art. 14.
55. Id., art. 34.
56. Id., art. 19, para. 1.
57. Id., art. 19, para. 2.
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Functions of the Commission are to: 1) determine whether to identify
an area for exploration and development; 2) facilitate information ex-
change for environmental assessment; 3) designate excluded areas; 4)
adopt safe and effective measures for prospecting, exploration, develop-
ment, and environmental protection; 5) adopt administrative measures;
and 6) review operations with a view to safeguarding the "environment in
the interests of all mankind."58 In exercising its functions, the Commis-
sion will take "account" of advice from the Advisory Committee. Deci-
sions on "matters of substance" will be made by a two-thirds majority of
present, voting members. Other decisions will be by simple majority.59
Parties also agree to maintain a Scientific, Technical and Environ-
mental Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee). Membership is open
to any Party to the Convention and observer status will be granted to any
Party to the Antarctic Treaty. Additionally, relevant international organi-
zations, including non-governmental, will also be afforded observer sta-
tus.60 The Advisory Committee is free to seek the advice of other scien-
tists and experts. It will also receive the views of organizations interested
in the considered issues.
The Advisory Committee's function is to advise the Commission and
Regulatory Committees by providing a forum for information collection,
exchange, and evaluation. As such, it is to recommend research projects,
advise Parties on available information and training programs and make
recommendations for prohibited areas. Further, it can provide the Com-
mission with advice on areas for exploration, development, and boundary
modifications, recommend environmental protection measures and effec-
tive exploration and development techniques, and monitor mineral
activities.6
The parties also agree to establish a Special Meeting of States Par-
ties (Special Meeting) in relation to the identification of areas for explo-
ration and development.6 2 Membership is open to all Parties to the Con-
vention. Observer status is afforded to any Antarctic Treaty party and
international organization entitled to observer status for Commission and
Advisory Committee meetings.63
There will be a separate Regulatory Committee for each area the
Commission identifies for mineral activity. Membership will consist of the
member of the commission (if any) asserting territorial sovereignty over
the identified area, the two members of the Commission which main-
tained the largest presence when the Antarctic Treaty came into force,
and additional members of the Commission including four members as-
serting territorial claims in Antarctica and four other members not assert-
58. Id., art. 22, para. 1.
59. Id., art. 23.
60. Id., art. 24, para. 2-3.
61. Id., art. 26.
62. Id., art. 28, para. 1.
63. Id., art. 28, para. 2-3.
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ing territorial claims. In selecting members, the Chairman of the Commis-
sion will ensure equitable representation of LDC members.6" If the Party
applying for an exploration permit is not a member of the Regulatory
Committee, that Party will become a member for consideration of that
application.65 Any Party to the Convention may attend a Regulatory
Committee meeting as an observer.
Functions of each Regulatory Committee will be to identify specific
blocks, consider applications for exploration permits, draft and approve
management schemes, and monitor, review, and revise activities in accor-
dance with management schemes.66
Prospecting in Antarctica requires no specific authorization, nor will
it confer any right or title to resources to the operator. Prospecting need
only comply with the objectives and principles of the Convention.67 Nine
months before an operator begins prospecting, the Sponsoring State must
notify the Commission and specify the general area of prospecting,and
the mineral resources sought. Included in the notice should be the meth-
ods, programs, and support facilities to be used, possible environmental
impact, and the duration of prospecting. The link between the operator
and the Sponsoring State must also be specified."
Any Party may request the Commission to identify an area for possi-
ble exploration and development. The notification must include a precise
location of the area with a description of the physical and environmental
conditions, and specification of the resource sought. A description of
methods to be employed, and an assessment of potential environmental
impacts of exploration and development must also be stated."
After receipt of the request notification by the Commission, the Ad-
visory Committee will convey its view to the Commission. The Special
Meeting then considers whether a determination by the Commission to
identify an area is in accordance with the Convention.7 0 The Commission,
"taking full account" of the views of the Advisory Committee and Special
Meeting, then determines whether such an identification would be consis-
tent with the Convention indicating which part of the area is covered,
what resource is concerned, and the participation of Parties in the ven-
ture." If there is a consensus of members, the Commission will identify
the area as consistent with the Convention.
After a positive determination, a Regulatory Committee will convene
to identify specific blocks and establish appropriate application fees. ' Af-
64. Id., art. 29, para. 2.
65. Id., art. 29, para. 5.
66. Id., art. 31.
67. Id., art. 35, para. 1-3.
68. Id., art. 35, para. 6.
69. Id., art. 37.
70. Id., art. 38.
71. Id., art. 39, para. 1.
72. Id., art. 41.
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ter the Regulatory Committee has acted, any Party may enter an explora-
tion permit application, either on its behalf or for a sponsored operator.
This application will: 1) identify the resource; 2) detail methods, equip-
ment, and support facilities; 3) assess environmental impacts including
measures to be used in event of an accident; 4) describe safety measures;
and 5) specify the duration of the permit. In the event an operator other
than a Party is involved, the application will describe the operator includ-
ing its financial resources and technical expertise.
73
If the Regulatory Committee is not satisfied with the link between an
operator and Sponsoring Party, the application is canceled.7 4 In the event
of multiple applications for the same block, the Parties will be directed
by the Regulatory Committee to resolve the competition amongst them-
selves. Failing that, the Regulatory Committee will resolve the issue giv-
ing priority to the application with the broadest participation amongst
the Parties, with an emphasis given to LDCs" The application is then
referred to the Advisory Committee which will identify environmental
risks and concerns. If the Advisory Committee finds an "unacceptable
risk," the Regulatory Committee may either reject the application or refer
it to the Commission, which can authorize the Regulatory Committee to
proceed with the application.7 If the Advisory Committee finds no unac-
ceptable risks, the Regulatory Committee proceeds with the preparation
of a management scheme. A management scheme prescribes terms and
conditions relating to: 1) the law applicable to the operator; 2) inspection
and enforcement of the scheme, 3) financial obligations, including levies,
taxes, and royalties.; 4) technical and safety specifications; 5) depletion
policy; 6) exploration time limits and diligence requirements; 7) accident
contingency plans; 8) liability, bonding, and insurance; and 9) decommis-
sioning requirements.77 A simple majority of the Regulatory Committee is
needed to approve the draft management scheme whereby the scheme is
authorized and a permit is issued.7 s
An operator with a valid exploration permit has the exclusive right to
explore and develop (subject to Articles 50 and 51) mineral resources in
the permitted block.79 These activities will be monitored by the Advisory
Committee and Regulatory Committee for compliance with the manage-
ment scheme."0
Following successful exploration activities, a Sponsoring State may
submit an application for a development permit. The application will
73. Id., art. 42.
74. Id., art. 43, para. 2.
75. Id., art. 43, para. 3.
76. Id., art. 43, para. 8.
77. Id., art, 45.
78. Id., art, 46.
79. Id., art, 48.
80. Id., art, 49.
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contain updated information and proposed modifications to the scheme."'
The Advisory Committee reviews the application to determine whether
there are any significant modifications or new environmental considera-
tions. A report is submitted to the Regulatory Committee to consider for
any new guidelines. It is then up to the Regulatory Committee to author-
ize the development permit.2
V. EVALUATION OF THE DRAFT
In its present form, the Convention rejects the proposal of placing
Antarctic resources under the Common Heritage of Mankind doctrine.
Language alluding to the "interests of the international community as a
whole 83 and safeguarding the environment "in the interests of all man-
kind" 8 may sound suspiciously like that of the common heritage doc-
trine, but it only echoes language used in the Antarctic Treaty, which
does not support the common heritage concept.8 5 Mineral activities would
be conducted within the Treaty family. Only members of the "Club" will
be allowed to explore for resources.
The current draft seeks to reach a more equitable position for the
various conflicting interests. Claimant states with territorial claims are
not to be recognized nor rejected, although the language establishing Reg-
ulatory Committees explicitly recognized that states do indeed have
claims. Because these states claim territorial sovereignty over sections of
Antarctica, they assert that they should have a central role in revenue
sharing and inspection control, and a veto over activities in "their" areas.
These are issues the draft rejects. The only recognition a claimant state is
afforded is a position on the Regulatory Committee concerning activities
in "their" area.
Less developed countries have lobbied for a larger presence in Ant-
arctica. Whether it is the lure of anticipated shared revenue or just politi-
cal maneuvering that has brought about this attention, the fact remains
that LDCs want an insured involvement in any regime established for
Antarctic resources. Other points advocated by LDCs are mandatory joint
ventures and a sharing of technology, positions the ATCPs are against.
Environmental protection is a basic concern in any mineral activity
due to the unique nature of the Antarctic environment. Environmental
interest groups have advocated mandatory impact assessments on all
phases of activity, stronger inspection provisions, and an internal policing
body. No institutional body is established by Beeby III, however, con-
81. Id., art, 50.
82. Id., art, 51.
83. See supra note 37.
84. See supra note 58.
85. The language is quite similar to that used in the preamble to the Treaty where "it
is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes."
86. For a discussion concerning a proposed Antarctic Environmental Protection
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sideration of the environment is stated in the objectives and principles of
the Convention, and provided for at the prospecting, area identification,
exploration application, and permitting stages. Other unresolved issues
involve deciding which Party is to be responsible for environmental pro-
tection compliance. Mining states would favor the Sponsoring State, but
claimant states also want to exercise their alleged jurisdiction.
The Regulatory Committees retain the most control over all aspects
of mineral activities. Regulatory Committees approve the management
schemes and issue the exploration and development permits. The Com-
mission wouid not have the power to cancel management schemes at ei-
ther the exploration or development stages. The only place the Commis-
sion has real power is in identifying an area. A consensus is needed to
approve identification. States favoring mining would rather have approval
by a "majority", but states favoring strict control prefer "consensus."
NCP are effectively removed from decision-making at this stage and any
subsequent stage. The Special Meeting of States Parties, which largely
accommodates NCP, is only a "strong" advisor to the Commission, with
no real power. Advisory Committees are also relegated to an advisory po-
sition only, with no real power. However, this body may be prone to polit-
ical influences as it is the only place that NCP have a role, or an opportu-
nity for input in exploration and development activities.
The composition of Regulatory Committees has posed national
problems. The United States and U.S.S.R. are guaranteed seats on every
Regulatory Committee since they are the two countries having the largest
position in Antarctica at the signing of the Treaty. LDCs wanted a guar-
anteed seat on each Committee, but now they are considered for a seat as
non-claimants. Additionally, criticism of Regulatory Committees also cen-
ters on the fact that each committee oversees only one area, leading to
different guidelines and a breakdown in uniformity.
The mechanism for resolving multiple exploration permit applica-
tions has been changed. Beeby III took the position that in the case of
competing bids, first in time would have priority. LDCs wanted more in-
volvement, and hence, the current version whereby broad international
participation and LDC involvement would give priority. Other states had
advocated an approach that would have taken recognition of financial
soundness, technological expertise, and environmental protection
measures.
The only opportunity for institutions other than the Regulatory
Committees to review or even override the Regulatory Committee is at
the exploration application stage. This check only applies to the permit
application; no such check exists on management schemes. In Beeby III,
it is the sole responsibility of the Regulatory Committee. Management
schemes are not required to go to the Advisory Committee for comment.
In the permitting stage, once an operator obtains an exploration permit,
Agency, see, Joyner, supra note 15, at 270.
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it is virtually assured the right to proceed to development. Development
permitting is also the sole responsibility of the Regulatory Committee
with no Commission involvement.
As yet, no proposals have been introduced for dispute settlement.
Neither is there specific language concerning the responsibility and liabil-
ity of parties engaged in mineral activities. It is expected that these issues
will be addressed in the next draft.
The ATCPs have gone far to ensure that mineral activities in Antarc-
tica will be conducted with due regard for the environment and the estab-
lished legal order. It is hoped that the final version will further delineate
these principles and provide a manageable system for all future mineral
activities Maybe even more importantly, the formulation of the Conven-
tion will test the cohesiveness of the Treaty System, which will ultimately
determine the future stability of the Antarctic Regime.
E. Paul Newman
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Litigation of International Disputes in U.S.
Courts
Reviewed by T.C. Hartley*
Nanda, V.P. and Pansius, D.K., Litigation of International Disputes in U.S.
Courts, Clark Boardman, New York (1986); $85.00 ISBN 0-87632-509-6, 546
pp.; index. (Volume 4, International Business & Law Series).
This book covers the principal areas of law relevant to international
litigation in American courts. The authors identify eleven such areas and
each of these is the subject of a separate chapter.1 The chapters are, how-
ever, of greatly differing lengths and almost half the book consists of just
two chapters, dealing respectively with sovereign immunity and the act of
state doctrine. These are both topics of great importance in transnational
litigation, though they concern one particular aspect of it, namely the le-
gal position of foreign states and the extent to which they are exempt
from the rules applicable to private citizens. Sovereign immunity is con-
cerned with the extent to which a state is immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of other states, and the act of state doctrine lays down princi-
ples regarding the right of the courts of one country to sit in judgment
over the acts of a foreign state. These separate, but related, doctrines are
relevant only when a plaintiff seeks to obtain a remedy against a foreign
state (or its agency) or seeks to obtain a remedy with regard to acts of a
foreign state.
Other topics given substantial treatment are personal jurisdiction
and extraterritoriality. The former, which is concerned in particular with
the constitutionally-mandated requirement of minimum contacts, raises
issues which are basic in any transnational action in an American court;
the latter, on the other hand, concerns a question which, though of great
interest (and the cause of significant international disputes between the
United States and other countries), is likely to be of practical importance
in only a relatively small number of cases.
* B.A., LL.B., Cape Town University; LL.M., University of London. Reader in Law,
London School of Economics.
1. There is also a twelfth chapter, on the recognition of American judgments and arbi-
tral awards in foreign countries, which, though obviously relevant, is not, strictly speaking,
within the main theme of the book.
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Two other topics of great practical importance are given fairly sub-
stantial treatment. These are forum non conveniens, which is raised in
almost every international case, and forum-selection and choice-of-law
clauses in transnational contracts.
The remaining topics are dealt with briefly: service of process abroad,
venue in suits with alien defendants, extraterritorial discovery, pleading
and proof of foreign law, the recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral
awards in American courts and the recognition of American judgments in
foreign courts. Many of these topics do not warrant more than summary
treatment. However, the subject of extraterritorial discovery deserves
fuller treatment than the nine pages devoted to it. For example, the prob-
lem of foreign blocking statutes and bank-secrecy laws is covered simply
by discussing the relevant sections of the draft Restatement of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States.2 Major cases are then listed in a
footnote. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters (now being considered by the Supreme
Court in the Aerospaciale case)3 is discussed in less than a page, in spite
of its complexities and the number of cases in which it has been in issue
both in the United States and in foreign countries (where American liti-
gants have often experienced considerable difficulties in obtaining docu-
mentary evidence needed in American actions). More could also have
been said in the chapters on the recognition of judgments in foreign
courts. Rather than to summarize the law of six countries in twenty
pages, it might have been better to omit this latter chapter altogether,
since it does not fit within the scope of the book.
In spite of these limitations (which are of minor importance when set
against the excellent coverage of the topics mentioned earlier) the book as
a whole deals with most of the questions within its scope. It is, moreover,
an area of such great academic interest and practical importance that it is
surprising that no comparable books have been published.4 For this rea-
son alone, the publication of this book is an important event for all those
interested in transnational law. But what makes it particularly valuable is
the excellent job of work that the authors have performed. In most of the
chapters they have found a level of specificity which succeeds both in
giving the reader a clear general picture and in supplying sufficient detail
to lead to a good understanding. This is not an easy thing to do and
shows both the expositional skills of the authors and their grasp of com-
plex areas of the law. Just as important, they have dealt with the main
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 3
1982).
3. Re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospaciale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986). At the
time of writing (February 1987), the Supreme Court has not yet handed down its decision.
4. G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF Dis-
PuTEs (1975), a multi-volume work by a well-known authority, covers some of the topics
dealt with by Nanda and Pansius, but its greater length and higher degree of specialization
sets it apart.
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topics clearly and systematically, showing how different theories fit to-
gether in different ways. For example, they explain how the minimum
contacts doctrine might apply differently in federal courts in diversity
cases and federal-question cases, and how subject-matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction are separate requirements, though this fact may
sometimes be overlooked. For these reasons, the book will be of great
value to the practising attorney: it will enable him to grasp the problems
that lie ahead when he begins an international action. He will learn from
it what to do and what to avoid and, if he has to argue one of the points
covered in the book, it will provide the starting point for his research. (In
this respect, it is a pity that the book does not provide a table of cases
and a list of the main articles and specialized books dealing with each of
the topics covered: these would have made the task even easier).5 The
book will also be of use to students in the many law school courses now
devoted to transnational law, since its clarity and structured presentation
make it a delight to read straight through.
5. It is also a pity that the cut-off date, which appears to be some time in 1984, is not
specified, so that the reader knows how far back he must go when researching for new
material.
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Human Rights and Third World
Development
Reviewed by Marc Salzberg*
SHEPHERD, George W., Jr. and NANDA, Ved P., HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn.,
(1985); $45.00, SBN 0-313-24276-3, 331 pp.; bibliog., index, introduction by the
editors.
I initially approached this book with a mixture of respect and uneasi-
ness. First, I have great respect for the editors of this anthology. They are
distinguished academicians whose scholarly credentials are impeccable
and whose knowledge in the field of human rights is unsurpassed. George
Shepherd is a Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies
of the University of Denver. Ved Nanda is a Professor in the College of
Law of the University of Denver and Director of its International Legal
Studies Program. Second, I was uneasy because though my training is
both in political science and law, my most recent education and my pro-
fessional activities are both in law. Lawyers are too often uncomfortable
with a non-legal approach. My uneasiness resulted from my initial con-
cern at finding the book insufficiently devoted to law.
This is not an international law book. It cites no World Court cases.
Treaties rarely appear among the footnotes. Only Ved Nanda's chapter at
the very end ties in international law.
This is a political book. Its essential theme is the politics and policy
of human rights in the Third World. Fortunately, a review of this book is
still appropriate in this journal, the "Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy". Once I changed hats and turned from attorney back to polit-
ical scientist, most of my uneasiness vanished. I could appreciate the
book as the fine political analysis that it is. . . .insightful, well-
researched, guilty of some wishful thinking, but on the whole, a valuable
study of "Human Rights and Third World Development".
The book is admirably organized. It is divided into three parts. The
first part raises the theoretical questions that are meant to permeate the
rest of the book. The second part (by far the major part) consists of case
studies from various countries and regions. The third part is meant to
serve as a conclusion and to tie the chapters together by discussing imple-
mentation of human rights.
The issue addressed by the book and set forth at its beginning is a
sizable and worthy question, incapable of a ready response. The question
* Marc Salzberg teaches International Law at the University of Denver College of Law;
Associate, Bucholtz, Bull & Ewing, Denver.
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raised is: Are human rights and third world development complementary
or competing? Nearly all the authors attack the commonly-held belief
that economic development cannot take place in Third World countries
without the sacrifice in the short term of political liberty and human
rights. The bulk of the evidence presented in this book supports the idea
that economic development and human rights can flourish side-by-side. A
consensus exists among the authors that economic development can take
place without jeopardizing human rights.
I agree whole-heartedly, of course, that economic development can or
may take place without trampling on human rights. But I could not help
remembering that in almost every instance, as a practical matter, it does
not take place in the Third World without serious threats to human
rights. Economic development is inevitably accompanied by change in the
power structure; such change has rarely been known to occur gently or
respectfully in conservative, non-democratic Third World societies. ,I am
unconvinced by the authors; I remained convinced instead that czarist
Russia could not have been industrialized and electrified without Stalinist
prison camps. Recent economic development in South Korea, Taiwan or
Brazil was not created in an atmosphere of participatory democracy and
flourishing human rights. Economic development may surely foster
human rights, to the extent that economic development typically does
widen sources of power to more strata of the society. Economic develop-
ment and human rights rarely march forward hand-in-hand in the Third
World, however.
I was a little disappointed by the third part of the book, the part
which held itself out as a conclusion. It was really more of a miscellany to
collect otherwise unclassifiable articles. Matthew Lippman's article on
multinational corporations and Arthur Blaser's article on nongovernmen-
tal organizations did not serve to tie the book together or to focus on
future implementation of human rights conventions or otherwise to con-
clude the book. Instead, they were simply additional "case studies" be-
longing more properly in the second and principal part of the book,
alongside other "case studies" like that of El Salvador by Ted Lewellen
and of China by Stephen Thomas. Only Ved Nanda's final article served
as a sort of synthesis, to refocus attention to the human dimension of the
entire issue, and on the role that international law can play in helping
individual people to reach their goals.
I felt, too, that the selection of articles showed a bias. There were
lengthy articles on state terror in El Salvador and Guatemala, where U.S.
Government intervention is apparent and undeniable. A more balanced
survey, however, would have included entirely homegrown human rights
repression in such countries as Uganda and the Central African Republic.
I was disappointed that so little was said of Haiti, a country where human
rights have been so ignored, and where economic development is so com-
pellingly necessary.
Some of the political analysis reflects blithely wishful thinking. I
think in particular of Shawky Zeidan's article on the West Bank and
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Gaza and of the starry-eyed solution he proposes to enable both human
rights and economic development to prosper among Palestinians. Some
authors are more realistic, however, and recognize, if grudgingly, that
much of the problem lies in native political cultures that spontaneously
repress human rights as part of a centuries-old way of life and will con-
tinue to do so, regardless of economic development and regardless of the
sins, real and imagined, of the U.S., of South Africa, and of Israel.
One subject was noticeably absent, though it ties in to economic de-
velopment in the Third World. That subject is terrorism. One instantly
thinks of the number of European and North American industrialists kid-
napped by terrorists in Uruguay and Argentina. Is it necessary for gov-
ernments, in their justifiable efforts to stamp out extremist terrorist
groups, to jeopardize human rights in so doing?
Although I did not leave the book with an exhilarating optimism for
parallel growth of human rights and economic development in most Third
World countries, the book was nevertheless a "good read" with splendid
case studies. Ved Nanda's final chapter on the role of international law in
this arena did lead me to try to imagine how international institutions
might effectively help enforce respect for human rights in those Third
World countries presently sacrificing human rights on the altar of eco-
nomic development. My thoughts turned to the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg, which enforces the European Convention of
Human Rights with some efficacy among member-states of the Council of
Europe. Unfortunately, however, the Strasbourg Court acts not among
Third World countries but rather among increasingly unified and politi-
cally developed Western Europe, and even so is not always extremely ef-
fective. Realistically, how much hope can there be that the O.A.S. or the
O.A.U. or that any U.N. body might provide meaningful assistance in im-
plementing the international law of human rights in those Third World
countries hell-bent on economic development at any price?
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